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ABSTRACT
As occasions wheIt large, complex, well-entrenched technological systems have gone
catastrophically "out of control," disasters such as the Bhopal gas leak and the Three Mile
Island and Chernobyl meltdowns have been moments of both technological and political
instability in industrialized societies. Through the enormous media attention they generate,
control breakdowns like these have taught lay citizens how complex technologies work and
how technological and political control are distributed at the local and national levels.
Citizens have used this information to press for safety improvements and for more
participatory ways of choosing, building, and managing large technological systems.
The study culls newspaper records, accident reports, social science data, and other sources to
reconstruct the origins and outcomes of five serious technological disasters of recent decades:
the 1965 power failure in the Northeastern United States, the 1977 blackout in New York City,
the 1979 meltdown at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in Pennsylvania, the 1984 methyl
isocyanate leak at a Union Carbide chemical plant in Bhopal, India, and the 1986 explosion
and meltdown at the Chernobyl atomic energy station in Ukraine. Each of these disasters led
to the public disclosure of previously unavailable information about the technical,
organizational, and political nature of the systems in question. Analysis focuses on the ways in
which this information shaped citizens' movements for technological change and for greater
citizen participation in decision-making about hazardous technologies.
The study concludes that control breakdowns in large technological systems have educated and
radicalized many lay citizens, enabling them to challenge both existing tec.hnmological p ans
and the expertise and authority of the people who carry them out. The author detects in this
development a new cultural undercurrent of "technological citizenship" characterized by
greater knowledge of, and skepticism toward, the complex systems that permeate modern
societies.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Charles Weiner
Title: Professor of History of Science and Technology
Program in Science, Technology, and Society
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
3
4
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
My first thanks rmnust go to the members of my dissertation committee,
who agreed to serve before anyone knew what the task would entail. Their
thoughtful commentary and collective sense of rigor and style have shaped
and improved this study at every stage. Professor Charles Weiner, the
committee chairman, has been a creative, attentive, generous, and
demanding primary advisor throughout my five years in the Program. With
his indulgence and support, I was able to pursue a curriculum and a thesis
topic that were eclectic even by te Program's standards. Professor Kenneth
Keniston invited me to join the Program in 1989 and has been a reliable and
dedicated counselor ever since. His and Professor John Ehrenfeld's graduate
course on "Technological Society" brought me into contact with the literature
on technological disasters, and his incisive and unsparing editing has vastly
improved the writing herein. I first met Professor Rosalind Wiliams when
she acted as an official reader of my undergraduate thesis in history and
science at Harvard. I liked her so well that I drafted her again, and she has
been an invaluable source of ideas, inspiration, encouragement, literary leads,
and lively conversation and correspondence. Victor McElheny, finally, has
become an unofficial mentor, sharing with me in dozens of encounters over
the past five years his voluminous knowledge of history, science, politics, and
journalism. He put his extensive personal archive of press clippings at my
disposal, and his hard-headed empiricism has more than once kept my
rhetoric from floating into the realm of pamphleteering.
I am also grateful to Professors Deborah Fitzgerald and Hugh Gusterson
of the STS Program, Professor John Staudenmaier of the University of
5
Detroit, and David Tebaldi of the Massachusetts Foundation for the
Humanities for reading and commenting on portions of the manuscript.
Other STS faculty who have offered advice, encouragement, and assistance
include Professors Merritt Roe Smith, Leo Marx, and Christian Appy. Judith
Stein shepherded me through the administrative part of the dissertation
process -- a first for both of us -- with care and diligence. Also at MIT, I have
received valuable help from David Ansley, Linda Lowe, Alison Miller, Mike
Rafferty, Judy Spitzer, Paul Vermouth, Helen Samuels, and Judy Radovsky.
I am grateful to Professor Kim Laughlin of Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute and to Professor Jane Dawson of Wellesley College for sharing with
me parts of their own dissertation work on the Bhopal and Chernobyl
incidents, respectively. Professor Thomas P. Hughes, while teaching a course
at MIT in 1991-92 on large technological systems, became a valued friend and
commentator. Professor Ken Alder of Northwestern University, though he
has not seen this dissertation, did more than anyone else to steer me toward
my present situation. His Harvard tutorial on "technological determinism"
first opened my eyes to the intellectual, philosophical, and scholarly world in
which I have been journeying ever since. While engrossed in his own
writing he served as my unofficial undergraduate thesis advisor, and it was
he who informed me in 1988 about the new doctoral degree offered by the
Program in Science, Technology, and Society.
My fellow graduate students have been a source of immense
encouragement, solidarity, and edification. Thanks go first to Jessica Wang,
George O'Har, Brian O'Donnell, and Dave Guston; we helped each other
endure our dissertations in fairly good cheer. I also thank Pat Bentley,
Roberta Bivins, Roberta Brawer, Greg Clancey, Karin Ellison, Greg Galer,
Yaakov Garb, Slava Gerovitch, Diane Ceco, Dave Hart, Rebecca Herzig,
6
Charlie Holtzman, Eric Kupferberg, Barbara Masi, Minakshi Menon, Dave
Mindell, Jen Mnookin, Priya Natarajan, Russ Olwell, and Heinrich Schwarz
for their friendship and academic camaraderie.
I owe thanks to David Brittan and Herb Brody at Technology Review for
their fine editing work on the magazine article from which the whole
dissertation bloomed. Editor-in-chief Steve Marcus, Managing Editor Sandra
Hackman and editors Laura Van Dam and Phil LoPiccolo have also excelled
as friends, editors, and colleagues.
I am fortunate to have a circle of close friends who have provided crucial
emotional support and fun times. This circle includes Graham Ramsay,
Sherrie Saint John, Jessica Wang and Brian Sliker, Tova Perlmutter,
Chauncey Wood, Kevin Healy, Jim Torrens, Tony Laden and Caroline
Guindon, Larry Saul and Jacqueline Bell, Celia Wren, Sara Barcan and Marc
Draisen, Millicent Lawton, Amy Bruckman, Anna Berkenblit, Paul Baum,
Marc Sabatine, Josh Hauser, Eric Johannsen, Stella Kim, Kathy and Ben Chen,
Sandy and Sidney Chen, Charles Wood and Mardges Bacon, Tammy Smith,
Randy and Linda Smith, Scott and Cathy Dexter, Brian and Anita Sutherland,
Michelle and Allen Borton, Craig Honshell, Ken Jansen, Dana and Carla
Tousley, and Don Zimmer.
Unconditional support from my loved ones will always be my most
valuable asset. My thanks and love go to Herb, Chris, and Laura Brail; to my
grandparents, Don and Jo Roush and Bill and Doris Bates; to my brother
Jamie; and especially to my parents, Paul and Roni Roush. This work is
dedicated, finally, to my cherished friend and companion Kevin Park.
7
8
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract ........................................................................................................ 3
A cknow ledgm ents ....................................................................................5
Introduction The Meaning of Technological Catastrophes ........ 11
A Look Forward, 26.
Control Room Blues
Large Technological Systems and the
Embrittled Metaphor of Cybernetic Control ......... 29
Why Large-Scale System Disasters? 36; Large Systems,
Complexity, and the Limits of Cybemrnetic Control, 46; The
Politics of Large Technological Systems, 59; Catastrophes: A
Chink in the Armor, 71; Risk, Social Movements, and
NIMBYism, 79.
The Precious Dark
The New York City Blackouts of
1965 and 1977 .............................................................. 91
The Great Northeast Power Failure, 100; Relay Race, 107; The
Blackout Experience, 108; Escaping the "Prison Farm of Modem
Technology," 113; And Then There Was Light, 118;
Dependence and Interconnection, 121; The 1977 Blackout, 130;
Blackout Looting, 135; Tumrning to Decentralized Energy, 141;
The Machine Stops, 146.
The Billion-Dollar Mausoleum
Three Mile Island and the Slow Demise
of Commercial Nuclear Power............................. 151
The Cold War's LWR Legacy, 159; "The Thing Was Simply
Uncorked," 171; "All Hell Broke Loose," 182; Shifting Ground,
191; "Moment of Truth," 201; Walking Away from Nuclear
Power, Slowly, 208.
continued on next page
9
Chapter 1
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Chapter 4 Runaway Reaction
Knowledge, Control, and
Danger After Bhopal ............................................... 221
Organic Chemistry Comes to Bhopal, 228; Poisoned Air, 238;
Knowledge, Control, and Danger, 251; Indian Citizens Respond,
256; "It Can Happen Here," 267; Winning and Using the Right
to Know, 277; The World After Bhopal, 290.
Chapter 5 A Crimson Incandescence
Chernobyl and the Fall of
the Soviet Union ..................................................... 297
Technological Gigantism, 312; Irregular Experiment, Normal
Accident, 319; An Assault on Health and Nature, 329; Soviet
Nuclear Power After Chernobyl, 337; The Fission of the Soviet
State, 349; "The Beginning of Wisdom," 360.
Chapter 6 Technological Citizenship..................................... 365
Challenges to Technological Design, 376; Challenges to
Technical 'authority, 380; Expanding Definitions of
Citizenship, 384; Technological Citizenship, 393.
Bibliography........................................................................................ 401
10
Introduction
THE MEANING
OF TECHNOLOGICAL
DISASTERS
11
12
The traffic moves around with care,
But we remain, touching a wound
That opens to our richest horror.
Already old, he question Who shall die?
Becomes unspoken Who is innocent?
For death in war is done by hands;
Suicide has cause and stillbirth, logic;
And cancer, simple as a flower, blooms.
But this invites the occult mind,
Cancels our physics with a sneer,
And spatters all we knew of denouement
Across the expedient and wicked stones.
-from Karl Shapiro
"Auto Wreck"'
Everyone is intrigued by disasters. News consumers sometimes
complain that earthquakes, floods, fires, bombings, plane crashes, factory
explosions, oil spills and the like crowd out more humane and uplifting
stories, but the truth is that when something terrible happens, people want to
know about it. This is why, from the journalist's point of view, disasters
have always been ideal news events. Sudden, unexpected, deadly, they
disrupt the routines of workaday life and remind us that no matter how
much control we think we exercise over nature and over our technology, it
can all crumble in minutes.
Disasters that get enough attention earn their own shorthand tags in the
history books, like the Massachusetts Blizzard of 1978, the Loma Prieta
earthquake of 1989, and the Black Monday stock market crash of 1987. My
argument begins with the fact that a striking number of the named disasters
of recent years, the ones everybody knows about, have been technological
IKarl Shapiro, Selected Poems (New York: Random House, 1968).
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rather than natural in origin. Think about it for a moment: Twenty years
hence, are not Love Canal, Three Mile Island, Bhopal, Chernobyl, the
Challenger explosion, and the Exxon Valdez likely to be remembered just as
vividly as, say, Hurricane Andrew in 1992 or the Mississippi River Valley
flooding of 1993? Whatever is going on -- whether the engineering
profession has simply had a run of extremely bad luck, or whether, as I will
argue, more systemic problems are at work -- the news pages of the past two
decades have provided nourishment for the idea that "technological
disasters" are a distinct kind of crisis, different from natural disasters and
other categories of carnage, with their own historical causes and implications.
Kai Erikson, the sociologist, has called technological disasters "a new
species of trouble," but they are not new.2 Gruesome train wrecks and
steamship explosions killed hundreds during the nineteenth century, and
industrialism's march in the twentieth has been regularly punctuated by
mining accidents, dam breaks, mass poisonings, and the like. The sinking of
the Titanic in 1912, the explosion of the Hindenburg in 1937, and the collapse
of the Tacoma Narrows bridge in 1940 all linger in the public memory as
spectacular examples of technological failure. What is different about the
disasters of recent years is that they have received such intense and extended
media coverage, each intensifying the publicity surrounding the next, that
many observers have begun to search for some kind of unified explanation.
Why are our machines doing this to us, and what can be done about it?
One good explanation has already been offered. In Normal Accidents:
Living with High-Risk Technologies, sociologist Charles Perrow laid out a
way of seeing serious accidents as the nearly inevitable outcomes of complex
2 See Erikson, Kai T., "Toxic Reckoning: Business Faces a New Kind of Fear," Harvard Business
Review (Jan.-Feb., 1990) 118-126.
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technological undertakings. Though Perrow published his book in 1984,
before the gas disaster in Bhopal, the Chernobyl meltdown, and the
Challenger explosion, it explains those newer catastrophes as accurately as it
did Three Mile Island and Perrow's other case studies. Normal Accidents is
essential reading today for industrial managers, organizational sociologists,
historians of technology, and interested lay people alike, because it shows that
a major strategy engineers have used in this century to keep hazardous
technologies under control -- multiple layers of "fail-safe" backup devices --
often adds a dangerous level of unpredictability to the system as a whole. In
fact, the only thing we can confidently predict about large, complex
technologies like nuclear power, chemical manufacturing, and manned space
flight is that they will occasionally be struck by massive "system accidents" in
which design oversights, mechanical malfunctions, and human errors
interact to defeat the built-in safeguards. "We have produced designs so
complicated that we cannot anticipate all the possible interactions of the
inevitable failures; we add safety devices that are deceived or avoided by
hidden paths in the systems," writes Perrow. "We might begin to learn [from
these ineffective technical 'fixes'] that of all the glorious possibilities out there
to reach for, some are going to be beyond our grasp in catastrophic ways."3
The particulars of Perrow's theory accord so well with common sense
that nothing has come along to replace them in the worlds of professional
risk assessment and industrial sociology, and neither will I attempt to do so
here. The rest of my argument hinges, instead, on the difference between
explanation and meaning. Perrow has set down in plain English a way of
understanding the causes of technological disasters: their logical
3Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (New York: Basic
Books, 1984) 11.
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development from prior decisions about designs, processes, materials, and
operating practices. While these causes are interesting and important in
themselves (and I will spend a good bit of time in the following pages tracing
the origins of several spectacular disasters), they do not necessarily reveal the
larger historical and political significance of technologicai catastrophes. The
severe disasters of recent years, I will argue, share hidden qualities beyond the
fact that they can all be attributed to unforeseen interactions between
supposedly fail-safe system components. Indirectly, these events are telling
us something about the very way technology fits into modem life. This study
will be a search for the cultural and political meanings of technological
catastrophes: for what they convey about the customs, assumptions, and
governing styles of modern industrial societies, and how all of these may be
changing as a result of the catastrophes themselves.
An old idea about the meaning of technological disasters, though not a
very thoroughly analyzed one, is that technology has somehow grown
beyond our control. Disasters are seen as an almost willful expression of
mechanical defiance, perhaps even punishment for humanity's hubris. In
his biography of the late physicist Richard Feynman, who served on the
presidential commission investigating the Challenger accident, science writer
James Gleick put this idea as follows:
Machinery out of control...After the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island,
Pennsylvania, and the chemical disaster at Bhopal, India, the space-shuttle
explosion seemed a final confirmation that technology had broken free of human
reins. Did nothing work any more? The dream of technology that held sway over
the America of Feynman's childhood had given way to a sense of technology as not
just a villain but an inept villain. Nuclear power plants, once offering the innocent
promise of inexhaustible power, had become menacing symbols on the landscape.
Automobiles, computers, simple household appliances, or giant industrial machines
-- all seemed unpredictable, dangerous, untrustworthy. The society of engineers, so
hopeful in the America of Feynman's childhood, had given way to a technocracy,
bloated and overconfident, collapsing under the weight of its own byzantine
devices. That was one message read in the image replayed hundreds of times that
day on millions of television screens -- the fragmenting smoke cloud, the twin
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rockets veering apart like Roman candles.4
Little is overdramatized in this portrait of American attitudes toward
technology circa 1986. I recall my own shock, grief, and suspicion on the day
of the Challenger explosion; I was nineteen at the time, not old enough to
remember Vietnam or Watergate but steeped in the legend of the Apollo
missions, and my consequent sense of disillusionment with American
achievements like the space program eventually led me to this very study.
Yet there is something incomplete about this way of understanding
technological disasters. Most naively, it assigns a mystical degree of
autonomy to machines. Technological artifacts cannot themselves be
villains, even inept ones, except in science fiction. While it is tempting to
believe that machines break down whenever they feel like it, or worse, that
they act with malice aforethought, this is ultimately just a way of ignoring the
human agency at work behind disastrous failures.
The concern hinted at, but left unexplored, by the lament of machinery-
out-of-control is that the organizations that run large technological systems
are what have truly threatened to grow beyond any form of democratic
governance. There is much evidence that the most important cultural
meanings of technological disasters lay in what they reveal about the way
technological control is distributed through society, and in how they help
change that distribution.
I have just introduced two slippery words, "democratic" and "control,"
and before continuing I must explain in a preliminary way how I believe each
relates to technology. While this study's immediate focus is on a set of recent
technological disasters and their causes and political implications, I approach
4 jamnes Gleick, Genius: The Life and Science of Richard Feynman (New York: Pantheon Books,
1992) 416.
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these episodes as useful prisms on a broader question: What forms can
citizenship take in societies that have been transformed by the presence of
powerful, complex, interconnected technological systems? Among the most
eloquent of the many writers who have grappled with this issue are Langdon
Winner and Richard Sclove, both political scientists. The two have urged
their fellow thinkers in the field of science and technology studies to eschew
elaborate policy prescriptions and pay more attention to the "nuts and bolts"
of democratic politics in advanced industrial societies:
Winner: Because technological things so often become central features in widely
shared arrangements and conditions of life in contemporary society, there is an
urgent need to think about them in a political light. Rather than continue the
technocratic pattern in which philosophers advise a narrowly defined set of
decision-makers about ethical subtleties, today's thinkers would do better to re-
examine the role of the public in matters of this kind. How can and should
democratic citizenry participate in decision making about technology?5
Sclove: An engaged citizenry must become critically involved with the choice,
governance, and even design of technological artifacts and practices, and committed
specifically to adopting only those technologies that are themselves compatible in
their design with reproducing through time the society's democratic nature. Or else
there can be no democracy...A special responsibility of scholars and academics...is
to select socially useful research topics... [including] evaluating local, translocal,
and international efforts to democratize technological design and politics.6
An objective look at several prominent technological disasters of the recent
past can, I believe, help to identify models of citizenship better attuned to the
political challenges created by today's technological environment.
"Democratic" technologies, in this context, would be those that promote,
or at least do not suppress, people's ability to govern themselves in the sense
intended by the authors of the U.S. Constitution. As Sclove explains,
"Technologies help to re-structure social relations. But notice that [they] tend
5 Langdon Winner, "Citizen Virtues in a Technological Order," Inquiry (35) 343.
6 Richard Sclove, "The Nuts and Bolts of Democracy: Democratic Theory and Technological
Design," a paper delivered at the 1987 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, pp. 1, 20-21. Copy provided courtesy of the author.
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to do this independently of their nominally intended purposes."7 Henry
Ford, for example, could not have foreseen that the character of urban,
suburban, and rural regions in the United States and elsewhere would be
transformed by mass ownership of automobiles, but nonetheless this was one
major result of his pioneering work in assembly-line auto manufacturing.
Deciding whether a technology is democratic or undemocratic, therefore,
means uncovering all of the ways in which it may enable or impair people's
basic rights to decide how and where they want to live, free from undue
government interference and threats to their health and safety. A democratic
technological order is one in which all citizens can participate equally in such
decisions.
"Control," as I want to use it here, is a slightly more complex idea. The
word has its origins in the medieval Latin verb contrarotulare, "to compare
against the rolls" or history books, and in the French contrerolles, from the
early capitalist practice of double-entry bookkeeping on "counter-rolls."8
From there the word spread into politics, science, and literature, where by
Shakespeare's time it had come to mean "To exercise restraint or direction
upon free action; to hold sway over, exercise power or authority over; to
dominate, command" 9 : in essence, it is the opposite of self-government and
democracy as these concepts would come to be understood by the late
eighteenth century.
During the nineteeth and twentieth centuries, as humans and machines
started working together on many kinds of tasks, "control" acquired
7 Richard Sclove, "Technological Politics As If Democracy Really Mattered," in Michael
Shuman and Julia Sweig, eds., Technologyfor the Common Good (Washington: Institute for
Policy Studies, 1993) 58.
8James R. Beniger, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the
Information Society (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986) 8.
9 Oxford English Dictionary, Compact Edition, Vol. 1, 542.
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important new technological meanings. The following passage, written by
three industrial engineers, tells this story and shows how the term is now
used:
A human-machine system requires the definition of roles both for the human and
the machine. In classical human-machine control, the human operator manipulated
the controls of the actuators and machines directly, and could see either the results
of those manipulations on the state of the process or product, or at least a very
direct representation of them by means of machine sensors and displays. With the
coming of automation, and particularly with the rise of computer control, the
situation has changed. Because so much of the control loop can now be given to the
machines, and also because of the increasingly hazardous operations involved in
high technology, the human is becoming ever less tightly coupled to the process he
or she controls... [For examplel in industrial operations such as nuclear power plants
there are parts of the plant which humans cannot enter on pain of death due to the
radiation. Hence the human now exercises control of not the process itself, but
through a machine of some kind which controls the process and purveys information
to the human. 10
Control, in this sense, supplements and extends human abilities, allowing
motion and energy to be harnessed in ever-greater quantities. But as Sclove
points out, advances in technology bring with them changes in the
distribution of decision-making power implicit in all technological systems,
and these changes may not necessarily proceed toward any democratically
defined social good. Historians of the U.S. space program, for example, have
documented how NASA's decision to spend tens of billions of dollars
developing the space shuttle was driven not by valid scientific or economic
rationale but by military pressures and the need for a post-Apollo mission
that would allow the agency to maintain its large, expensive research-and-
development bureaucracy. 11
When technological systems begin to readjust their political and
economic environments according to their own internal requirements -- and
10Neville Moray, William R. Ferrell, and William B. Rouse, Robotics, Control and Society:
Essays in Honor of Thomas B. Sheridan (London: Taylor & Francis, 1990) 101.
1 See, for example, Joseph J. Trento, Prescription for Disaster From the Glory of Apollo to tile
Betrayal of the Shuttle (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1987).
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particularly when the technical processes employed are so hazardous that
extraordinary social and technical measures must be taken to guard against
the potentially catastrophic consequences of a breakdown -- then the political
and technological meanings of "control" begin to blend and reinforce one
another. The power to design, build, and operate technological systems
encroaches on the free action of individual citizens, becoming a form of
governing authority. It is not unusual nowadays to hear citizens
complaining that they "have no control" over what goes on at the nuclear
power plant or the hazardous waste incinerator down the road. They are
expressing a dual frustration: that the technology is run by people,
organizations, and machines they do not knowv or trust and that they were
not included in decisions about whether, where, and how the installation was
to be built in the first place.
Now I may return to my previous point, which is central to this study.
Technological disasters, by definition, involve the breakdown of control over
highly energetic processes. (If control were never lost, nothing unexpected or
accidental would ever happen, and if large amounts of energy were not
involved, the consequences of an accident would not be disastrous; at stake is
the difference between a fender-bender and a DC-10 slamming into the
ground at high speed.) The most basic lesson of a disaster, then, is that
control is not immutable. It can be gained or let slip, hoarded or shared.
Because technological disasters are news, they call attention to those who
have control and how they lose it. At the same time, disasters show that the
citizens who suffer most from sudden releases of energy are often those who
have the least initial control; and citizens, whether they live under
democratic or authoritarian regimes, can get very angry about the
vulnerability that goes along with this kind of powerlessness.
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But in a disaster, fortuitously, there is a kind of democracy of
powerlessness, since the people in charge of the technology, having proved
unable to prevent the catastrophe, lose much of their claim to expertise and
authority. They may also forfeit the public confidence and trust which
customarily shelter them from scrutiny by outsiders. A technological
catastrophe, therefore, can create the conditions for a process of negotiation
over how control is to be shared in the future. As they try to reestablish
technical control, the owners and managers of the system that failed are likely
to be forced to cede some political control to those outside the initial technical
control process, and they -nay even find that their technology is no longer
wanted by the general public. When control over technology is shown to be
synonymous with control over people's health, safety, and freedom, then
technological catastrophe -- the ultimate control breakdown -- can be a
democratizing wedge.
Demonstrating disaster's democracy-enhancing power in practice will be
this study's main goal. Though I draw on a mix of methods and styles, my
intellectual home is in history and journalism, and so what I mainly have to
offer by way of evidence are narratives. These are documented accounts of
some of the most important large technological systems of our day (electrical
power distribution, nuclear energy, and chemical manufacturing) and the
corporations, agencies, workers, and citizens who build, regulate, run, and
live among them. In each case, of course, the crux of the story is a devastating
technological failure that leads the press, citizens, and their representatives in
government to question the nature of the technology itself, including its
inherent hazards and its political character.
After the Bhopal gas disaster killed some 3,000 people in India, the
editors of The New Yorker wrote that "what truly grips us [in accounts of
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technological catastrophe] is not so much the numbers as the spectacle of
suddenly vanishing competence, of men utterly routed by technology, of fail-
safe systems failing with a logic as inexorable as it was once -- indeed, right up
until the very moment -- unforeseeable. And the spectacle haunts us because
it seems to carry allegorical import, like the whispery omen of a hovering
future."12 If non-fictional events like the ones I will retell here can indeed be
allegorical, then one of the truths they express is that no technology is so safe
and essential, and no technological organization so dependable and pure of
intent, that democratic checks and controls may reliably be dispensed with.
Citizens, as they come to this realization, are devising new and more effective
ways to become involved in ethical and political decisions affecting their
technological environments.
Acmittedly, this way of talking about disasters may fasten on the
exceptional. For one, the customary cultural response to technological failure
has little to do with direct public participation. It is, instead, to demand that
engineers isolate and correct the cause of the failure so that life may continue
free of this hazard in the future. This response may be called "meliorist," a
word coined by the nineteenth-century novelist George Eliot to describe her
belief that the world may be made better through human effort (Latin melior
-= "better"), and it is one of the basic doctrines underlying the tremendous
scientific and technological successes of the last three centuries. If architects
and engineers were not able to learn from their mistakes and to try again,
then the great cathedrals of Europe, the Golden Gate Bridge, and the Boeing
747 would not exist today. As the engineer Samuel Florman once wrote,
"The colossal works of man are no more inherently vulgar than the small
12
"Notes and Comment," The New Yorker (Feb. 18, 1985) 23-30.
23
works are inherently petty."13
But making a technology bigger and more reliable does not necessarily
make it more socially acceptable. What I want to chronicle here are a few of
the occasions in history when at least some citizens have concluded that an
automatic meliorist response to disaster would conflict with other deeply-
held values, including safety, freedom, and democratic rule. Neighbors of the
Three Mile Island nuclear plant in Pennsylvania, for example, were unhappy
to learn after the meltdown inside the Unit 2 reactor there that the plant's
owners intended to continue operating the (undamaged) Unit 1 reactor. They
were angry enough to spend six years battling the utility and the federal
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to prevent the restart. Though they were
ultimately not successful, the battle alerted millions of citizens to the fact that
large technological systems like nuclear energy can take on an internal
momentum and direction that grow increasingly disconnected from
democratically-formulated social goals (see Chapter 3).
From their earliest years, children are taught to appreciate disasters.
Lullabies, fairy tales, and nursery rhymes contain some of our culture's most
garish depictions of death, destruction, and chaos. Play, too, often revolves
around control and its antithesis: toddlers build towers of blocks for the sheer
pleasure of knocking them down at the end, and older children construct
houses of cards in anticipation of that excruciating, thrilling moment when
the whole structure flutters back to flatness. Is it any wonder, then, that
motorists passing the scene of an automobile accident do not look away but
gaze attentively at the twisted, smoking wreck, or that thousands of witnesses
gather whenever an old building is being demolished, or that the same
3Samuel C. Florman, "Small is Dubious," Haer's Magazine (Aug., 1977) 10-12.
13Samuel C. Flonrman, "Small is Dubious," Harper's Magazine (ug., 1977) 10-12.
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gruesome images appear over and over on our television screens after a
catastrophe like the Challenger explosion? An ingrained appetite for
spectacle is part of what draws people to disaster.14
This fascination with catastrophe can lead citizens to a more engaged,
inquisitive stance toward the important technological failures of our day.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines disaster as "anything that befalls of
ruinous or distressing nature; a sudden or great misfortune, mishap, or
misadventure: a calamity," but to settle for this definition would be
unimaginative. I do not mean to suggest that technological failures should be
enjoyed, but perhaps they should, in a sense, be inhabited. Curious minds
may profit from the study of breakdowns precisely because they are out of the
ordinary. As- Thomas Drabek, a sociologist and disaster researcher, has
pointed out, "Disaster events represent unique laboratories; they are in this
sense ethically acceptable natural experiments."15 This does not mean that it
is ethical to set up technological disasters: only that it is ethically required to
extract all possible knowledge about their causes and implications when they
do happen. The facts brought to light can be used not only to prevent
recurrences, but to map out the ways in which society depends on the
technology in question, the extent to which those needs are legitimate, and
how they might be met more safely and fairly in the future.
While this is most importantly a schola-iy study, I have tried to include
elements that will interest many groups of readers. For nonspecialists who
may be curious about the disasters themselves, I hope to render an accurate
picture of their historical antecedents, technical development, and political
14 0n the latter theme, Don DeLillo's 1985 novel White Noise is instructive.
15 Thomas E. Drabek, Human System Responses to Disaster: An Inventory of Sociological
Findings (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1986) 420.
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outcomes. For disaster buffs or social scientists studying catastrophes, on the
other hand, I hope to bring together familiar details in new and useful ways.
For business people or industrial managers who may already be versed in
theories like Perrow's, I hope to offer a broader, more contextualized view of
technological disasters, one that may help them see the changes their own
firms are facing as part of a larger trend toward citizen assertiveness. For
community activists and others who are concerned about technological
threats to their own health and safety, I hope to point out a few encouraging
examples of democratic reform flowing from disasters, and also to offer a
review of the barriers to change. For my fellow students in the fledgling field
of "science and technology studies," finally, I hope to provide a worthwhile
example of scholarship that is beholden to no particular academic discipline
but that draws on useful ingredients of many.
A Look Forward
Chapter 1 considers in more detail several of the concepts just proposed,
asking: What is a technological disaster? What are some of the political
outcomes of the spread of large technological systems in modern industrial
societies? And why are sudden, severe breakdowns within these systems
worth examining separately from other kinds of disasters? We will see why
large-system disasters are unlikely to abate in the future and why, ironically,
they may be the best way for people to learn about the architecture of the
technologies on which they depend. "If there is such a thing as technological
citizenship, then disasters serve alongside consumer experience as schools of
this type of responsible participation," writes Victor McElheny.16
1 6 Personal communication, Feb. 23, 1994.
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Chapter 2 is the first substantive case study. It tells the story of the two
massive electrical blackouts endured by the residents of New York City in
1965 and 1977, the first merely surprising, the second genuinely disastrous.
The blackouts showed one of the most ubiquitous technologies of modem
life, the electrical grid, to be frighteningly vulnerable to breakdown. While
the failures spurred electrical utilities to take steps to enhance reliability, they
also forced New Yorkers and others to recognize their extraordinary
dependence on this centralized, monopolistic technological system. One
result is today's growing emphasis on smaller, more distributed energy
technologies.
Chapter 3 reviews the nuclear meltdown at Three Mile Island in 1979, an
event that killed no one (as yet) but that has become, along with the
Challenger explosion, the archetypal American technological disaster. We
will see how the confusion and contradictory information surrounding the
meltdown helped destroy the U.S. nuclear industry's credibility in the public
mind, and how the accident led to a vigorous political movement for the TMI
plant's abandonment. This local movement failed, but the dreary national
future of nuclear power testifies to the power of a disaster to help seal the fate
of an expensive and hazardous technology.
Chapter 4 details what was probably the most gruesome industrial
catastrophe in history, the 1984 methyl isocyanate leak at the Union Carbide
pesticide factory in Bhopal, India. Central to that accident was a shocking lack
of awareness of the plant's hazards among almost all of those concerned --
including Union Carbide executives, workers at the plant, and especially the
thousands of gas victims. The disaster underscored the links between
knowledge, control, and danger, and greatly boosted the movement -- in the
United States -- for "right-to-know" laws guaranteeing public involvement in
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the management of chemical hazards.
Chapter 5, on the 1986 explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power station
in Ukraine, examines how the catastrophic failure of a state-operated
technology helped undermine that state's legitimacy. We will see how the
Chernobyl accident, coming on the cusp of revolutionary (or
counterrevolutionary) changes in Soviet political life, contributed in crucial
ways to the downfall of the Communist Party and helped set the former
republics on a tentative path toward popular rule.
Chapter 6, finally, interprets the citizens' movements that follow
technological disasters as makeshift yet vital substitutes for democracy in
societies where, thanks partly to modem technology itself, traditional forms
of representative democracy have failed. Disasters foster public skepticism
toward large technological systems ad those who claim to "control" them.
This skepticism, I conclude, is a necessary ingredient in any truly participatory
technological order.
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Chapter 1
CONTROL ROOM BLUES
Large Technological Systems and the
Embrittled Metaphor of Cybernetic Control
29
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The flow of new and useful information about how technological
systems fail is in no danger of drying up. Breakdowns, disruptions, and full-
blown disasters involving complex technologies and the complex
organizations that manage them occur today with fateful regularity, as a few
examples from recent headlines show:
* July 3, 1988. The cruiser U.S.S. Vincennes, on patrol in the Persian Gulf
to help protect U.S. oil-shipping interests during a tense phase of the
Iran-Iraq war, launches two surface-to-air missiles against an Iranian
passenger jet, killing all 290 people aboard. Flaws in the ship's $600
million Aegis computerized defense system led crew members to
misidentify the plane as a hostile F-14 fighter.1
* January 16, 1990. A faulty switch at AT&T's New York City switching
center triggers a hidden error in the company's new signaling software,
shutting down primary and backup computers at other centers across the
country. Of the 138 million long-distance calls attempted that day, 70
million are turned away. AT&T customers suffer business losses
1An excellent rendition of the Vincennes incident is available in Leonard Lee, The Day the
Phones Stopped: How People Get Hurt When Computers Go Wrong (New York: Donald I.
Fine, Inc., 1992), 214-240. Another recent book rich in descriptions of interesting technological
failures is Steven Casey's Set Phasers on Stun, And Other True Tales of Design, Technology,
and Human Error (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Aegean Publishing Company, 1993).
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amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars.2
* September 17, 1991. A generator at another AT&T switching station in
Manhattan fails, and backup battery power is exhausted before operators
notice the problem. Phone service into and out of New York City is
halted. The failure paralyzes air traffic control systems, leading to flight
delays and cancellations up and down the East Coast. The Federal
Aviation Administration later awards a $558 million contract for new
inter-airport communications links to MCI.3
* March 25, 1992. Just before the close of trading on the New York Stock
exchange, a clerk at Salomon Brothers mistakenly instructs the
company's computers to sell 11 million shares, rather than $11 million
worth, of a certain stock. Propagated instantly to computers around the
world, the $500 million sale triggers a frenzy of other sell orders. The
Dow Jones' resulting free fall -- 15 points in five minutes -- is halted only
by the closing bell.4
* September 22, 1993. A barge adrift in an Alabama bayou collides with a
railroad trestle, severing its rails. Circuitry designed to detect a break in
the tracks fails to trigger stop signals. Minutes later, an Amtrak train
plunges off the bridge into 30 feet of water, killing 47 passengers.5
2Ibid., 73-108.
3 Edmund L. Andrews, "A.T.&T. Employees Missed Breakdown," The New York Times (Sep. 19,
1991) Al, D21; Edmund L. Andrews, "MCI Wins Contract for Air-Control Link," The New York
Times (March 18,1992) D4.
4 Casey, 109-116.
5Ronald Smothers, "Dozens Are Killed in Wreck of Train in Alabama Bayou: Amtrak's Worst
Accident," The New York Times (Sep. 23, 1993) Al, D21.
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Mishaps like these never fail to evoke surprise and consternation. One
major task of any technology-related organization, after all, is to catch small
errors while they are still small. Yet in each of these cases, an innocent and
seemingly detectable irregularity -- a misleading altitude reading, a broken
switch, a typographical error -- triggered unanticipated, automatic, and quite
disastrous behaviors in the larger system. Breakdowns in complex systems
are among the most provocative of technological catastrophes, because they
force citizens to question the rightness of modern society's strategies for
controlling critical or hazardous technologies.
Consider the following list of failures that contributed to a recent
technological disaster: The plant's control room was laid out with little
attention to ergonomic efficiency. Control room instruments failed to
measure important system variables. Sometimes the instruments registered
incorrect data. The controls themselves were designed in a way that did not
prevent operators from implementing catastrophic combinations of actions.
During operator training, emergency drills failed to simulate realistic failure
conditions. The plant's operators were unfamiliar with some of the basic
physical principles underlying the production system. Once the actual
malfunction began, the operators interpreted the situation incorrectly.
Believing they had no choice, they interfered with automatic emergency
systems in ways forbidden by plant guidelines. They overlooked several
available indications that total failure was imminent. Undetected mechanical
malfunctions added to the confusion. With supervisors looking on, finally,
the operators took steps that made catastrophic failure irreversible.
To which disaster does this description apply? In fact, these failures are
frighteningly generic. They occurred during the Three Mile Island accident
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and were repeated at Bhopal and Chernobyl. The operators, the instruments,
and the chronologies of these disasters are in a sense interchangeable, since
the same basic inadequacies in contemporary modes of technological control
were at work in each case. Each new disaster underscores the synergy of
human fallibility and imperfect engineering. It is not artistic license, then,
when the drama in disaster films like Dr. Strangelove, The China Syndrome,
or WarGames takes place inside a control center of some kind. Recent history
shows that control rooms are precisely where large technological systems go
out of control.
The idea that humans can transform the natural environment through
their mastery of machines dates back to the Enlightenment -- as does the
notion that the well-ordered society operates according to mechanical
principles. ("By art is created that great LEVIATHAN, called a COMMONWEALTH,
or STATE, which is but an artificial man," Thomas Hobbes wrote in 1651.6) In
this century the control room, with its gauges, buttons, flashing lights, and
computer screens monitored by attentive, clean-cut technicians, has become a
universal icon of the advanced industrial state. The aura of technological
prowess emanating from "mission control" during the days of NASA's
Apollo moon missions highlighted the defining ideology of technological
society: Control is Power. 7
But this power can slip away with remarkable ease. The disasters I
investigate in the following chapters occurred in large, fixed technological
systems where the use of highly energetic processes or highly toxic substances
(or both) required strict safety procedures and automated control
6Thomas Hobbes, Levathan, Michael Oakeshott, ed. (New York: Collier, 1962).
70n the U.S. space program's role as jingoistic "technological display," see Michael Smith,
"Selling the Moon," in Richard W. Fox and T.J. Jackson Lears, eds., The Culture of
Consumption (New York: Random House, 1986).
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mechanisms. In each case, human errors, mechanical malfunctions, and
unnoticed design flaws combined to defeat these safeguards and bring on
catastrophe, raising fundamental questions in the minds of both experts and
lay citizens about the reliability and desirability of the systems themselves.
I had no such criteria in mind when I chose to study these particular
episodes. I had intended only to single out the most memorable disasters of
recent decades, with an eye toward discovering whether and why each had
generated a political response among the citizenry. But it gradually became
clear that the New York City blackouts, the Bhopal gas leak, and the Three
Mile Island and Chernobyl meltdowns -- aside from being memorable, close
together in time, and richly documented -- also shared parallel histories that
seemed to define the limits of the quest for total control over large-scale
technological systems. Most importantly, there was no one in charge of these
systems when crisis hit -- or more precisely, the people, procedures, and
backup devices supposedly in place to prevent catastrophe proved
unexpectedly ineffective or inoperative. Control collapsed on both the
technical and organizational levels, inviting criticism from those who
depended on these systems and their safe operation. What had drawn me to
these case studies, I realized, was the suspicion that technological control is
itself a political phenomenon, in the sense that it involves decisions about
the way people live and the hazards they must bear, and that control
breakdowns are therefore moments of political instability and potential social
and technological change.8
A clearer understanding of the politics of control breakdowns in large-
8Smaller or less complex technologies can also fail catastrophically (as in an oil tanker
accident or a dam break, for example), but these kinds of disasters do not seem to me to raise
the same issues of control and its distribution, and so may have different meanings from a
cultural or political standpoint.
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scale systems can help identify the forces straining traditional modes of
citizenship, and may even point out opportunities for the expansion of
citizens' roles in future decisions about technology -- leading, perhaps, to a
more democratic technological order in the future. In this chapter, I will flesh
out some of the terms of my argument, with the goal of providing a
framework or "experimental method" for thinking about the upcoming case
studies. Large technological systems, complexity, cybernetic control, and the
political significance of control breakdowns will each be dealt with in turn. I
will begin, however, by drawing some necessary distinctions between control
breakdowns in complex, large-scale technological systems and other kinds of
catastrophes.
Why Large-Scale System Disasters?
The broadest, most inclusive definition of "disaster" might be an
unexpected, extraordinary event that commences suddenly and disrupts the
routines of human life in undesirable ways. Because disasters place people,
organizations, and societies under unusual stresses, they can often be sources
of psychological, sociological, and political insight. This is why disasters have
been a staple of social commentary for millennia, from Pliny the Younger's
account of the destruction of Pompeii in 79 A.D. to Voltaire's history of the
1755 earthquake in Lisbon, and why "disaster research" has recently acquired
scholarly respectability, winning both government funding and a place in the
academy. 9 But different kinds of disasters have very different stories to tell.
9The first disaster of any kind to receive systematic attention from sociologists was a
technological one: the accidental explosion of a munitions ship in Halifax Harbor, Nova
Scotia, that killed 2,000 people and leveled two square miles of the city on December 6, 1917
(S. Prince, Catastrophe and Social Change, New York: Columbia University Press, 1920).
Since then, however, the bulk of the scholarly work on disasters has focused on natural
catastrophes (see Drabek, Human System Responses to Disaster). This is unsurprising, since
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In the following pages I will focus on catastrophic control failures in large,
complex technological systems, and before arguing that these failures have
special political significance it will help to show how they fit into the general
bestiary of catastrophes.
Because the immediate effects of disasters are often similar -- death,
injury, disease, social and psychological trauma, and environmental
destruction -- they are probably best classified according to their origins and
mechanisms. The most commonly used distinction is that between disasters
originating in the natural environment and those arising from the activities
of humans. The boundary between "natural" and "technological" disasters
can, admittedly, be arbitrary and hard to discern; as Rosalind Williams, the
cultural historian, has pointed out, "Technological systems always include
people and nature, and natural ones include people and technology."10
Devastating flooding in the Mississippi River Valley in 1993, for example,
resulted both from both the "natural" fact of unusually heavy rainfall and
from the "technological" fact that the river, squeezed into an artificially
narrow channel by hundreds of miles of man-made levees and dams, rapidly
deaths and other social costs from fires, floods, earthquakes, storms and the like have
always far exceeded those from purely technological causes. Knowing how individuals and
groups respond in these crises can help emergency management agencies, international relief
organizations, and civil defense organizations plan for wars and other future disasters; as a
result, social and psychological responses to disaster are far better understood than political
reactions. Even with today's heightened awareness of technological threats to health and
envirornmental integrity most studies of human responses to hazards continue to concentrate on
people's "cognitive and/or behavioral adjustments" to these problems. (See, for example,
Valerie Preston, S. Martin Taylor, and David C. Hodge, "Adjustment to Natural and
Technological Hazard," Environment and Behavior (March, 1983) 143-64; Charles B.
Wilkinson, "Aftermath of a Disaster: The Collapse of the Hyatt Regency Hotel Skywalks,"
American Journal of Psychiatry (Sep., 1983) 1134-39; Julian Barling, Stephen D. Bluen, and
Rolene Fain, "Psychological Functioning Following an Acute Disaster," Journal of Applied
Psychology (72: 1987) 683-90; Robert J. Ursano and Carol S. Fullerton, "Cognitive and
Behavior Responses to Trauma," Journal of Applied Social Psychology (20: 1990) 1766-75.)
10 Personal communication, June 8,1994.
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overtopped and destroyed these very control structures.11 The damage caused
by natural disasters, moreover, is often magnified by, or even wholly
attributable to, technological factors; the 1994 Northridge earthquake in Los
Angeles was significant because it demonstrated the structural integrity (or
lack thereof) of the city's buildings and highways. But the distinction between
natural and technological disasters may be worth preserving nonetheless, if
only because historians and social scientists have discovered that the
questions of responsibility raised by disasters perceived as predominantly
technological in origin are much more problematic than those surrounding
disasters seen primarily as "acts of God."'2
The difference is partly captured by the story of the Buffalo Creek flood of
1972, caused by the collapse of a makeshift coal-slag dam built by the Pittston
Corporation across a West Virginia coal mining valley. It had been raining
steadily the night before the dam broke. Just before 8:00 a.m. on February 26,
the slag became saturated, turned to something like Jell-O, and collapsed on
itself, releasing 132 million gallons of thick black water into the valley below.
Within minutes 125 valley residents were swept to their deaths by the
thundering wall of water. Hundreds more escaped to the hills barely in time,
11New York Times reporter Keith Schneider wrote: "Two assessments by the Army Corps of
Engineers, one completed almost a decade ago and one done this week for the New York
Times, found that flood crests in Iowa, Illinois and Missouri would have been two to three feet
lower had the river not been confined by hundreds of miles of levees on both sides of the
Mississippi." Schneider, "Like Flood, New Policy Could Inundate Levees," The Newv York
Times (July 18, 1993) 23.
12 See, for example, Roger E. Kasperson and K. David Pijawka, "Societal Response to Hazards
and Major Hazard Events: Comparing Natural and Technological Hazards," Public
Administration Review (Special Issue, "A Challenge for Public Administration," 1985) 7-18.
Kasperson and Pijawka write: Technological hazards pose different, and often more
difficult, management problems than do natural hazards. Contributing factors to this greater
difficulty are...the broader opportunities for control intervention; the perceived amenability
of technological hazards to fixes; and the simultaneous need to enlarge benefits and reduce
risks in judging the tolerability of technological hazards and instituting control strategies"
(17).
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only to watch their family members, friends, houses and vehicles carried
away like toys. Afterward it was as if the old mining-camp towns along
Buffalo Creek had never existed. Every tree, every house, every telephone
pole and street sign had been scoured from the landscape.
Kai Erikson's visit to Buffalo Creek shortly after the disaster turned up
evidence of social and cultural damage almost worse than the flood's physical
effects. The sociologist traveled to the scene as a consultant to the
Washington law firm that represented some 650 of the survivors in a suit
against Pittston. The psychic scars borne by the survivors, he found, were far
worse than one might have observed in an area struck by a tornado,
hurricane, or some other natural event. The people of Buffalo Creek were
suffering not simply from the loss of their loved ones and all their material
belongings, but also from a deep blow to their trust in Pittston and the other
social institutions that they had supposed were there to take care of them.
Erikson's findings helped to define and legitimate this kind of victimization,
winning the plaintiffs an unprecedented $13.5 million settlement. 13
Events at Love Canal, New York, provided further evidence of
technological victimization. After experiencing years of mysterious illnesses
and unpleasant odors, residents of the Niagara Falls neighborhood learned
between 1976 and 1978 that their homes had been built on the edge of a long-
forgotten industrial waste dump containing high levels of toxic chemicals.
Press accounts led to national attention and state and federal investigations,
which confirmed a high incidence of miscarriages in the area. Prodded by
local activists, the federal government eventually bought up most of the land
in Love Canal and relocated its families. But relocation was by no means a
13See Kai T. Erikson, Everything In Its Path: The Destruction of Community in the Buffalo
Creek Flood (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1976).
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total solution to the crisis. The insidious nature of the toxic threat has caused
ongoing uncertainty and stress, in addition to painful social stigmatization,
for many former Love Canal homeowners. The disaster inspired one former
Love Canal resident and local leader, Lois Gibbs, to establish what is now one
of the nation's most active grassroots environmental organizations, the
Citizens' Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste.
Erikson comments: "The people who have gone through these
experiences are suffering forms of trauma that have not been talked about
enough. What makes something like Love Canal so hard to bear, aside from
the damage it does, is first of all that other human beings did it, as often as not
without expressing any sorrow for having done it. But in addition, toxicity
itself has the character that it contaminates the world in which you live in
such a way that the disaster never really ends. You have this feeling that toxic
materials have worked their way into the grain of the world and into the
tissues of your body, and even into your children's bodies."'14
The feelings of personal violation engendered by technological accidents
can linger for decades. As a consequence, technological disasters often lack
discrete endings analogous to rebuilding after a natural disaster. Even
fourteen years after the Buffalo Creek flood, psychiatrists found residents who
had participated in the suit against Pittston to be suffering from high rates of
anxiety, depression, belligerence, alcoholism, and family strife.15 "With a
natural disaster the start and finish are both very well-defined, and the result
is to restore a social normalcy," says William Freudenburg, a sociologist who
1 4 Telephone interview, Nov. 11, 1992
15Jack Zusman and Jesse Simon, "Differences in Repeated Psychiatric Examinations of Litigants
to a Lawsuit," American Journal of Psychiatry (Oct. 1983) 1300-04; Bonnie L. Green, et al.,
"Buffalo Creek Survivors in the Second Decade: Comparison with Unexposed and
Nonlitigant Groups," Journal of Applied Social Psychology (20: 1990) 1033-50.
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has studied differing perceptions of technological hazards among lay and
technical communities. But with many technological disasters, Freudenburg
says, "rather than the restoration of normalcy, you have the end of
normalcy." 16
Natural disasters have some of the same power as technological disasters
to reveal hidden pathologies in human affairs. Huge forest fires in the
western United States in 1988, for example, proved that the U.S. Forest
Service's longstanding policy of suppressing natural fires had merely
increased the load of combustible material, inviting an uncontrollable
conflagration. 17 The Mississippi flooding of 1993 showed that the Army
Corps of Engineers' long campaign to restrict the river to a narrow channel
had exactly the opposite effect, and as a result this policy may soon be
reversed.18
While natural disasters can demonstrate the futility of attempts to
control nature, however, technological disasters are better at revealing the
weaknesses and inequities of the systems structuring social life. Both natural
and technological disasters are sudden and powerful, but only technological
disasters are seen as preventable. When a piece of technology breaks down
catastrophically, people ask how and by whom the failure should have been
prevented and whether control and danger are being shared fairly or
democratically -- political questions, all. Since life in the industrialized world
depends on a growing network of sophisticated technologies, failures striking
16Telephone interview with the author, Nov. 3, 1992.
17Stephen J. Pyne warned of this problem in Fire in America: A Cultural History of Wildland
and Rural Fire (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982).
180n the Army Corps' long battle against the Mississsippi, see John McPhee, The Control of
Nature (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1989) 3-94. See also Schneider, "Like Flood,
New Policy Could Inundate Levees," and Isabel Wilkerson, "Running Wild: The Mississippi
Reclaims its True Domain," The New York Times (July 18,1993) IV: 1, 3.
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these technologies demand particular attention from observers interested in
the relationship between technology and citizenship.
Just as natural disasters can be classified according to whether they are
geological, celestial, climatological, or biological in origin, technological
disasters stem from a variety of identifiable causes (see Figure 1.1). As we
hone in on the type of disaster central to this study, it is important, first, to
distinguish between deliberate and accidental technological catastrophes.
War, genocide, crime, sabotage, terrorism and other examples of man's
inhumanity to man are often carried out through technological means, and
all are disastrous for various social groups. Robert Jay Lifton and others, for
example, have documented the ongoing psychic and social disruption caused
by one of the twentieth century's most infamous man-made catastrophes, the
bombing of Hiroshima.19 Such disasters remind us of the unimaginable
destructiveness of modern technologies of war, and of the fact that our
control over these state-organized technologies is extremely remote:
decisions about whether to build, deploy, and use devices such as nuclear
weapons can only be made under conditions of great secrecy. Just as
important, the memory of disasters like Hiroshima underscores the fact that
the technological hazards imposed y modern industrialism are now global
in scope. No one is safe from the threat of nuclear conflict.
It is important to note, however, that what we fear most about nuclear
weapons, terrorist bombs, computer viruses, and the like is that they will
work exactly as they were designed to do. Human ingenuity has created these
technologies -- the "genie has been let out of the bottle" -- and the challenge
19See Robert Jay Lifton, Death in Life: The Survivors of Hiroshima (New York: Random House,
1967); John Hersey, Hiroshima (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946, new edition: 1985).
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now is to prevent their use.20 This is a very different social problem from the
threat of accidental catastrophes, which arise from the sudden and unexpected
misbehavior of technologies we use every day. Accidental breakdowns lead
us to question whether the operations of important technologies and
technological systems are defined by well-understood rules -- as we are
repeatedly told by these systems' managers, and as we would like to believe --
or rather, whether social commitments and decisions about many of these
technologies have been made on the basis of a misleading and incomplete
portrayal of their internal characteristics (especially the relationship between
idealized "rules" and actual practices).2 1 Deliberate catastrophes merely
confirm our knowledge that technology can be put to destructive ends.
Accidental disasters, on the other hand, require people to form a more
sophisticated understanding of technologies that exist for putatively
constructive purposes -- a fact with direct bearing on changing conceptions of
citizenship.
One way to subdivide the large class of accidental technological disasters
into smaller classes is to ask what kinds of entities can initiate these events.
Individuals operating technological devices in unintended ways can provoke
numerous varieties of small disasters, including accidents at home, at work,
and on the roads. Ignorance, negligence, and miscalculation are often at the
root of such accidents, so the victims have no one to blame but themselves or
other reckless individuals. Objects standing alone can also fail
20To be sure, the possibility exists that an accidental nuclear war could be triggered through a
series of breakdowns in control, communications, and intelligence. This would be the ultimate
accidental technological catastrophe, but preventing it is, in a sense, the entire mission of
organizations like NORAD and SAC. It falls to politicans and diplomats to prevent the
failure of the theory of deterrence, that is, the deliberate use of nuclear weapons.
21Brian Wynne explores this possibility at length in "Unruly Technology: Practical Rules,
Impractical Discourses and Public Understanding," Social Studies of Science (Vol. 18, 1988)
147-67.
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catastrophically, usually as the result of careless design or bad choices of
materials and construction methods. Product failures like the exploding Ford
Pintos of the early nineteen-seventies fall into this category, as do structural
failures like the Buffalo Creek disaster and the collapse of the Kansas City
Hyatt Hotel walkways in 1981. Recovery from this kind of failure usually
proceeds according to well-established tort procedures and engineering
practices. The courts attempt to pinpoint the origin of the failure, often
negligence of some kind; the parties found responsible are forced to
compensate the victims or their survivors; and engineers, perhaps under the
pressure of new regulations or public demands for safety reforms, go on to
build a better object. Citizen intervention in such cases takes the form of
litigation or movements for "consumer rights" -- by which is usually meant
the right to full information about a product or the right to compensation for
its defects, not the right to be involved in its design or placement.
Accidental technological disasters initiated by a third kind of entity,
organizations, lead to a different set of political possibilities. Organizations
include individuals and technological objects, but combine them with a new
element: planning. Just as technological devices are defined by their designs,
organizations exist to carry out plans. (The authority to make plans and
oversee their execution is one way of defining control, a theme to which we
will return shortly.) The breakdown of an organized technological process
simultaneously calls into question the competence of the people belonging to
the organization, the adequacy of the technological designs which the
organization exists to exploit, and the wisdom of the original plan of
operation. Forced to defend itself on these three fronts, an organization
suffering a disaster may become vulnerable to external pressures for change,
and it is at this moment that citizens may throw off their status as the passive
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"victims" of technological failure and win some measure of control over the
technology's design, operation, and planning.
The plans technological organizations carry out may be either complex
or linear in nature. These terms will be explained in the next section; suffice
it to say for now that complex technological processes are more prone to
catastrophic organizational breakdowns than linear ones. The basic purpose
of any complex technological organization, finally, is either to make or to
move. If it makes things, it is in production; if it makes energy, it is in
generation; if it moves people or things, it is in transportation; and if it
moves information, it is in communication.
The domain of this study, then, is the lower right-hand corner of the
branching chart in Figure 1.1: complex, organizational, accidental
technological disasters. The four case studies are in the areas of energy
generation and manufacturing, but examples of large-system breakdowns are
available in the fields of transportation and communication as well. To limit
the study's field of vision to this single variety of catastrophe is not to deny
that other kinds may have equal meaning for modem societies, but it is a way
of asserting that the connection between complex organizational breakdowns
and ideas of citizenship and democracy has, to date, been left largely
uncharted.
Large Systems, Complexity, and the Limits of Cybernetic Control
It is common to speak of networks of artificial devices or structures as
systems, as in the telephone system, the interstate highway system, or data
processing systems. But since these networks cannot function apart from
their human planners and operators, it seems justifiable to expand the
meaning of "system" to incorporate people and organizations. This is just
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what some historians and social researchers have done -- perhaps too
enthusiastically. The catch-all terms "large technological system," "large-scale
sociotechnical system," "megatechnical system," and the like are used today to
refer to entities so varied and widespread that it is difficult to say anything
precise about them, except that their dominance is what defines modern
technological societies.
Born of the nineteenth century but fully realized only during the
twentieth, large technological systems are amalgams of specialized hardware
and specially-skilled people organized bureaucratically for the efficient and
profitable exploitation of technological processes. One can hardly move
through a day's activities without encountering at least a dozen of them,
including telephones, television, computers and computer networks, roads
and highways, air and rail transportation, and systems for the distribution of
water, electrical power, gasoline, and food and the collection of garbage and
wastewater. Manufacturing or generating complexes like petroleum
refineries, chemical process plants, and nuclear power stations count as large
technological systems, though they are also components in even larger
systems. To use a description offered by Langdon Winner, large technological
systems are marked by "large size, concentraiion, extension, and the complex
interconnection of a great number of artificial and human parts." The result
of this interconnection, Winner observes, is "a quantum jump over the
power and performance capabilities of smaller, more segmental systems. In
this regard, the genius of the twentieth century consists in the final
connecting of technological elements taken from centuries of discovery and
invention."22 Led by historian of technology Thomas P. Hughes, scholars in
22 Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political
Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977) 238.
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science and technology studies have developed a growing interest in recent
years in the genesis and expansion of large technological systems,2 3 but few
have yet examined how these systems evolve in response to catastrophic
failure.
Without speaking of large technological systems as systems it would be
hard to describe the structural and behavioral features that contribute to
failure, and this is the real reason to use the term here. When large
technological systems break down it is almost never due to a single cause like
a burned-out fuse or an operator's mistaken command. Simple lapses like
these are interdicted before they can cause a chain of other problems; that is
what safety devices are for. Truly catastrophic breakdowns only occur as the
result of unexpected interactions between multiple smaller failures.
This is the central insight in Charles Perrow's work on system accidents.
Two kinds of interactions can take place within a technological process,
Perrow explains: "linear" interactions, between components that immediately
follow each other in a planned sequence of production, and "complex"
interactions, between one or more components outside the normal
production process, whether by design or not. The larger the number of
complex interactions that can take place within a large technological system,
the more vulnerable it is to a system accident.2 4 The 1991 AT&T generator
failure that left airline passengers stranded from Boston to Washington was a
23See especially Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society,
1880-1930 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); Wiebe E. Bijker and Thomas P.
Hughes, eds., The Social Construction of Technological Systems (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1987); Thomas P. Hughes and R. Mayntz, eds., The Development of Large Scale
Technical Systems (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988); North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Advanced Research Workshop on Social Responses to Large Technical Systems:
Regulation, Management, or Anticipation, Social Responses to Large Technical Systems:
Control or Adaptation, Todd LaPorte, ed. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991).
24Perrow, Normal Accidents, 77-78.
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perfect example of a system breakdown caused by complex interactions
between supposedly unrelated components of a large technological system.
System complexity -- the extent to which a system permits complex
interactions -- is, in itself, no index of undesirability. We happily rely on any
number of complex technological systems to protect us from danger, from the
computerized anti-lock brakes that help us steer out of skids to the weather
satellites that warn of us approaching hurricanes. And as Perrow points out,
"complex systems are more efficient than linear systems...There is less slack,
less underutilized space, less tolerance of low-quality performance, and more
multifunction components."2 5 What determines a system's hazardousness is
not just the degree of its complexity but also whether its human operators are
able to keep pace with that complexity by identifying hidden interactions
before they cause trouble. As Winner notes, "Complexity looms as a
distinctive problem when systems of interconnected parts begin to tax the
human ability to make the artificial whole intelligible...In almost no instance
can artificial-rational systems be built and left alone. They require continued
attention, rebuilding, and repair. Eternal vigilance is the price of artificial
complexity."26
Nor is complexity the sole ingredient of a system accident. It is usually
possible to stop unexpected interactions from multiplying catastrophically
unless the system is also "tightly coupled" -- an engineering term meaning
that there is little slack or buffer in a chain of causation. In tightly coupled
systems, including chemical plants, spacecraft, nuclear reactor cooling
systems, electrical power grids, and passenger jets, individual decisions
produce quick results, with little time for recovery if a decision turns out to
25 Normal Accidents, 88.
2 6 Winner, Autonomous Technology, 183.
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have been flawed. "Loosely coupled systems...can incorporate shocks and
failures and pressures for change without destabilization," Perrow writes.
"Tightly coupled systems will respond more quickly to these perturbations,
but the response may be disastrous."2 7
An example of a disaster involving very tight coupling (but in which the
"system" itself was defined only loosely) was the crash of a two-passenger
helicopter on an elevated highway approaching the New Jersey side of the
Lincoln Tunnel on May 6, 1994. The helicopter, flying at an altitude of only
150 feet, clipped and severed a non-energized wire on an overhead power
line. The copter crashed onto Interstate 495, killing both of its occupants and
spilling fuel onto a commuter parking lot below. The severed wire,
meanwhile, brushed against an electrified line and was itself energized; it
scattered sparks over the parking lot, igniting the spilled fuel and incinerating
78 vehicles. The downed power line cut off electricity to 25,000 homes, and
highway shutdowns caused hours of gridlock throughout northern New
Jersey and Manhattan.2 8 At no point in this bizarre sequence of events was
there time for anyone to intervene. The disaster resulted from the sheer
physical concentration of the urban environment, manifested when
helicopter, power line, highway, parking lot, and fuel all occupied the same
space at the same time: the tightest coupling possible.
When a system is both complex and tightly coupled, the stage is set for
what Perrow called a "normal accident": an "odd term...meant to signal that,
given the system characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of
27Normal Accidents, 92.
28Robert D. McFadden, "2 Die as Helicopter Crashes Near Lincoln Tunnel," The New York
Times (May 6,1994) Al, B4; Iver Peterson, "Faster Licensing Path Lured Helicopter Occupants
to U.S.," The New York Times (May 7 ,1994) 25, 28.
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failures are inevitable."29 The meltdown at Three Mile Island was Perrow's
paradigmatic "normal accident." Among the other technologies whose
complexity and tight coupling invite special scrutiny are -- not surprisingly --
electrical grids and chemical manufacturing. These technologies are not new,
of course, and the phenomena of complexity and tight coupling have been
known to engineers under one name or another for generations. The
technique that has been developed to deal with them is called cybernetic
control.
Control has always been a crucial function of large industrial
organizations. The great railroads of the American continent devised the first
systematic methods for ensuring smooth operations through the prevention
of delays and collisions, and the form of corporate organization that evolved
alongside these methods permanently altered the way Americans do
business.3 0 Frederick W. Taylor and Henry Ford systematized the control of
mass production early in the twentieth century through their techniques of
"scientific management" and vertically integrated assembly-line
manufacturing. Control over man-machine systems emerged as a scientific
preoccupation during World War II, when reliable methods were needed for
such tasks as aiming anti-aircraft guns against rapidly moving targets.
Research on automatic control by MIT researcher Norbert Wiener and others
in the late nineteen-forties led eventually to the design of robots and
electronic controls for almost every conceivable industrial task, including the
operation of nuclear power stations and continuous-process plants like
chemical factories and petroleum refineries.
2 9 Normal Accidents, 5.
30See Alfred Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1977).
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The foundation of cybernetics was Wiener's insight that electro-
mechanical systems employing "feedback control" could take over human
tasks like computation and forecasting and perform them with much greater
speed and accuracy. Feedback, crudely defined, is information about the
difference between the actual outcome and the desired outcome of a step in a
continuous control process; this information is "fed back" into the process so
that on the next step the real outcome may be brought closer to the desired
one. 3 1 Many human neuromuscular feats, from picking up a pencil to
driving a car, are accomplished through a kind of unconscious feedback, so
the variety of operations that can be usurped by automatic control systems is,
in principle, very large.32 Indeed, Wiener described cybernetic control in
explicitly physiological terms: "The many automata of the present age are
coupled to the outside world for both the reception of impressions and for the
performance of actions. They contain sense organs, effectors, and the
equivalent of a nervous system to integrate the transfer of information from
one to the other...It is scarcely a miracle that they can be subsumed under one
theory with the mechanisms of physiology."33
That cybernetic theory and high-speed computers developed alongside
one another was no accident. Wiener's original work on control and
communication at MIT was inspired by Vannevar Bush's success with the
Differential Analyzer, an early computer for the solution of single-variable
differential equations. Wiener wrote in 1948, "It has long been clear to me
31See Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics, Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the
Machine (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1948, 1961) 6-7.
3 2Engineer Thomas Sheridan writes that "humans are multi-dimensional feedback control
systems, continually moving off-track and correcting themselves in a progression of feedback
loops encompassing thoughts, whole-body movements, manipulation of controls and system
feedback." Telerobotics, Automation, and Human Supervisory Control (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1992) 316,
3 3 Wiener, Cybernetics, 43.
52
that the modern ultra-rapid computing machine was in principle an ideal
central nervous system to an apparatus for automatic control; and that its
input and output need not be in the form of numbers or diagrams but might
very well be, respectively, the readings of artifical sense organs, such as
photoelectric cells or thermometers., and the performance of motors or
solenoids." 34
As computers grew in speed and sophistication during the nineteen-
fifties, Wiener's dream began to take on reality. Computers became part of
the control loop in many cybernetic systems, performing such tasks as
augmenting and stabilizing aircraft control, filtering signal patterns from
background noise, and generating electronic displays.3 5 These techniques
greatly increased the flexibility and reach of man-machine systems, making it
possible for human supervisors to monitor and occasionally intervene in
feedback control processes while leaving much of the "dirty work" to
machines. Technological systems could now be built to operate in
environments that would previously have been considered too hazardous for
human activity: the ocean bottom, outer space, the interiors of nuclear
reactors.
This increase in risk-taking with improved technology is similar to an
effect among consumers that economists call "offsetting behavior." A recent
study by the Highway Loss Data Institute, an insurance industry research
group, provides an example of this pattern. Institute researchers who tallied
insurance claims were surprised to find that antilock braking systems have
not helped to further the 50-year trend in the U.S. toward lower death rates
per mile traveled by automobile. Economist Robert S. Chirinko speculates,
3 4 Ibid., 26.
35See Sheridan, Telerobotics, Automation, and Human Supervisory Control, 7-12.
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"When a new technology arrives, drivers will alter their behavior. They will
realize that cars with antilock brakes are safer, which means the cost of risky
driving is lower. Many of them will drive more aggressively, or drive more
often in dangerous, inclement weather. Thus, even if accidents are less
serious because these brakes do control skidding, the number of potential
accident situations will increase."36
The computerization of cybernetic control systems, as we will discover,
has made room for offsetting behavior on a gargantuan scale. The radar-
evading "flying wing" design of the Northrop Corporation's B-2 bomber, for
example, is so aerodynamically unstable that only a computer can control its
flight. Nuclear energy, to take another obvious case, poses safety challenges
that would be impossible to meet without automated controls. The essence of
a nuclear reactor is to bring together enough uranium and moderating
substances so that spontaneous fission events can build into a heat-generating
chain reaction. Assuring that there are always enough cooling and control
substances present to draw off the excess heat and stop the reaction when
necessary is an extremely tricky process, one nuclear engineers are still
attempting to perfect after four decades of research. In an American-style
nuclear reactor, there is no choice but to automate the backup systems needed
to ensure that a loss of coolant does not lead to a worst-case failure (that is, a
meltdown), and as a result these plants have become tangles of plumbing and
electronics so complex that not even their operators understand them fully,
as we will see in Chapter 3. Choosing to build a large number of nuclear
power plants in the belief that safety systems will work in an emergency is not
so different, then, from choosing to drive cars more aggressively in the belief
3 6 Robert Chirinko, "As Cars Get Safer, Drivers Take Risks," The New York Times (April 10,
1994) '11: 17.
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that their sophisticated brakes will prevent serious accidents. Both beliefs
may be justified, but the number of potential accident situations will
multiply.
The analogy between computers and cars is historically apt, since Wiener
coined the word "cybernetics" from the Greek cybernetes, meaning driver,
steersman, or pilot. ("Governor" and hence "government" derive from a
Latin corruption of the same word.) From the earliest stages of research on
cybernetics, it was obvious what kinds of advances the combination of
computers and control would make possible, and Wiener was the first to
worry about how his work would be applied:
We have contributed to the initiation of a new science which embraces technical
developments with great possibilities for good and evil. We can only hand it over
into the world that exists about us, and this is the world of Belsen and Hiroshima.
We do not even have the choice of suppressing these new technological
developments. They belong to the age...The best we can do is to see that a large
public understands the trend and bearing of the present work, and to confine our
personal efforts to those fields, such as physiology and pyschology, most remote
from war and exploitation...There are those who hope that the good of a better
understanding of man and society which is offered by this new field of work may
anticipate and outweigh the incidental contribution we are making to the
concentration of power (which is always concentrated, by its very conditions of
existence, in the hands of the most unscrupulous). write in 1947, and I am
compelled to say that it is a very slight hope.3 7
Wiener's main fear, it seems, was that cybernetics would form the basis of a
new generation of more dehumanizing technologies for industrial
production and more lethal technologies for war, and in this he was
absolutely correct. But Wiener was also acknowledging the paradoxical reality
that the new science of control could not itself be controlled -- "We do not
even have the choice of suppressing these new technological developments."
Cybernetics could serve wise or foolish ends with equal efficiency, and it
might be used in ways that would make human existence not simply easier
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37Wiener, Cybernetics, 28-29.
but also more dangerous.38
Control rooms at complex facilities like nuclear plants and chemical
factories have indeed become nodes of power in technological societies, places
where decisions affecting the comfort and safety of millions are made every
day. But as Perrow's work has shown, systems complex enough to require
control rooms are inherently vulnerable to unanticipated failures; after this
level of complexity has been reached, the addition of safety features may
make the system more vulnerable, not less. No matter how well-behaved are
the system's technical components, moreover, the ever-present possibility of
human error places its own limit on system reliability.
Engineers in the field of "human supervisory control" have attempted
to minimize the threat from human error by building industrial control
systems with greater and greater autonomy. This project suffers, however,
from the fundamental flaw that (as industrial psychologist James Reason has
written) it "was not conceived with humans in mind." It arose instead from
the microchip revolution, military demands, the feasibility of assigning ever-
more-complex tasks to computer programs, and engineers' desire to encode as
much human operating skill as possible into compliant, untiring, non-
salaried machines -- thus relegating the operators themselves to the roles of
babysitters and second-guessers. 39 Neither of these jobs suit the abilities of
38 Around the same time Wiener wrote these words, however, he adopted a policy of personal
resistance to the military application of his scientific work. In a 1946 letter of refusal to a
Boeing missile designer who had requested copies of his work on prediction and filter theory,
Wiener wrote that "the policy of the government itself during and after the war, say in the
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has made clear that to provide scientific information
is not a necessarily innocent act, and may entail the gravest consequences...In any
investigation of this kind the scientist ends with the responsibility for having put unlimited
powers in the hands of the people whom he is least inclined to trust with their use...I do not
expect to publish any future work of mine which may do damage in the hands of irresponsible
militarists." The letter is reprinted in "From the Archives," Science, Technology, & Human
Values (Summer, 1983) 36-38.
3 9 0n the ways in which military requirements influenced the development of automatic control
56
humans, who tend to be bored to stupefaction by routine monitoring tasks,
but then paralyzed by information overflow during actual emergencies. "If a
group of human factors specialists sat down with the malign intent of
conceiving an activity that was wholly ill-matched to the strengths and
weaknesses of human cognition," Reason writes, "they might well have
come up with something [like] what is currently demanded of nuclear and
chemical plant operators."4 0
All of the easy tasks in facilities like petroleum refineries and power
stations have been automated, leaving human operators with only thc
hardest one: responding to emergencies. Yet nothing in the everyday
operation of these plants prepares operators to make the right decisions when
emergencies actually occur, since accidents, by their very nature, cannot be
reliably modeled and simulated beforehand. If they could be, then the proper
responses would be programmable and there would be no need for human
operators; emergencies are events that evade forethought and automatic
control since, by definition, they "emerge" unexpectedly. The paradox is most
acute precisely where reliable control is most essential. When the potential
deaths from a catastrophic failure can be measured in the thousands -- as is
true for nuclear power technology -- elaborate safety systems are an absolutely
necessity. Yet the more complex these systems grow, the less chance their
human operators have of interceding correctly.
One important function of system failures, then, is to alert citizens to the
contradictions and limitations inherent in the idea of computerized
methods in the United States, see David Noble, Forces of Production: A Social History of
Industrial Automation (New York: Knopf, 1984).
40 ames T. Reason, Human Error (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 183.
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cybernetic control. "The layman believes that the very fact that a program
runs on a computer guarantees that some programmer has formulated and
understands every detail of the process which it embodies. But his belief is
contradicted by fact," noted Joseph Weizenbaum in his 1976 study Computer
Power and Human Reason:
Programming systems can be built without plan and without knowledge, let alone
understanding, of the deep structural issues involved, just as houses, cities, systems
of dams, and national economic policies can be similarly hacked together. As a
system so constructed begins to get large, however, it also becomes increasingly
unstable. When one of its subfunctions fails in an unanticipated way, it may be
patched until the manifest trouble disappears. But since there is no general theory
of the whole system, the system itself can be only a more or less chaotic aggregate
of subsystems whose influence on one another's behavior is discoverable only
piecemeal and by experiment.41
Technological disasters are one kind of "experiment" through which people
can come to understand the chaos inherent in complex systems. But why, in
the end, should citizens concern themselves with such abstruse matters?
Operating large technological systems safely in the face of real-world
unpredictability is, after all, what professional engineers, programmers, and
managers are paid to do. is it not?
It is, but to limit the question in this way leaves out the crucial fact that
large technological systems are more than networks of people and devices.
They are also the accumulated result of decades of innovation, negotiation,
and investment, and in a democracy it is the right and the responsibility of
each new generation to reassess these commitments. Otherwise, the systems
are guaranteed to grow aloof, unresponsive to the needs of the people, and
perhaps physically dangerous. As Weizenbaum put it, "The reification of
complex systems that have no authors, about which we know only that they
were somehow given us by science and that they speak with its authority,
41 Joseph Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgment to Calculation
(New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1976) 119,234.
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permits no questions of truth or justice to be asked."42 What is needed is a
general recognition of how swiftly technological control in its modern,
cybernetic form can take on the aspect of political control.
The Politics of Large Technological Systems
Many technologies are inherently "political" in the sense that their
designs dictate the social conditions under which they may be used.43 That
complex industrial enterprises require a centralized, hierarchical form of
social control in order to function efficiently, for example, is now virtually
undisputed. In his comprehensive studies The Visible Hand and Scale and
Scope, business historian Alfred Chandler showed that industry's enormous
expansion in the United States after the Civil War was made possible by new
managerial techniques modeled on military line-and-staff command systems.
Field managers reported to middle administrators, who reported in turn to
top executives, thus assuring the coordination and economies of scale that
would make good on the large investments required to set up such far-flung
business empires as railroads, electrical utilities, and chemical companies.4 4
No serious reworking of the military-bureaucratic pattern has been attempted
since, probably because modern technologies simply require this form of
4 2 Ibid., 252.
43The automobile, for example, has, perhaps more than any other invention in this century,
reordered the external world to fit its peculiar character; suburbia, the interstate highway
system, and the global petroleum economy all owe their existence to automobility's powerful
appeal. The best treatment of this general theme is Langdon Winner's "Do Artifacts Have
Politics?," the second chapter in The Whale and the Reactor: The Search For Limits in the
Age of High Technology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986) 19-39.
44During the nineteenth century, Chandler summarizes, "the firm was the agent making the
engine go, putting together resources to distribute technology and affecting the shift from
rural agrarianism to urban industrialism." (From author's personal notes on Chandler's
remarks at the Workshop on Technological Determinism, Program in Science, Technology,
and Society, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, December, 1989.) See also Alfred
Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business, and Scale
and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1990).
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organization if their material possibilities are to be fully exploited. As John
Kenneth Galbraith has written, "More perhaps than the machinery, massive
and complex business organizations are the tangible manifestations of
advanced technology."45
Large-scale undertakings in this century such as rural electrification and
the building of the atomic bomb, historians point out46, have required the
creation of powerful "expert bureaucracies" that operate outside democracy's
traditional system of checks and balances. Existing to promote and exploit
particular technologies, quasi-public organizations like the Tennessee Valley
Authority and the Atomic Energy Commission (now the Department of
Energy) have gradually assumed overt legislative powers over social affairs.47
The AEC, for example, nurtured the commercial nuclear power industry in
the United States through an expert-driven plant licensing process that was
long immune to local opposition, and today TVA ratepayers must shoulder
huge yearly interest payments on the $25 billion debt from the agency's
failure-ridden nuclear power projects.48 Understandably, expert bureaucracies
often acquire a reputation for arrogance and unaccountability. To quote an
executive of one power company -- busy, at the time, slicing through a rural
Ohio village with a high-voltage transmission line -"There are always a few
crackpots who feel sentimental about dear old grandfather's place, but we
have standard ways of dealing with them...It's easy to force our way through
Zilchville." 49
4 5John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State, 4th edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1985) 16.
46See, for example, Brian Balogh, Chain Reaction: Expert Debate and Public Participation in
American Nuclear Power, 1945-1975 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
47On the history of the AEC and the TVA's involvement in nuclear power, see Balogh.
48See Danielle Droitsch, 'T.V.A.'s Blighted Nuclear Romance," The Nation (June 27,1994)
906-08.
49Quoted in Louise B. Young, Power Over People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973) 185.
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While the growth of large, highly organized technological systems has
vastly increased the range of goods and services available to the citizens of
industrialized nations, it has also surrounded them with a kind of shadow
government, one no less influential than the traditional governing
institutions of laws, elections, and taxes. The authors of "The Triple
Revolution," an open letter to President Lyndon B. Johnson by a group of
humanists, economists, journalists, and social activists, warned of this
change, which they called the cybernation revolution, as early as 1964:
A new era of production has begun...Its principles of organization are as different
from those of the industrial era as those of the industrial era were different from
the agricultural. The cybernation revolution has been brought about by the
combination of the computer and the automated self-regulating machine...
Cybernation is already reorganizing the economic and social system to meet its own
needs...The fundamental problem posed by the cybernation revolution in the U.S. is
that it invalidates the general mechanisms so far employed to undergird people's
rights as consumers. Up to this time economic resources have been distributed on the
basis of contributions to production, with machines and men competing for
employment on somewhat equal terms. In the developing cybernated system,
potentially unlimited output can be achieved by systems of machines which will
require little cooperation from human beings.50
The writers called for the creation of a network of democratically-run
planning institutions "at every level of government" to combat technological
unemployment and manage the difficult transition from an economy of
scarcity to the "era of abundance" promised by cybernation. These
institutions, of course, were never created, since as the authors themselves
recognized, "the present system encourages activities which can lead to
private profit and neglects those activities which can enhance the wealth and
For more on the conflict between utility companies and property owners over the right of
eminent domain as it applies to the construction of electrical transmission lines, see Barry M.
Casper and Paul David Wellstone, Powerline: The First Battle in America's Energy War
(Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1981).
50 Ad Hoc Committee on the Triple Revolution, 'The Triple Revolution" (March 22,1964),
reprinted in Michael Shuman and Julia Sweig, eds., Technology for the Common Good
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1993) 144-60.
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the quality of life of our society."
Langdon Winner argues, similarly, that the technological capabilities of
large systems have come to define not only how we work and how our
material surroundings are structured, but also what kinds of political goals it
is permissible to pursue. The "theory of technological politics" outlined in
Winner's study Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a
Theme in Political Thought (1977) brings together the ideas of social thinkers
like Karl Marx, Jacques Ellul, Herbert Marcuse, Lewis Mumford, and John
Kenneth Galbraith, and places them in the context of today's fully-realized
technological systems. "We continue to talk as if telephone and electric
systems were analogous in their employment to a simple hand drill, as if an
army were similar to an egg beater," Winner complains. In fact, writers like
Ellul and Mumford have already helped us to see that "the total order of
networks is anything but neutral or tool-like. In its centrality to the daily
activity and consciousness of the 'employee,' the function-serving human
component, the technical order is more properly thought of as a way of
life." 5 1
The original purposes people assign to large technological systems,
Winner suggests, tend to be supplanted over time by new goals defined by the
systems themselves -- especially their need to secure the proper conditions for
their own continual expansion. In a process Winner labels "reverse
adaptation," systems attempt to readjust human ends to match their own
specialized capabilities, eliminating along the way all independently
formulated goals and needs. "Beyond a certain level of technological
development, the rule of freely articulated, strongly asserted purposes is a
5 1 Autonomous Technology, 201-202.
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luxury that can no longer be permitted,' Winner observes.5 2
Systems optimize their surroundings by gaining control over relevant
markets and regulatory processes, by manipulating human needs through
advertising and other methods of persuasion, and by fabricating crises or new
missions that match their capabilities and justify expansion.53 A large
industrial corporation like General Electric, for example, protects its diverse
interests by securing long-term contracts with government agencies, by
lobbying extensively in Washington (making large campaign contributions to
favored members of Congress, scuttling some laws and helping to write
others), by controlling national media outlets, and by representing itself as the
political voice for hundreds of thousands of employees and others whose
livelihoods depend on the company's fate.54 Given the sheer size of
organizations like GE, NASA, or the Department of Defense -- organizations
that must wield political influence in order to hold together their sprawling
technological empires - it is not surprising that national politics has become a
game too expensive for average citizens to play.
Yet the style of governance that results is neither elitist nor cabalistic. It
bears little resemblance to various social theories about the "establishment,"
the "power elite," or the "technostructure."55 Instead the fulfillment of each
large system's technical and economic requirements adds to a set of demands
on a society's overall resources that eventually becomes the society's political
52 Ibid., 238.
5 3 Ibid., 24249.
54A leading producer of everything from jet engines to medical imaging equipment, nuclear
weapons to financial services, General Electric owns 177 plants in the United States and
employs 243,000 Americans. For an analysis of GE's political style, see Chapter 15 of
William Greider's Who Will Tell the People: The Betrayal of American Democracy (New
York: Touchstone, 1993) 331-55.
5 5 See C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); Galbraith,
The New Industrial State.
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agenda. "To ignore these demands, or to leave them insufficiently fulfilled, is
to attack the very foundations on which the modern social order rests,"
Winner writes.56 In such a technological order, a citizen's role is principally
to "serve one's own function and not meddle with the mechanism."5 7
While not specifically concerned with technology's social effects,
William Greider's recent catalog of the major forces eroding traditional
notions of citizenship, Who Will Tell the People: The Betrayal of American
Democracy (1992), continues Winner's argument. The success of large,
powerful organizations in making government into the instrument of their
own needs, Greider contends, has drained democracy of its essential meaning.
The citizens who appear in Greider's book say they have learned through
practical experience -- in conflicts over the environment, education, taxation,
nuclear arms, food safety, and dozens of other issues - that "the law is not on
our side," as one environmental activist put it.58 Unable to compete with
monied interests for the attention of their elected representatives,
unprotected by political parties, labor unions, and the other mediating
institutions that once represented them, and left to watch helplessly as
controversial policy issues become engulfed in the expert-dominated state
and federal bureaucracies, many middle- and working-class people have
developed a poisonous contempt for government, Greider believes. "The
political culture that fractured governing authority and allowed political
institutions to become irresponsible has done the same to the citizenry," he
writes. 59
Greider offers this discouraging but accurate summation of the state of
5 6Autonomous Technology, 258-59.
5 7 Ibid., 207.
5 8 Greider, Who Will Tell the People, 166.
5 9 Ibid., 162.
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democratic politics in the United States today: "Behind the reassuring facade,
the regular elections and so forth, the substantive meaning of self-
government has been hollowed out...Citizens are cut out of the politics
surrounding the most important governing questions. The representative
system has undergone a grotesque distortion of its original purpose. The
connective tissues that once linked ordinary people to governing no longer
function reliably...In sum, the mutual understanding between citizens and
government necessary for genuine democracy is now deformed."60
One major force causing this deformation, I believe, is the political
power of large technological systems. Whether in the form of the
corporation, the quasi-public authority, or the government agency, these
systems continually attempt to reduce citizenship to a controllable variable in
the technological universe of inputs and outputs. Here is how one system
manager, Theodore J. Nagel of the American Electric Power Service Company
of New York, has described the need to curb and contain citizen participation
in his system's activities:
Public concern and involvement in the siting process is essential in a free society. In
a complex, industrialized (but orderly) society, however, complex issues require the
application of specialized knowledge by those trained and experienced. In other
words, a specialized technical activity such as power system planning cannot be
carried out in an open forum or in the atmosphere of a town hall. This means that
the entire intervention process needs to be circumscribed by certain rules...The
alternative can be nothing less than confusion and chaos.6 1
Lest the reader think that this is the attitude of a small, defensive group of
6 0 Ibid., 11-12.
6 1 Theodore J. Nagel, "Operating a Major Electric Utility Today," Science (Sep. 15, 1978) 985-
93. The use of the word "intervention" to describe citizen attempts to participate in
technological decision-making underscores the extent to which - in language, thought, and
political reality - the prerogative to plan in industrialized societies has been ceded to those
managing large technological systems. On the politics of siting controversies, see especially
the work of Dorothy Nelkin: Nuclear Power and Its Critics: The Cayuga Lake Controversy
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971); Jetport: The Boston Airport Controversy (New
Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1974); Controversy: Politics of Technical Decisions
(Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979).
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industrial leaders, consider what John Kemeny, then president of Dartmouth
College, came to believe about the American democracy after his experience
as head of President Carter's commission to investigate the accident at Three
Mile Island. In an address at MIT, Kemeny declared that "Jeffersonian
democracy cannot work in the year 1980 -- the world has become too
complex...The only way to save American democracy is to change the
fundamental decision-making process, at the federal level, so that it can come
to grips with the enormous and complex issues that face this nation."
Kemeny advocated the creation of expert panels of scientists and engineers to
craft solutions to major social problems.62 He concluded, "I trust democracy --
the president and Congress -- to choose among [these solutions]; but I do not
trust democracy to try to put [them] together."6 3
On one level, what Nagel, Kemeny, and many others have asserted
about the complex nature of industrialized societies is perfectly sensible. The
comfort and security of modem social life -- as compared to the drudgery and
brevity of life in traditional societies -- rest on the smooth operation of
innumerable systems for the sharing of energy, products, and information
across great distances. "Even the smallest of neighborhood stores probably
obtains its goods from all over the world," as Anthony Giddens observes.6 4
62Kemeny, a mathematician by training, was by no means the first scientist to propose reforms
strengthening the role of expertise in government. The physicist Robert Millikan, as early as
1932, proposed a "scientific jury system" to discover the true "social facts" on which policies
to end the Depression could be built. See Dorothy Nelkin, "Controversies and the Authority
of Science," in H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr. and Arthur L. Caplan, eds., Scientific
Controversies: Case Studies in the Resolution and Closure of Disputes in Science and
Technology (Cambrdige, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1987) 283-93.
63 Kemeny's address was reprinted as "Saving American Democracy: The Lessons of Three Mile
Island," Technology Reuiew (June/July, 1980) 65-75.
64Giddens continues, "Every time someone gets cash out of the bank or makes a deposit, casually
turns on a light or a tap, sends a letter or makes a call on the telephone, she or he implicitly
recognizes the large areas of secure, coordinated actions and events that make modem social
life possible...Trust in abstract systems is a condition of time-space distanciation and of the
large areas of security in everyday life which modern institutions offer as compared to the
66
We do entrust the operation of these extended systems to people with special
knowledge, training, and experience, because the systems could not operate
otherwise; a carpenter would make a very poor air traffic controller, and a
kindergarten teacher a bad jet pilot. It would seem to follow from this fact
that solutions to the novel social dilemmas generated by these systems'
growth can only be discovered and elaborated by those with a thorough
command of the systems' complexities.
Against this brand of technocracy, however, there are three strong
arguments. First, no guarantee exists that the "solutions" crafted by scientific
and technical experts will be those that best serve the social good65 rather than
those that merely serve the technical and economic requirements of the
systems the experts represent.6 6 "Even in their highly mathematical or
technical garb," writes Ulrich Beck, the cost-benefit analyses constructed by
experts "contain statements of the type That is how we want to live--
statements, that is, to which the natural and engineering sciences alone can
provide answers only by overstepping the bounds of their disciplines."67 The
U.S. experience with commercial nuclear power, examined in detail in
Chapter 3, is a case in point. Driven by Cold War fears, Congress delegated
traditional world." The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 1990) 109,
113.
65As defined by the members of society themselves, through whatever democratic means
available.
66This is, of course, a version of the venerable Marxist critique of industrial capitalism. As
David Harvey writes, 'The disciplining of labor power to the purposes of capital
accumulation...is a very intricate affair. It entails some mix of repression, habituation, co-
optation and co-operation, all of which have to be organized not only in the workplace but
throughout society at large. The socialization of the worker to conditions of capitalist
production entails the social control of physical and mental powers on a very broad basis."
The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford,
U.K.: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1989) 123.
67Ulrich Beck, The Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage Publications, 1986)
58.
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responsibility for the development and regulation of nuclear power to
nuclear engineers, utility planners, and their counterparts in the Atomic
Energy Commission and its successor, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The result today is a technology so crippled by public mistrust and economic
woes that some utilities are attempting to dispose of their reactors at fire-sale
prices68 and even nuclear experts acknowledge that one more accident on the
scale of Three Mile Island would likely mean the shutdown of the industry.69
Second, proponents of technocratic rule dismiss too quickly the
possibility of thoughtful, rational, informed public participation in complex
technological issues. While it is indeed true that in order to understand all of
the workings of a nuclear reactor a Ph.D. in physics and/or nuclear
engineering is required, the basic technical facts of nuclear power -- most
importantly for the present study, the relationship between a reactor's
complexity and its vulnerability to catastrophic breakdown -- are well within
the grasp of the average lay person. A number of social-scientific studies have
confirmed this general point. After showing groups Af lay people short films
on technological problems such as global warming and solid-waste disposal
and then conducting 45-minute discussion sessions, for example, researchers
John Doble and Amy Richardson found that participants' comprehension of
technical details, as measured by before-and-after surveys, increased by 50
percent. The study participants also grew more confident in their assessments
68The Washington Public Power Supply System sold two $4 billion plants for scrap, netting $10
million, and is now trying to sell another two plants, backed by $9.25 billion in bonds, for
their $50 million to $100 million salvage value. See Leslie Eaton, "Utilityv Trying Hard to
Sell Reactors," The New York Times (July 14, 1994) D1, D19.
69The National Research Council's Committee on Future Nuclear Power Development warned
in 1992, "Public policy makers...shoul be concerned about the level of accident prevention
measures because another accident like that at TMI in the near future would seriously affect
the future of nuclear power in the United States." Nuclear Power: Technical and Institutional
Options for the Future (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1992) 61.
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of possible practical solutions, and their final policy choices corresponded
closely with those preferred by leading scientists whom Doble and Richardson
contacted. "A lack of detailed scientific knowledge does not block most people
from carefully assessing complex issues," the two researchers concluded. 70
What does block people from participating in such assessments is the myth,
formulated by technical elites and ratified by expert-dominated government
and industry bodies, that they are uninterested and ineducable.
The third argument against technocratic social control, and the one most
pertinent to this study, is that experts themselves can never possess complete
knowledge of the behavior of complex systems. Any claim to such
knowledge must itself be a carefully cultivated fiction, as control breakdowns
make clear. "In nearly every investigation of accidents and their
precursors...one finds the same situation," Brian Wynne writes. "Beneath the
public image of rule-following behavior, and the associated belief that
accidents are due to deviations from those clear rules, experts are operating
with far greater levels of ambiguity, needing to make uncertain judgments in
less than clearly structured situations."7 1 There is more to this than the fact
that experts, like all humans, occasionally fall victim to error or to their own
ignorance of the "expertise" they are presumed to possess. Catastrophes help
to demonstrate, instead, that perfect expertise cannot exist: a kind of G6del's
70 John Doble and Amy Richardson, "You Don't Have to Be a Rocket Scientist..." Technology
Review (January, 1992) 51-54. The authors also found that the times when the lay citizens
disagreed with scientists, as in the case of nuclear power, had no correlation with low
comprehension scores. Moreover, the same number of respondents were opposed to nuclear
power after the presentations as before, even though the presentations emphasized that
nuclear power does not contribute to global warming. The authors compared citizens' position
on nuclear power to the view that "no matter how many safety features it has, a car is unsafe
if the driver is incompetent." Citizen opposition, they suggested, is a product of well-founded
mistrust of nuclear designers, operators and regulators.
7 1 Wynne, "Unruly Technology," 153.
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Incompleteness Theorem for technology.72 Giddens is precisely correct in this
matter: "There is no skill so carefully honed and no form of expert
knowledge so comprehensive that elements of hazard or luck do not come
into play. Experts ordinarily presume that lay individuals will feel more
reassured if they are not able to observe how frequently these elements enter
into expert performance." 73 To the extent that hazard or luck are part of any
complex social or technological system, therefore, the qualifications of experts
for the roles of ethicist and policy-maker are no stronger than those of lay
citizens.
That the technocratic world-view remains persuasive to many people,
however, demonstrates the ongoing success of large technological systems in
transforming the cultures and the political frameworks in which they are
embedded. These systems have not just helped to destroy the old "connective
tissues" linking citizens and government; they have become those tissues,
replacing old mediating institutions like labor unions and an independent
press with faceless bureaucracies expert at representing their own interests as
those of the citizenry at large. In reality, large technological organizations do
not transmit democratic impulses so much as dampen and disperse them. As
Winner writes, "If some perverse spirit set out deliberately to design a
collection of systems to increase the general feeling of powerlessness, enhance
the prospects for the dominance of the technical elites, create the belief that
politics is nothing more than a remote spectacle to be experienced vicariously,
and thereby diminish the chance that anyone would take democratic
citizenship seriously, what better plan to suggest than that we simply keep the
72Kurt G6del was the mathematician who demonstrated in the nineteen-thirties that no
mathematical system can be sufficiently sophisticated to prove its own basic hypotheses
7 3 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 86-87.
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systems we already have?"74
Catastrophes: A Chink in the Armor
As failures that start small and shatter outward through nested spheres
of control, technological catastrophes open large systems to unwelcome
meddeling from the outside. The loss of control often begins well before an
actual accident, in the form of design oversights, maintenance errors,
miscommunication, poor regulation, and other mistakes that remain latent
in the system until activated by some mechanical or electronic malfunction.
As warnings are misinterpreted, safety devices misfire, and large amounts of
energy are misdirected, operators may then lose control over the system itself.
The loss soon spreads to the outside environment, threatening bystanders
with injury, death, or disruption. If public grows sufficiently angry over the
threat, finally, the system may lose some of its accustomed power over the
society's political agenda. In this way, the "rule of freely articulated, strongly
asserted purposes" may be partially restored.
We have seen how complexity, tight coupling, computerization, and
increased risk-taking with improved technology contribute to uncertainty in
large technological systems. Disaster researchers and organizational
sociologists attempting to explain the current proliferation of technological
hazards also point to two other basic trends in industrial innovation:
Older Technologies on a Larger Scale. Maturity does not always confer
reliability. Though much safer than in the past, some of the most ancient
industrial activities, such as mining, logging, and marine shipping, are still
among the most hazardous. And certain enterprises that originated before
71
7 4Autonomous Technology, 325.
World War II, especially chemical manufacturing, have lately become so
central to the industrialized world's high-production, high-consumption way
of life that they have acquired a new and portentous omnipresence. "When
we started research about 40 years ago, chemical disasters were simply not
mentioned as a major or frequent risk," writes Henry Quarantelli, a
sociologist at the University of Delaware's Disaster Research Center. Since
then, "the incidence of chemical emergencies and disasters has continued to
increase around the world...Even localities which in the past had none or few
risks are now vulnerable if they have any roads, railways, or navigable
waterways in the vicinity of toxic chemical spills, explosions, or fires."75 Size.,
in other words, has its drawbacks. It is seldom possible to carry out an old
activity on a vastly increased scale without also multiplying its hazards.
Globalized Networks. A process of invention that began with smoke
signals and semaphores has brought humanity into the age of global
interconnectivity. Telegraphs, telephones, computer networks, radio and
television link us together electronically, just as roads, highways, water
mains, sewers, pipelines and the electrical grid link us physically. But
AT&T's telephone-network glitches and the Salomon Brothers computer-
trading fiasco show that these networks allow undesired effects to spread just
as quickly as desired ones. In 1965, a single overloaded circuit breaker in
Queenston, Ontario, triggered a series of power failures that blanketed the
entire Northeastern United States in darkness (see Chapter 2). In 1988,
Cornell computer science student Robert Morris Jr. released a self-replicating
"worm" designed to hide harmlessly within the memories of computers
75E. L. Quarantelli, "More and Worse Disasters in the Future: The Social Factors Involved,"
Preliminary Paper #173 (Delaware, Maryland: University of Delaware Disaster Research
Center, 1991) 5-6.
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linked to the Internet. An error in the program caused it to run amok,
jamming more than 6,000 computers nationwide.76 In short, it has become
dificult to safeguard oneself, one's family, or one's business from the effects of
breakdowns kilometers or continents away.
Given that the deep-rooted trends toward greater complexity, tight
coupling, computerization, risk-taking, size and globalization are unlikely to
reverse themselves soon, it is a good bet that there will be "more and worse
disasters in the future," as Quarantelli puts it. We can be certain, at least, that
it will never be possible to eliminate technological breakdowns altogether.
Ultimate safety is a chimera, a forever-postponed promise made by
technologists (including, for example, the designers of the vaunted "next
generation" of "inherently safe" nuclear reactors) to mollify a distrustful
public.
But perhaps this situation is not as desperate as it sounds. Engineers
argue that "failure analysis," the technical study of technological disasters, is
both a useful way of detecting design flaws and a spur to safety-improving
organizational and regulatory reforms.7 7 I propose that disasters are an
important source of revelation not just about how particular technologies
work but about the way technological society operates. Without these
occasional shocks, citizens would have fewer opportunities to learn about
large technological systems and to assess their compatibility with important
political values. We need not welcome -- and it would be folly to encourage --
disruptive and harmful technological breakdowns. But we would not be very
76 John Markoff, "Keeping Things Safe and Orderly In the Neighborhoods of Cyberspace," The
New York Times (Oct. 24, 1993) IV:7.
77See James L. Adams, Flying Buttresses, Entropy, and O-Rings: The World of an Engineer
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991); Henry Petroski, To Engineer Is Human
(New York: St. Martins Press, 1985).
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good experimentalists if we let these episodes pass without examining them
for their social lessons. We all have a stake in the outcome of these exercises
in "technopathology."
Failures are as varied in their origin and character as the technologies
they strike, but the strain I have been describing, the large-technological-
system breakdown, stands out as particularly problematic and meaningful. It
is this kind of failure that most upsets assumptions about the imperviousness
of large, complex systems, and for that reason I would like to christen it
Winner's Apraxia.
Apraxia is a neurological term describing the inability to use sensory
information to coordinate bodily movements. Apraxic patients, usually the
victims of brain lesions, cannot carry out everyday motor tasks such as
opening doors or eating with silverware. They may grope about or gesture
grotesquely when asked to salute or flip a coin; they may be able to dress
themselves on one side of their bodies, but not the other. Interestingly, a
person with apraxia sees, hears and understands sensory cues, but the neural
pathways which usually transmit commands from the visual and auditory
cortices to the motor cortex or from one hemisphere of the brain to the other
are somehow blocked. The right hand literally does not know what the left is
doing. Worse, it has no way of reestablishing communications.7 8
The unique properties of this disorder have made it an irresistible
metaphor for trouble in other kinds of complex systems. Langdon Winner
adopted it in Autonomous Technology to describe the loss of control and
coordination in large systems such as the electrical grid or the air-traffic-
control network. "If a significant link in a technical system ceases to function,
78Erick R. Kandel and James H. Schwartz, Principles of Neural Science, Second Edition (New
York: Elsevier Science Publishing Co., 1985) 499, 698-699.
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the whole system is thrown into chaos...In large-scale technical networks
composed of artificial components with complex interconnections and
interdependencies, apraxia is a constant danger."7 9 Just as an apraxic
patient's brain injury makes it difficult for him to dress, eat. and generally
coordinate sensory impressions with bodily actions, control breakdowns leave
large technological systems without the nervous systems they need to transfer
information between their sensors and effectors. Blackouts, telephone system
failures, nuclear plant shutdowns, and computer errors threaten modern
society with literal dis-integration. "The technological order is one in which
all systems are 'go' and indeed must be," Winner notes. "The alternative is
disaster for technology-dependent human populations....In visions of
technological society, apraxia...is the ultimate horror, a condition to be
avoided at all costs."8 0
7 9 Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977) 186. It should
be noted that certain globalized networks -- the Internet is the paradigmatic example - are
designed precisely so that the failure of one node will not throw the system into chaos. (In
the case of Arpanet, the core network from which the Internet grew, this was important
because it conferred survivability in a nuclear war.) Internet is, in a sense, a chronically
apraxic technological system -- what Thomas Hughes has called a "postmodern" system
(Thomas P. Hughes, "Postmodern Engineering," Arthur C. Miller Lecture on Science and
Ethics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, April 8, 1993).
80 Ibid., 186-87. Victor McElheny writes in rejoinder, "A good way to horrify people would be to
describe what happens normally every minute in these systems (electrical grids, air traffic
control, and so on). They would reel at the complexity, the near-misses, etc. And yet it can be
claimed that the day-to-day reliability continues to increase to nearly incredible
levels...Normal accidents, indeed! Normal highwire success is more like it." (Personal
communication, June 8,1994.) Todd LaPorte and Paula Consolini expand on this celebratory
theme in an article on so-called 'high-reliability organizations' entitled "Working in
Practice But Not in Theory." They write, "From the literature [in organizational sociology]
one cannot expect that sustained failure-free performance is possible, even to a moderate
degree. Yet there are large-scale, highly complex organizations that have taken up this
goal and almost always achieve it." (Todd M. Laporte and Paula R. Consolini, 'Working in
Practice But Not In Theory: Theoretical Challeges of 'High-Reliability Organizations,"'
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory ,Vol. 1, No. 1, 1991, 1947.) McElheny,
LaPorte, and Consolini are all correct that large systems nearly always work well, but the
emphasis in this study is on the "nearlys" and the "almosts." When these 'high-reliability
organizations' do fail, they fail spectacularly, and it is legitimate to examine the systemic
problems thus revealed.
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No one welcomes catastrophe. But might technological apraxia, as I
have been arguing, actually possess qualities worth studying? To find out, let
us follow the metaphor a bit farther. As a neurological condition, apraxia is
unfortunate but not life-threatening. Patients who are unable to carry out a
command using verbal cues are often successful when they switch to visual
ones, or vice-versa. Moreover, there is very little that can be done about
apraxia; once cerebral damage has occurred, neurologists are usually limited
to diagnosing it. Given that there will always be a certain number of apraxic
patients, it would be a shame if neuropathologists did not use this
opportunity to learn how lesions in the brain affect language processing and
motor performance. Studies of these patients have, in fact, helped to establish
that the brain hemisphere that is dominant for language is also dominant for
learning skilled movements, since a lesion in the dominant hemisphere
prevents an apraxic patient from carrying out verbal commands with either
hand but a lesion in the non-dominant hemisphere disables only one hand
or, more often, neither.81
Technological apraxia can be a similarly rich source of insight for
"technopathologists." Just as the physician's highest obligation under the
Hippocratic Oath is to do no harm, there is, as Winner warns, a kind of
"moral imperative" that views any attempt to disturb the technological order
as positively malicious.82 But technological breakdowns, like sickness, occur
without human intention. Our best efforts to keep major systems in working
order are often inadequate, so that there is a constant supply of interesting
mishaps. (William McNeill goes so far as to suggest that a "law of the
81Richard L. Strub and F. William Black, The Mental Status Examination in Neurology,
Second Edition (Philadelphia: F.A. Davis Company, 1985) 142.
8 2Winner, 187.
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conservation of catastrophes" rules human affairs.83) We would be remiss if
we failed to investigate the social and political implications of these
breakdowns, just as the neurologist who ignored the effects of injury would
forfeit valuable information about the brain's normal functioning. The
revelatory power of technological disasters is that they show attentive
observers how technological society works from the inside out - creating the
opportunity for reflection and change.
The usual impulse following almost any kind of technological failure,
whether it be a plane crash or a phone-system crash, is meliorist: Launch an
investigation, discover the cause of the failure, repair or replace the flawed
components, chastise those who may have contributed to the failure, then get
on with life. There is a powerful logic to this approach. It is, after all, the way
hazardous technologies are made safer. We need not discard the world fleet
of DC-10 jets after only a few accidents, much less give up telephones after a
few calls fail to get through. Next time we will do better.
But if the quick-repair response becomes wholly automatic -- if, as
Winner suggests, the slightest disturbance to the technological order is seen as
intolerable - then something valuable has been forfeited. It is the willingness
to have our assumptions jarred, the opportunity to re-evaluate how
technological systems should behave in light of how they misbehave.
Winner coined the phrase "epistemological Luddism" to describe the
voluntary, systematic interruption of certain links in the technological order;
such an activity might be undertaken, he wrote, "as an opportunity to
83McNeill writes, "It certainly seems as though every gain in precision in the coordination of
human activity and every heightening of efficiency in production were matched by a new
vulnerability to breakdown. If this really is the case, then the conservation of catastrophe
may indeed be a law of nature like the conservation of energy." "Control and Catastrophe in
Human Affairs," 11-12.
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inquire, to learn, and to seek something better...What is the institution doing
in the first place? How does its technological structure relate to the ends one
would wish for it? Can one see anything more than to plug the whole back
together the way it was before?"8 4 Winner says he never expected to see
epistemological Luddism applied as an exercise in the real world; he
proposed the idea mainly because it was certain to be dismissed as impractical,
thus illustrating exactly how strong the meliorist mindset has grown. "It was
an impish proposal that I offered, instead of a proposal for reform, precisely to
get people to see how deeply enmeshed we are and how deeply our ability to
make choices and decisions has been given over to systems and arrangements
that are almost impossible to change," he explains.85
But conditions of technological disorder that we would never endure
voluntarily, precisely because they are so disruptive, come along once in a
while whether we like it or not. We may as well take advantage of them. As
Winner concluded in Autonomous Technology, "The best experiments can
be done simply by refusing to repair technological systems as they break
down." 86
Lewis Mumford offered a similar idea in The Myth of the Machine.
"Half a century ago H.G. Wells observed, correctly enough, that mankind
faced a race between education and catastrophe," Mumford wrote in 1964.
"But what [Wells] failed to recognize was that something like catastrophe has
become the condition for an effective education. This might seem like a
dismal and hopeless conclusion, were it not for the fact that the power
system, through its own overwhelming achievements, has proved expert in
84Winner, Autonomous Technology, 332-333.
85 Telephone interview with Winner, November 4, 1992.
86Ibid., 333.
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creating breakdowns and catastrophes."87
Mumford, like Winner, failed to explore the implications of his remarks.
What kinds of breakdowns can be educational? How do the lessons of
catastrophe take hold and spread through society? How, in the end, is the
"power system" itself transformed by this process? These are the some of
questions I hope to answer in the following chapters. One of my goals is to
demonstrate that a technological disaster's technical details cannot be
disentangled from its political significance. More specifically, I want to show
that "citizen technopathologists" can put the lessons learned from
technological disasters to use in local and national conflicts over issues of
health, safety, and democratic participation. I will argue that many of the
critical decisions preceding severe disasters are social, political, or economic in
nature, rather than simply technical, and that the final meaning of many
disasters rests as much on lay people's interpretations of events as on the
interpretations of scientists, engineers, and politicians.
Risk, Social Movements, and NIMBYism
Especially since Love Canal and Three Mile Island, a rapidly growing
body of historical and social-scientific work has focused on technological
hazards. Three general concepts -- risk perception, social movement theory,
and the "Not-In-My-Back-Yard" label -- have structured and informed the
bulk of this scholarship. Before going on to the case studies, I must explain
why this investigation is not about any of these ideas, and why I am arguing
for a less theoretical, more event-centered understanding of technological
breakdowns and their political consequences.
87Lewis Mumford, The Myth of the Machine: The Pentagon of Power, (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, Jovanovich, 1964) 409.
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Citizen opposition to nuclear power and other hazardous technologies
has often been derided by technical experts and industry advocates as a
product of misinformation, irrationality, and emotionalism. Reams of
analysis in the fields of risk assessment, risk management, risk perception,
and risk communication have attempted to explain why the average non-
scientist's estimates of the dangers associated with particular technological
activities never seem to coincide with analysts' careful mathematical models
of the "actual" risks. Most puzzling to these analysts is the fact that people
consistently say they dread low-probability/high-consequence hazards such as
reactor meltdowns more than high-probability/low-consequence events such
as auto accidents.88
I believe, however, that people have a considerably subtler grasp on the
nature and magnitude of most technological hazards than they are typically
given credit for. Most analyses of risk reduce the definition of the "rational"
evaluation of hazards to the mathematical comparison of failure
probabilities. As Sheldon Krimsky and Alonzo Plough have pointed out,
many risk assessors "merely categorize 'irrationalities' and do not explore the
cultural underpinnings of risk perception." Risk analysts' studies, Krimsky
and Plough explain, ignore the crucial difference between technical
rationality, resting on the scientific method, objective inputs, and logical
consistency, and cultural rationality, resting on people's real, subjective
88See, for example, Sarah Lichtenstein, et al., ? udged Frequency of Lethal Events," Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory (1978) 551-78; Paul Slovic, Baruch
Fischhoff, and Sarah Lichtenstien, "Perception and Acceptability of Risk from Energy
Systems," in William R. Freudenburg and Eugene A. Rosa, eds., Public Reactions to Nuclear
Power: Are There Critical Masses? (Washington, D.C.: American Association for the
Advancement of Science, 1984) 115-35; Roger E. Kasperson, "The Social Amplification of Risk:
Progress in Developing an Integrative Framework," in Sheldon Krimsky and Dominic
Golding, eds., Social Theories of Risk (Wesport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1992) 152-78. The
Krimsky & Golding volume contains 14 other essays representing a range of recent work on risk
perception, risk assessment, and risk management.
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experiences of technological or other hazards.8 9 "To understand the measure
of a risk, you have to understand its history," says Mark Sagoff, director of the
Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy. "No risk that is involuntary,
illegitimate, unreasonable or unfair might be too small to be resented."90
But is "cultural rationality" truly rational? On this matter I share the
perspective of Harry Otway, an engineer and social psychologist who observes
that "ordinary people are pretty good at acting in accordance with their own
beliefs and values to attain their own goals...People do not necessarily behave
in a highly efficient way to satisfy their goals but, in the long run, they do
manage to muddle through quite well."9 1 The factors ordinary people take
into account in assessing risk are highly reasonable, even if they cannot be
expressed mathematically. "People are concerned about much more than the
level of risk to which they will be exposed," Otway writes. "They also care
about qualitative aspects, such as who is exposed, who gets the benefits, what
social institutions are favored by the particular technology, how the risk will
by physiologically manifested, what the catastrophic accident potential is,
which effects are delayed, and so on."92
"Risks," in other words, are not disembodied mathematical quantities;
they are personalized threats carrying physical, emotional, and political
significance for those being threatened. Risk analysts, however, treat the
89Sheldon Krimsky and Alonzo Plough, Environmental Hazards: Communicating Risks as a
Social Process (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House Publishing Company, 1988) 304-306.
90Sagoffs comment is from Knowing Our Place: Challenges to Citizenship in a Technological
Age, Program II: "Risk, Rationality, and Realpolitik," a live interactive television program
produced by David Tebaldi of the Massachusetts Foundation for the Humanities and
broadcast by the Massachusetts Corporation for Educational Telecommunications on May 5,
1994.
9 1Harry Otway, "Public Wisdom, Expert Fallibility: Toward a Contextual Theory of Risk," in
Krimsky and Golding, eds., Social Theories of Risk, 216-28. Otway adds wryly, "The idea
that people behave rationally is not uncommon in many social science disciplines, such as
social psychology, socioloyg, and anthropology."
92 Ibid.
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public as if they were a bus full of amnesiacs, driving around in circles
because they never remember where they have been and gaping at each piece
of scenery as if they were seeing it anew. They fail, in other words, to
recognize the role of memory and experience in shaping the public's
technological preferences. As Krimsky and Plough write, "Cultural
rationality can only be understood when people's cognitive behavior is
observed as they are threatened by an actual risk event."9 3 A set of
impressions as powerful as those provided by the disasters discussed in this
thesis can be virtually impossible to counteract; the public's trust in a
technology and its overseers, once revoked, is likely to be withheld for a very
long time. People learn from the mistakes of others as well as from their
own. 9 4
One element from the literature on risk, the concept of "availability
bias," is particularly treacherous for anyone trying to understand people's
reactions to technological disasters. The basic idea, that "an event is judged to
be likely if instances of it are easy to imagine or recall,"95 seems to coincide
closely with what I have just described as the "crucial rle of memory and
experience." It is true that people form judgments about the danger or safety
of particular technological systems on the basis of their prior knowledge and
experience of these systems. On closer inspection, however, the concept of
availability bias turns out to be yet another way of discrediting people's
understanding of technological threats. Barbara Combs, Baruch Fischhoff,
Sarah Lichtenstein, and Paul Slovic have argued that people consistently
overestimrnate the frequency of spectacular, dramatic, or sensational kinds of
93 Krimsky and Plough, 305.
94Trust and mistrust in large technological systems will be examined further in the Conclusion.
95Slovic et al., "Perception and Acceptability of Risk from Energy Systems," 117.
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lethal events (e.g., industrial accidents, tornadoes, and floods) and
underestimate the frequency of those that claim few victims at a time
(lightning, stroke, diabetes). The most overestimated hazards, they argue, are
those which receive what they term a "disproportionate" amount of media
coverage.9 6 Following this logic, they claim that citizen opposition to nuclear
power results not from the fact that deficiencies in reactor safety have led to
real catastrophes, but from the "availability" of disembodied "instances" like
Three Mile Island and Chernobyl in some psychological realm of media-
manipulated images. People's perceptions of risk, these and many other
analysts cnclude, are more the product of their values, beliefs, and
personality types and of media sensationalism than of any objective process of
learning and experience: This is, in short, an intellectualized restatement of
the old bias again:,c cultural rationality.
A full critique of the concept of risk as scholars and technical experts use
it today could fill many pages. Here, however, I want to argue that when
applied outside the narrow tasks for which it was developed -- principally,
gauging the relative reliability of various components of nuclear reactors and
their safety systems -- risk assessment becomes a form of scientism, a
mathematical construct lending specious authority to business and
government decisions about the hazards to which the general population
should be subjected. Indeed, the real question might not be whether cultural
rationality is truly rational, but whether technical rationality is. As I argued a
few pages ago, experts can never possess complete knowledge of the behavior
96 Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff, and Sarah Lichtenstin, "Rating the Risk," Environment (21:
1979) 14-39; Barbara Combs and Paul Slovic, "Newspaper Coverage of Causes of Death,"
Journalism Quarterly (4:1979) 837-43, 849; see also Allan Mazur, "Media Influences on Public
Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power," in Freudenburg and Rosa, eds., Public Reactions to Nuclear
Power, 97-114.
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of complex technologies. Risk assessors who purvey their calculations as
objective truth not only ignore the tentative nature of all scientific results, but
conceal from the public the considerable uncertainties, mathematical
shortcuts, and simplifying assumptions that go into their quantitative
estimates. As one physicist put it,
The expert community is divided about the conceivable realism of probability
estimates [regarding reactor accidentsl in the range of one in ten thousand to one in
one billion per reactor year. I am among those who believe it to be impossible in
principle to support numbers as small as these without convincing theoretical
arguments..The reason I hold this view is straightforward: Nuclear power systems
are so complex that the probability that the safety analysis contains serious
errors...is so big as to render meaningless the tiny computed probability of an
accident. 97
Risk estimates may sti!l be useful for identifying the most worrisome routes
to failure in facilities like nuclear and chemical plants,9 8 but people's
assessments of the dangers in their lives flow from their knowledge of real,
historical hazards, not from mathematical comparisons. What we require if
we are to uncover the cultural and political meanings of technological
catastrophes, therefore, are portrayals of disasters rich in narrative,
ethnographic, and technical detail. To the extent that accounts of real
disasters highlight the artificiality of the discourse about risk, they clear the air
for honest public conversations about technological choices. In what follows,
therefore, I will use the terms "risk" and "risky" very rarely, and then only in
the vernacular sense of danger, peril, or probability of loss.
At the opposite extreme from studies of the mathematics of risk are
analyses that place citizen responses to technological hazards within the
framework of one or another theory about social movements and how they
97John P. Holdren, 'The Nuclear Controversy and the Limi ltions of Decision Making by
Experts," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (32: 1976) 20-22.
98See, for example, Carnegie Mellon University engineering professor M. Granger Morgan's very
circumspect treatment, "Risk Analysis and Management," Scientific American (July, 1993) 32-
41.
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arise, succeed, and fail. While social movements have always been powerful
forces behind social and political change, social movement theory suffers
from a highly blinkered view of participants' motivations. Social
constructionism, resource mobilization theory, entrepreneurial theory, New
Class theory, Jurgen Habermas' neo-Marxist theory and other schools of
thought attempt to explain people's participation in modern social
movements as the product of their own interests, values, world-views, and
class allegiances.9 9 Feelings of "relative deprivation" and envy for the power
of privileged classes play an especially large part in these explanations.
Sociologists Frances McCrea and Gerald Markle, for example, assert in
their study of nuclear weapons protest in the United States that
"characteristics of advanced capitalistic society have created a new class that
increasingly comes in conflict with the old ruling class over the management
of society." True enough; the growth of universities in this century has given
rise to a large group of humanistic and technical intellectuals equipped to
challenge the ruling traditions. But in McCrea and Markle's view, it is this
group's "shared grievances, collective interests, and common values and
beliefs...[that] lead to a questioning and critiquing of the existing order.
Awareness of relative deprivation (in terms of repute, power, and income)
increases alienation from the ruling apparatus." 100 Objective threats to
health, safety, and democratic representation posed by technologies like
nuclear weapons and nuclear power are reduced in this view to "grievances"
that launch, but do not explain, conflicts that are essentially about class
privilege.
99For a succinct summary of these various schools, see Ch. 1, "Social Movements in
Postindustrial Society," in Frances B. McCrea and Gerald E. Markle, Minutes to Midnight:
Nuclear Weapons Protest in America (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1989).
1 00 1bid., 35-36.
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Since theorists such as McCrea and Markle believe, following Marx, that
class struggle is tied to irresistible world-historical forces arising from the
evolution of capitalism, it becomes difficult to use their theory of social
movements to explain how real, discrete events -- like technological disasters
-- could contribute substantively to shifts in the balance of political power. As
I hope to show, disaster events are not simply "resources" for the
mobilization of protest groups, nor are they reducible to the vague
"precipitating factors" or "critical events" to which social movement theorists
resort when it begins to seem that their explanations are devoid of anything
that moves.1 01
A disaster, rather, provides a flood of news about a technological
system's technical and political structure, and this news sometimes convinces
a sector of the public that the system needs fixing or replacing. Social
movements may arise as a result, but their goals are usually well-defined,
centering on preventing the construction or operation of particular industrial
facilities. Collectively, these groups can slow or stop an entire industry -- as
we will see in the next chapter -- but this is not the driving agenda of each
local group. Members are usually concerned about their own safety and
health and about exercising their rights to participate in political and
technological decisions. They are not simply acting out hidden class envies;
101This critique does not apply to Alain Touraine's "critical action theory," which takes a
much more historicist approach to the development of social movements. Touraine argues, for
example, that "At the origin of the anti-nuclear struggle are to be found on the one hand the
fear of the harmful effects of radiation in the factories and on the environment...and on the
other hand an appeal to the natural life with an increasingly strong rejection of an industrial
civilization which depletes resources, pollutes, overcrowds and fatigues human beings and
sinks into contradiction and absurdity...A social movement is taking shape... [that] no longer
opposes workers and bosses but the great apparatuses which determine their way of life and
their collective future, which impose their decisions on the whole of the community in the
name of technical rationality and economic necessity." In Touraine, et al., Anti-Nuclear
Protest: The Opposition to Nuclear Energy in France, Peter Fawcett, trans. (Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge University Press, 1983) 174,179.
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many are not sufficiently educated or cosmopolitan to be considered part of
the "New Class." It has been said that God (or the Devil) is in the details.
This is true for anti-technology movements as well. Once people have
learned the details of a technological disaster, these details become the
substance of new knowledge-based conflicts over objective hazards and the
political mechanisms by which these hazards have been apportioned.
The web of local movements expressing a growing grassroots skepticism
toward technological "progress" is most commonly known by the acronym
NIMBY, for Not In My Back Yard. Initially a derogatory banner invented by
critics, the label has come to be used by scholars and even, with perverse
pride, by members of the movements themselves to refer to local opposition
to the siting of hazardous or undesirable technological projects in the locales
where the protesters live or work. Journalist Charles Piller's conversion on
this issue in The Fail-Safe Society illustrates the way the word's meaning has
evolved:
Conventional wisdom, as promoted by those who introduce, manage, or profit from
science and technology, holds that NIMBYism is the product of selfish ignorance
about risk and that NIMBY groups should be stamped out before they irreparably
harm our ability to extend society's technical reach and our standard of living.
When I began this book, in a basic way I agreed with this view. I saw NIMBYism
as a vexing problem to be solved...[but] as I examined the roots of the NIMBY
phenomenon...I grew to recognize that by labeling NIMBYism as the problem I had
obscured more central issues. It is not risk per se, but how hazards have been
generated and distributed that has led to the NIMBY era.102
While certainly opposed to specific technologies as they have been
implemented, NIMBY groups are not necessarily anti-technocratic, much less
revolutionary, in nature.10 3 They do not aim to overthrow the "ruling class."
102 Charles Piller, The Fail-Safe Society: Community Defiance and the End of American
Technological Optimism (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1991) 14.
103I have portrayed the concept of "risk" as part of technocrats' attempt to recapture
technological control from the NIMBY movements that threaten to erode it. To the extent
that they must combat "riskism," therefore, NIMBY movements may be anti-technocratic.
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In fact, their members are often political conservatives (as, for example, in the
rural regions of southeastern Pennsylvania where many residents became
anti-nuclear protestors after Three Mile Island) who simply dislike the way
decisions about important technological developments are made. They are
usually respectful of the power of science and scientists to better the human
condition, and in many cases they have called on sympathetic scientists and
technicians for assistance in their campaigns. Most of these groups are for
local control -- community involvement in decisions about current and
future technologies -- and against the rule of large-scale technological systems,
especially with regard to the siting and operation of facilities that could one
day break down catastrophically.
Other NIMBY groups, of course, are obstructionist: witness, for example,
the vehement opposition in many communities to the construction of drug-
treatment centers or group homes for the mentally ill. It should be
recognized, however, that the popular vetoes often mobilized by NIMBY
movements are one of the few tools citizens can use to affect technological
politics. "Our strategy is basically like plugging up the toilet," says Lois Gibbs
of the Citizens' Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste. "By stopping [industry]
from opening new landfills, incinerators, and hazardous v aste sites, what
happens? When the cost is high enough, corporations will decide to recycle
wastes and reclaim materials, to substitute nontoxics in their products, to
change their processes of production.' 04 In this way, citizens' power to
prevent may gradually be transtormed into the power to change and create.
104 Quoted in Greider, 169-170. The monthly newsletter of the Clearinghouse is entitled
Everyone's Back Yard.
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* ~~~~**
This chapter has had a number of goals: to draw a distinction between
large-scale technological disasters and other kinds of catastrophes; to trace the
history of, and some of the flaws in, the idea of cybernetic control; to explore
large technological systems' role in governing society; to emphasize the
political importance of breakdowns in these systems; and to distinguish these
ideas from other thinking on the social meaning of technological hazards. In
the coming chapters I will use this framework to explore my basic claim that
control breakdowns in large technological systems disclose the hidden
technical and political nature of these systems, creating valuable leeway for
democratic experimentation in technological societies.
The results of these experiments are often subtle, tentative, and
incomplete. I do not intend to argue that technological disasters
automatically bring societies closer to Jeffersonian democracy, or that, as one
wit put it after Three Mile Island, "every radioactive cloud has a silver
lining."10 5 The main insight in the following case studies, rather, is that
technological catastrophes generate broader understanding of both the
technical flaws and political implications of large systems. What citizens
actually do with this new understanding, and whether they can use it to win
greater safety and greater control over technology, depends on their own
skills, motivations, and political strengths and on the power and resilience of
their opponents.
105 Quoted in Richard D. Lyons, "Nuclear Plant Shutdown: Possible Blessing," The New York
Times (April 11, 1979) A18.
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Chapter 2
THE PRECIOUS DARK
The New York City Blackouts of 1965 and 1977
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Here come more stars to character the skies
And they in the estimation of the wise
Are more divine than any bulb or arc,
Because their purpose is to flash and spark,
But not to take away the precious dark.
We need the interruption of the night
To ease attention off when overtight,
To break our logic in too long a flight,
And ask us if our premises are right.
- from Robert Frost, "The
Literate Farmer and
the Planet Venus '"l
The bigger a technology grows, the less noticeable it becomes. Probably
the most remote and invisible parts of our technological environment,
because they envelop us so completely, are the large, distributed systems
described in Chapter 1. We do things with these systems, but we seldom
contemplate doing anything about them, since as long as they are functioning
normally they remain hidden, unobtrusive, and quite impervious to local
inputs. As historians of technology Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wacjman
have written, "We live our lives in a world of things that people have made.
Mostly we take that world for granted. We do not ask why our refrigerator
makes an annoying humming noise, nor why our domestic appliances are
shaped the way they are. We think about electricity only when the bill has to
be paid, or when the supply fails...Technological change seems to have its
own logic, which we may perhaps protest or even try to block, but which we
appear to be unable to alter fundamentally." 2
1From "The Literate Farmer and the Planet Venus," The Poetry of Robert Frost (New York:
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1969) 368-370.
2Donald Mackenzie and Judy Wacjman, eds., The Social Shaping of Technology: How the
Refrigerator Got its Hum (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1985) 2.
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Electrical power networks are the most forgettable and far-removed of
large systems, yet they underpin all our activities. 3 Thomas Edison installed
the world's first commercial power network in Manhattan in 1882, less than
two human lifetimes ago; today the generation of electricity consumes one-
third of the energy used in the United States, more than any other sector.4
Even this figure understates electricity's importance, since nearly every phase
of modern manufacturing, transportation, communication, and business
administration depends on its steady supply. Demand for electricity in the
United States increased by a factor of almost 100 between 1900 and 1950.5 It
then doubled between 1950 and 1960, doubled again between 1960 and 1970,
and doubled yet again between 1970 and 1990.6
More subtly, however, electrical devices have infiltrated every part of
daily life. The alarm clock that wakes me in the morning, my coffeemaker
and toaster and shaver, the computer on my desk are all electrical. (Simply
programming all desktop computers in the U.S. to go into electronic
hibernation when they are not being used, according to the Environmental
Protection Agency, would save an amount of energy equivalent to the annual
electricity use of Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine combined. 7 ) The
nation's electrical utilities, for their part, are straightforward about the
nation's increasing dependence on electricity, even proud of it. "Electricity as
3And the first studied in detail; see Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in
Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983).
4Pietro S. Nivola, The Politics of Energy Conservation (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1986) 151.
5Sam H. Schurr and Bruce C. Netschert, Energy in the American Economy, 1850-1975
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press for Resources for the Future, Inc., 1960) 181.
6 Growth slacked off somewhat after the Arab oil embargo of 1973. Sam H. Schurr, et al.,
Electricity in the American Economy: Agent of Technological Progress (New York: Greenwood
Press for the Electric Power Research Institute, 1990) 382.
7Steve Lohr, "Recycling Answer Sought for Computer Junk," The New York Times (April 14,
1993) Al, D13.
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an agent of tecmhnological progress has left as strong an imprint on our daily
lives at home as on the performance of work in the industrial sector," boasts
the Electric Power Research Institute, an industry think tank and lobbying
organization. "Further, no end is in sight, given the rapid proliferation of
electronic, mechanical, and thermal applications of electricity in the home."8
Electrification has even shaped the way we think about how large
enterprises should be managed. The vesting of control over electrical
generation and distribution in private investor-owned utility companies has
long been a simple "fact of life" within the industrial economy of the United
States. 9 "Almost from its earliest days, the physical anC economic
characteristics of the electrical industry were recognized as such that a single
supplier within a local area offered the most efficient way of getting electric
power generated and delivered to the consumer...Furthermore, each supplier
needed to stand ready to meet the peak demands of all its customers in a
situation in which production and consumption occur simultaneously...
[leading to] spontaneous merger of the separate systems that were originally
in existence within many localities."10 Very early in the industry's history,
the special logic of efficiency closed off the possibility of local control over the
supply of electricity, guaranteeing the growth of what are politely called
"natural monopolies."
In a very brief time, in other words, the electrification of modern society
by centralized, large-scale energy bureaucracies has become a tradition, in the
sense of an inherited, established, or customary pattern of thought, action, or
8Schurr, et al., 269.
9 Hans H. Landsberg and Sam H. Schurr, Energy in the United States: Sources, Uses, and Policy
Issues (New York: Random House, 1968) 209
1 0 Ibid.
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behaviora l (This is one of the fascinating ironies of modem technological
development: that it establishes itself as permanent and inevitable while
simultaneously bringing unceasing upheaval and change. It attempts to
displace all other traditions with its own.) And traditions, while they are our
main link to the past and the source of the cultural continuity tbai makes life
comprehensible, can also work to make the present seem inevitable and
unremarkable. They discourage us from asking why things are the way they
are. Martin Heidegger, the German philosopher, had this to say about
tradition:
When tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it
"transmits" is made so inaccessible...that it rather becomes concealed. Tradition
takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our
access to those primordial "sources" from which the categories and concepts handed
down to us have been in part genuinely drawn. Indeed it makes us forget that they
have had such an origin, and makes us suppose that the necessity of going back to
these sources is something which we need not even understand.12
Electricity is among the most fundamental "categories and concepts" handed
down to us by the Second Industrial Revolution. It has, as the electrical
industry claims, "penetrated deeply and brought important changes into
virtually every corner of American life," so much so that we are seldom
conscious of the extent of our dependence on it or of the complex political
and technical arrangements by which it is delivered to us. 13 We only know
that when we flip a switch, the lights come on. Beyond this point, the
technicians are in charge.
11This is one definition offered by Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary. Another
relevant definition might be "characteristic manner, method, or style," since reliance on large
technological systems such as electrical grids is a part of the established "technological
style" of modem industrial societies.
12Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (San
Francisco: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1962) 43.
1 3 Schurr, et al., xiii.
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But must it be this way? Must we depend for this basic resource on a
system that is so complex, inaccessible, and monolithic? Must we get our
electricity from big utility companies and giant generating stations whose
capacities vastly outscale the end uses to which the power is put? Must wc
trust that this system is the safest and most reliable that can be built? And
must all future growth in electricity demand be met using the same
approach? In short, is there any reason to respect the century-long tradition
of centralized electric power distribution in the United States, other than that
it is such a tradition?
Though Heidegger seems to have considered the quest for human
control over technology ultimately futile14, he did offer a possible antidote to
technology-as-tradition in his landmark study Being and Time. Heidegger's
main concern as a philosopher was with the nature of existence, or what it
means to "be" in the world. But in order to pin down the nature of being-in-
the-world, he had first to say what that world is. In Heidegger's scheme the
world is constituted by the sum of the entities which we encounter and use in
our everyday lives: in other words, tools. (His precise word was Zeug, which
can also mean "gear," "equipment," or just "stuff".) Tools, according to
Heidegger, can either be "ready-to-hand," existing only to be used, or "present-
at-hand," existing as objects of attention in themselves. On the surface this
distinction might seem academic. It rests, after all, more on the way we
perceive objects than on their "real" essences. But for exactly this reason, it
helps us to reflect more carefully on the ways in which we take certain
artificial parts of our environment wholly for granted.
14 See Langdon Winner's discussion of Heidegger in Autonomous Technology: Technics-Out-of-
Control as a Theme in Political Thought Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977) 131.
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Heidegger believed that people deal with tools primarily as ready-to-
hand, that is, without really thinking about their roles or "assignments."
Thus a hammer typically exists as such only while being used in the act of
hammering. But here is the important point: For Heidegger the hammer's
presence-at-hand, its meaning as an object separate from its user, becomes
most visible when it is damaged, missing, or unusable, and therefore
conspicuous. "When an assignment has been disturbed -- when something is
unusable for some purpose -- then the assignment becomes explicit," he
wrote. "The context of equipment is lit up...Similarly, when something ready-
to-hand is found missing, though its everyday presence has been so obvious
that we have never taken any notice of it, this makes a break in those
referential contexts which circumspection discovers. Our circumspection
comes up against emptiness, and now sees for the first time...what the
missing article was ready-to-hand for."15
A hammer is a considerably simpler tool than an electrical generation
and transmission network, but Heidegger's point can be generalized. People
do not flly comprehend what their machines are doing for them, or to them,
until those machines malfunction. The machines then cease to exist merely
as extensions of their designers' or users' intentions; they become
autonomous objects, impinging on the world with their own recognizable set
of requirements and effects. A system breakdown of the kind described in
Chapter 1 is, in Heidegger's terms, the ultimate "assignment disturbance."
With the loss of control in a complex technological system, the functions of
the various subsystems begin to conflict. They may either cancel each other
out or resonate catastrophically. If the conflict is bad enough, the system
93
15 Heidegger, Being and Time, 105.
finally shatters into all its constituent purposes, and the figurative debris is
thrown about for everyone to see. Attentive citizens taking up the role of
"technopathologist" may use this evidence to argue for a reevaulation of
existing methods of planning and control.
MacKenzie and Wacjman's observation that "we think about electricity
only...when the supply fails" is thus a weightier one than they may have
realized. For reasons we began to explore in Chapter 1, large technological
systems like electrical grids do not always function as designed. Even if all of
a system's constituent parts are well understood and perform according to
specifications, the system as a whole can still collapse in response to
unexpected blows from without or unexpected conflicts from within. The
electrical power industry has suffered its share of system breakdowns in this
century, and the few that were bad enough to be memorable -- notably, the
great Northeast power failure of 1965 and the New York City blackout of 1977
-- were classic examples of the "brittleness" of large, complex, tightly-coupled
technological systems.16
But they were also, as Winner put it, "opportunities to inquire, to learn,
and to seek something better." The present chapter is included in this study
of the political meanings of technological disasters not because the blackouts
generated a widespread grassroots response -- they did not -- but because they
contributed to a slowly gathering critique of the way electricity is generated
and distributed in North America. This critique, together with long-term
economic trends affecting the growth of electrical demand, is beginning to
result today in significant technological and political changes for the industry.
The 1965 and 1977 blackouts forced citizens to recognize that with dependence
16 See Amory B. Lovins and L. Hunter Lovins, Brittle Power: Energy Strategy for National
Security (Andover, Mass.: Brick House Publishing Company, 1982).
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comes vulnerability: that the comfort provided by our electrified
surroundings masks our enslavement to the possibility of system-wide
failure. Seeing how the "interruption of the night" can "break our logic in
too long a flight," therefore, means interpreting an event like a blackout as
something more than an inconvenience.
The Great Northeast Power Failure
It was the middle of rush hour in New York City on a crisp November
afternoon in 1965. The vast living machine made up of subways and
elevators and stoplights and computers and over seven million people -- the
most complex technological setting on Earth-- pulsed with traffic and vitality.
Then without warning, at half past five, the machine stumbled and lurched
into a comatose silence from which it would n:ot completely reawaken until
thirteen hours later. For the first time in its history, New York had
succumbed to a complete failure of its electrical power network.
Hundreds of thousands were trapped in darkened subway tunnels and
elevator shafts. In hospitals, surgeons hurriedly finished their operations by
candlelight. Airline pilots watched in horror as runway lights at LaGuardia
and Kennedy airports flickered, then went out. It would have been like a
scene from the 1951 science-fiction film The Day the Earth Stood Still, except
that the city's cars, trucks, and taxis, equipped with their own generators, still
crawled through the nearly-paralyzed streets, casting meager illumination
from their headlights. Overhead, luckily, there was a full moon. For once
uncontested by the city lights, its brightness reminded some of the "bomber's
moon" that hung over London during the Blitz.
New Yorkers were not alone in the crisis, though they discovered this
only slowly as they listened to news updates over their battery-powered
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transistor radios. Incredibly, the power failure blanketed all of New York
State, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire, parts of Maine,
and the southern chunk of Ontario. These areas were home to over 30
million people, more than had been affected by any other blackout in history.
For most, power was restored within two to eight hours. But the unforeseen
necessity of "cold-starting" a distribution system as complex as New York
City's delayed Consolidated Edison's efforts to restore power fully until early
the next morning. For the millions of New Yorkers who lived through this
"eerie all-night fantasy when the whole machinery of life came to a halt," to
use the words of one reporter, a resource normally taken for granted gained
sudden conspicuousness through its very absence, just as Heidegger had
predicted. 17
New York's blackout experience was all the more remarkable in view of
the city's role as the birthplace of commercial electric power. Consolidated
Edison (Con Ed), the city's sole supplier of electricity for heat, light, and
power, is a descendent of Manhattan's Edison Electrical Illuminating
Company, which acquired the world's first electric lighting franchise from the
city government in 1881. The six direct-current generators located at the
company's first station on Pearl Street had originally been designed by
Thomas Edison to supply power to 1,200 sixteen-candlepower lamps. The
innovation proved an immediate success, and Edison's base of 59 customers
expanded to over 500 within the first year of service, with 11,000 lamps lit by
the end of 1883. To avoid adding to the mess of overhead telephone and
telegraph wires already clogging the city's skyline, Edison inventively placed
electrical lines underground in iron conduits. Soon franchises began
17Homer Bigart, "A Night of Confusion, Frustration, and Adventure," The New York Times
(Nov. 11, 1965) 1,37.
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springing up to serve other parts of the city, and they offered electricity for
power, not just light. The city's gas distributors, rightly worried about these
new developments, merged into the Consolidated Gas Company in 1884 and
began, in 1901, to acquire the electrical franchises serving Westchester County
and all of New York's five boroughs, including the original Edison Electrical
Illuminating Company. In 1936 the Consolidated Gas Company changed its
name to the Consolidated Edison Company. 18
By 1965, Con Ed represented only one small region in a nationwide
electrical web with a total annual output of a trillion kilowatt-hours -- more
than Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union combined.
Electric power consumption in the U.S. that year was triple what it had been
in 1950. The electrification of even the most remote areas under the New
Deal's Rural Electrification Administration was essentially complete, with
privately-held utility companies serving about eighty percent of the nation's
electrical customers and publicly-owned cooperatives and government
agencies serving the rest. The national electrical grid connected hundreds of
local and regional utilities into six major groups, the largest of which, the
Interconnected Systems Group, stretched from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico
and from the Atlantic coast to the Rocky Mountains. Con Ed was part of this
group.
Part of the logic behind the grid system was that it improved reliability: a
company whose own generating capacity was reduced for some reason could
maintain service by importing power from outside sources. But the utilities
had not linked arms for purely altruistic reasons. The grid evolved during the
nineteen-forties and fifties as a way for utilities to ensure continual expansion
18Lurkis, Alexander, The Power Brink: Con Edison, A Centennial of Electricity (New York, The
Icare Press, 1982) 1644.
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by keeping the cost of electricity down. Instead of duplicating each others'
efforts to build generating capacity, the companies agreed to share power by
transmitting it over long distances to the locations where it was needed most
at any given time. High electrical demand during the 5:00 p.m. rush hour in
New York City, for example, might be met using excess generating capacity in
rural areas as far away as Michigan, where the daily demand curve
corresponded to farming routines. In this way individual utilities could
obtain power from the most cost-efficient sources and also reduce the reserve
capacity they set aside for maintenance, repairs, and emergencies. The
strategy seemed to work. While the cost of living in the United States
doubled between 1940 and 1965, the inflation-adjusted cost of electricity fell by
half. 19
Con Ed, with its 91 boilers supplying steam to 68 turbine-generators at 12
generating stations (one of them nuclear, many of the rest recently converted
from sulfur-dioxide-emitting coal to oil), 45 major substations plus 215 unit
substations, 60 miles of underground cable carrying power at 345,000 volts, 300
miles carrying 138,000 volts, and 42 network areas supplied by more than 700
network feeder cables, was the most complex generating, transmission and
distribution system in the world. It was also the largest utility in a
confederation of 42 power companies called CANUSE, for Canada-U.S.-Eastern.
The region's main 345,000-volt transmission lines formed a giant T, with one
line running east-west from Detroit to Boston via Niagara Falls, and the other
running north-south from Schenectady to New York City. (See Figure 2.1.)
Like Venice and Stockholm, New York City is an archipelago, cut off from the
mainland by the Hudson and East Rivers and Long Island Sound. Because it
19A.M. Rosenthal and Arthur Gelb, eds., The Night the Lights Went Out (New York: Signet,
1965) 68-76.
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is difficult to lay power cables either over or under the water, the city's power
connections to the outside world have always been somewhat precarious.
But with links to New Jersey and upstate New York -- and, through them, to
the entire CANUSE grid -- Con Ed power planners in 1965 did not believe they
would ever face a total shutdown, no matter how much local generating
capacity was temporarily lost. The system was designed o compensate
immediately by rerouting the flow of electricity from far-away generating
stations.
But there was a catch. In pooling their power resources to prevent local
brownouts and blackouts without also equipping themselves with centralized
control facilities and displays of the grid's condition, tle utilities had
unwittingly opened themselves to system-wide failure. By its very
architecture, the grid as it stood in the early nineteen-sixties -- before the
technical lessons of the great Northeastern blackout -- was just as capable of
communicating a massive power drain to all its member utilities as it was ot
occasionally shoring them up. The danger was that a severe breakdown in
one section of the grid would create an excessive drain on neighboring
utilities, which might collapse and drag down their neighbors in turn -- a
cascading effect that the automatic circuit breakers on some transmission
lines might not prevent. Moreover, the interconnection of separate utilities
meant that the 60-Hertz cycle of the alternating current being generated at
hundreds of power stations around the grid had to be exactly synchronized.
Power drains often caused a drop in this frequency, and even small
discrepancies could lead generators to "quarrel" and cut off automatically.
Such were the possibilities on the eve of the November blackout. Con
Ed officials, however, were sanguine. "In the push for improved efficiency in
generation and transmission in the nineteen-fifties and early nineteen-sixties,
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reliability was nudged aside and relegated to a somewhat lesser role," Michehl
Gent, current president of the North American Electric Reliability Council,
explains today.20 This is not to say that Con Ed engineers underestimated the
amount of disruption a city-wide blackout would cause; even 34 years earlier
a proposal to turn off the city's electric current for a single minute in honor of
the death of Thomas Edison had been rejected as too costly and dangerous.
But Con Ed had failed to read the warning signs provided by earlier
power failures. A blackout that prefigured the 1965 disaster in miniature
occurred on August 17, 1959, when five square miles of upper Manhattan lost
power for more than twelve hours. The chief engineer for the city's Bureau
of Gas and Electricity, Alexander Lurkis, blasted Con Ed for having failed to
provide sufficient electric feeder capacity to the affected areas. Lurkis wrote in
his official report that the pre-existing overload, combined with the
company's inability to isolate faulty sections from the rest of the urban grid,
had resulted in a cascading series of feeder breakdowns. Con Ed, however,
denied that its grid was at fault, calling the failure an "act of God." The
company went on to state that "the mathematical chances are negligible that a
similar situation will develop again." But a nearly identical breakdown
"developed" less than two years later, on June 13, 1961. This time, five square
miles of mid-Manhattan were paralyzed for more than four hours by the
failure of a high-voltage circuit breaker at one substation and the consequent
shutdown of two other substations. Not until the early nineteen-seventies,
after the massive 1965 blackout, did Con Ed give in to public frustration over
these frequent breakdowns and begin to study changes in its underground
distribution system. 21
2 0North American Electric Reliability Council 1990 Annual Report, 4.
2 1 Lurkis, The Power Brink, 1, 51-55.
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Relay Race
The utility's inability to protect itself from cascading power shutdowns
was precisely what made the big 1965 blackout possible. The failure began - as
most technological failures do -- as a combination of human unmindfulness
and minor electromechanical failure. A shoebox-sized transmission relay at
the Ontario Hydro-Electric Power Commission's Sir Adam Beck generating
station in Queenston, Ontario, had been set in 1963 to interrupt the
westbound flow of power if the load on its line exceeded 375,000 volts. That
line, however, was capable of transmitting 500,000 volts, and controllers,
unaware of the low setting on the relay, had been using it to transmit higher
and higher voltages to meet growing demand in Toronto. At eleven seconds
after 5:16 p.m. on November 9, 1965, they finally pushed the relay too far.
Load on the line briefly climbed above 375,000 volts, and the relay tripped
circuit breakers that took the line out of service.
Electricity is the flow of electrons and can be compared to water flowing
downhill through a sluice gate. Electrical current, measured in amps,
corresponds to the volume of water passing through the gate per unit time,
and the potential difference between the electrons' source and their
destination, measured in volts, corresponds to the height from which the
water falls. But the crucial part of the analogy here is that as long as circuits
are closed and there is a positively-charged destination to draw on the
negatively-charged electrons, then electricity, like water falling under the
force of gravity, will take any available route to its destination. When the
first line to Toronto tripped out, its load was thrown onto four parallel lines,
all of which overloaded and disconnected within three seconds. Now the big
block of power being generated at the Beck plant tried to reach Toronto by way
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of lines through upstate New York. Those lines overloaded and failed as
well, forcing the Beck plant off-line.
With major transmission lines out of service, electrical demand in the
Lake Ontario region would now have to be met by generating stations in
other parts oi the CANUSE grid. To protect itself, the Pennsylvania-New Jersy-
Maryland part of the eastern grid cut off all connections with CANUSE. The
Con Ed system, which had been importing 220,000 kilowatts moments before,
suddenly found itself confronting a massive power drain to the north.
Demand exceeded supply by 1.1 million kilowatts. Generating stations
throughout New York and New England strained to make up the gap, but
when two New England generators quarrelled and tripped off, the Eastern
grid began to fracture into all its constituent parts. Rapid frequency declines
caused more generators to go off-line. In the New York City control room,
Con Ed engineers tried frantically to "shed load" by closing relays and cutting
off power to individual neighborhoods, including the West Bronx, Yorkville,
and East Brooklyn. But they were too slow. At 5:28 p.m., twelve minutes
after the first relay tripped at the Ontario station, the entire Con Ed system
collapsed, along with most of New England, New York State, and Ontario.22
The Blackout Experience
The city quickly ground to a halt. And so, save for their automobiles,
telephones, and transistor radios, New Yorkers found their technological
habitat completely inert: proof of how thoroughly the built environment had
been shaped around the availability of electricity. Water pressure to the
upper floors of high-rise building dropped to zero. Gasoline stations could no
2 2Dorothy Ellison and Kathleen R. Gordon, special section on the 10th anniversary of the
blackout, Around the System (Consolidated Edison newsletter) (October, 1975) 16-17.
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longer pump gas. All of New York's nine television stations were forced off
the air. Not even during the jittery time of air-raid drills during the second
World War had the city been this dark. New York-based Time magazine
wrote:
New Yorkers assailed by the chill night -- and, for a frozen instant, silence --
reacted almost sportively, as if it were all a gigantic game of Blind Man's Buff [sic].
In soaring office buildings and fetid subway tunnels, beleaguered commuter trains
and jampacked terminals, they joked and chattered, waiting from minute to minute
for the reviving whine of dynamos, the first stutter of returning light. And,
incredulously, they began to realize at last that they had been transported to
Caliban's world, a vast, trackless cave without warmth or wheels, without hot
food or the lights of home.2 3
The events of that long night would become a kind of urban legend.
Everyone who took part had a story to tell afterwards, sometimes even
decades later. The blackout, ironically, caused what sociologists have called
the "flashbulb effect," illuminating the oft-forgotten details of daily existence
in an unfamiliar fashion and freezing the experience in people's memories.
"This is the type of day where you remember everything. Everything you did,
everything you ate. I'll remember it all," a young woman told The New York
Times. She was eating lukewarm frankfurters and cold baked beans by the
light of a flickering candle in a Lexington Avenue luncheonette. One utility
employee would write ten years later, "It was one of those timesheds, like
Hurricane Hazel and the Kennedy assassination, around which people relate
the events of their lives."24
To the contemporary imagination, sobered by the violence and urban
decay of the intervening decades, certain events of that night would seem
unbelievable if not for the direct historical evidence confirming them.
Crime, for example, was virtually absent: there were only one-quarter as
2 3
'The Disaster That Wasn't", Time (November 19, 1965) 20-25.
24Rosenthal, The Night the Lights Went Out, 47; Jim Dunn, "Ten years later and all's well,"
Hydroscope (Newsletter of the Ontario Hydro-Electric Power Commission) (Nov. 7, 1975).
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many arrests as on a usual night. Only three people died as a result of the
blackout. One fell down a stairway and struck his head, another had a heart
attack after climbing ten flights of stairs, and a third was found at the bottom
of an elevator shaft six days later. (No one knew how he had gotten there.)
Perhaps even more astonishing, however, the blackout brought out a 
streak of humanity and carefree generosity in New Yorkers that surprised
even themselves. "New Yorkers learned something about themselves
yesterday that they probably never suspected," wrote one journalist. "Under
stress, and in the face of the unknown, they proved, generally, to be
courteous, friendly, and considerate." Another reporter observed that
normally defensive urbanites "helped one another, gave one another rides
home, lent each other matches and cigarettes and candles. In many apartment
buildings, children with candles stood ready to lead tenants up the pitch-black
stairs." One woman received so many courtesies during the power failure
that she said it had "restored her faith in mankind." A magazine
commentator marveled, "The blackout showed that when the switches are
down, New Yorkers have a heart; are human, after all; and can display a sense
of humor." When a fireman who had broken through the wall of a stalled
elevator in the Empire State Building asked whether there were any pregnant
women in the car, one of the men trapped there reportedly replied, "We've
hardly even metl" 25
25Richard J.H. Johnston, "Bright Side to Blackout: Hidden Virtues Show Up as New Yorkers
Give Help During Crisis," The New York Times (Nov. 10, 1965) 4; The Night the Lights
Went Out, 46; Howard Simons, "Inquest on Power," The New Scientist (Nov. 25, 1965) 569;
McCandlish Phillips, "Blackout Vignettes Are Everywhere You Look," The New York Times
(November 11, 1965) 37.
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Chief Engineer Lurkis was himself one of the 800,000 people stranded in
the city's subway tunnels and bridges. He described his fellow citizens'
aplomb this way:
Traction power was lost just as my train entered the Brooklyn-New York under river
tunnel on the Brooklyn side. The passengers were marvelous in their calm...Someone
had a transistor radio, and that is how we found out it was a blackout. When it was
reported that the traffic signals and street lights were out, and that traffic was
jawrnaing everywhere, I decided to stay put where there was some light, rather
than fight the traffic, the cold weather and the uncertain conditions in the open.
Four hours later, when the train's battery lights started to dim, I decided it was
time for me to move. I walked to the rear of the train, with the aid of a trainman's
lantern and along to track to the Brooklyn station. I climbed out of the station, and
after waiting for some time, grabbed a bus running over the Manhattan bridge...The
walk through the darkness to the west side was without event; no molestation or
mugging. The people along the way took the disaster with good humor, enjoying the
unusual experience...Drivers used extreme caution and courtesy in driving through
the dark streets aided by volunteer traffic directors.26
Millions shared this unexpected serenity in the face of the disaster. A lawyer
working with his colleagues on the 32nd floor of a Third Avenue office
building, reluctant to walk the 600 darkened steps down to the street, told a
reporter, "First we just sat around having drinks. Now we're having a seance
to communicate with the spirit that caused this bliss...We're all getting to
know each other."27 A man who was in an all-night bar when the power
came back on remarked, "You know, it's a big pain and all, but I sort of hate to
see it all over. Tomorrow will be just another working day."28
Counter to the widely-held perception that natural and technological
disasters are nightmarish ordeals, researchers say the experience of disaster
often involves a strange and infectious kind of euphoria. David Riesman,
the Harvard sociologist whose 1950 study of post-industrial autonomy and
conformity among Americans, The Lonely Crowd, had become a bestseller,
2 6 Lutrkis, The Power Brink, 56-57. 
27William Borders, "Many Caught in Elevators, Most Quickly Freed - Upper Floors Soon
Become Jovial," The New York Times (Nov. 10, 1965) 3.
28Homer Bigart, "A Night of Confusion, Frustration and Adventure," The New York Times
(Nov. 11, 1965) 1, 37.
111
gave this explanation for behavior during the blackout: "When something
like this happens, it's not our fault and we know it's not. So we say to
ourselves, 'Fate is in charge,' and we enter into an era of good feeling. That's
what happened Tuesday night."29 But the psychic roots of the spontaneous
cameraderie and goodwill demonstrated by New Yorkers during the 1965
blackout may go deeper than Riesman suggested. Michael Barkun, author of
an extensive study on millennial cults, has written that "Mass ecstasy - or, to
use the terminology of historians of religion, enthusiasm -- stems from two
principal causes: radical changes in sensory stimulation and situations which
create extraordinary degrees of tension and anxiety...Disaster inadvertently
produces many of the same effects as intentional ecstatic techniques."30 Both
of Barkun's ingredients were present in the blackout, and mass enthusiasm, if
not quite "ecstasy" seems an apt description for New Yorkers' reactions that
night.
Certainly, the blustery joviality displayed by many was partly a cover for
deeper worries and anxieties -- for example, that the Russians might
somehow be responsible for the disaster, or simply that they might not reach
their homes until very late that evening. And for what New York Times
editor A.M. Rosenthal called "the plugged-in society," the loss of power and
light did amount to a radical change in sensory stimulation. It was not a
change New Yorkers would have endured voluntarily; historian David E.
Nye has described how, even as early as World War I, emergency cutbacks of
the dramatic electric lighting so characteristic of New York City had proved an
29
"The Disaster That Wasn't," 25. See also David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the
Changing American Character (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950, 1965).
30Michael Barkun, Disaster and the Millennium (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974)
156-57.
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"unacceptable psychic loss" for its residents.3 1 But the disruption did provoke
people to a heightened awareness of their physical and social surroundings,
one of those rare moments when the familiar suddenly seems strange and
wonderful. As an awed Columbia University student stuck on the 86th-floor
observatory of the Empire State Building remarked, "You should see the full
moon shimmering in the East River -- I've never seen anything like it!"32
With its darkened towers silhouetted against the moonlit sky, its televisions
and hi-fis silenced, the technological metropolis became a huge canvas for the
human imagination. It was all oddly exciting. "While the city of bricks and
mortar was dead," the editors of The New Yorker wrote, "the people were
more alive than ever."33
Escaping the "Prison Farm of Modern Technology"
Aside from the darkness, the most obvious part of the radically altered
environment -- and, judging from New Yorkers' own statements, a
surprising source of "disaster euphoria" during the blackout-- was the fact
that nothing electrical worked anymore. "To Americans served and shielded
by machines at every turn, each silent switch and powerless push button was
a taunt," Time magazine observed. "Yet Northeasterners wasted little time
lamenting their betrayal by the machine. Instead, with a high sense of shared
adventure, they set about the unfamiliar task of using legs and arms to help
31The U.S. Fuel Administration had ordered the city's electric signs turned off as a
conservation measure, and "Broadway had been dark only two or three nights before requests
that the lights be turned on again began to pour into the headquarters of the Fuel
Administration...The advertising signs were soon turned on again so that the city could
appear 'normal.'" David E. Nye, Electrifying America: Social Meanings of a New
Technology (MIT Press, 1990) 60.
3 2 Borders, "Many Caught," 3.
33 Quoted by Lewis Mumford, The Myth of the Machine: The Pentagon of Power (New York:
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1964, 1970) 409.
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themselves and their fellow men." Many took advantage of the opportunity
to try out long-disused skills and to resurrect technologies from simpler days.
Candles were at a premium that night. (The news staff of the New York
Times, the only newspaper to publish the day after the blackout, worked
through the night under the glow of ceremonial candles from Holy Cross and
St. Malachy's Roman Catholic churches and elegant restaurant candles from
the Astor and New Yorker hotels.34 ) Thousands, like Chief Engineer Lurkis,
cheerfully walked miles to reach their homes. People everywhere made do
with what they had, and seemed to enjoy it. Time reported, "When power
failed in the $37,500 Queens home of Mechanical Engineer Edwin Robbins,
the result was pure farce. Nothing worked, not the multitone door chimes or
the intercom system, not the Danish dining-room chandelier or the bedroom
clocks, not the hair dryer or the electric blankets, not the can opener or the
carving knife, not the toothbrush or the razor. Not even the electric-eye
garage door. For dinner, the Robbins had charcoal-broiled steaks grilled over a
primitive backyard barbecue."3 5
The Times, understandably prideful for having defied the blackout by
publishing an abbreviated morning edition at the plant of a New Jersey
newspaper, editorialized that "Suddenly, man's capacity to send rockets to the
moon, to produce limitless quantities of goods without human effort, faded
into irrelevance. People rediscovered their feet; the candle came back into its
own; the infinite resiliency of the human spirit was demonstrated anew."36
In a paperback compilation of Times articles on the blackout entitled The
34Alfred E. Clark, "How Times Published: Paper Printed at Plant of Newark Evening News,"
The New York Times (Nov. 10, 1965) 2.
3 5
"The Disaster That Wasn't," 20-25.
3 6
"Aladdin's Lamp Blacks Out," The New York Times (Nov. 10, 1965) 6.
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Night The Lights Went Out, editor A.M. Rosenthal wrote this Robinson
Crusoe-like paean to the darkness:
The blackout brought fears and mysteries; it also brought a certain exhilaration. In
every man there is a corner of rebellion against the machine, and the blackout
allowed us a brief period of freedom from its dominance. We were all delighted at
the rediscovery of the importance of things that were not plugged into walls-
things that were almost forgotten by us-most of all, the wonderful, wonderful
candle. What a moment of triumph to know that the huge computers we really did
not like and that we suspected really did not like us were lying massively dead and
useless, but the old pencil sharpener still worked. It was modem man's closest
equivalent to being alone on a desert island, and the great joy of making do bouyed
us all. We knew we would be recaptured and brought back submissively to the
prison farm of modem technology but it was good being free, loose and on the run for
a few hours.
Rosenthal correctly anticipated that the blackout would make prime material
for future scholars. "Psychologists will peer into the behavior of men under
stress, sociologists will examine the suddenly torn fabric of modern life,
economists will dissect the relationship of public utilities to public
interests...And philosophers and theologians will search their minds for the
meaning of man's position in a technological society which he found he
neither really understood nor controlled, a most bewildering and frightening
moment of awareness."37
Lewis Mumford was one of these scholars. A life-long New Yorker who
was often gloomy about the possibility of human freedom in the face of what
he called the "megamachine," Mumford nevertheless found cause for hope
in the blackout. Near the end of The Pentagon of Power, the crowning
volume in his series The Myth of the Machine series, Mumford wrote:
For many [the 1965 blackout] proved an exhilarating experience: autos, which can
function by their own power and light, kept moving: citizens supplemented
policemen in directing traffic: trucks took on passengers: strangers helped one
another: people found that their legs would transport them sufficiently when
wheels failed: one set of young men and women gaily formed a procession, carrying
candles, chanting in mock solemnity, 'Hark the Herald Angels Sing!' All the latent
3 7 The Night The Lights Went Out, 11-12.
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human powers that a perfect, smooth-running mechanical organization suppresses
began to function again.38
For Mumford, as for Rosenthal, the blackout experience was something to be
treasured, preserved, dissected for all it had to tell about human dependence
on machines. While both stopped short of advocating deliberate acts of
technological abstinence, it was the spiritually purifying effect of doing
without electricity that they found most valuable. It was a short step from
this belief to the conclusion that the blackout was not a disaster at all. "What
seemed a calamity turned into an opportunity," Mumford wrote. "When the
machine stopped, life recovered."3 9
At the center of many New Yorkers' blackout experiences, then, were
three complementary discoveries: that everyday activities depended utterly
on the uninterrupted supply of electricity; that this supply was in fact
astonishingly fragile; and that life without electricity, or life less dependent
on the electrical power system as structured, was not unthinkable. Though it
is impossible to determine exactly how many people reached these
conclusions in their own minds, anecdotal evidence suggests that they were
not merely the opinions of a small group of left-leaning writers and critics of
technology. Many New Yorkers were frustrated over the inconvenience
caused by the blackout and angry toward Con Ed for its perceived
incompetence, but these reactions were accompanied by the impulse to reflect
on the unique experience. ("Like a play," Michael Barkun writes, "the sudden
onslaught of disaster introduces the unusual and dramatic into lives that may
have seemed bland and commonplace."40 ) Commuters forced to sleep on the
floor of Grand Central Station told a newspaper reporter that they considered
38 Mumford, The Myth of the Machine: The Pentagon of Power, 409-412.
3 9 Ibid.
40Barkun, Disaster and the Millennium. 163.
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the blackout "the ultimate affront to American know-how." Some believed
that the power failure meant "the death of the American dream" and that
"basic creature comforts such as electric power could no longer be taken for
granted." Many took the occasion to criticize Con Ed's electrical monopoly,
advocating public ownership of utilities instead. And one Greenwich Village
man pointed out, "That's what's wrong with a push-button society. All that
has to happen is for one button not to work."4 1
New Yorkers may have been especially predisposed to treat the blackout
as a holiday from their complex urban existences. Under contract for the
Office of Civil Defense, pollsters for the National Opinion Research Center
fanned out through New York and other affected cities within days after the
power was restored, interviewing a total of 1,313 people about their
experiences during the blackout. They found that New Yorkers were more
than twice as likely as residents of the other cities surveyed to have observed
"people making a holiday occasion out of the blackout" or "strangers being
more helpful and friendly to each other than usual." Among New Yorkers
whose power was off the longest, fully 61.3 percent observed unusual
friendliness among strangers and 26.3 percent observed holiday behavior.42
Even after acounting for the fact that New York was blacked out for longer
than the other cities surveyed, the city's residents seem to have been much
more convivial during the disaster than people in Albany, Boston, Utica, or
Waterbury.
New York's fast-paced environment was and is a paradigm of urban
technological complexity and interdependency. To meet the demands of so
4 1Bigart, "A Night of Confusion, Frustration and Adventure," 37; Phillips, "Blackout
Vignettes," 37.
42 National Opinion Research Center, Public Response to the Northeastern Power Blackout
(unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago, October 1966) 22-26.
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many people crowded into so small an area, systems for electricity, gas, water,
sewer, sanitation, communication, mass transportation, food distribution,
and the control of traffic on the ground and in the air, to mention just a few,
must function continuously and in perfect harmony. Participating in this
artifice can be wearying, as anyone who has ever been stuck in a traffic jam or
a crowded subway car can attest. (A sign posted on a New York overpass
during the nineteen-fifties captured this variety of urban despair: "In the
event of nuclear attack, drive off bridge."43) New Yorkers may have enjoyed
the blackout more than their counterparts in smaller metropolitan areas
simply because they found it a bigger relief. On November 9, 1965, the "city
that never sleeps" finally got a good night's rest.
And Then There Was Light
New Yorkers' unexpected delight in rediscovering themselves and their
city during the blackout did not slow efforts to restore power. The machinery
of bureaucracy swung immediately into action to repair the machinery of life.
Within minutes after the electricity went off, a phalanx of government and
utility officials were phoning each other, trying to determine the cause and
extent of the failure. (The telephone system, supplied by backup diesel
generators, continued to operate throughout the blackout, though under
considerable strain as curious Northeasterners placed tens of millions of extra
calls to each other.44) Civil defense offices went on alert. President Johnson
was notified at his ranch in Texas. New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller
issued statements for radio broadcast to the public. Meanwhile, Con Ed utility
43 William Safire, "On Language: Linguaclip" The New York Times Magazine (Sep. 19, 1993).
4 4
"Telephone Calls Set Record Here During Blackout," The New York Times (Nov. 11, 1965) 40.
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workers faced the unprecedented task of restarting their system from an
absolute standstill.
Elsewhere in the Northeast, conditions had returned to normal
relatively quickly. In most locations, workers first had to find the relays that
had been thrown open by the overload, then close them by hand. Hundreds
of miles of transmission lines had to be inspected, and generators had to be
restarted using backup motors or water power, then carefully matched in
phase. Utilities warned their customers to turn off all their lights except one
in order to prevent another overload when the power came back on. Then,
as power levels slowly crept back to normal, one region after another was re-
lit. By 10:00 p.m., most of the CANUSE grid had been restored. Connecticut
lagged until 11:30.45
New York City was a different story. Four of Con Ed's big generators,
including "Big Allis," the nation's largest steam-turbine generator at the
Ravenswood plant in Long Island City, were seriously damaged in the
blackout. Ironically, while wild fluctuations in demand and loss of phase
synchronicity had been the immediate causes of the local power shutdown,
most of the damage to the generators was secondary -- caused by the power
failure itself. "Big Allis" lacked backup power for the electric pumps that
bathed its turbine bearings in lubricating oil. In the event of a local blackout,
the plant's designers had counted on electricity being available from
elsewhere in the grid. So when the lights went off across the Northeast, so
did the pumps at Ravenswood. The bearings on the still-spinning turbines
quickly burned out, their linings softening and peeling away under the
intense friction, putting the generator out of commission for weeks. Turbines
4 5 The Night The Lights Went Out, 25, 31.
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at Con Ed's Astoria plant in Queens burned out in a similar fashion, and the
East River plant on 14th Street was damaged in an electrical fire.46
Thousands of other pieces of equipment had to be inspected for damage,
and Con Ed repairmen worked through the night to piece the system back
together. Fortunately, a number of stations, including the Indian Point
nuclear power plant on the Hudson River, had been spared any danger
because they were out of service at the time of the blackout. Shortly before
sunrise on November 10, Con Ed officials reached their moment of triumph:
"After a final check came the count-'One...Two...THREE'--and 24 switches
slammed into closed position, instantaneously transforming the Grand
Central network area from a sea of blackness into a sea of light. So many men
had reported for emergency duty, there were enough to stand at windows
overlooking mid-Manhattan when the network went on the line and a
spontaneous cheer rose from a score of throats."47 By 7:00 a.m., thirteen and a
half hours after the blackout began, Con Ed had restored electricity to the
Bronx, the last borough without power. The company was able to meet
Wednesday's peak demand of 4.3 million kilowatts using smaller generators
that did not depend on electrically-pumped lubrication and by importing
additional power from Connecticut and Niagara Falls.
By Friday, the blackout was already fading as a topic of conversation.
That day Mayor Robert Wagner declared the emergency over and rescinded
his appeal that the city conserve electricity.48 Though New York had
returned to its regular routines, a few things had subtly changed. There had
46John Noble Wilford, "Million-Kilowatt Generator Here May Stay Knocked Out a Week,"
The New York Times (Nov. 12,1965) 36.
47Around the System, 16-17.
48Peter Kihss, "Emergency Over, Wagner Rescinds Save-Power Plea," The New York Times
(Nov. 12,1965) 1.
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been a small redistribution of wealth, for one; while the city's share of the
overall losses from the disaster was put at $100 million, most of it the result
of the interruption of trade, certain businesses had made a killing during the
blackout, including hotels, restaurants, bars, rental car agencies, and hawkers
of candles, flashlights, and batteries.4 9 Hospitals, airports, and other critical
facilities immediately began making plans to improve their backup power
systems. And people discovered they had been drawn a little closer as a
community: "A Connecticut woman yesterday found her fellow commuters
less impersonal after spending the night on the 5:31 to Norwalk. 'Everybody
recognizes everybody else now," she said. 'Although they've seen me for 10
years, and they've done nothing but help me up the stairs, now it's a tip of
the hat and a 'good morning, Ph llis, how are you today?"'50
Dependence and Interconnection
During the weeks after the blackout, readers of the New York Times and
other newspapers received a basic course in the politics, geography, and
economics of electric power transmission. They discovered that with little
fanfare the utilities of the northeast had spent the previous fifteen years
building a loose power-sharing federation, so that Company A might be
directly linked with Company B, but also indirectly through B to C, D, E, and
dozens of others. "Most New Yorkers were surprised to learn...that the
electricity they 'burn' may come from Boston or Niagara Falls, or as far away
as Detroit"- and that as a result, a generator problem in Detroit might be felt
in New York, one reporter wrote. 51 "It became apparent to New York City
4 9 Leonard Sloane, "Trade Loss Here Put at 100 Million," The New York Times (Nov. 11, 1965) 1,
38.
50 Martin Tolchin, "Blackout Woes End in This Area," Tihe New York Times (Nov. 12, 1965) 36.
51Gene Smith, "'Grids' and Such Cut Power Cost," The New York Times (Nov. 12, 1965) 36.
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residents last week that flicking a light switch is not a wholly isolated act,"
noted another. "The blackout Tuesday drew attention to what lies behind the
light switch -- an immensely complex and interlocking network of men,
machines, and wires that is not infallible."52
Interconnection made economic sense, utility spokesmen reassured the
press. Coal- and oil-burning plants had reached a plateau of efficiency around
1950, forcing companies to pursue power pooling and improvements in
transmission to keep electricity costs down. As the maximum voltages cables
could carry rose from 345,000 volts in 1956 to 460,000 volts in 1962, the utilities
realized it would be cheaper to band together to build big power plants near
fuel supplies and share power over long distances than for each company to
build enough capacity to meet peak local demand (assumptions which have
subsequently been challenged; see below). New York went black because Con
Ed had been unable to disconnect itself from the grid swiftly enough to avoid
the power drain and frequency fluctuations to the north. But the utility could
be forgiven, a Con Ed spokesman implied, since the power pools had also
been designed as mutual protection societies. "It's like a group of friends
swimming," the spokesman explained. "If one of them starts to sink, then
it's natural for the rest to help. You may sink a bit yourself, but if enough of
you help, you expect to pull through."53
But on November 9, it was as if the swimmers were handcuffed
together. "Something pulled everybody down that night," the spokesman
admitted.54 United States Senator George Aiken, a Vermont Republican,
criticized the very concept of utility interconnection, saying "We should
5 2McCandlish Phillips, "Behind the Light Switch Lies Complex Power Network Covering
Entire Northeast," The New York Times (Nov. 15, 1965) 42.
53Ibid.
54 Ibid.
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construct our power system so that if one egg goes rotten, the others won't."
The editors of the Times complained that "the utilities and the Federal Power
Comission have so far shed little light on the blackout. The one thing that
has emerged is that the technologically advanced concept of a regional pool to
feed power from one area to another in periods of peak demand is far from
foolproof. Until the weaknesses in this system can be discovered and
corrected, the nation remains dangerously vulnerable to paralysis of its power
supply."5 5 The only thing that had prevented the power failures from
cascading across the entire nation, many observers concluded, was that the
utility networks were not yet connected into a single, national grid. George
Orrok, vice president in charge of engineering at the Boston Edison Company,
told reporters that if a national grid had been in place the entire country could
have been "plunged into darkness in less than a second." Orrok said a worse
blackout had been avoided only because the existing grid was "weak in
spots."56
To many, the grid's breakdown indicated that private utilities pursuing
efficiency and profit could not be trusted to provide reliable service. The
utilities "have been given quasi-governmental powers to serve the public,"
the Times editorialized, "yet when its power failed Consolidated Edison
compounded matters with a lack of candor -- or shall we say a super-
optimism -- about the emergency and its duration that would be unacceptable
from any government body."57 Times reporter Eileen Shanahan observed
that "demands [for more Federal electric power] have been heard increasingly
in the last several days from the traditional advocates of government
5 5
"Paralysis of Power," The New York Times (Nov. 11, 1965) 46.
56Orrok and Person quotations from: Gene Smith, "Utilities Agree on a Prediction: Statewide
Failures Can Recur," The New York Times (Nov. 11, 1965) 38.
57
"Paralysis of Power," 45.
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ownership of power facilities -- supporters of the cooperative power
movement and others." Investigations of the blackout's exact causes would
surely intensify the political contest between public and private power
advocates, Shanahan predicted, since the answers would "point the way
toward remedies that are certain to displease one side or the other -- and
conceivably both -- in the fight over who is to own major electric power
facilities and what kinds of facilities should be built in the future...The
decisions on preventive measures may be based entirely on the political
support each side can muster."58 Chief Engineer Lurkis, meanwhile, warned
that Con Ed should not be let off the hook ust because the power failure had
started in Ontario. "New York City's blackout problems are built in and
cannot be solved by placing the blame across the borders or elsewhere," Lurkis
asserted in his report. He traced the local blackout to Con Ed's overreliance
on imported power, its failure to install adequate load-shedding devices, and
poor training and inadequate communication among system operators. "Con
Edison consistently wants returns equal to private industry's earnings but
does not want to be held by the same rules that prevail in private industry,"
Lurkis concluded. "The losses and costs due to blackouts and brownouts
should all come out of the pockets of Con Edison's stockholders and not out
of the purses of consumers."59
For others, the grid's collapse conveyed a more general warning about
the dangers of size, complexity, and centralization. In a meditation entitled
"Fail-Safe Syndrome," Times science reporter Walter Sullivan wrote of
cosmologist Fred Hoyle's argument that the same technology that made it
possible to feed, clothe, and shelter an ever-growing number of people would,
5 8 Eileen Shanahan, "Politics and Blackouts," The New York Times (Nov. 13, 1965) 23.
5 9 Lurkis, The Power Bink, 59-60, 181-182.
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in time, destroy civilization. As technology advances, Sullivan summarized,
it becomes increasingly complex. "Centralization and bigness make for
greater production efficiency, be it the generation of electric power or the
prodessing of food. But such societies become increasingly vulnerable to
catastrophic disruption....Hoyle argues that our civilization will become so
vulnerable that it will ultimately succumb to some such threat as a new
disease, a nuclear war, or simply a general collapse." Sullivan concluded that
the "spirit of public service and cooperation in the face of common danger"
that New Yorkers had displayed during the blackout contradicted Hoyle's
argument. Still, Sullivan wondered whether humanity would ever
"recognize the ultimate crisis in uncontrolled technological development."
Such cautions notwithstanding, the net effect of the 1965 blackout was to
increase rather than decrease Americans' dependence on a complex,
centralized system of electrical power distribution. The blackout had come as
an embarrassment to the utility companies and to the politicians charged
with regulating them, and it touched off a flurry of official investigations
aimed at affixing blame and restoring public faith in the power system (both
electrical and political). The Federal Power Commission, the Federal
Communications Commission, the City of New York, the New York State
Public Service Commission, and agencies in other states all launched
inquiries into the blackout's causes and ways to prevent a recurrence. These
investigations uniformly concluded that a national electrical grid, had it been
in place, would have prevented the blackout altogether. "The principle of
pooling and interconnection is basically sound, as indicated by the fact that
the kind of power failure just experienced has rarely occurred," said Robert
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Person, president of the Edison Electric Institute, an industry think-tank.6 0
"Nothing that has occurred indicates that we should go back to bow3 and
arrows or isolated and inefficient generating plants," remarked the Chairman
of the Federal Power Commission, Joseph Swidler.6 1 "The prime lesson of
the blackout," the Federal Power Commission insisted in its report to
President Johnson, "is that the utility industry must strive not for good but
for virtually perfect service...Well-integrated power pools add strength and
reliability to service from all the interconnected systems. The so-called
CANUSE network, within which the failure occurred, is not yet such an
integrated power pool."62 The problem was thus defined by industry leaders
and their government overseers not as one of too much complexity, but too
little -- a common but often misguided answer to the challenge of reliability,
as we will see shortly.
With the federal government's backing, the utilities undertook a series
of improvements to the grid system. More high-voltage interties between the
regional utility groups were constructed, along with equipment to sense
network irregularities and give operators more time to act during a crisis.
Con Ed bought computers designed to "anticipate trouble and help solve
problems before they reach crisis stage." New load-shedding devices were
installed, some of them designed to cut off power to blocks of customers
automatically in the event of instabilities in the alternating-current
frequency. Utilities in the Northeast set up emergency communications lines
between the various companies' control centers.63 A year after the blackout,
6 0Orrok and Person quotations from: Gene Smith, "Utilities Agree on a Prediction: Statewide
Failures Can Recur," The New York Times (Nov. 11, 1965) 38.
61Around the System, 20.
62Federal Power Commission, Northeast Power Failure: November 9 and 10, 1965: A Report to
the President (Washington: Government Printing Office, December 1965) 1.
6 3 Around the System, 20.
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while still urging stronger interconnections, FPC officials concluded with
satisfaction that the utilities had taken "numerous steps to increase power
reliability" and declared that the chances of another power failure triggered by
the same cause were now "virtually zero."64
Hoping to prove the regulators right, the utilities formed nine "regional
reliability councils" under the umbrella of the Princeton, N.J.-based North
American Electric Reliability Council. The NERC tracked system disturbances
and published annual assessments of its members' abilities to share power
and meet peak demands. Under the NERC's direction, the utilities joined
into four "Interconnections" blanketing the U.S. and Canada, the largest of
which, the Eastern Interconnection, now covers all or part of 38 states and
three provinces. Within each Interconnection, the frequency of alternating
current is the same at all points, ensuring that demand at any location in the
Interconnection can be supplied by generation located at any other location.
At the same time, however, a generation or transmission failure anywhere in
the grid sends waves of stress throughout the Interconnection, with results
that can be vexing for local system controllers. Interestingly, the utilities
stopped short of creating a national or continental Interconnection:
"technical and economic reasons [made it] impractical to use alternating
current transmission lines to tie the major Interconnections to each other,"
the NERC explains.6 5
During the nineteen-seventies, the utilities began to discover that bigger
grids could cause bigger headaches. The laws of physics imposed unexpected
difficulties: capacitors installed on some long transmission lines to
64Eileen Shanahan, "Giant Blackouts Still Possible, U.S. Study Finds," The New York Times
(Nov. 6, 1966) 1, 44.
65North American Electric Reliablity Council, 1989 Reliability Assessment: The Future of Bulk
Electric System Reliability in North America 1989-1998 (Sep., 1989) 22.
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compensate for the storage of energy in the lines' magnetic fields, for
example, had resonant frequencies that were so close to those of generating
equipment that catastrophic mechanical vibrations destroyed several
turbogenerators shafts. There were also problems of control and
communication. In a system monitored from multiple, independent control
centers, decisions made by operators in Florida could conflict with those made
in Saskatchewan and vice versa. "It is becoming apparent that the increasing
complexities of the nation's electric energy system are rapidly outstripping its
capabilities," concluded a systems engineer at the federal Energy Research and
Development Administration.
Oui interconnected energy systems seem to be evolving into a new condition whereby
'more' is turning out to be 'different.' As they become more tightly interconnected
over larger regions, systems problems are emerging which neither are presaged,
predicted, or addressed by classical electrical engineering and which are no longer
amenable to ad hoc solution...Accordingly, the industry has been devoting
considerable effort to studying what has become known as the dynamic stability
problem...[and] it is acknowledged that the larger, more tightly interconnected
system is behaving in a fashion qualitatively different from that of earlier,
smaller systems...Analyzing effective control strategies is in its infancy.66
Jack Busby, the president of the Pennsylvania Power and Light Company, put
it more bluntly: "We hoped the new machines would run just like the old
ones we're familiar with, and they sure as hell don't."6 7
The rush to make power grids more rigidly interconnected obscured an
alternative means of protecting consumers from blackouts: building more
decentralized generation systems that would be inherently resistant to
system-wide failure. Computer-monitored high-voltage interties between
utilities might enable them to withstand predictable kinds of breakdowns,
66L. H. Fink, "Systems Engineering Challenges Emerge as Electric Energy Network Increases in
Complexity," Professional Engineer (Dec., 1976) 20-21; quoted in Lovins and Lovins, Brittle
Power, 138-39.
67 Richard F. Hirsh, Technology and Transformation in the American Utility Industry
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 87.
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critics pointed out, but only a more modular, redundant, flexibly-
interconnected system would be able to handle massive, unforeseen
disruptions like the 1965 failure. This distinction, as conservation and
renewable-energy advocates Amory and Hunter Lovins have put it, is one
between reliability and resilience. The Lovinses write, "The property being
sought when one designs a system for resilience is that it be able to survive
unexpected stress: not that it achieve the greatest possible efficiency all the
time, but that it achieves the deeper efficiency of avoiding failures so
catastrophic that afterwards there is no function left to be efficient."68
But by the time of the 1965 power failure, the technological and
economic momentum behind further interconnection was already too strong
to be deflected. The economies of scale provided by large generating units
(maximum output had risen from 5 megawatts in 1903 to 1,000 megawatts in
1965), together with improvements in transmission efficiency, had made the
industry the most productive in the U.S.69 At $70 billion in 1968 dollars, the
total value of the utilities' plant and equipment also far outstripped that of
other industries.7 0 Electrical demand seemed certain to continue growing at
an annual rate of about 7 percent, doubling every ten years. And as long as
the cost of electricity continued to decline, the public utility commissions
regulating consumer rates remained reluctant to interfere with the utilities'
plans for growth and interconnection. The "stakeholders" in the electrical
power industry -- utility managers, regulators, investors -- "had forged an
implicit consensus concerning the choice, management, and regulation of a
technological system," writes industry historian Richard Hirsh. "As long as
68 Lovins and Lovins, Brittle Power, 191. Emphasis in original.
69 Hirsh, Technology and Transformation in the American Utility Industry , 83.
7 0Landsberg and Schurr, Energy in the United States: Sources, Uses, and Policy Issues, 208.
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benefits continued to accrue to everyone, the consensus w .uld remain
intact. 7 1 Larger electrical grids, one science writer concluded, would become
"an inevitable consequence of consumer demands for cheaper power and the
continued advance of technological development, especially computers,
automated equipment and more efficient extra-high voltage transmission
lines, regardless of who wants what."72
The 1977 Blackout
On July 10, 1977, Con Ed chairman Charles Luce told the Subcommittee
on Energy and Power of the U.S. House of Representatives that he could
"guarantee" that there was no likelihood of a recurrence of the 1965
blackout. 73 Three days later, a series of lightning strikes, equipment failures,
and operator errors disrupted Con Ed's power connections to the surrounding
grid and left the utility's internal generating capacity nearly two million
kilowatts short of demand. The result was a 25-hour city-wide blackout and a
night of lawlessness that cost Con Ed, other businesses, and the city
government an estimated $1 billion.7 4
In one way, however, Luce had been correct. The precipitating cause of
the 1977 breakdown was exactly the reverse of the 1965 crisis. Then, Con Ed
managers had failed to anticipate the results of being so tightly interconnected
to the Northeast power grid. This time, they failed to foresee the
consequences of being wholly unconnected. In both cases, though, power
system controllers were ambushed by a combination of breakdowns they had
not thought possible, an emergent aspect of the system's very complexity and
7 1 Ibid., 86.
72Howard Simons, "Inquest on Power," The New Scientist (Nov. 25, 1965) 569.
7 3 Lovins and Lovins, Brittle Power, 51.
74The estimate was Charles Luce's. Ibid., 65.
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tight coupling. It was as if the technical lessons of the 1965 blackout had to be
learned all over again. And this time, there was an added fact to be reckoned
with: the outage had unleashed a night of warlike social disorder in the city.
In the years since 1965, clearly, New York had come to depend on its fragile
electrical network in new and troubling ways.
The region's basic geographical and political boundaries had enforced
New York City's isolation as an electric archipelago even after the grid
improvements that followed the 1965 blackout. Con Ed's major links to the
Eastern Interconnection all squeezed through a narrow corridor in
Westchester County. A strong 345,000-volt line underneath the Hudson
River tied Con Ed to power sources in New Jersey, but this line's phase-
regulating transformer had failed the previous September. On July 13, 1977,
the Indian Point 2 nuclear plant was out of commission with a failed pump
seal, the Bowling Point 2 fossil fuel plant was down with boiler problems, and
the Astoria 6 plant had suffered a turbine failure. As a result, the total
generating capacity available within the Con Ed system was only 3.9 million
kilowatts. A heat wave gripped New York that day with temperatures as high
as 93° F, and power-guzzling air conditioners had pushed total demand to 6.1
million kilowatts. The extra 2.3 million kilowatts were being imported
through the Westchester County lines.75
Early that evening, a line of thunderclouds crossed rapidly into
Westchester. At 8:37 p.m. lightning struck two 345,000-volt overhead
75Sources for my description of the blackout's technical progress include: "Con Ed seeks light,
less heat, on system blackout," Electrical World (Aug. 15, 1977) 25-28; Philip Boffey,
"Investigators Agree N.Y. Blackout of 1977 Could Have Been Avoided," Science (Sep. 15,
1978) 994-98; Norman Clapp, State of New York Investigation of the New York City Blackout
(Jan., 1978); Peter Kihss, "Con Ed Had 15 Minutes to Pull Switch," The New York Times (July
18, 1977) 1, 49; Lovins and Lovins, Brittle Power, 51-58; Victor McElheny, "Improbable
Strikes by Lightning Tripped Its System, Con Ed Says," The New York Times (July 15, 1977)
A2; G.L. Wilson and P. Zarakas, "Anatomy of a Blackout," IEEE Spectrum (Feb., 1978) 3946.
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transmission lines running from the Indian Point 3 nuclear plant to
Millwood, N.Y., where six major power lines intersected. Most transmission
lines are equipped with circuit breakers designed to open when lightning
strikes and then reclose automatically, momentarily isolating the overload
until it can drain off into the ground. This time, the circuit breakers opened
but failed to reclose; one had a loose locking nut, and the reclosing circuit on
the other had been disconnected and not yet replaced. With nowhere to send
its power, the Indian Point reactor shut down automatically, reducing the
power available to Con Ed by 0.9 million kilowatts. Another 345,000-volt line
across the Hudson tripped out after an improperly-designed protective device
failed to recognize that the first two lines had already isolated the lightning
flash. The lost power from Indian Point and the three transmission lines,
however, was made up immediately by power flowing through Millwood on
a line from upstate New York and Canada.
William Jurith, the Con Ed system operator at the company's Energy
Control Center near Lincoln Center, sent an alarm to all the city's generating
stations requiring them to increase power production and directed that jet
aircraft-type turbines at Astoria be put into service. But these generators
provided only half the extra power Jurith had expected; some were shut
down for inspections, others malfunctioned, and some were unmanned. At
8:56 p.m. another lightning strike short-circuited two of the three lines from
Millwood to New York City. One of these reclosed. The other stayed open,
and is loss caused a power surge that overloaded yet another line. Now only
a single cable from New York to the north was intact. This cable was
operating at 32 percent over its emergency rating, and a smaller tie to New
Jersey was overworked by 20 percent.
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The double lightning strike, Con Ed president Arthur Hauspurg later
insisted, had been completely unforeseeable. That sort of thing "just never
happens," he said.76 At this point, wrote Science magazine writer Phillip
Boffey, "the situation could still have been saved by alert, well-trained
operating personnel. They could, for example, have shed some load or
increased generation to restore equilibrium. But Con Ed's control room
succumbed to confusion and panic and did neither effectively."77
Though flow meters and a teletype machine in the control room
indicated that the third Millwood line was down, Jurith believed that it was
still operating. Operators in an adjacent room, where there was a flashing
screen with a high-pitched alarm, knew that the line was inoperable, but they
failed to pass that fact on to Jurith. Had he known, he might have dispatched
workers to reclose the line manually. (On the other hand, this might have
been difficult, since Con Ed's UHF and VHF radio networks for
communication with maintenance crews were both inoperative due to the
failure of backup power supplies.) Dispatchers at the New York Power Pool
control center in Guilderland advised Jurith repeatedly to shed load. He
resisted, instead calling the chief system operator at home for advice. The
chief ordered a 5-percent voltage reduction at all Con Ed substations to reduce
load. Ten minutes later, the voltage was reduced again. Two Westchester
Co ',ty areas were blacked out, but the remaining load was still too high.
The last straw came at 9:19 p.m. The line from Millwood north to
Pleasant Valley, after being overloaded beyond its 20-minute emergency
rating for 23 minutes, finally tripped out. Thermal expansion in the line had
caused it to sag to the ground and short-circuit. The Long Island and New
76McElheny, "Improbable Strikes by Lightning Tripped Its System, Con Ed Says," A2.
77Boffey, "Investigators Agree N.Y. Blackout of 1977 Could Have Been Avoided," 995.
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Jersey ties, normally carrying a combined 0.8 million kilowatts but suddenly
faced with a load three times as great, failed within minutes. Con Ed now
had 4 million kilowatts of local generating capacity with which to meet a
demand of 5.7 million kilowatts.
After the 1965 blackout, a sequence of seven load-shedding switches had
been installed in the Energy Control Center. Jurith could have disconnected
as much as a quarter of the system's load manually using these switches,
perhaps saving the rest of the city, but the controls required that a master
switch be operated first to prevent accidental shedding. urith went through
the procedure but never set the master switch properly, and nothing
happened. As generating frequency spiraled downward due to the excessive
demand on the in-city generators, automatic load-shedding equipment (also
installed after 1965) stepped in, quickly and mindlessly cutting off power to
neighborhood after neighborhood. As was discovered later, however, the
automatic devices shed load too quickly, creating a frequency surge and
voltage fluctuations that forced the remaining generators off-line. "Con Ed
engineers never dreamed their system would be reduced to such a small
island," Boffey observed, "so they never bothered to analyze what would
happen to system voltages after automatic load shedding on an isolated
system."78 By 9:34 the entire Con Ed system was black-- thanks partly to the
safety systems that had been installed after 1965 to prevent just such a failure.
This time, it would take 25 hours to restore power fully, in part because
pumps providing cooling oil to the main underground cables lacked backup
power and restoring oil pressure proved difficult. "Once the system failed, its
very complexity slowed recovery," wrote New York Times reporter Victor
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McElheny. Con Ed was in the position of a "turtle on its back struggling to
right itself."79
Blackout Looting
While Con Ed struggled, New Yorkers endured 25 of the longest hours
in the city's history. Once the electricity went off the assumption quickly
spread, thanks to memories of 1965, that the city was in for a long night
without power. Violence ad looting erupted in all five boroughs, with the
worst unrest centered in black and Hispanic neighborhoods.8 0 Stores and
shops, their burglar alarms disabled by the power outage, made easy pickings
-- especially since most had already closed for the night when the power went
off. (In 1965, by contrast, the power had gone off early enough in the evening
for many store owners to decide to stay in their stores overnight.) Darkened
traffic signals and street lights caused numerous traffic accidents and made it
dificult for police and fire officials to respond to calls for help. More than
1,600 businesses were damaged, most in Brooklyn and the Bronx, and 900 fires
were reported, 50 of them serious. Over 3,300 people were arrested. The
blackout forced most banks, offices, stores, theaters, and financial exchanges to
close for a full day, resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars in lost
business. 81
The failure of backup generators at many critical facilities compounded
the crisis. The New York state legislature had mandated after the 1965
79Victor McElheny, from New York Times News Summary carbon copy in McElheny's files,
dated July 20, 1977.
8 0Harlem, East Harlem, the South Bronx, Jamaica in Queens, and the Bedford-Stuyvesant,
Bushwick, Crown Heights, and Williamsburg sections of Brooklyn were the worst hit.
81Robert D. McFadden, 'New York's Power Restored Slowly; Looting Widespread, 3,300
Arrested; Blackout Results in Heavy Losses," The New York Times (July 15, 1977) A1-A2;
Robert Curvin and Bruce Porter, Blackout Looting! New York City, July 13, 1977 (New York:
Gardner Press, Inc., 1979) xiv-xv, 24, 25.
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blackout that all hospitals be equipped with diesel auxiliary generators, but at
Bellevue Hospital the required auxiliary system failed after only a few
minutes. Medical staff resorted to squeezing air bags by hand to provide
oxygen to patients who had been on mechanical respirators.8 2 Backup
generators also wheezed to a halt in several police precincts, complicating the
response to the city-wide crime wave. Gasoline pumps for police cruisers
were left powerless, as were the boosters and repeaters needed to maintain
radio contact between station houses, patrol cars, and foot-patrolmen. The
main cause of the failure of backup equipment: During required monthly
inspections, officials had tested most generators for only a few minutes at a
time, failing to determine whether they would perform well under real
emergency conditions. 83
Though there were examples of gallantry and perseverance that night --
flashlight-wielding doormen helped hundreds of tenants up darkened
stairways, and concerts and plays darkened by the power failure continued by
candlelight - the major impressions were of pathos and dread. One woman
stranded at the top of a high-rise apartment complex recounted her terror at
hearing crashing noises as looters climbed upward through he building.
They stopped just two floors below her.84 Many New Yorkers were puzzled
by the contrast with the peaceful example set in 1965. "There seemed
agreement that much of the old elan was sadly Jacking," wrote one journalist.
"If the 1965 blackout had produced complaints, it also produced people who
8 2Lawrence K. Altman, "Bellevue Patients Resuscitated With Hand-Squeezed Air Bags," The
New York Times (July 14, 1977) A;
83iCurvin and Porter, Blackout Looting!, 70.
84 Deirdre Cannrmody, "Pathos, Heroics, Humor On a Night to Remember," The New York Times
(July 15, 1977) A14; Frank J. Prial, "New York Theaters Bouncing Back Faster Than Its
Restaurants After the Blackout," The New York Times (July 15, 1977) A14; Curvin and Porter,
Blackout Looting.?.
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laughed at their corplaints, accepting their ordeal with infinite patience and
great style. On Wednesday, with looters in some neighborhoods and
indifference in others, there was precious little humor to mitigate the
darkness, the fear, the inconvenience."85
The main difference between 1965 and 1977 was easy to discern from
newspaper headlines: "Ravaged Slums Face an Uncertain Future," "Social
Overload," "When Poverty's Part of Life, Looting is Not Condemned."
Predictably, racial minorities and the poor had been hardest hit by the
seventies' rampant unemployment and inflation, the twin components of
the "misery index" so frequently cited during the Carter administration.
During the ten years from 1967 to 1977, unemployment among African-
Americans nationally doubled from 7 to 14 percent, while the cost of living as
measured by the Consumer Price Index rose by 86 percent.86 In 1965, New
York City had spent $100 million on programs for youth in poor areas, but in
1977, with the city barely recovered from a brush with bankruptcy, "all that is
out the window," as former Mayor Robert Wagner observed.8 7 Even Ronald
Reagan was moved by the olackout to remark that "It makes you wonder
what we have done to this society in that short period of time."8 8
To some observers, social conditions in parts of the city had grown so
desperate than even the slightest disruption could have touched off the
looting. A Ford Foundation study of the blackout concluded, "The root of it
all, the fundamental source, was the poverty and growing hardship both in
the old ghettos and i neighborhoods more recently inhabited by the city's
85Richard Severo, "Two Blackouts and a World of Difference," The New York Times (July 16,
1977) 8.
86Curvin and Porter, Blackout Looting!, 183.
8 7
"Who Gets the Blame?" New York magazine(Aug. 1, 1977) 33-34.
8 8 Ibid.
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poor...To say [the looters] were simply hoodlums ignores the social and
economic realities of urban life which became startingly visible in the
darkness of the night of July 13, 1977." 89 Anthony Bouza, deputy chief of the
New York Transit Police, observed that "the blackout [was] irrelevant to what
happened in the streets, except as a precipitate cause, a match. It could have
been a shooting, a boy hit by a police car, or the clearing of a park. The
combustible substance was already there."90 In this sense, the 1977 blackout
was a social disaster, not just a technological one. Like the riots following the
Rodney King verdict in Los Angeles in 1992, it pointed to major shortcomings
in the city's economic system, refocusing public attention, at least briefly, on
persistent race- and class-based inequalities.
But it is absurd to insist that the lawlessiess of that night was no more
than a flare-up of social and economic tensions, while ignoring the crucial
part played by the city's technological infrastructure. As two electrical
engineers summarizing the blackout's lessons noted, "The use of electricity
has grown from its inception at the turn of the century as a nonessential
convenience to a major national resource necessary to meet the most
essential needs of society."9 1 T , power failure, then, was not simply a
"match" that ignited "combustible substance." It would be more accurate to
say that the social order in New York City had come to rest on the availability
of electricity in such a way that its absence was like releasing a brake on
neighborhood unrest. Norms of respect for private property, the blackout
showed, hinged on whether that property was protected by a functioning
electronic burglar alarm. People's perception that they could get away with
89Curvin and Porter, Blackout Looting!, 185.
90Ibid.
91Wilson and Zarakas, "Anatomy of a Blackout," 46.
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looting was greatly strengthened by the knowledge that law enforcement had
been immobilized. This, too, is part of the "context of equipment" that can be
"lit utp" by disaster. If a city's electric power network is so brittle and
monolithic that a thunderstorm can trigger a complete shutdown of essential
services, that fact should be part of any assessment of the city's social stability.
(The New York State Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, recognized
Con Ed's implicit obligation to maintain service by ruling against the utility
in 1981 in a multimillion-dollar suit over food spoilage at city grocery stores.)
What could have been done to lessen New York's dependence on the
Con Ed system, thereby increasing stability? Smaller generating units located
closer to critical facilities and managed independently from the grid might
have ensured that police stations, hospitals, and traffic lights remained
energized. A report on the 1977 blackout prepared for the U.S. Department of
Energy's Office of Policy and Evaluation found: "There is no question that
[decentralized sources]...would have helped greatly provided that they had
been properly integrated into the power system under conditions of cascading
outage. This means that fail-safe procedures must exist to ensure that [the
decentralized sources] continue to function...and are, in fact, connected to the
essential loads, i.e. [vital functions in] buildings, government services, traffic
lights, etc....The demand for essential services is estimated to be in the range
of several percent of total demand. Thus, several hundred megawatts of
[decentralized sources] .. .might have prevented the loss of essential
services."92
Just as in 1965, however, the major technological response to the
blackout was a shoring-up of the existing power network rather than an
92Systems Control Inc., Decentralized Energy Technology Integration Assessment Study (Dec.,
1980); Quoted .a Lovins and Lovins, Brittle Power, 280-81.
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attempt to supplement it with alternative sources. Within days Con Ed
announced it would take "super-extra precautionary measures" to prevent
more blackouts, including installing more backup generators and adding staff
at control centers and at previously automated facilities. Later, the company
said it would improve the training of system operators, further strengthen
interties with other utilities, and redesign the Energy Control Center to
facilitate decision-making in crisis situations.9 3 One skeptical reporter
remarked that "it could not be determined immediately whether the changes
were substantial or were meant to regain a measure of public confidence in
the system's reliability," but in fact both goals were crucial to the utility's
survival: the blackout had greatly amplified calls for government takeover of
the power grid, especially in Westchester County, where officials had already
commissioned a $100,000 study of the possibility. 9 4 A group called the
Coalition for a Publicly Owned and Democratically Controlled Utility
announced that "The Real Issue!! is Public Power versus Con Edison, a profit-
making monopoly," and reminded New Yorkers that "there IS something
they can do about the highest rates in the country...[and] the arbitrary cut-offs
of service."9 5 All this may have contributed to a novel hint of humility in
Con Ed's public stance. Though the utility initially called the multiple
lightning strikes "acts of God," it later admitted that a number of human and
technical failures, notably Mr. Jurith's failure to shed load manually, had
brought about the blackout and the long delay in restoring power. Said
93Consolidated Edison press release, Aug. 2, 1977, McElheny files.
9 4 Wolfgang Saxon, "Con Ed Acts to Cut Chance of Blackouts," The New York Times, (July 17,
1977) 1, 39; "Issue and Debate: Can Westchester County Quit Con Edison?" The New York
Times (Dec. 14,1976) 74.
95 Coalition for a Publicly Owned and Democratically Controlled Utility, broadsheet,
McElheny files.
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chairman Luce, "From now on I'll never feel I have anything under control
again." 96
Turning to Decentralized Energy
In 1979 the director of the Pentagon's Defense Civil Preparedness
Agency9 7 became alarmed by the ongoing energy crisis of the nineteen-
seventies and by the spectacle of the nation's largest city stripped of electric
power. He commissioned Amory Lovins, a physicist and energy strategist,
and Hunter Lovins, a lawyer and political scientist, to assess the fragility of
the national energy system. The result was the Lovinses' 1982 book Brittle
Power: Energy Strategy for National Security. In it the the couple argued that
energy-delivery technologies as highly centralized in those in the U.S. invited
catastrophe both through system accidents and through acts of terrorism.98
The Lovinses called for incremental changes to increase these technologies'
resilience - their ability to withstand unpredicted disturbances - and for
conservation and efficiency measures to reduce the nation's prior dependence
on them. The most important contribution of their study, however, was to
refute the old assumption that large, centralized, monopolistic energy systems
like electrical utilities were necessarily more efficient and reliable than other
kinds of systems. Energy sources that were small, simple, diverse, dispersed,
96
'Where Were You When the Lights Went On?" Fortune (Aug., 1977) 20.
97Now the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
9 8Novelist Tom Clancy acknowledged the potential for terrorism involving the national
electrical grid in Patriot Games: 'There were ways to hurt America, to get attention in a way
that no revolutionary group ever had. What, for example, if he could turn out the lights in
fifteen states at once? Alex Dobbens knew how. The revolutionary had to know a way of
hitting people where they lived, and what better way, he thought, than to make unreliable
something they took for granted? If he could demonstrate that the corrupt government could
not even keep their lights on reliably, what doubts might be put in people's heads next?
America was a society of things, he thought. What if those things stopped working? What
then would people think? He didn't know the answer to that, but he know that something
would change, and change was what he was after." (New York: Berkley Books, 1987) 334.
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redundant, and autonomous, they found, would be not only more resilient
than the old energy networks, but also cheaper:
The diseconomies [of centralized energy systems using large, expensive generating
plants] are far more numerous, and seem collectively larger, than the economies...Of
course, there are still tasks for which big systems are appropriate and cost-
effective. It would, for example, be almost as silly to run a big smelter with many
little wind machines as to heat many houses with one big reactor. Mismatching
scale in either direction incurs unnecessary costs...Thus the extreme centralization
which is at the root of America's energy system is not economically essential and is
probably an economic mistake or liability.9 9
In the construction of large electrical generating plants, the Lovinses pointed
out, money is saved through the dilution of costs for setup, labor, and
materials, but money is lost through the cost of interest on loans, the need for
new designs to cope with added complexity, expensive onsite fabrication, and
the lack of standardization. Big plants have higher operating costs as well,
since they can fail in more ways than smaller plants, are more difficult to
repair, and have longer downtimes. 100 The cost of transmission and
distribution over long, high-voltage cables, moreover had risen by the early
nineteen-nineties to a steep $1.50 for every $1 spent on generation.10l
Security against system breakdowns, the Lovinses concluded, could be
achieved through a gradual shift to dispersed, renewable sources that,
fortuitously, would also be economically and environmentally sound.
As the Lovinses described it, this shift to more resilient technologies
would also have interesting political results. Resilient technologies get that
way partly because of a set of inherent qualities that also happen to enhance
democratic participation in technological decision-making. These
technologies are local (geographically and socially close to users),
comprehensible (easy to use), and user-controllable (capable to doing what
99Lovins and Lovins, Brittle Power, 220-23.
10 0 Ibid., 335-346.
101 Leslie Lanmarre, The Vision of Distributed Generation," EPRI Journal (April/May, 1993) 11.
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users want). They are also simple (so that "anyone can see what is wrong"
when they break), accessible (allowing people to form intelligent judgments
about their use), and optionally autonomous (capable of contributing to an
interconnected network, but also able to stand alone if necessary).02 The
means of electrical generation highest on the Lovinses' list of resilient
technologies included mini-hydroelectric stations, photovoltaic cells, and
windmills, all devices that consumers can easily install and maintain. "The
problem [renewable energy experts] had feared was that there might not be
enough attractive renewable sources to meet the needs of an advanced
industrial economy," they wrote. "The problem they are actually
encountering, however, is that there are too many." 10 3
Many of the concepts offered in Brittle Power seemed far-fetched in
1982.104 Utility companies were beginning to recognize the liabilities
attached to large construction projects (especially nuclear ones - see chapter 3)
but most had turned to demand-management and conservation measures as
a way to defer questions about how best to meet future electrical demand. 105
1 02 Ibid., 190, 202, 205, 216-17.
103 bid, 373.
104There was, however, solid historical precedent for many of the Lovinses' ideas. The city of
London, for example, resisted relying on a single, centralized electric utility from the very
first days of electrification. A patchwork of small, privately- and publicly-owned
companies covered the city, each making a profit and providing "reliable and affordable
power adapted to local needs...London's borough governments, perceiving their own political
significance and autonomy as inextricable from the infrastructure upon which they depended
economically, consistently opposed Parliamentary efforst to consolidate the grid. The
boroughs favored a highly decentralized electrical system that each could control more
easily." See Richard Sclove, "Technological Politics as if Democracy Really Mattered," in
Michael Shuman and Julia Sweig, eds., Technology for the Common Good (Washington, D.C.:
Institute for Policy Studies, 1993) 65-66; Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power:
Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1983) chapter 9.
105The growth of demand had slowed to about 3 percent per year by 1982, and by 1993 had
declined further to 1.5 percent per year. North American Electric Reliability Council, 12th
Annual Review ,' Overall Reliability and Adequacy of The North American Bulk Power
Systems (Aug., 19 2) 8; Reliability Assessment 1993-2002 (Oct., 1993) 16.
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Fourteen years later, however, the Lovinses' ideas about small, dispersed
generating units have entered the mainstream of utility industry thought
under the label "distributed generation." EPRI Journal, a publication of the
Electrical Power Research Institute, noted in 1993 that heightened
competition, technological advances, a strong environmental movement,
and new legislative and regulatory initiatives were "causing analysts to
question the existing paradigm of central-station-based resource planning."
Jarred by new Federal legislation in 1992 that made it easier for
independent power producers to compete with the big utilities, the industry
has begun searching for ways to reduce costs by exploiting "economies of mass
production" rather than economies of scale. This might mean installing
hundreds of 100- to 3,000-kilowatt diesel and internal combustion engines., gas
turbines, fuel cells, or photovoltaic arrays wherever power is most needed in
a utility's service area. These distributed units could provide industrial and
commercial customers with a more reliable electricity supply, and would also
be more acceptable generating sources in communities opposed to the siting
of large facilities. But as the Lovinses foresaw, the main logic behind the shift
to distributed generation is still economic. "The feeling of some in the
industry is that if utilities don't offer these kinds of [distributed] services,
independent power producers will," says one EPRI economist.106
Regulatory changes underway in California, moreover, may soon free
electricity consumers from their traditional ties to large utility companies. In
a move that is likely to spread to other states, Califomrnia's Public Utility
Commission voted in April, 1994, to create a legal mechanism allowing
consumers to shop for low electric rates among power providers inside and
106 Lamarre, "The Vision of Distributed Generation," 8.
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outside the state, just as the 1982 Bell breakup allowed people to hire the long-
distance telephone company of their choice. Called "retail wheeling," the
system is supported by utility customers who have "learned how hard it is to
negotiate with a monopoly" and who want "a true choice of supplier," writes
Barbara Barkovich, a California energy consultant.10 7 The system may go into
effect as early as 1996, putting even more pressure on private utilities to phase
out high-cost generation facilities like nuclear plants in favor of smaller,
more distributed sources. (Pacific Gas & Electric's Diablo Canyon reactor,
which was built at $4.5 billion over its original $1 billion budget and is shut
down a minimum of 50 days per year for refueling, is among the plants that
may quickly become white elephants.) The California commission's vote on
retail wheeling "is going to be a landmark decision that will pave the way for
a radical restructuring of the electric power industry," predicts Michael Foley
of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners.108
It took the Arab oil embargo, consequent consumer protests over high
energy costs, the 1965 and 1977 blackouts, and years of low growth in electrical
demand to convince utilities that bigness was the wave of the past. "The
utility industry appears to have lost the technological imperative for
remaining a monopoly," Richard Hirsh wrote in 1989. "Because low growth
rates combined with financial troubles and public resentment against 'big'
technologies militate against building large plants, utilities prefer to add
capacity in small, quickly installed modular units. But these technologies do
not require the giant consolidated utility companies to finance and build
107 Barbara Barkovich, letter to the Business Page editor, The New York Times (July 10, 1994)
III: 11.
108 Seth Mydans, "California Nears Competition Among Electricity Providers," The New York
Times (April 21, 1994) A14; Agis Salpukas, "A Utility Gets Ready to Compete," The New
York Times (May 11, 1994) D1, D6.
145
them...Public pressure and new laws make a return to 1965 impossible, with
the result that utility managers are indeed losing control of their industry." 109
The role of the blackouts in these changes was, if not decisive, then at
least significant. The Lovinses' prescription for a more distributed, resilient
energy system derived directly from the experience of the 1977 blackout, and
the subsequent move toward small-scale generation and transmission over
shorter distances partly reflects the realization that even massive grid
interconnections cannot stave off failures when local generating capacity is
inadequate. The two blackouts, moreover, were startling reminders of the
magnitude of the responsibility society had handed to the providers of
electrical power. They were occasions for some to question whether
monopolistic private utility companies -- saddled with massive, expensive
equipment and vulnerable interconnections, and lacking market incentives
to maintain reliability or affordable rates -- were worthy of that responsibility.
The private utility is not an endangered species in the large technological
ecosystem; the pastoral visions of windmill-covered fields and photovoltaic-
covered roofs evoked by the work of the Lovinses and others are unlikely to
materialize anytime soon. But a future in which consumers are less
beholden to brittle, oversized, inefficient power systems for the reliable
supply of electricity may already be on its way.
The Machine Stops
Go to a quiet hilltop in any city of respectable size, away from distracting
noises, and close your eyes. You will hear a constant dull roar that seems to
come from all directions. It is the sound of thousands of cars, trucks,
109Hirsh, Technology and Transformation in the American Utility Industry, 167-70.
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motorcycles, airplanes, railroad engines, air conditioners, ventilation fans,
radios, stereos, and televisions, all mixed together like the hash of frequencies
engineers call "white noise." It is the pulse beat of technological civilization,
the rush of enegy through a vast artificial bloodstream. It surrounds us all
day long, yet we hardly perceive it. We are like Vashti, an inhabitant of the
underground city in E.M. Forster's science-fiction short story "The Machine
Stops": "Above her, beneath her, and around her, the Machine hummed
eternally; she did not notice the noise, for she had been born with it in her
ears." 1 1 0
My point, and Forster's and Heidegger's, is that we usually fail to see
what is going on all around us until some disaster forces a break with our
expectations. When the Machine finally stops -- sending an airship crashing
through her underground complex -- Vashti dies in the rubble, but lesser
calamities may suffice to remind us of our own technological dependence.
Power failures are among the most common of such reminders. Once a
blackout has occurred it is usually too late to prevent harm and disruption,
but such events can also be the beginning of a process of investigation,
thought, and political experimentation. As noted by the writers of a 1989
NOVA episode on New York City and the technologies like water, sewers,
and electricity that keep it running, "It's an interesting thing about these
systems. they're pretty much invisible, and pretty much ignored, until they
break down. And of course they break down, especially when they're ignored.
110E.M. Forster, 'The Machine Stops," in Ben Bova, ed., The Science Fiction Hall of Fame,
Volume IIB (New York: Avon, 1973) 248-79; originally published in E.M. Forster, The Eternal
Moment and Other Stories (New York Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1928).
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It's a vicious circle, really. But given a little public insight, not inevitably
SO."111
The 1965 and 1977 blackouts did not inspire grassroots squadrons to
question Consolidated Edison's competence or the wisdom of interconnecting
electrical utilities from Lousiana to Quebec. Though the political clashes
during the nineteen-sixties and seventies between advoc:ates of public and
private power need more study, it does not seem that the blackouts changed
the balance in this struggle significantly. Nor did the expanding
environmental lobby (which will play an important role in each of the next
three chapters) perceive electric system reliability as an issue demanding its
attention, except on the level of community opposition to the construction of
individual plants or transmission lines. What the blackouts did do, mainly,
was force everyone affected by them to recognize the power grid's fallibility --
and perhaps to ponder what this fallibility means in a world where every act
from microwaving one's dinner to preventing an inadvertent nuclear war
depends on the smooth functioning of large, complex technological systems.
After the 1977 blackout, it was John Noble Wilford, director of science news
for the Ne., York Times, who penetrated to the heart of the matter:
When the lights go out, as they did in New York last week, people suddenly
r'ealize how dependent they are on electricity for the amenities and necessities of
life. And they must wonder if the blackout, temporary though it was, does not
represent yet another warning hat, a; Emerson once wrote, 'Things ace in the
saddle and ride mankind.'... [Buit] Emerson could not have imagined the 'things' of
today's plugged-in society or the magnitude o; the disturbing questions raised anew
by the I lackout. Will Americans have to leans to live with less speed and fewer
conveniences, and like it? Are the technologies that sustain modern life too complex
111Carl Charlson, writer and producer, 'The Hidden City," NOVA episode #1611 (Boston:
WGBH Educational Foundation, 1989). The "public insight" called for in this passage might
involve closer, more sophisticated oversight of the municipal and private bureaucracies that
provide essential services, and a willingness to pay for improved maintenance and preventive
measures.
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to manage? How many blackouts, oil embargoes and other alarms must be endured
before the nation and the world find a way out of the energy crisis?112
As long as someone is writing such words, things' are not entirely in the
saddle. The real value of technological disasters is that they give people pause
to reassess their technological surroundings. But only if sufficient numbers
of those affected choose to remember their experiences and resist an
automatic return to tradition -- as occurred after the Three Mile Island
disaster, described next -- can there be any possibility of democratic change in
society's technological arrangements. The answers are not in the newspapers:
only the questions.
112 John Noble Wilford, 'The 'Good Life' Has Found a Limit," The New York Times July 17,
1977) section 4, page 1.
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Chapter 3
THE BILLION-DOLLAR MAUSOLEUM
Three Mile Island and the Slow Demise of
Commercial Nuclear Power
151'
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Hell no, we won't glow.
- anti-nuclear slogan
chanted by protesters at
Three Mile Island1
The core of the Unit 2 reactor at Three Mile Island is a strange, dark,
forgotten world. A void fills the center of the vessel where 40,000 pounds of
molten uranium fuel burned through the reactor's inner wall fifteen years
ago and slumped down into its bowl-shaped bottom. The thirty feet of water
now covering the melted fuel is kept at a sub-tropical 80° Fahrenheit by the
fuel's ongoing radioactive decay. Eddies and convection currents swirl
through the blackened water, in which are suspended fine sediments and the
decomposing remains of several hardy species of algae, fungi, and bacteria
which once flourished under the hot camera lights used during the delicate
defueling operation. Most of the fuel has long since been broken into bits and
removed, a pebble at a time, by workers who used chisels and pliers attached
to 40-foot-long metal poles. The workers were allowed to spend no more than
20 hours every six weeks inside the containment building, and their task took
almost a decade to complete. Even so, much of the radioactive debris is still
there. It has been burrowed through like Swiss cheese, so that no more than
70 kilograms, the critical mass required to initiate a fission chain reaction, is
present in any single "neutronic area." According to plant owner General
Public Utilities, which has already spent $1 billion on the cleanup operation,
the reactor is in "Post Defueling Monitored Storage" -- meaning that the rest
1Richard D. Lyons, "Antinuclear Politicking Makes Odd Bedfellows," The New York Times
(May 13, 1979) 2E.
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of the job will be put off until the entire plant reaches the end of its
commissioned lifetime around the year 2010.2
Three Mile Island is still an operating nuclear power facility, feeding a
peak 906 megawatts of electricity to the surrounding grid. The Unit 1 reactor,
which began commercial service in 1974, was undamaged by the meltdown at
the newer Unit 2. It sat idle for seven years after the accident while, outside
the plant gates, citizens and regulators battled over its future. But in October
1986, the battle decided in its favor, Unit 1 was restarted without trouble. The
hundreds of fuel assemblies in its core -- each a 12-foot stack of inch-long
uranium oxide pellets, covered by a zirconium alloy cladding -- continue to
radiate the fast neutrons which, when slowed by water in the primary cooling
system, become slow enough to knock other neutrons off of other splitting
bits of uranium in a self-sustaining reaction. The highly pressurized water in
the primary cooling system carries the 575 F heat liberated by this fission
reaction to the steam generator. There, the primary cooling system gives up
heat to a separate, "secondary" cooling system, creating the steam used to run
the huge turbines in the generator building. The 110 commercial nuclear
reactors still operating in the United States, most of them light-water reactors
(LWRs) like those at Three Mile Island, together produce about 20 percent of
the United States' electricity supply.
The proximity of the operating Unit 1 reactor to its ruined counterpart
only a hundred yards away is symbolic of larger contrasts. For most
Americans, the words "Three Mile Island" connote a set of menacing
television images: panic, confusion, evacuation, the huge cooling towers
looming over communities threatened by invisible radiation. But Three
2 William Booth, "Postmortem on Three Mile Island," Science (vol. 238, Dec. 4,1987) 1342-45.
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Mile Island is also a real place where thousands of people still work, visit, or
live nearby, and where the consequences of the partial meltdown on March
28, 1979, are still felt in the form of health worries, higher utility rates, and
lingering bitterness.
Unit 2 is also a metaphorical mausoleum for the dying hopes of the
nuclear industry and its government proponents. These groups once
envisioned nuclear power as a safe source of electricity "too cheap to meter"
but now preside over a technology which, for political and economic reasons
stemming largely from the accident itself, is slowly going extinct.3 No new
nuclear plants have been ordered in the U.S. since 1978, more than a hundred
have been cancelled, and many plants are approaching the end of their useful
lifetimes. Alvin Weinberg, one of the inventors of the LWR, predicted in
1979 that "unless the public can regain confidence in nuclear energy, the
nuclear age will grind to a halt as the present reactors run their course," and
this is more or less what is happening4
But the continuing operation of TMI Unit 1, despite strong opposition,
testifies to the industry's grip on life. Nuclear power's public reputation was
largely undone by the Three Mile Island accident, subsequent revelations of
operator incompetence and safety violations, and the 1986 Chernobyl disaster
(see Chapter 5), but the industry remains a pervasive presence in American
society. No location on the eastern seaboard between Maine and South
Carolina, save portions of Delaware and eastern Maryland, is more than 50
3Atomic Energy Commission chairman Lewis Strauss included the now-famous line "It is not to
much to expect that our children will enjoy in their homes electrical energy too cheap to
meter...This is the forecast for an age of peace," in a speech to the National Association of
Science Writers in September, 1954. Quoted in Daniel Ford, The Cult of the Atom (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1982) 50.
4David Burnham, "Three Mile Island Accident: A Cloud Over Atom Power," The New York
Times (Sep. 23, 1979) 1, 48.
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miles from an operating nuclear reactor. Altogether more than 10 million
Americans live within 20 miles of a nuclear plant, and more than 20 million
live within 30 miles.5
The twin TMI reactors, one thriving, one silent, embody the complex
history of nuclear energy itself. If any nuclear plant should have been an easy
target for shutdown by local opponents, it is Three Mile Island. The
meltdown was, after all, the closest the U.S. nuclear industry has come to a
worst-case accident. But once the industry and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission closed ranks to ensure that Unit 1 would be restarted, it became
clear that the regulatory and business structures governing nuclear power in
the United States excluded direct involvement by local citizens. Area
residents' seven-year fight to override those processes ended in defeat, and
every glimpse of the plant's 350-foot cooling towers now reminds them of the
possibility -- however remote - that a similar or worse accident could happen
again.
The world beyond the TMI region, however, has become a very different
place since the accident. The meltdown so magnified the regulatory,
financial, and political burdens associated with nuclear power that utilities
and their investors no longer consider it a viable way to meet future energy
needs. (Energy suppliers have turned instead to demand management and
the idea of "distributed generation," described in Chapter 2.) This is not to
claim that nuclear power is dead; the last LWR will not be decommissioned
until sometime around 2025. But changes vital to the long-term survival of
the industry have not yet taken place. In the years since Three Mile Island,
many existing LWRs could have been phased out while a new generation of
5David Burnham, "Siting Nuclear Reactors Once Seemed Simple and Safe," The New York
Times (May 6,1979) E 6-8 (see accompanying maps).
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safer reactors was under development; instead, "inherently safe" nuclear
reactors are still decades away from commercial deployment. A safe,
acceptable location could have been found for the temporary or permanent
disposal of spent reactor fuel and other radioactive wastes; instead,
controversy and scientific uncertainty continue to thwart the search for such a
hiding-place. Given the added onus of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, it
seems unlikely that the percentage of the public favoring the construction of
more nuclear plants will ever return to pre-TMI levels. U.S. Energy Secretary
Hazel O'Leary, moreover, has declared the government's official lack of
interest in pursuing new fission technologies.
Why these disparate, almost paradoxical outcomes? How could the U.S.
antinuc!ear movement have failed to shut the single most demonstrably
hazardous plant in the country, while at the same time the accident has
helped impose a not-so-distant limit on commercial nuclear power's
lifespan? The answer has partly to do with the difference between local and
national responses to disaster. "Lose locally, win globally" is a common
pattern in the stories told in this thesis. At the local level, even the best-
organized and most strongly-supported citizens' groups face uncertain odds
when they confront large industries and government bureaucracies. In their
struggle to win technological change to reduce the risk of a future catastrophe,
citizens often become entangled in side disputes over legal and economic
issues; their organizations often succumb to internal disputes; they are often
simply outspent or cut out of negotiations by influential industry groups. At
the national level, however, industries usually have a harder time
maneuvering around broad-based shifts in public opinion. Investor edginess,
boycotts, state ballot initiatives, new federal legislation and the like have top-
down effects that are difficult for even big companies to ignore.
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Breakdowns severe enough to merit national attention are almost
always greeted first by vigorous local protest movements. The irony is that
few of the significant technological and political changes that emerge from
these disasters directly answer local citizens' concerns - and almost never do
they adequately compensate survivors for their trauma. To put this more
positively, a community's victimization in a severe breakdown may inspire
sympathy, outrage, and concern on a broad enough scale that society-wide
changes occur to prevent a recurrence in any location.
The Three Mile Island accident has become, in many respects, the
archetypal American technological disaster. Though other accidents have
cost more lives, TMI occupies a special place in the iconography of technics-
out-of-control, to use Winner's apt phrase. 6 Why else would some 80,000
curious tourists each year take time to visit the facility? Why else would
Homer Simpson, patriarch of the popular TV family, be portrayed as a
bumbling nuclear-plant operator who catches three-eyed fish in the cooling
pond and averts a meltdown at the last second by playing eeny-meeny-miney-
moe with the control panel? When an industry that was once a symbol of the
nation's technological prowess becomes the butt of jokes among its own
citizens, fundamental changes are underway, and I will use this chapter to
explore the technological and political events underpinning these changes.
Because the events at Three Mile Island were so central to Americans'
disillusionment with nuclear power, they are examined here in detail,
beginning with an account of the military origins of light water reactors and
the politics surrounding the early days of the nuclear enterprise. The chapter
highlights the aspects of the accident that most alarmed the public and
6See Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-Out-Of-Control as a Theme in
Political Thought (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977).
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provided powerful ammunition for nuclear power's critics. I then recount
the struggle over the restart of the Unit 1 reactor and examine its implications
for the democratic control of large technological systems. Finally, I trace the
declining fortunes of the U.S. nuclear industry since Three Mile Island,
stressing the role of public opinion as measured by state ballot measures and
surveys.
The Cold War's LWR Legacy
The accident at Three Mile Island punctured a quarter-century's claims
for the safety and efficiency of nuclear power in the United States. In official
risk-assessment reports nuclear engineers had pegged the probability of a
TMI-type accident at once in every 17,000 years of a reactor's operation -- a
prediction so roseate that critical valves and indicators whose failure led
directly to the meltdown had been designated by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission as "non-safety-reated." Power plant operators and regulators,
not to mention the people of Pennsylvania, realized in retrospect how lucky
they had been that the first major core-melt accident to strike the U.S. nuclear
industry - the failure that finally exposed the weaknesses of the system - had
caused no casualties. As it was, the accident caused widespread panic, the
release of small amounts of radiation into the atmosphere, billions of dollars
in damage to the plant, and the near financial ruin of the utility operating it.
7From the so-called Rasmussen Report of 1975, chaired by MIT Professor of Nuclear Engineering
Norman Rasmussen. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study: An
Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-75/014,
WASH-1400 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975). A reactor-year is
equivalent to the full-time operation of a nuclear reactor for one year; the U.S. nuclear
industry has less than 3,000 reactor-years of operating experience behind it. For a pointed
critique of probabilistic risk assessment methods, see "Nuclear Power: Can We Live With It?
A Panel Discussion on Nuclear Risk, the Lessons of Three Mile Island, and the Future of
Nuclear Power," Technology Review (June/July 1979) 33-36.
159
Robert Kates, a geographer at Clark University who was part of a team in the
nineteen-seventies investigating the possible outcomes of hypothetical
nuclear accidents, described his group's conclusions to newspapers shortly
after Three Mile Island: "If the first accident were a real disaster involving
loss of life and extensive contamination, we felt, it would spell the end [of
nuclear power]. But if the first incident were moderate and handled very
smoothly, public anxiety would decrease." TMI fell squarely in between these
two projections. As the nuclear lobby repeated mantra-like after the accident,
no one died at Three Mile Island, but even proponents of nuclear power had
to admit that the way experts and utility officials handled the accident was far
from smooth. "The stage may be set," Kates ventured, "for what is an
exceedingly rare event in our society: the rejection of a technology."8
"Cautious disinvestment" is a better description than "rejection" for
what has actually happened since Three Mile Island. If the hopes tied to
commercial nuclear power over its 30-year history could be graphed, TMI
would mark the midpoint on an arching curve that has been descending ever
since. The first, upward half of that curve - especially the buoyant early years
when the military, utility companies, and reactor manufacturers like General
Electric and Westinghouse were in league to promote the "peaceful atom" --
is where we must look for many of the political and technological decisions
that made the accident possible and that virtually assured that Americans
would, sooner or later, turn against nuclear power.
Though the first atomic bombs were built in utmost secrecy, the new
force unleashed over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 did not take the globe
entirely by surprise. The physical principle behind both atomic weapons and
8David F. Salisbury, "How will public take its jarring encounter with A-power risks?" The
Christian Science Monitor (April 5, 1979) 1, 7.
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atomnic power had been set down by Albert Einstein in 1905 in his famous
equation E=mc2, which accounted for the odd fact that when a heavy atomic
nucleus splits into two smaller nuclei, their combined masses are less than
that of the original nucleus. The missing mass, Einstein showed, is liberated
as energy in the form of heat and gamma rays. The ever-prescient H.G. Wells
mused about atomic chain reactions and coined the term "atomic bomb" in
his 1913 novel of global air warfare, The World Set Free. In 1933 the
Hungarian physicist Leo Szilard, while waiting onr a London pavement for a
traffic signal to change colors, had a sudden vision of how to initiate a fission
chain reaction by starting with extremely heavy, unstable elements like
uranium. A series of well-publicized experiments in the late 1930s
demonstrated the feasibility of Szilard's idea. The result - to condense a story
others have explored in great detail9 -- was the Manhattan Project.
The war's end left the United States with sole control over nuclear
energy, and Congress moved quickly to preserve this psychological ad
strategic advantage. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 -- a response, in part, to
the concerns of Manhattan Project scientists and others that they had
unleashed an energy source that could be used for great evil -- put nuclear
technology under civilian control on the principle that only in this way
would its peacetime potential be fully exploited and the horrors of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, if this were possible, begin to be redeemed. In practice,
however, the new Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was handmaid to the
military, making bombs to its specifications, maintaining tight government
control over fissionable materials and bomb-building knowledge, and
managing the network of laboratories and factories left behind by the
9See especially Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1986).
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Manhattan Project. In 1954 -- five years after Russia had broken the U.S.
nuclear monopoly, and shortly after President Eisenhower's "Atoms for
Peace" pcech at the United Nations - the Atomic Energy Act was amended
to allow private companies to pursue the development of controlled fission
power. The amendments provided for private ownership of nuclear reactors,
private control of fissionable materials, and private access to government
nuclear secrets.10
Eisenhower had told the UN General Assembly, "It is not enough to take
this weapon out of the hands of the soldiers. It must be put into the hands of
those who will know how to strip its military casing, and adapt it to the arts of
peace." l l The first commercial venture in controlled nuclear fission,
however, was a thoroughly military affair, down to the choice of reactor
technology. The successful launch in 1954 of the U.S.S. Nautilus, named for
Captain Nemro's wondrous vessel, had proved that the pressurized light-
water reactor developed by Alvin Weinberg and others at Tennessee's Oak
Ridge National Laboratory could be squeezed into a submarine; now the
Nautilus' builder, Hyman G. Rickover, was seconded to Shippingport,
Pennsylvania, to help the Westinghouse Corporation build an LWR on the
banks of the Ohio River. (Federal leadership and large subsidies were
required to promote civilian nuclear power, historian Brian Balogh explains,
because private companies feared the technology would be unprofitable.'2)
Because light-water reactors require so much complex, corrosion-prone
10See Richard G. Hewlett, et al., A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commision, 3
vols. (University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962-).
11Eisenhower spoke at the United Nations in December, 1953. Quoted in U.S. President's
Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Washington, D.C., Oct. 1979) 6.
12Brian Balogh, Chain Reaction: Expert Debate and Pu'!ic Participation in American
Commercial Nuclear Power, 1945-1975 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1991)
95-119.
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plumbing, many AEC scientists favored other approaches to moderating and
cooling the fission reaction, such as graphite-moderated/gas-cooled or heavy-
water-moderated/heavy-water-cooled reactors 13 But LWR technology was
ready first, and the AEC feared that any delay would risk ceding the U.S. lead
in fission power to the Soviets, who might then gain a major influence over
the developing world. "In essence," as one industry observer put it, "the
nuclear submarine reactor was beached and scaled up by the private sector at
the urging of the AEC."14 Under Rickover's leadership, the Shippingport
plant was completed in under three years, opening in 1957.
The possibility of a dangerous heat buildup inside the core of a light-
water reactor was always implicit in the notion of "controlled" nuclear
fission. Reactor fuel rods must be continuously bathed in high-pressure
coolant water to remove both the heat generated by fission and heat from the
fuel's normal radioactive decay; if the coolant flow stops, even the insertion
of the graphite control rods (a reactor "scram," halting the fission chain
reaction 15) is not enough to contain the decay heat. Unless emergency
systems inject extra coolant, a core meltdown is the inevitable result.
Congress, for its part, neglected safety questions in both the original Atomic
Energy Act and the 1954 amendments. 16 Private industry was more jittery. A
1957 AEC study entitled "Theoretical Possibilities and Consequences of Major
13Balogh writes, "Because the pressurized water reactor (PWR) at Shippingport would do
little to advance scientific knowledge or improve nuclear power's economic competitiveness,
advocates of more sophisticated approaches dubbed the PWR "Power Without Reason."
Chain Reaction, 107.
14 Edward J. Walsh, Democracy in the Shadows: Citizen Mobilization in the Wake of the
Accident at Three Mile Island (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988) 23.
15The phrase is a not-so-quaint relic of the early days of controlled chain-reaction
experiments, when the most basic safety measure was to "drop the :ontrol rods and scram."
16Except for orders that the AEC "protect health and minimize danger to life and property" by
preventing the diversion or loss of nuclear material. Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 7.
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Accidents in Large Nuclear Power Plants" (also known by its publication
number, WASH-740) predicted that a worst-case reactor breach would kill
3,400 people, injure 43,000, and spread radioactivity over a 150,000-square-
mile area, causing $7 billion in damage.
Before they would sink significant sums into nuclear energy, utility
companies demanded federal protection against such fantastically high
potential liability. Congress, just as eager as the AEC to promote nuclear
power, complied. "My gosh," one resident of the Three Mile Island area
would later exclaim, "the federal government is going to subsidize a nuclear
disaster!" -- a comment which more or less sums up the intent of the Price-
Anderson Act of 1957.17 The law limited total damages available to the
victims of a nuclear accident to $560 million. The first $60 million would be
paid by the industry's private insurers, with the rest to be underwritten by the
United States Treasury.'8 Without this benevolent intervention by Congress,
the usual market mechanisms for weighing potential profit and loss would
never have favored nuclear energy.
As regulated monopolies, utilities in the United States have traditionally
operated on a "cost-plus" basis, meaning that a company's rates can legally be
set high enough to ensure profits no matter how large its capitalization or
operating costs.19 During the nineteen-sixties this fact, along with the
17Quoted in Raymond L. Goldsteen and John K. Schorr, Demanding Democracy After Three Mile
Island (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1991) 141.
18Amendments made to the Price-Anderson Act when it was renewed in 1988 limit the
maximum liability of the nudclear industry to $7 billion, or about $63 million per plant, with
Congress retaining discretion to pay for damages above this amount. The Act will expire in
2002 unless renewed again. See National Researcda Council, Nuclear Power: Technical and
Institutional Options for the Future, 43.
19This has begun to change in the nineteen-eighties and nineties; utilities are no longer so quick
to pass cost overruns on large construction projects on to ratepayers, and the California Public
Utility Commission's decision to allow utility competition in the state may have far-
reaching effects on profitability. See chapter 2.
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cushion provided by the Price-Anderson Act, made the construction of
nuclear plants virtually risk-free for investors. In 1962 there were four
operating reactors in the United States, each with an electrical output of about
150 megawatts, but in 1965 alone the AEC issued construction licenses for 30
new reactors.20
At the time, oil and other competing energy sources were cheap and
interest rates were rising, considerations that sparked a menacing new trend:
the attempt to realize economies of scale by wringing more power from
reactor cores. Designers planned larger, more efficient plants with electrical
outputs of up to 1,200 megawatts, five to seven times greater than that of the
first-generation LWRs. But this scaling-up required that the reactor cores be
surrounded with complex emergency cooling machinery, reducing the
reaction time available to operators in the event of an accident. This problem
in turn required the construction of elaborate backup systems - the "defense-
in-deptt" strategy -- which themselves created even more situations in which
operators could err. The "race between education and catastrophe" predicted
by Wells was playing itself out inside nuclear plants as the complexity of
reactor systems began to exceed the comprehension and agility of their
operators.
When AEC officials updated the WASH-740 safety report in 1964, they
hoped to find that the larger reactors were less capable of causing catastrophic
damage than their predecessors. Instead, estimates of the number of people
who would be killed in a worst-case accident rose from 3,400 to 45,000, the
number injured from 43,000 to 100,000, and the amount of damage from $7
billion to $17 billion. At the request of the Atomic Industrial Forum, an
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2 0 Walsh, 24-25.
industry trade group, the AEC suppressed the updated report.2 1 Plant
construction plunged forward. By 1970 the Commission, which had "no
intention of seriously constraining the commercial use" of nuclear power,
had issued permits for more than 90 large p!ants.22
During the nineteen-sixties the civil rights movement, the women's
movement, the anti-war movement, the gay rights movement and the
environmental movement finally began to sweep away Americans' old
submissiveness toward established institutions and customs.2 3 Books like
Rachel Carson's Silent Spring (1962) and Stewart Udall's The Quiet Crisis
(1963) were wakening Americans to the extent of their society's
environmental depradaticns. At the same time, international protest over
the health effects of allout from atmospheric atomic weapons testing and the
conclusion in 1963 of an above-ground test ban treaty had sensitized people to
the issues of airborne radioactivity and the dangers of reactor accidents. It was
inevitable that the secretive nuclear industry -- born in the Cold War crucible,
nurtured by special government ispensation, and largely sanguine about
safety questions -- would eventually run afoul of the nation's emerging
environmental consciousness.
Although these were the nuclear industry's boom years, loca.
environmental groups managed to force the cancellation or relocation of
21Walsh writes: "The 1964 [Wash-740 update] was revealed to the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, the Atomic Industrial Forum, and representatives from reactor manufacturers such as
Westinghouse, General Electric, and Babcock & Wilcox. The Atomic Industrial Forum, on
behalf of the industry, strongly urged that the revised study not be published or otherwise
released to the public. The AEC accepted this recommendation and withheld the WASH-
740 update from publication.. .In response to those seeking information about the updated
study, the AEC insisted that it was never completed." Democracy in the Shadows, 25. Daniel
Ford details this story at greather length in The Cult of the Atom (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1982).
22Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission , 12.
23In Janet Malcolm's felicitous words, "The nineteenth century came to an end in America only
in the nineteen-sixties." 'The Silent Woman - ," The New Yorker (Aug. 23 and 30, 1993) 89.
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several isolated projects. In 1964 New York's Con Ed abandoned plans for a
1,000 megawatt plant at Ravenswood, Queens, a stone's throw from
downtown Manhattan, in the face of skepticism over the necessity of placing
a nuclear plant in such a densely populated area.2 4 Later that year Pacific Gas
& Electric Company gave in to local residents who worried that a plant under
construction at Bodega Head, California, would be vulnerable to earthquake
damage and would blight the area's scenic beauty.2 5 In 1968 a plan to use
nuclear bombs to blast huge caverns for liquid natural gas storage under the
Appalachians -- part of the "Project Plowshares" effort to demonstrate the
peaceful uses of atomic explosions -- was dropped due to citizen opposition.
In 1969 local residents stopped the construction of a fast breeder reactor
planned for a site on the Susquehanna River in Pennsylvania (the same river
where the Three Mile Island Unit 1 reactor was under construction). The
breeder project was forced to move to Tennessee.26
Between 1969 and 1971, opposition to nuclear pwer grew into an
authentic national movement. Two widely-read books published in 1969 --
The Careless Atom, by Sheldon Novick, and Perils of the Peaceful Atom, by
Richard Curtis and Elizabeth Hogan -- incensed industry and AEC officials
with their depictions of the horrors of a nuclear accident. Anti-nuclear
groups gained the legal ammunition with which to delay dozens of projects
when, in 1971, the federal courts ruled in the Calvert Cliffs decision that the
National Environmental olicy Act of 1969 required the AEC to evaluate the
environmental impacts of nuclear plants before it could grant construction
24See George T. Mazuzar, "A Power Reactor for New York City," Technology and Culture
(April, 1986).
25 j. Samuel Walker, Containing the Atom: Nuclear Regulation in a Changing Environment,
1963-1971 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992) 59-72, 84-99, 388-389.
2 6Walsh, 29-30.
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permits. (The ruling also forced the AEC to re-license the 60 plants already in
operation, contributing to extensive delays throughout the industry.)
Also in 1970, the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) stirred interest in
reactor safety by publishing a sharp critique of the AEC's technical standards
for LWR emergency core cooling systems. Founded in 1969 by a group of MIT
professors opposed to the nuclear arms race and U.S. military policies in
Vietnam, UCS had recently turned its expert lens on environmental issues,
including nuclear power. The group's study concluded that the emergency
cooling systems were "likely to fail" in the event of a reactor coolant leak,
leading to "a peace-time catastrophe whose scale...might well exceed anything
the nation has ever known."2 7 UCS called on the AEC to stop issuing
operating licenses until the problem could be solved. In a petition circulated
in 1975, the group recommended "a drastic reduction in new nuclear power
plant construction starts before major progress is achieved in the required
research and in resolving present controversies about safety, waste disposal,
and plutonium safeguards."28
If nuclear power had "come of age" during the nineteen-sixties, to use
the words of AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg, then by the middle nineteen-
seventies it was already showing signs of decrepitude.2 9 The number of
citizens who said they would oppose the construction of a nuclear plant near
their homes had risen from between 3 and 8 percent in 1965 to between 30
and 38 percent in 1971, prompting some utilities to build conventional power
27 Quoted in Walker, 199.
28 Quoted in Allan Mazur, "Three Mile Island and the Scientific Community," in Thomas Moss
and David Sills, eds., The Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident: Lessons and Implications
(New York: The New York Academy of Sciences, 1981) 216.
29Glenn T. Seaborg, "Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," excerpted from the Third United
Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy at Geneva, in
Harlow Shapley, et al., eds., The New Treasury of Science (New York: Grolier, Inc., 1965)
325.
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plants rather than face public protest and protracted licensing disputes.30 In
1973 environmentalists threatening a suit against the AEC under the
Freedom of Information Act finally forced the release of the updated WASH-
740 accident predictions, a public-relations disaster for the industry.
Technical and economic difficulties heightened uncertainty among utilities
and investors. Several years before the accident at TMI confirmed the trend,
orders for new nuclear plants had begun to fall off drastically; some 231
reactors were ordered through 1974, and only 15 after that. 31 Conservation
measures inspired by the the 1973 Arab oil embargo had moderated the
growth of electrical demand, making it harder to justify the enormous
investment required to bring a nuclear plant on-line. Construction delays,
the result of environmentalist intervention, labor trouble, tightening
regulations, and bureaucratic backlogs at the AEC, plagued the industry.32
Delays translated into huge cost increases through accumulating interest
charges. Operators, moreover, were having difficulty coaxing their plants to
perform up to specifications. The nation's nuclear plants were off-line for
maintenance, repairs, or refueling for an average of more than four days out
of ten, a dismal rate compared to plants in France, Japan, and West
Germany.33
In 1974 -- the same year construction was completed on the Unit 1 reactor
at Three Mile Island -- Congress split apart the AEC in an attempt to sort out
3 0Walker, 391, 408-409. These poll results, like all the "social-science" statistics used this
thesis, should be interpreted only as loose indicators of ebb and flow of public opinion. Survey
results are highly sensitive to small changes in the wording of questions, among other factors,
and in any case citizens' actual beliefs are only weakly mirrored in their responses to these
selected, standardized inquiries.
31John L. Campbell, Collapse of an Industry: Nuclear Power and the Contradictions of U.S.
Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988) 3.
3 2 Walker, 409.
33 National Research Council, Nuclear Power: Technical and Institutional Options for the
Future, 182.
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the agency's promotional and regulatory roles. In retrospect, it would have
been surprising if the Cold War preoccupation with strength-at-any-cost that
governed the AEC's primary task of bomb-building had not also influenced
its civilian programs; had not led it to peddle a flawed reactor technology
simply because it was the first one available; had not fostered an indulgent
disregard toward the industry's safety shortcuts. Congress, by delegating
weapons production and reactor development to the new Energy Research
and Development Agency (later the Department of Energy) and vesting
oversight of the nuclear power industry in the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, hoped to mollify grassroots groups critical of the plant-siting
and licensing process. The Reorganization Act undid itself, however, by
transferring the AEC's regulatory bureaucracy of some 2,000 people -- intact
and "fully conditioned to overlooking or neglecting difficult questions"-- to
the new NRC.34 Within five years, the President's Commission on the
Accident at Three Mile Island would describe the NRC as an agency where the
promotional philosophy was still so rampant, and safety standards so
slipshod, that an entirely new restructuring was needed.3 5
Had the accident at Three Mile Island never happened, regulators,
reactor manufacturers, and utilities might or might not have gone forward
with plans to convert more and more of the United States' electrical supply to
LWR generation; counterfactual questions are the hardest for historians to
answer. But on the eve of the disaster the public's doubts about nuclear
power were clearly stronger than ever before. At the Seabrook construction
site in New Hampshire, thousands had recently taken part in the largest anti-
34Brightsen, "The Way to Save Nuclear Power," Fortune (Sept. 10, 1979) 128.
35U.S. President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, The Need for Change: The
Legacy of TMI (Washington, D.C.: Goverrunment Printing Office, Oct. 1979) 19-22, 61-67.
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nuclear demonstrations to date. The NRC, under pressure from
environmental groups, had just shut down five East Coast reactors thought
vulnerable to earthquakes. And from the long lines outside theaters showing
The China Syndrome, released in mid-March, 1979, it appeared that audiences
found the film's fictional reactor-accident scenario all too plausible. (In one
of the more bizarre instances of art anticipating life, a physicist in the film put
the AEC's own WASH-740 predictions into prosaic terms, explaining that a
loss-of-coolant accident and the resulting meltdown could "render an area the
size of Pennsylvania permanently uninhabitable.") 36 The Three Mile Island
accident, to quote one industry journal's rueful account, "could not have
come at a better time for opponents of nuclear power."37
"The Thing Was Simply Uncorked"
The following inquest does not scrutinize every human error or
mechanical or electronic failure that contributed to the crisis at Three Mile
Island. The need is to isolate the parts of the event that, in retrospect, seem to
have decisively shaped public opinion regarding nuclear power. Fine-
grained, technically exhaustive accounts of the accident have been available
from soon after the disaster.3 8 But it appears that several dramatic moments
36The China Syndrome's screenwriter, Mike Gray, consulted with MIT physicist and Union of
Concerned Scientists founder Henry Kendall while preparing the screenplay. Kendall wrote
in 1980, The risks of catastrophic [nuclear] accidents has been extensively studied by
scientists...These accidents, which could disperse massive amounts of radioactivity from a
nuclear power plant into the surrounding area, have not arisen to date in the country's limited
commercial nuclear power experience, but the long-term chances of operating nuclear plants
while avoiding such potential calamities remain an open question." Henry W. Kendall and
Steven J. Nadis, eds., Energy Strategies: Toward A Solar Future (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger
Publishing Co., 1980) 11. See also Union of Concerned Scientists, The Risks of Nuclear Power
Reactors (Cambridge, Mass.: Union of Concerned Scientists, 1977).
3 7
"Accident clouds future for U.S. nuclear power," Chemical & Engineering News (April 9,
1979) 8.
38See footnote 43.
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revealed how the nuclear industry operated under pressure and convinced
many lay people that the hazards associated with LWRs outweighed the
benefits. There were encouraging moments in the crisis, for example the
times when technicians took actions that prevented an even worse accident
or when public servants brought needed calm to a chaotic situation. But the
close calls and last-minute saves made less impression than the series of
things that went wrong. The accident's technical causes and the impressions
they left on the public make the disaster's political aftermath intelligible.
To say that the Unit 2 reactor at Three Mile Island was an accident
waiting to happen sounds like a cliche, but in fact the partial meltdown
occurred so early in the reactor's commercial lifetime and was so heavily
foreshadowed by the plant's construction and operating record that the
reactor's entire history can be considered ill-starred. Ironically, there was little
need for an additional reactor at Three Mile Island; Unit 1 was expected to
meet projected demand in the area well into the future. Plant owner General
Public Utilities (GPU) had originally intended to build a new reactor at Oyster
Creek, New Jersey, but encountered labor problems and licensing delays there
and settled on TMI instead.39 While Unit 1 had performed at or near
expected capacity over most of its five-year lifetime, its younger sibling was
troublesome from the very beginning. Both Unit 1 and Unit 2 were designed
by the Virginia engineering firm of Babcock & Wilcox, but because GPU
contracted with different groups of architect-engineers for the installation of
the two reactors, they were configured quite differently. The lack of
standardization is a major problem throughout the U.S. nuclear industry;
each new plant was essentially custom-built. At least one analyst contends
3 9 John Sorensen, et al., Impacts of Hazardous Technology: The Psycho-Social Effects of
Restarting TMI-1 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987) 8.
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that this has been the cause of the industry's downfall.40 Construction site
security at TMI-2 was violated repeatedly between 1974 and 1978.
Maintenance crews had been reduced due to cost cutbacks and the remaining
crews were seriously overworked. When the NRC granted TMI-2 its
operating license on February 8, 1978, there were still 14 "unresolved safety
items" on its agenda, including a lack of data on operators' ability to
counteract hypothetical pipe breaks and resulting coolant losses.41 One of the
NRC's five commissioners, Richard Kennedy, said later that the plant should
not have been operating while these safety matters were still outstanding. 42
From the time it "went critical" on March 28, 1978, to December 30, 1978,
when it started producing electricity, Unit 2 was shut down for adjustments
and repairs 71 percent of the time, 30 percent above the industry norm for the
startup phase. In one test during startup, a critical safety valve attached to the
pressurizer (the vessel that maintains high water pressure in the primary
coolant system) had stuck open, creating the possibility of a loss of coolant in
the core. (See Item no. 7 in Figure 3.1.) Damage to the reactor was averted,
but this power-operated or "pilot-operated" relief valve (PORV) remained
leaky even after the plant went on-line. Between December 30 and the day of
the accident three months later, the reactor operated at full power less than
half of the time.
40Campbell, Collapse of an Industry, 31-49.
4 1Sharon M. Friedman, "Blueprint for Breakdown: Three Mile Island and the Media Before the
Accident," Journal of Communication (Spring, 1981) 125-126.
42Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 31.
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The accident began, broadly speaking, with a minor error that had most
likely occurred two days before the onset of the actual core-melt emergency.43
On March 26, 1979, in order to carry out a routine test of the emergency
feedwater pumps (designed to inject large amounts of cold water into the
steam generator in the event of a loss of circulation in the secondary
coolingsystem), operators closed two valves that isolated the emergency
feedwater system from the secondary cooling system. After the test, the
valves were left closed, although workers swore they remembered having
reopened them. Testimony before the President's Commission revealed that
"with hundreds of valves being opened and closed in a nuclear plant, it [was]
not unusual to find some in the wrong position..Large valves do not close by
themselves, so someone must have goofed."44 One of the two indicator
lights in the main control room that would have alerted operators to the
valves' closure was obscured by a yellow repair tag hanging down from a
different light.45
This valve problem is worth mentioning because it was not the sort of
failure that stirred deep public doubts about LWRs' reliability. It was
indicative of lax safety training and poor maintenance procedures, but on the
43This and the following ten paragraphs draw on a variety of sources, including: U.S.
President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, The Need for Change: The
Legacy of TMI (also known as the Kemeny Report); Nuclear Regulatory Commission Special
Inquiry Group,Three Mile Island: A Report to the Commissioners and to the Public, vol. I
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Jan., 1980) (also known as the Rogovin
Report); B. Drummond Ayres, "Three Mile Island: Notes From a Nightmare," The New York
Times (April 16,1979) Al, B10; William Booth, Postmortem on Three Mile Island," Science
(Dec. 4, 1987) 1342-1345; Leonard Jaffe, "Technical Aspects and Chronology of the Three Mile
Island Accident," in Moss and Sills, eds., The Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident: Lessons
and Implications; Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (New
York: Basic Books, 1984) 15-31.
44Perrow, Normal Accidents, 19.
45 It is also possible that the valves were reopened after the test but closed again by operators
during the emergency, or that they were closed from control points outside the main control
room. U.S. President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, The Need for
Change: The Legacy of TMI, 94.
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whole the public understands the fragility of complex machinery and almost
expects a certain level of failure. (Who, for example, would not be surprised
to drive a car 100,000 miles without a hint of mechanical trouble?) While the
TMI accident drew attention to devices that should have been designed better,
operators who should have known better, and a regulatory system that was
apparently incapable of detecting and correcting these flaws, these were not
the failures that truly alarmed accident-watchers. Rather, it was the systemic
nature of the breakdown -- the fact that it resulted from the unforgiving,
ultimately incomprehensible complexity of the technology itself -- that was
truly frightening.
Ezra Pound once wrote that "error is all in the not done," and this is a fit
enough description for the main sequence of events that allowed the Unit 2
reactor core to consume itself.46 It was early in the morning on March 28.
TMI-2 was running at 97 percent power. Operators Craig Faust and Edward
Frederick were monitoring instruments in the control room, while night
shift supervisor William Zewe worked i a glass-enclosed office at the rear of
the control room and shift foreman Fred Scheimann was down in the turbine
building. All four of these licensed operators were veterans of Rickover's
"nuclear Navy."47 Scheimann was helping two workers who had been
attempting for the last 11 hours to unclog a pipe leading to the condensate
polisher, a device that scoured mineral contamination from the water in the
secondary cooling system (the one, remember, that removes heat from the
primary cooling system and supplies steam to the turbines). The polisher had
broken down three times in recent months; now workers were using
4 6Ezra Pound, "Contra Natura," in Cantos, 1965.
47 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Special Inquiry Group,Three Mile Island: A Report to the
Commissioners and to the Public, vol. I, 9.
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compressed air from instrument air lines to dislodge a debris-packed resin
filter inside the polisher.48 The instrument air was at a lower pressure than
the polisher's water stream, and at 4:00 a.m., water entered the air lines. This
disabled instruments and shut down the polisher, which in turn triggered the
main feedwater pumps and the electrical turbines themselves to trip off.
Circulation halted throughout the secondary cooling system, leaving no
escape for the tremendous heat being carried away from the reactor core by
the primary cooling system.49
The emergency feedwater pumps came on immediately to restore
cooling to the steam generator, but since the block valves had been left closed,
no water actually reached the generator. The heat accumulating in the
primary cooling system caused water pressure inside the reactor to shoot up,
and the PORV opened automatically to compensate. Sensors detected the
still-rising pressure and instructed the reactor to scram. As noted before,
however, the insertion of the control rods halts only the fission reaction, not
the ongoing radioactive decay of the uranium oxide fuel. Ordinarily, the
decay heat would be transferred to the secondary cooling system at the steam
generator until the pressure dropped sufficiently for the PORV to re-close; but
because the secondary teedwater was not circulating, the primary coolant
48This was a "one-minute modification" of the kind that engineers low routinely warn against.
"Clearing any system with instrument air as a pressure sources is a bad idea. Other
pneumatic sources such as utility air, plant air or nitrogen should be used instead," writes
British chemical-plant engineer R. E. Sanders. The Management of Change in Chemical
Plants: Lessons from Case Histories (Oxford, U.K.: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1993) 80.
49A total feedwater shutdownm, it is intereresting to note, could not have occurred in the Unit 1
reactor. There, half of the feedwater is always routed around the condensate polishers, and
the polisher system is equipped with an automatic bypass valve rather than a manual valve
like the one on the Unit 2 polisher. An operator's report noting these design discrepancies had
so far been ignored. Jaffe, "Technical Aspects and Chronology of the Three Mile Island
Accident," 40.
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water in the steam generator was essentially boiling away. The entire job of
venting the excess heat and pressure fell to the PORV.
Even so, the PORV should have closed when the pressure finally
dropped back to acceptable levels. It stuck open, just as it had done during
tests the year before, allowing large volumes of vaporized coolant to rush out.
(Analysts assessing the Babcock & Wilcox reactor design had calculated that
the PORV would fail in this way only once in every 50 uses -- which were
supposed to be infrequent anyway -- but the President's Commission later
found evidence of at least 11 failures at other nuclear plants.50) Meanwhile,
two high-pressure injection pumps started up automatically to flood the
reactor core and prevent the fuel rods from being uncovered.
All of this happened in about 12 seconds, scarcely enough timte for Zewe,
Faust, and Frederick to make sense of the cascade of flashing lights and alarms
in the control room. A number of conflicting signals confronted the
operators, in combinations they had never seen in their simulations and
drills. System pressure in the primary coolant loop was dropping, indicating
that a possible loss-of-coolant accident was in progress. hi fact, this was exactly
what was happening, as the coolant water spewed out into the containment
building through the stuck-open PORV; "the thing was simply uncorked," to
use Perrow's colorful description.51 But because the coolant was boiling,
pockets of steam had formed throughout the primary system, forcing liquid
water into the pressurizer vessel and creating water-level readings that falsely
reassured the operators that the coolant level was still adequate. They even
began to fear that the extra water entering through the high-pressure
injection pumps would cause the pressurizer vessel to "go solid," a disastrous
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50Perrow, 20.
5 1 perrow, 21.
condition in which all control over the pressure level in the primary system
is lost because the pressurizer, normally half-filled with steam, has entirely
filled with water. Hoping to avoid this, Zewe ordered Frederick to shut down
one of the high-pressure ijection pumps and to cut the other to half power.
Later, investigators would call Zewe's order the most significant error leading
to the meltdown, but it was one the operators could hardly have avoided
given the lack of time or consistent information about what was going on
inside the reactor. The situation could now be described in the language of a
simple high-school math problem: "The starting volume of the primary
cooling system is 90,000 gallons. If coolant is leaking out at the rate of 320
gallons per minute but is being replaced at only 100 gallons per minute, how
long will it take for the fuel rods to be completely uncovered?"
The grim outcome of this exercise in related rates might have been
avoided had Zewe and his subordinates been aware of the two valve
problems. But the fact that the emergency feedwater block valves were closed
went unnoticed until Ken Bryan, an operator from Unit 1, arrived on the
scene some eight minutes into the accident. Workers were sent to open the
valves, and emergency flow to the steam generator was restored. The stuck-
open PORV remained that way, however, for another 2 hours and 12
minutes. Throughout this time the operators assumed that the valve was
closed, since the indicator light which they believed would have been shining
if the valve were open was, in fact, dark. This indicator, however, was of a
particularly lazy design; it did not really indicate the position of the valve at
all, but only whether an electrical current was flowing to the solenoid that
was supposed to open and close the valve. So the fact that the light was off did
not prove that the valve had actually shut, and another light that operators
had installed to counteract this flaw had failed due to a faulty switch.
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Zewe and his crew also dismissed another, more positive irdication that
coolant was leaking: a high temperature reading in the reactor coolant drain
pipes leading to the containmer building sump. The leaky PORV had often
caused such high readings, Zewe testified later, but they were nothing to be
alarmed about.5 2 At about 4:40 a.m., a worker telephoned Frederick in the
control room to notify him that more than six feet of water had accumulated
in the containment sump. Fearing that the water might be radioactive (as it
was) Frederick stopped the pumps that emptied the sump into an auxiliary
building -- but not before some 8,000 gallons had already been deposited there
and a small amount of radioactive vapor had been vented to the outdoor air.
The operators failed to interpret the presence of the water in the auxiliary
building as a sign that the PORV was stuck open; they imagined instead that
a small pipe had broken somewhere. None of the information available to
them had yet pierced their assumption that coolant levels were still high, a
misperception compounded by the absence of instruments to monitor the
reactor coolant level directly.
At about 5:13, the operators noticed that the four main reactor coolant
pumps in the primary system were shaking violently. (The effect was
uncannily similar to the climactic near-meltdown scene in The China
Syndrome.) The vibrations were caused by "cavitation," or steam bubbles
passing through the pumps, and were another sign that coolant level was
dangerously low. To prevent the pumps from shaking themselves apart, the
operators shut down two of them at 5:14, and the other two half an hour later.
Still believing that the core was full of water, they hoped that natural
5 2 The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI , 96.
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convection currents would keep the fuel rods cool.53 In fact, the coolant had
now dropped to less than one-third of its usual level.
Between 6:10 and 6:20, the coolant level bottomed out. The 12-foot fuel
rods were now more than half uncovered, and although the operators and
other personnel summoned to the plant had finally diagnosed and closed the
stuck PORV, it was too late. The core had begun to melt. Events from this
point forward were reconstructed only years later, after the cleanup and
defueling process was complete, but it appears that the zirconium alloy
cladding covering the uranium pellets first ruptured, then burned. A molten
mixture of zirconium and uranium oxides flowed down toward the center of
the reactor, forming a six-inch crust on top of the remaining water. By 7:00
a.m., operators had begun to send more cold water into the core, but this only
had the effect of shattering the fractured, overheated fuel assemblies and
creating a large void at the reactor's center. Molten fuel and cladding
accumulated on top of the crust until 7:46, when the crust broke and the fuel
burned through the reactor's inner wall. In less than a minute twenty tons of
the molten mass migrated to the bottom of the reactor shell, where water
cooled it enough to prevent it from burning through the reactor vessel and
dropping onto the floor of the containment building itself.54 A later analysis
showed that had the PORV remained open for another thirty minutes with
the injection pumps still at low power, a full meltdown and reactor vessel
breach would likely have resulted.55
53Three Mile Island: A Report to the Commissioners and to the Public, 18;The Need for Change:
The Legacy of TMI, 99.
54Booth, "Postmortem on Three Mile Island," 1343-1344.
5 5 Perrow, 29.
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"All Hell Broke Loose"
Before most people in the TMI region had even left their homes for
work or school that Wednesday morning, then, the most dangerous phase of
the accident was over. But no one knew this at the time, and TMI's operators
were only beginning to realize what had actually occurred inside the reactor.
The public-safety crisis would not reach its peak until Friday, when thousands
evacuated the area, heeding experts' warnings that a potentially explosive
hydrogen bubble might be building up inside the reactor vessel. At this point
in the story, however, it will help to step back from the technical details in
order to assess the depth and seriousness of the impressions the accident
conveyed to the residents of the Middletown-Harrisburg area and to the larger
TV-viewing public.
The best one-word summary for those impressions is confusion--
confusion evident among TMI's operators and owners, among experts inside
and outside the NRC, and among state and federal officials responsible for the
public safety. It became terrifyingly obvious to the lay public that the people
supposedly in charge of the nuclear machinery were themselves at wits' end
over the accident. Given that Vietnam, Watergate, and Love Canal, among
other episodes, had already conditioned Americans to be unsurprised by high
levels of official bad faith and incompetence, the logical conclusion for many
observers was not that different officials should be put in charge but that
LWR technology was too dangerous to entrust to anyone, let alone to profit-
minded utilities and promotion-minded regulators. Whatever faith the
public still placed in the U.S. nuclear power industry before the accident,
much of it evaporated along with Unit 2's vital coolant.
The immediate response to the accident outside the TMI plant gates
might be described as a study in "information pathology." With the possible
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exception of General Public Utilities, no single person or group behaved
irresponsibly, attempted to conceal known hazards, or knowingly
disseminated misleading information. Reporters acted as effectively as they
could under difficult circumstances, spreading the facts as they were known
with a minimum of error and sensationalism; NRC officials, once they had
taken over public-information duties at the accident site, were cooperative
and forthright; and Pennsylvania emergency management officials acted
cautiously and according to the best information available to them. Yet the
net result was chaos, fear, and panic on a scale to match the bafflement of the
technicians inside the plant. The breakdown of public trust in authority
structures -- the hierarchy of sources to which the public usually looked for
advice on health and safety matters -- stemmed from rampant contradictions
in these authorities' words and actions. Utility and government officials
repeatedly claimed, on the one hand, that the danger was minimal and that
events inside the plant were "under control." But conflicting claims about
exactly what these events were betrayed the officials' true confusion and
ignorance. This was an understandable condition for them to be in, given the
sheer complexity of the plant and of the accident's progress,56 but by not
admitting their ignorance sooner officials only invited a worse breakdown of
trust later. The "information pathology," therefore, had its origins in the
technology itself, and was only exacerbated by officials pretending to know
more than they did. Given the morass of conflicting signals available to the
the population around Three Mile Island, evacuation was a sensible
alternative.
56Indeed, accounts of the accident like the preceding one could only be pieced together after
weeks, months, or years of investigation.
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The substitution of blithe reassurances for unvarnished facts about the
TMI plant was a pattern established long before the accident. Metropolitan
Edison, the GPU subsidiary that ran Three Mile Island, employed four public
information officials whose main function was to disseminate weekly press
releases written by plant engineers. The releases tallied startups (as opposed
to shutdowns), used misleading jargon such as "deenergized power
distribution bus" (i.e., a blown fuse), and unfailingly described technical
problems as inconsequential to public health and safety. Unfortunately, local
reporters failed to perceive the pattern of safety problems the press releases
cumulatively indicated. 5 7 From 1976 to 1978 the eight newspapers in the
region published, between them, an average of about two articles each week
on the Three Mile Island plant, but most of these focused on Unit 2 licensing
hearings and milestones in the construction and startup process rather than
on safety and operating setbacks.58
Despite the dearth of critical public attention to events at the plant, a
local anti-nuclear group, Three Mile Island Alert (TMIA), had come into
existence as early as 1977.59 Another, older group, the Environmental
Coalition on Nuclear Power, tied together some 35 citizens' organizations
opposing plant licensing in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. These early
activist organizations, however, boasted little direct support from the people
of the region. Local residents were not exempt from the national trend of
growing opposition to nuclear power. But the vast majority, if they
questioned TMI's presence at all, were only sympathizers of the anti-nuclear
57Friedman, "Blueprint for Breakdown," 118-119.
58U.S. President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, Report of the Public's
Right to Information Task Force (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Oct. 1979)
43.
5 9 Walsh, 49-51.
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movement, not committed activists. As one resident said later, "The events
at Seabrook in 1977-78 did arouse my consciousness...but I'm ashamed to
admit that I kept TMI and other power plants out of my mind."60 The years
were not long gone when syndicated columnist Mary McGrory had called
southeastern Pennsylvania "the confidence-in-authority capital of the
country." 6 1 Only the alarming reports that began to emanate from Three
Mile Island on the morning of March 28 would push residents solidly into
the anti-nuclear camp.
A traffic reporter who had been monitoring police radio
communications broadcast the first news of the accident on Harrisburg station
WKBO at 8:25 a.m. The Associated Press reported soon after that Metropolitan
Edison had declared a "general emergency" at the site, but "neither the utility,
nor the NRC, nor the state explained clearly what a general emergency was,"
noted a report by the President's Commission assembled to investigate the
accident. People calling GPU's headquarters in Reading that morning were
told, quite falsely, that there had been "no recordings of any significant levels
of radiation" either inside or outside the plant and that there was "no danger
of meltdown." At an 11:00 a.m. press conference, Lieutenant Governor
William Scranton, the head of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management
Agency (PEMA), announced that some radiation had been vented into the
atmosphere, but he did not say how much.
A statement released by GPU at about the same time announced that
there had been a "malfunction" at TMI-2 in which "some damage to the fuel
cladding may have occurred" and that the company was "presently
monitoring some low level release of radioactive gas beyond the site
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6 0Walsh, 83.
6 1Quoted in Walsh, 64.
boundary." At the plant itself, however, the public information staff
maintained that "No [off-site radioactive releases] have been found, and we
do not expect any." In fact, field scientists for the Pennsylvania Department
of Environmental Resources had detected airborne radiation of up to 10
millirems per hour -- more than ten times the normal background level, but
not enough to require an evacuation. 62 At 4:30 p.m., Scranton told reporters
that "Metropolitan Edison has given you and us conflicting
information...There has been a release of radioactivity into the
environment." Scranton said state officials were concerned most about the
accumulation of radioative iodine in the thyroid glands of those exposed to
the radiation.6 3
At about 1:50 Wednesday afternoon, meanwhile, operators inside the
TMI-2 control room heard a heavy thud. The station manager, Gary Miller,
who was leaving for a briefing with Scranton, dismissed the thud as the noise
of a closing ventilator. Though computers registered indications of a
"pressure spike" of 28 pounds per square inch inside the containment
building, but operators "wrote it off...[as] possibly instrument malfunction."6 4
In fact, there had just been an explosion of hydrogen gas released from the
reactor. Zirconium in the overheated fuel cladding had interacted with water
in the primary coolant system, bonding with its oxygen and freeing hydrogen,
which then bubbled out into the containment area where it was ignited,
probably by a spark from an electric pump. The overpressure produced by the
explosion was fully half the maximum for which the building had been
designed. If the utility had not acceded to the state's earlier demands that the
62The average dose from natural background radiation in the United States is 100 millirems per
year; NRC regulations permit nuclear plant workers to receive up to 3 rems every 3 months.
6 3 Report of the Public's Right to Information Task Force, 79, 83, 85, 100.
6 4 The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI, 107.
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containment be reinforced to withstand the impact of a jet airliner (in
deference to the nearby Harrisburg airport), the building might well have
been too weak to contain anything after the hydrogen burn.6 5
By the next day, the situation seemed to have stabilized. Because no one
recognized that a hydrogen explosion had occurred, it went unreported.
Residents paid close attention to the ongoing media coverage and were
skeptical about the reports of low radiation, but few yet saw any compelling
reason to leave the area. In testimony before Congress that Thursday, NRC
chairman Joseph Hendrie asserted that there was "no serious ongoing
problem" at Three Mile Island.66 That afternoon, however, Met Ed angered
many, including Pennsylvania Governor Richard Thornburgh, by dumping
some 400,000 gallons of radioactive xenon-contaminated wastewater into the
Susquehanna River without notifying anyone outside the plant. Thornburgh
later said the utility was "insensitive to our responsibility to inform the
public and to take appropriate action." An enraged press corps learned of the
dumping only the next morning. "Why weren't we told about this for ten
hours?" one reporter asked. Destroying in a single sentence whatever was left
of the utility's credibility, a Met Ed vice president replied, "I don't know why
we need to tell you each and every thing that we do."67
The only accurate description for the events of Friday, March 30, was the
one many local residents would later use: "All hell broke loose."68 No one
yet knew whether the reactor core temperature was under control. At 7:10
a.m., in an attempt to reduce pressure in the the coolant water supply tank, an
operator ordered the transfer of radioactive gases from that tank to another,
65Perrow, 29-30, 41.
6 6 Walsh, 35.
6 7 Report of the Public's Right to Information Task Force, 124-125.
68 See, for example, Walsh, 39; The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI, 123.
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the waste gas decay tank. Some of the gas escaped through leaky pipes in the
auxiliary building and was vented into the atmosphere. Helicopters hovering
above the plant reported radiation readings of up to 1,200 millirems per hour.
In what John Kemeny, head of the President's Commission, would later call a
"horrible coincidence," an official participating in a briefing at NRC
headquarters in Washington had just shared an off-the-cuff calculation that if
the waste gas decay tank relief valve were to be opened, some 1,200 millirems
per hour would be released on the ground, a level exceeding EPA exposure
guidelines for "sensitive individuals." When the news of helicopter readings
of exactly this amount reached the NRC, the result was "significant
apprehension," according to one official. Unaware that the waste gas decay
tank was not actually being vented and that the radiation measurement had
been taken from the air directly above the plant, not from off-site, the agency
recommended to PEMA that the state begin an evacuation of everyone
within five miles of the plant. Before Governor Thornburgh could approve
such an order, however, PEMA had alerted other agencies and radio stations
that evacuation was imminent, and the exodus was underway. Officials at
the plant learned of the evacuation warning only when one of them drove
into Middletown to pick up some sandwiches and saw that shoppers were
"scurrying away as though being pursued." "What are you people doing to
us?" station manager Miller angrily asked one NRC inspector.
Within an hour the confused radiation reports were ironed out and
Thornburgh countermanded the evacuation notice, instead advising people
within five miles downwind of the plant to stay indoors with their windows
closed. But the NRC's own report later acknowledged that the premature
evacuation warning had let loose "fear that [rolled] around the area like a
loose cannon, doing incalculable damage to the morale of this placid, stable
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region."6 9 When Thomrnburgh announced at 12:30 p.m. that pregnant women
and young children should leave the entire five-mile zone, most residents
took this to mean there was a serious emergency. Parents removed their
children from school, customers jammed banks and grocery stores, phone
lines overloaded, and highways and bridges clogged. Over the next three
days, more than 200,000 people -- some 60 percent of residents within the five-
mile radius, 40 percent within fifteen miles, and 11 percent within twenty-
five miles -- would flee their homes.70 In the absence of trustworthy
information from Met Ed or the NRC, the evacuees' overwhelming impulse
was "better safe than sorry." One later recounted, "Either they were lying to
us about the radiation releases or else they didn't really know what was
coming out of that damn plant -- either way, I didn't want to stay around."71
While the evacuation was going on around them Friday and Saturday,
operators and officials inside the control room were preoccupied with a new
problem. A 1,000-cubic-foot hydrogen bubble had been detected inside the
reactor core, a product of the same zirconium-water reaction that had led to
Wednesday's explosion in the containment building. A hydrogen explosion
inside the core might rupture the reactor vessel, spilling highly radioactive
materials onto the containment floor or even causing a full meltdown. The
hydrogen could not explode, however, unless there were also free oxygen
inside the reactor, and some NRC scientists calculated that over several days,
a process known as radiolysis -- the breakdown of coolant water into
hydrogen and oxygen by radioactive bombardment from the decaying fuel --
6 9 Three Mile Island: A Report to the Commissioners and to the Public, 59-67; Report of the
Public's Right to Information Task Force, 125-142; The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI ,
116-119.
70Walsh, 37.
7 1Walsh, 41.
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could liberate enough oxygen to make the hydrogen flammable. Saturday
evening, the Associated Press reported estimates from NRC sources that the
bubble might become explosive within two days. But engineers at Babcock &
Wilcox insisted that the excess hydrogen would suppress radiolysis altogether.
In a late-night press conference on Friday, NRC spokesman Harold Denton
denied there was any danger of an explosion, but disagreement over the
question persisted among experts throughout the weekend, even as President
Jimmy Carter and First Lady Rosalynn Carter toured the plant on Sunday.
Press reports highlighted the conflict. As the NRC's accident report later
observed, "The hydrogen bubble never explode[d] in the reactor vessel; it
[blew] up instead in the media."72 In any event, the bubble controversy had a
chilled public perceptions of the nuclear establishment. "People saw the
disorganization of the system. They saw technical experts not knowing what
was going on, and I think that made people very uncomfortable," observes
nuclear engineer Margarita Crocker, an expert on nuclear regulation in the
U.S., Germany, France, and Japan.7 3
The bubble trouble soon passed. Beginning Sunday evening, operators
were able to draw off most of the excess hydrogen using the reactor's
degasification system. On Tuesday, Denton announced that the bubble had
been eliminated. (He did not add that the NRC's original calculations about
the generation of oxygen had been in error, creating needless panic.)
Residents soon began returning from their places of escape - some as far away
as Missouri -- and on April 9 Governor Thornburgh announced that
pregnant women and children could safely re-enter the area. By April 27, the
Unit 2 reactor had been put in "cold shutdown," with natural convection
7 2 Three Mile Island: A Report to the Commissioners and to the Public, 80.
73 Telephone interview with Crocker from her home in Somerville, Massachusetts, Jan. 14, 1993.
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currents absorbing the remaining decay heat.74 The total amount of
radiation released during the accident, according to later estimates, was so
small that it would lead to less than one extra cancer death in the TMI region
over the coming decades.75 The immediate danger had passed. But the
citizen response to the crisis was just beginning.
Shifting Ground
The accident heightened the already-strident national debate between
pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear contingents. Both launched public-relations
campaigns to capitalize on renewed media attention to the issue. Opponents
framed the accident as the realization of all their worst predictions about the
hazards of LWRs. The nuclear industry, pointing out that the reactor vessel
was never breached and only a tiny amount of radiation escaped, portrayed it
as a successful test of the defense-in-depth strategy. Taking aim at the anti-
nuclear camp, industry pundits reached into their quiver of epithets and
came up with such phrases as "calamity howlers," "purveyors of panic,"
"Doomsday Lobby," "quasi-religious crusade" and "a fierce Lilliputian
minority...strapping down the nation's energy supply like Gulliver."76 The
Union of Concerned Scientists, in turn, bought a full-page advertisement in
the New York Times calling the nuclear enterprise "a technological
Vietnam...run by people too obstinate to disengage us despite all the evidence
74Three Mile Island: A Report to the Commissioners and to the Public, 87.
75 It is estimated that a total of 2 million Curies of radioactive noble gases and 17 Ci of iodine
radioisotopes were released as a result of the accident. Achilles G. Adamantiades et al., A
Guide to Nuclear Power Technology: A Resource for Decision Making (New York: John Wiley
& Sons, 1984) 737. This was a very small release compared to the 200 million Curies of
radioisotopes estimated by Alexander R. Sich to have been released during the Chernobyl
disaster; see Chapter 5.
76 James J. Kilpatrick, "Yes, it was a disaster," and Patrick J. Buchanan, "Now, the anti-nuclear
cry," Washinglon Star (April 7, 1979); Charles Bartlett, "Let the public decide," Washington
Star (April 4, 979).
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in the world that the nuclear power dream has become a nightmare." The ad
admonished citizens that "only your immediate action can stop the
incompetence, malfeasance, industry arrogance and government insensitivity
that is hurling us all towards the next nuclear accident."77 Escalating the war
of words was a two-page notice in the Wall Street Journal written by physicist
Edward Teller and clandestinely funded by Dresser Industries (the
manufacturer of the faulty pressurizer relief valve at TMI). Teller's ad
claimed, incredibly enough, "I Was the Only Victim of Three Mile Island."
Teller had suffered a heart attack while lecturing in defense of nuclear power,
and now he wrote tha: "I feel compelled to use whatever time and strength
are left to me to speak out on the energy problem...Unless the political trend
toward energy development in this country [i.e., away from nuclear power]
changes rapidly, there may not be a United States in the twenty-first
century."78
In Washington, Three Mile Island made nuclear power a political issue
in a way it had never been before. Under pressure from anti-nuclear
Democrats like California Governor Jerry Brown, Senators Edward Kennedy
of Massachusetts and Gary Hart of Colorado, and Arizona Representative
Morris Udall -- all Presidential hopefuls -- President Carter moderated his
outspoken support for the nuclear industry. Carter said shutting down
existing nuclear plants was "out of the question," but he suggested that the
U.S. should move to develop alternative energy sources and reduce its
reliance on nuclear power.79 Even before the Unit 2 reactor had cooled, the
usual round of official investigations were underway, with various bodies --
77The New York Times (April 8,1979) 22.
78 The Wall Street Journal (July 31, 1979) 24-25.
79Lyons, "Antinuclear Politicking Makes Odd Bedfellows," 2E.
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Congress, the executive branch, the NRC -- vying to be the first to assign
blame for the accident.
The role of the official accident investigation commissions that often
form in response to severe failures has always been a dual one: To root out
the accident's causes in hopes of preventing similar problems in the future,
but also to restore public confidence in the technology in question by
demonstrating that the causes of failure are thoroughly understood and, by
implication, controllable. The two major postmortems on Three Mile Island
presented clear and comprehensible accounts of the accident and ended by
distributing blame fairly evenly across the involved parties -- GPU, Babcock &
Wilcox, PEMA, the NRC, and the plant operators. But no one who read these
reports closely could have come away reassured that combinations of events
like those that led to the meltdown were even in principle preventable. So
many things went wrong during the accident -- as the commission reports
and, later, Perrow' Normal Accidents made graphically clear -- that to offer
guarantees against a similar accident in the future would have been
ludicrous. Indeed, while the reports called for numerous technical and
organizational changes to improve reactor safety (not least within NRC itself)
they also cautioned ominously that good evacuation plans for the
populations around nuclear plants were the best final defense against the
danger of a meltdown.
The months after the TMI accident, as the facts of the accident began to
come to light, were heady ones for critics of nuclear energy: for the first time,
what Robert Kates had called that "exceedingly rare event," the renunciation
of a technology, seemed plausible. An accident as serious and well-publicized
as the one at Three Mile Island could not help but lead to sober public
discussion of the nuclear power's pros and cons. In a message to the utility
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industry, NRC Commissioner Richard Kennedy conceded that "the inherent
desirability or undesirability of nuclear power" was now at issue and said that
"its ultimate evolution must depend on the political process rather than the
regulatory process."80 Another commissioner, Victor Gilinsky, mused that
Three Mile Island could "represent for the nuclear reactor what the
Hindenburg was for the airship."81 Daniel S. Greenberg, journalist and later
publisher of the influential Science & Government Report, wrote in the
Washington Post that "Despite what [the nuclear apologists] say, the fact is
that, given the political will, public cooperation and shrewd exploitation of
non-nuclear energy sources, we could get by without nuclear power for the
next couple of decades...The disaster that we're all now brooding over
provides an opportunity -- though one of short duration -- to rethink and
perhaps re-legislate the role of nuclear energy in American life."82
Throughout the first year after the accident, the force it added to anti-
nuclear arguments seemed strong enough to assure a substantial victory for
nuclear opponents in the Three Mile Island region: the permanent
shutdown of the plant, including the undamaged Unit 1 reactor.
Approximately 600,000 people lived within 25 miles of TMI, and whether
they had stayed or fled during the accident, most emerged from the
experience angry and afraid. Though many residents of this predominantly
agricultural area had paid little attention to the plant before the accident, they
now viewed it as a technological monster in their midst. "There is a good
80Richard T. Kemnnedy, "Remarks Before the Edison Electric Institute Spring Legislative
Conference, Washington, D.C., June 12, 197.-," (United States Nuclear Regulatory Comrnission
release no. S-8-79).
81Victor Gilinsky, "Remarks Before the Government Affairs Committee of the American
Newspaper Publishers Association, Washington, D.C., Sep. 19, 1979," (United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission release no. S-11-79).
82Daniel S. Greenberg, "Nuclear Power: Reform Not Abolition," The Washington Post (April 3,
1979).
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possibility that the emotions of the people here are so strong," one NRC
official said in March, 1980, that "one could well speculate" that the plant
might never reopen.83 Many felt that GPU had, in essence, broken te "social
contract" by which concern for public health and safety was to be put ahead of
profit, and that the authorities who were supposed to have enforced this
contract -- mainly, the NRC -- had shown themselves to be little more than
co-conspirators in the utility's bad faith.84 Coming together first in everyday
conversation with their neighbors, and later in organized anti-TMI groups
throughout the region, residents appear to have formulated three main
arguments in favor of a permanent shutdown: first, that the safe exploitation
of nuclear power was beyond society's technological and organizational
capabilities; second, that the parties who had violated the "social contract" in
the first place could not be trusted to honor it in the future; and third, that
the very least residents deserved as compensation for the trauma imposed by
the accident was to be free of any renewed threat.
The first argument was fueled by abundant media coverage of the
accident and the investigations. For anyone who watched television or read a
newspaper during the crisis, the accident amounted to a crash course in LWR
technology. "Never before TMI had the American people been presented, in
such comprehensive fashion, with information on how nuclear reactors
operate," observed the NRC's Kennedy.8 5 The nature of heat generation
inside the core, the transfer of energy from the primary to the secondary
feedwater loop, the spaghetti-like plumbing of the emergency core cooling
83Ben A. Franklin, "Public Anger May Doom Crippled Nuclear Reactor," The New York Times
(March 21,1980) A14.
84For an extended discussion of the "social contract" metaphor as it applies to Three Mile
Island, see Goldsteen and Schorr, 175-190.
8 5 Richard Kennedy, Remarks (June 12, 1979).
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systems, the bewildering sameness of the dials and switches in the control
room -- all this and more were part of the media's presentation. For TMI-area
residents the information was doubly relevant, and the effects of this instant
education profound. The accident greatly heightened residents' awareness of,
and antipathy toward, the TMI facility and the nuclear establishment in
general, as press accounts and strong quantitative and anecdotal social-
research data attest.86
Many residents concluded after the accident that nuclear energy was
simply too complex a technology for humans to manage safely.87 "It's a new
field. They really don't know all the things they should know about it," one
25-year-old woman said. "There are so many things that could go wrong
down there, I'm sure something will get screwed up," said a successful
businessman. One weatherworn farmer allowed, "Maybe the accident could
have been blamed on the operators too instead of the plant itself. I believe the
operators were at fault, I believe it. You got to know what you are doing." A
young man with two small children observed that "The utility companies, in
the need for a type of energy that they can sell to people, that they can control,
have gone ahead with nuclear power regardless of the fact that there is
nothing to do with the nuclear waste...I do not see it as a good source of
power... But if it is absolutely necessary, then they should put it in
86See especially Goldsteen and Schorr, 117-153; Sandra Prince-Embury, et al., "Perception of
Control and Faith in Experts Among Residents in the Vicinity of Three Mile Island," Journal
of Applied Social Psychology (Vol 17., no. 11, 1987) 953-968; Brad Richardson, et al.,
"Explaining the Social and Psychological Impacts of a Nuclear Power Plant Accident,"
Journal of Applied Social Psychology (Vol. 17, no. 1, 1987) 16-36; John Sorenson, et al., Impacts
of Hazardous Technology: The Psycho-Social Effects of Restarting TMI-1 (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1987); P. Walker, et al., eds., Proceedings of the Workshop on
Psychological Stress Associated with the Proposed Restart of Three Mile Island, Unit 1,
(United States Nuclear Regulatory Comission, April 1982);
87A1I the quotations in this paragraph are from interviews conducted by Goldsteen and Schorr;
see their Demanding Democracy After Three Mile Island, pages 51-111.
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nonpopulated areas." And this opinion, worth quoting at length, came from a
woman who gave birth to a son about a month after the accident:
I feel very angry about it, really, because I just feel that there was so much
incompetence on the part of the utility, on the part of the NRC, on the part of the
local governments...It seems to me that it's a technology in general that's really
gotten away from us. When the accident happened, there was so much floundering
around that, at the time, I was thinking it was just a cover-up. They don't want to
admit that they goofed.. .There are so many alternatives we could explore, you
know, that I don't really think we have to go the nuclear route...But it's pretty
obvious that the nuclear industry -- they have so much money tied up in it now, and
all the plants are extremely expensive to build, and they aren't going to get their
money back off of them, you know. It's like, they made a mistake twenty-five,
thirty years ago when they opted to go nuclear, and now instead of saying, "Hey,
we goofed, This is not the way we should have gone," and [they] just let them sit
where they are...I understand they can't iust shut them all off tomorrow because a
lot of areas of the country really depend on nuclear for electricity...It just seems like
such a pigheaded course to me. I just can't see why they don't admit their mistake.
They seem to feel that they're above the law. They're above their responsibilities
to the ratepayers and the public in general...I never was particularly pronuclear. I
always felt that it was not a very safe thing to fool around with, that we really
weren't ready for it...It seemed that as far as industry and government was
concerned, they took it all very lightly and pooh-poohed the idea, [saying] that
anyone who was against [nuclear power] was an alarmist and going around crying
doom, you know...I guess [the accident] just sort of crystallized my feelings. I feel
more strongly since it happened....1 think they were taking it so much for granted.
They had all these technological goodies, and it was just going to keep this safe,
and the backup systems were going to work. So don't worry about it. Just push the
buttons. That's it. But it just doesn't seem to be working that way. I really fecl that
sooner or later, maybe not necessarily at TMI, but someplace in the world, there's
really going to be a bad, bad accident...Life obviously is not a fairy tale, never has
been and never will be, but after this, it just really made me wonder, "Are we going
to be able to overcome this? Is our technology going to do us in before we wake up and
look at it?"
Such sentiments, though not as coherently expressed by others, were not
unusual. Surveys conducted in the years 1979-1986 showed that between 60
and 72 percent of TMI area residents considered living near any nuclear
power plant to be dangerous and that 81 to 83 percent considered Three Mile
Island in particular to be either "dangerous" or "very dangerous." Between 39
to 46 percent said they would have moved farther away from TMI if they
could have afforded to do so. Between 57 and 79 percent said they did not
trust the utility or the federal government to regulate nuclear power
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adequately, and 36 to 41 percent said they favored a total ban on nuclear
power.88
Social scientists found that residents' first-hand experiences during the
accident and evacuation, rather than any views or political positions they
held beforehand, were the most important factor explaining their post-
accident attitudes toward nuclear power. One group of social psychologists
who conducted a multivariate path analysis on survey data taken after the
TMI accident concluded that "a bad experience with a threat seems to alter
how people subsequently distribute their supply of 'worry beads'...Impacts on
people seem to be caused by individual and group experience with the
accide much more than prevailing pre-accident population
characteristics." 89 In other words, it was what people learned during the
accident -- that the threat of meltdown was real, that reactor systems were
complex and difficult to manage, and that TMI's operators and regulators
were apparently not up to the task -- that created their unfavorable attitudes
toward LWR technology.
The collapse of old patterns of trust in authority in the communities
around Three Mile Island was equally thorough. As we have seen above, and
as sociologists confirmed, "Faith in experts crumbled in the wake of the
accident as conflicting statements were made by industry, government
officials and through news media."90 Earlier technological disasters had led
to similar collapses (the 1972 Buffalo Creek flood, as described by Kai Erikson
and others, was the archetype in the disaster literature 91) but at TMI the state
88Goldsteen and Schorr, 118-119,121, 152-153,171.
89 Richardson et al., "Explaining the Social and Psychological Impacts of a Nuclear Power
Plant Accident," 26-27, 30.
90R. Holt, quoted in Prince-Embury, "Perception of Control and Faith," 955.
91Kai T. Erikson, Everything In Its Path:The Destruction of Community i the Buffalo Creek
Flood (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1976).
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of relations between citizens and leaders was especially critical. Thle prospects
for a mutually satisfactory resolution of the Unit 1 restart controversy would
obviously be minimal if citizens, utility officials, and regulators could not
negotiate from a base of mutual respect. In a 1980 survey, fewer than 8
percent of the population within 25 miles of TMI felt that Met Ed was either
believable or reliable, and the NRC fared little better.9 2 Said one resident,
"We resent the NRC even more than Met Ed because the feds were supposed
to be in control and they didn't know what was going on around here."93
At the heart of this ill will was Pennsylvanians' belief that the nuclear
establishment, in its obsession with "exploiting the peaceful atom," had
deliberately compromised their safety and would do so again if given the
chance. They were also convinced that the institutions of nuclear power were
beyond democratic control. "Money has spoken, and we the people do not
matter at all. We can be replaced," said one cynical resident. "Met Ed is
concerned about their money, and I think that's where the key lies," said
another. "They want to get that thing back in operation, and that seems to be
all they're concerned about."94
From the moment GPU announced plans to bring Unit 1 back on-line,
area citizens were overwhelmingly opposed to the idea. Surveys taken
during the six-year restart controversy showed opposition to be steady at
about 70 percent.9 5 At first the accident created an energetic local movement
for "strong democracy" -- direct citizen participation in the restart decision
through hearings and referenda.96 But as the case moved into the courts and
9 2Appendix A, Table A-8, in John Sorenson, et al., Impacts of Hazardous Technology, 116, 179.
9 3 Walsh, 41.
94 Goldsteen and Schorr, 170, 172.
9 5 Ibid., 156.
96Many analysts, including Langdon Winner and Peter Stillman, have argued that nuclear
power plants are inherently resistant to democratic control, but at the same time too complex
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it becane clear that the restart could not be prevented solely through local
political action, the movement's efforts grew narrower and more specialized.
While safety concerns were at the core of citizen opposition, the court battle
rver the restart would come to hinge on a number of unrelated questions:
whether, for example, the resumption of operations at Unit 1 would
significantly impair residents' social and psychological well-being. Many
residents said the accident had been an extremely stressful experience and
predicted that a Unit 1 restart would add to their feelings of fear, anxiety,
paranoia, hopelesness, and powerlessness, perhaps also contributing to
medical problems, family strife, neighborhood conflict, and community
decline.97 TMI opponents were forced to stress these psychosocial effects in
their legal efforts because regulators discounted their concrete health and
safety concerns; in essence, the strategy called on the NRC to include citizens'
mental health as a component of Unit l's "environment," the "impact"
upon which should be duly "assessed" before TMI's operating license could
be re-issued. The psychologization strategy was activists' final attempt to beat
the regulators at their own game -- a risky proposition in any industry, let
alone one as closed and defensive as commercial nuclear power. Given the
legislative and regulatory history of nuclear power in the United States, the
eventual Supreme Court decision allowing GPU to restart the Unit 1 reactor
was all but inevitable. What is noteworthy is that it was six years in coming.
for experts and organizations to manage reliably. Stillman writes: "Energy production by
nuclear power is inimical to democracy and prerequisites of democracy such as equality, an
open society, and the free flow of information...[yet] the manifold problems at TMI raise
questions about the competence and legitimacy of technical experts and government agencies."
In such a case, intervention to shut down the technology through "strong democracy" may be
the only sensible course. Stillman, "Three Mile Island: A Case of Disinformation,"
Democracy (Fall, 1982) 66-78.
9 7 Sorensen et al., 40.
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"Moment of Truth"
In the reshuffling of local loyalties after the accident, Three Mile Island
Alert (TMIA) was one of the few organizations to come out ahead. The small
anti-nuclear group, operating out of a basement apartment in Harrisburg, had
been warning area residents about deficiencies at the plant since 1977.
Overnight, the accident gave the group new credibility among residents who
had formerly considered the anti-nuclear movement a part of the "radical
fringe." (It didn't hurt that the group's telephone number was listed right
after the Three Mile Island plant itself; many callers trying to reach utility
spokespersons wound up speaking with TMI opponents instead.9 8)
Thousands of people who had never acted on their convictions about nuclear
power were now roused to join TMIA and the four other major anti-restart
groups that quickly sprung up in the region: the Susquehanna Valley
Alliance, the Newberry Township Steering Committee, People Against
Nuclear Energy (PANE), and the Antinuclear Group Representing York
(ANGRY). Sympathizers were becoming activists. When some 150,000
people gathered at a Washington, D.C. anti-nuclear rally on May 6, 1979,
several hundred TMI residents were there as honorary leaders.
Preventing the Unit 1 restart was their overriding concern, but area
activists took broad aim at the nuclear industry, as names like PANE and
ANGRY implied. The Susquehanna Valley Alliance declared its long-term
goal to be the phasing out of nuclear power stations in the U.S.99 A ten-page
statement released by the faculty of the nearby Lancaster Theological
Seminary near Three Mile Island read like both a prayer and a call to arms:
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9 8 Walsh, 49.
9 9 Walsh, 81.
We confess our responsibility for conditions leading to the Three Mile Island
accident. We confess we have become increasingly aware of the danger of nuclear
power, but we did not publicly advocate stopping the construction of nuclear
facilities...We believe that although nuclear energy is part of God's good creation,
it has been developed in ways which have become destructive in our time. The
accident at Three Mile Island highlights these harmful aspects of nuclear power in
a dramatic way that summons the Church to speak out...Evidence now strongly
indicates that nuclear power in its present form is unsafe, uneconomical, and unsound
ecologically...At times in history, an occurrence takes place which breaks the
seemingly inevitable sequence of events and opens up new possibilities for creative
participation...Selma, Kent State, and Watergate were occasions of this kind.
Three Mile Island is also such an event, a moment of truth in which the grip of the
'powers' over us is at least temporarily broken. In such a moment our values are
judged and we are given a suddenly-expanded opportunity to decide the course of
our future...In response to Three Mile Island we summon the Church to pray, to
think, to act.1 0 0
The seminarians called for a moratorium on the construction of new nuclear
plants and the rapid phaseout of existing plants. Other groups lobbied for the
repeal of the Price-Anderson Act ensuring utilities' invulnerability to liability
for reactor accidents. Though the regional anti-nuclear movement had no
single agenda or unified leadership, it was clearly awake to the national, even
global implications of the events at Three Mile Island.
Activists quickly recognized, however, that the trans-local character of the
nuclear establishment itself would be the biggest barrier to grassroots change
at TMI. Regulators and utility officials voiced a commitment to "public
involvement" in decisions about plant siting and operation, but they clearly
believed that the experts employed by large technical organizations should
have the final say. (As we heard an official of the American Electric Power
Service Corporation assert in Chapter 1, "a specialized technical activity such
as power system planning cannot be carried out in an open forum or in the
atmosphere of a town hall."10l ) Early on, the NRC's Atomic Safety Licensing
Board (ASLB) agreed to hold public hearings on GPU's proposal to restart
10 Quoted in Walsh, 81-82.
10 1 Theodore J. Nagel, "Operating a Major Electric Utility Today," Science (Sep. 15, 1978) 985-
93.
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Unit 1, but few area residents believed that the heavily pro-nuclear body
would reject the proposal. One fifty-year old woman living in Newberry
Township told interviewers "we should have a say" in the reopening of TMI
"because we're the victims." She added, however, that "We'll spout off a little
bit, or maybe we'll go to the capitol building and have banners, you
know...but in the end the little guy just [has] no say. I've never seen the little
guy win yet when you come up against a big organization." 10 2
Though convinced that the hearings' outcome would go against them,
the six area groups participated anyway, using the opportunity to build a legal
record in preparation for later court challenges. The hearings went on until
July, 1981. Activists expected the NRC to rule hastily in favor of the Unit 1
restart once the hearings were over, but now the trouble-prone plant was hit
by two new problems. NRC investigators uncovered evidence that GPU
operators had cheated on examinations, and the utility discovered that
thousands of steam tubes in Unit l's secondary cooling system were defective,
necessitating lengthy delays for repairs. Activists capitalized on these
setbacks. They collected enough signatures to put a nonbinding restart
referendum on the May, 1982, ballot in three of the four counties
surrounding TMI. Voting was 2-1 against restart.
Meanwhile, PANE and the other groups sued the NRC, contending that
the National Environmental Policy Act still required the agency to include
psychosocial effects in its consideration of environmental impacts during the
relicensing procedure. In January, 1982, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia ruled in PANE's favor, and the NRC commissioned a
group of geographers, anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists to
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study the proposed restart's implications. 10 3 At the same time, however, the
agency appealed the ruling. The Supreme Court later overturned the appeals
court, finding that the NRC was not required to take the fact of the Unit 2
accident into account in its decision about Unit 1, and that Congress had not
had psychological harms in mind when it wrote the Environmental
Protection Act. In July, 1982, the ASLB recommended that Unit 1 be allowed
to restart, and the NRC commissioners set December 10 as the date for their
own final vote on the issue.
The "final hearing" before the restart vote, held November 9 in a high
school auditorium in Harrisburg, marked the first time all five NRC
commissioners had appeared together in a public forum and was a moment
of high tension. Edward J. Walsh, a Pennsylvania State University
sociologist who attended the event as an observer, reported that "although
the original program called for only thirty citizen representatives to speak to
the commissioners, more than forty-five took the microphones as the five
NRC officials sat semi-captive to the overwhelmingly hostile crowd of
approximately 1,500 people. Many of the protest group leaders spoke that
evening, but there were also some surprisingly critical speeches from
previously uninvolved attorneys, clergymen,. political officials, doctors,
farmers, and housewives who used pleas, demands, and even threats in their
efforts to persuade the commissioners to vote against a Unit 1 restart."
One activist predicted that residents would forcibly occupy the plant
rather than allow it to restart. Another told the commissioners, "I resent five
men in Washington holding our fate in their hands. I resent your taking
103The result, completed after the Supreme Court overturned the appeals court ruling,, was Jon
Sorenson et al., Impacts of Hazardous Technology: The Psychosocial Effects of Restarting
TMI-1 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987).
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three-and-a-half years to come to Harrisburg to hear us...But most of all I
resent my feelings of helplessness...If ours is still a government 'of the people,
by the people, for the people,' then you must know that we have spoken and
said 'No Restart."'1 04 Perhaps in deference to residents' protests, the
commissioners allowed December 10 to pass without a final vote. (Pressure
from Governor Thornburgh and further revelations about irregularities at
GPU may also have been factors in the postponement.)
The utility's own blunders were the major source of hope for TMI
opponents between late 1982 and the final restart decision in May, 1985. A
lawsuit brought by GPU against Babcock & Wilcox alleging negligence in the
reactor design backfired on the utility when witnesses for the manufacturer
testifed that prior to the accident, GPU had systematically falsified operating
data in order to avoid shutdown. GPU's firing of four engineers in 1983 for
blowing the whistle on mismanagement of the Unit 2 cleanup process drew
extensive publicity. In 1984, the utility pleaded "guilty" or "no contest" to
seven of eleven federal charges that it had falsified records, and a TMI
operator was convicted for cheating on operator examinations. Restart
opponents cited to each of these lapses as further evidence of the utility's
untrustwc):rthiness. Ralph Nader, speaking in Harrisburg at the fifth-
anniversary commemoration of the accident, asked "At what point do we
determine that [GPU] has flunked as a corporation?" and suggested that the
company should be dissolved. 10 5
But the NRC commissioners continued !ito favor restart, and probably
would have allowed GPU to proceed much earlier had the string of legal
embarrassments not interceded. One week after a May 22, 1985, hearing in
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10 5 Waish, 153.
Washington, D.C. -- at which Governor Thornburgh, Pennsylvania Senators
Arlen Specter and John Heinz, and hundreds of TMIA members made a final
plea that the wishes of area residents be respected -- the Commission voted 4
to 1 to authorize the Unit 1 restart. In a statement following the vote,
Commissioner James Asselstine, the only dissenter, asserted that GPU was
unfit to hold a license to operate a nuclear plant and accused the other
commissioners of ignoring important safety issues.
The restart vote unleashed a final spasm of local protest. TMI opponents
who had found few outlets for activism during the long licensing dispute
now engaged in non-violent civil disobedience. On the evening of the restart
decision hundreds of demonstrators blocked the plant gates. State police
arrested 82. Meanwhile TMIA, the Union of Concerned Scientists, and
lawyers for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appealed the restart decision
itself to the Federal circuit court in Philadelphia. The court issued a stay
against the restart order pending arguments on the need for further hearings.
This sufficed to keep the reactor cold throughout the summer, but on
September 19 the judges decided the review had gone on long enough and
lifted the stay. On October 2, 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear the
case. The next day, GPU finally powered up the long-idle reactor. Expressing
residents' frustrat on at the defeat, the editors of the Harrisburg Patriot called
the restart a "triumph of technology over the common man and common
sense" and commented that "democratic rule is one of the more conspicuous
victims lying in the Unit 2 rubble."106
Pennsylvanians concluded bitterly that the American political system
had failed them. Raymond Goldsteen and John Schorr, two social researchers
10 6 October 4, 1985; Quoted in Walsh, 177.
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who spent several years interviewing residents of Newberry Township west
of Three Mile Island, wrote that the accident turned the area "from an
ordinary community into a fearful, angry and cynical one" where people had
"soured on basic democratic prccesses." 107 Forty-eight percent of TMI-area
residents surveyed in 1986 said they were less satisfied with government than
before the accident, and 90 percent of this group attributed their dissatisfaction
directly to the accident and its aftermath.10 8
Yet mirroring these changes was a greatly heightened level of citizen
intervention in arcane, formerly hidden processes of decision-making about
nuclear power technology. Inhabitants emerged from thc accident "much
more suspicious, more involved," in Edward Walsh's words. "They know
they can be agents of change." 109 Tens of thousands of lay people in the
region took part in some phase of the grass-roots effort to prevent the Unit 1
restart, whether by volunteering for anti-TMI organizations, joining lawsuits,
attending hearings or rallies, voting in a referendum, speaking with
journalists, or participating in social research projects.
And for the hundreds who became committed anti-nuclear activists, the
six years of the restart battle worked profound personal changes. Walsh
writes: "After years of struggle, [activists'] knowledge of organizational and
political processes as well as energy issues had increased by degrees of
magnitude. Many had become familiar with certain aspects of the political
wheeling and dealing in both Harrisburg and Washington, D.C., and scores
had gone to jail for their principles. The need for presentations in homes,
schools, and elsewhere prompted dozens to develop into decent public
1 0 7 Goldsteen and Schorr, 174, 205.
1 0 8 1Ibid., 173.
109Wade Roush, "Learning from Technological Disasters," Technology Review (Aug.-Sep.,
1993) 50-57.
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speakers, while circumstances forced others to pick up considerable legal skills
along the way.'"1l 0
The accident had, in essence, given rise to a tradition of "technological
citizenship" where there was almost none before (a theme to which I will
return in Chapter 6.) TMI area residents had the right to be bitter about the
outcome of the restart battle; at every point possible the NRC had attempted
to cut them out of the decision. But residents also had reason to be proud.
They had helped delay the restart for six years, and in the process they had
acquired the skills, knowledge, and confidence with which to defend
themselves in any dispute related to technology or the environment. In the
words of Jacques Ellul's translator John Wilkinson, "To bear witness to the
fact of the technological society is the most revolutionary of all possible acts,"
and this is exactly what TMI area residents had done."'
Walking Away from Nuclear Power, Slowly
For the commercial light-water reactor, a technology scaled up and
scattered across the American landscape more rapidly than was technically,
economically, or politically wise, obsolescence seems an appropriate fate. At
the time of the accident at Three Mile Island, there were 72 reactors in
commercial operation in the United States and another 174 in the
construction or planning stages. Today, only 110 are in operation, four are
still under construction, none are planned, and several are being
dismantled. 112 All of the reactors now running were ordered in 1973 or
1 1 0 Walsh, 189.
1 1 1 See Translator's Preface to Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1965).
11 2Campbell, Collapse of an Indust;y, 3-5. The four reactors still under construction are all
owned by the Tennessee Valley Authority, whose chairman, Craven Crowell, acknowledged
in Congressional hearings in March, 1994, that "If we were a private utility, we wouldn't
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earlier, and 38 have been operating for 20 years or more, not far short of their
expected 30-year lifetimes.113 Widespread cancellations of orders for new
electrical generating capacity had begun several years before the accident, but
after TMI nuclear power became the target of choice for utilities making
cutbacks. Scrapped nuclear plants accounted for 71 percent of the total
cancelled generating capacity from 1974 to 1978, and 90 percent from 1979 to
1982.114 By the early nineteen-eighties, the U.S. had ceded its lead in
commercial nuclear technology development to Europe and Japan. As John
Campbell writes in his detailed political-science study Collapse of an Industry,
"Nuclear power suffered one of the most dramatic declines of any industrial
sector in the United States in recent memory.'"115
The reasons for this decline are complex and still controversial, but the
permanent national-level shift in public attitudes toward nuclear power that
occurred after Three Mile Island played an undeniable part. Skyrocketing
construction costs (from an average of $817 per kilowatt of generating capacity
in 1971 to $3,133 per kilowatt in 1988, in constant 1988 dollars), increasing
construction times (from 5.4 years per plant in 1975 to 12.2 years in 1989), and
high operating costs (nuclear plants turn out to be no cheaper to run than
coal-fired plants) were among the direct causes of cancellations and the
still be constructing nuclear plants. But we're a government agency, and we have access to
capital that allows us to continue construction." Three of the four reactors may be canceled
nonetheless. Danielle Droitsch, "T.V.A.'s Blighted Nuclear Romance," The Nation (June 27,
1994) 906-908.
113Matthew L. Wald, "10 Years After Three Mile Island," The New York Times (March 23,
1989) D1-D17; M.D. Mulheim and E.G. Silver, "Operating U.S. Power Reactors," Nuclear
Safety (Jan.-Mar., 1993) 115-121.
114See Table 6.5 in Campbell, Collapse of an Industry, 103.
11 5 Ibid., 6.
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cessation of new orders.116 But behind these statistics were important events
in the political and regulatory spheres. Intolerable construction delays (with
their associated finance costs) resulted partly from strong regional resistance
to new plant openings and partly from the fact that new and more stringent
safety regulations enacted in response to Three Mile Island "added to plant
complexity and increased planning and construction costs at [the industry's]
expense."1 17 Higher construction and operating costs hurt utilities mainly
because public utility commissions, responding to public pressure, began in
the nineteen-eighties to refuse to pass these excess costs on to ratepayers.
At bottom, Three Mile Island accelerated the change in Americans' basic
views on the place of nuclear power in U.S. energy production. To the most
straightforward question about the desirability of nuclear power -- "Do you
favor the construction of more nuclear power plants?" - between 45 and 58
percent of Americans surveyed throughout the nineteen-seventies had
answered "Yes." Immediately after the accident this level of support dropped
to 39 percent, while opposition grew to 44 percent. This nearly even division
of opinion has persisted ever since. When asked the very different question
"Would you support the construction of a nuclear power plant in your local
community?" people expressed even greater caution toward nuclear power.
Those opposing local nuclear projects had begun to outnumber supporters in
1978, even before Three Mile Island, and by 1980 the ratio of opponents to
supporters had grown to 3-1.118
116See Tables 2-4 and 2-5 in National Research Council, Nuclear Power: Technical and
Institutional Options for the Future, 31, 33.
117Campbell, Collapse of an Industry, 8.
118Stanley M. Nealey, Barbara B. Melber, and William L. Ranking, Public Opinion and
Nuclear Energy (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books-D.C. Heath and Company, 1983) 16-23,
27-29.
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At the same time, however, the percentage of the public supporting the
total and permanent closure of all nuclear plants has remained low (15 to 25
percent). In the years since Three Mile Island, apparently, Americans have
reached an uneasy but pragmatic accommodation with nuclear power. They
recognize that a significant investment has been made in the technology and
that it would be difficult, in the short term, to replace the 20 percent of the
nation's electricity that comes from nuclear plants.119 But they also hope that
the existing plants will be the last to be built and that, over time, other energy
sources will be found to replace nuclear power. The nuclear industry's
argument that electrical generation from nuclear fission is more desirable
than the burning of fossil fuels because it does not contribute to air pollution
or global warming has not proved persuasive to the public, who still see
nuclear power as the least-desirable energy option among the choices of coal,
oil, natural gas, and conservation. 12 0
At the heart of the public's cautious attitude toward nuclear power is
skepticism about the adequacy of reactor safety systems. Media coverage of
nuclear safety issues after Three Mile Island (network news broadcasts
devoted more time to the subject in the two weeks after the accident than in
the previous 35 years of nuclear energy's history, one study found121) helped
give structure and focus to citizens' concerns. Polls taken in 1979 found that
82 percent of the public had been either "somewhat" or "deeply" disturbed by
the accident. GPU and Babcock & Wilcox received the most negative ratings
119A 1979 Gallup poll found that a majority of Americans (56 percent) believed that the energy
shortage that might result from the shutdown of all nuclear reactors was a bigger risk to the
nation than the presence of those reactors. Ibid., 89.
120 Ibid., 129-135; Eugene A. Rosa, et al., "Public Views Toward National Energy Policy
Strategies: Polarization or Compromise?" in William Freudenburg and Eugene A. Rosa, eds.,
Public Reactions to Nuclear Power: Are There Critical Masses? (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1984) 69-93.
1 21 Robert L. DuPont, "Understanding Fear of Nuclear Power," (1980), cited in Nealey, et al., 5.
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for their parts in the accident, though 55 percent of those polled believed
operator error was most to blame. CBS and the Harris polling organization
both asked respondents whether they believed that the Three Mile Island
accident was a freak event or whether they thought more nuclear accidents
were likely. Only 37 and 29 percent, respectively, said the accident was
unusual enough that a similar event was unlikely; 50 and 69 percent
believed a recurrence was probable. 122
When the National Science Foundation asked people in 1979 whether
they believed that harmful consequences were likely to come from the
construction of more nuclear plants, 78 percent said yes, and the largest group
of these respondents, 36 percent, said they feared most the possibility of
meltdown or human error leading to a catastrophic accident.'2 3 In another
poll, the percentage of people who agreed with the statement "The thing that
worries me the most about nuclear plants is the question of safety" jumped
from 70 percent in 1978 to 86 percent in 1979.124 These worries have grown
even stronger in the post-Chernobyl era; in a 1990 poll, three-quarters of
Americans said they believed nuclear energy was the most dangerous way to
generate electricity.12 5
Capitalizing on this new skepticism, organized anti-nuclear groups
successfully placed nuclear energy referendums on a number of state ballots
in the nineteen-eighties. The outcomes of these votes reflected Americans'
compromise solution on the phaseout of nuclear power:
12 2 Ibid., 86-88.
12331 percent mentioned low-level radioactive leaks, and 13 percent pointed to radioactive
waste disposal problems. Ibid., 67-68.
124 Ibid., 75.
12 5National Research Council, Nuclear Power: Technical and Institutional Options for the
Future, 58.
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* A 1980 Oregon initiative requiring local referenda before the siting of
new nuclear plants passed by 53 to 47 percent.
* A 1981 Washington state initiative requiring voter approval before the
Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS, universally known
to Washingtonians as "Whoops") could issue bonds for the construction
of nuclear and other power facilities passed by 58 to 42 percent. (WPPPS
eventually defaulted on existing bonds and was forced to suspend
construction on five nuclear plants in the state.)
* A 1982 ballot question in Massachusetts restricting nuclear plant
construction and radioactive waste disposal passed by 2-1.
* A 1986 initiative in Oregon to require the shutdown of the Trojan
nuclear plant near Portland was rejected by nearly 2-1.
* A 1987 initiative in Maine to shut down the Maine Yankee reactor
failed by a similar margin.
* A 1988 ballot question that would have resulted in the shutdown of
Massachusetts nuclear plants also failed by 2-1.
* Also in 1988, a county initiative in Sacramento, California, to shut
down the trouble-ridden Rancho Seco nuclear plant lost by a slim
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margin, 50.3 to 49.7 percent. (The plant was later closed down for safety
reasons). 26
In state voting, ballot issues creating broad regulations or democratic approval
mechanisms for the management of nuclear power fared far better than those
aimed narrowly at the shutdown of particular existing plants. Even taking
into account the disparities in campaign funding and advertising available to
the two sides in each ballot question (nuclear energy proponents in the 1980
Oregon initiative, for example, outspent the initiative's supporters by 18 to
1127), it seems clear that American voters are reluctant to take sweeping action
to eliminate nuclear power as an energy source for the present. As public-
beliefs researchers Stanley M. Nealey, Barbara B. Melber, and William L.
Rankin wrote in 1983,
Little by little, more people are going to know more about nuclear technology and
the issues surrounding nuclear-power development. The usual course of public
acceptance of a new technology, from automobiles at the turn of the century to
microwave ovens in the nineteen-seventies, involves initial fear and skepticism.
This gives way to eventual wide acceptance, if the technology delivers important
benefits and if the period of its introduction passes without one or more
catastrophic mishaps. The Hindenburg disaster brought the development of
dirigibles to a sudden halt though their popularity had been growing prior to the
disaster and though technical developments, such as the use of helium, would have
overcome the fire hazard. The accident at Three Mile Island, by far the most
widely known event in the history of commercial nuclear power, seems not to have
been perceived byr most people as the catastrophic mishap that justifies the end of
nuclear power. 1 28
Nealey, Melber, and Rankin were unable to foresee, of course, the Chernobyl
disaster and the record-high levels of opposition to nuclear construction
126 David P. Schmidt, Citizen Lawmakers: The Ballot Initiative Revolution (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1989) 77-95; Betty H. Zisk, Money, Media, and the Grass Roots:
State Ballot Is.ues and the Electoral Process (Newbury dark, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1987)
104-5, 126-27, 200, 210-11.
1 2 7 Zisk, Money, Media, and the Grass Roots, 105.
128Nealey et al., Public Opinion and Nuclear Energy, 181-82. Emphasis added.
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projects that followed it (70 percent in 1986).129 While 38 of the plants under
construction at the time of the Three Mile Island accident have since come
on-line, levels of opposition like this and the drawn-out siting and licensing
disputes they guarantee mean that nuclear power is, in fact, approaching its
permanent demise. A nuclear plant would be the last option considered by a
utility thinking of adding new generating capacity. Even existing nuclear
plants are giving owners bigger and bigger headaches, as on-site storage space
for spent fuel runs low and as questions loom about how to decommission
and unbuild old nuclear reactors safely. As Alvin Weinberg predicted after
Three Mile Island, the present reactors will be allowed to run their course, but
no further growth will be tolerated: a remarkable story, unparallelled among
the large technological systems of the twentieth century.
It would be unfair to overlook another important outcome of the
accident: the improvements made to LWR safety systems. Equipment
upgrades mandated by the NRC included the redesign of display consoles and
control room layouts, the installation of instruments to measure core coolant
levels directly, and the replacement of pipes and valves with new models that
function reliably under a broader range of operating and emergency
conditions. Utilities have banded together to form the Institute for Nuclear
Power Operations, which runs an operator training academy and audits each
plant annually for adherence to quality standards. Satellite links installed at
each reactor control room now relay 60 categories of real-time telemetry,
including reactor pressure, coolant flow, temperature, and outside weather, to
NRC headquarters in Washington, and the Commission employs resident
inspectors at each site. NRC officials have become less reluctant to shut down
129Van der Pligt, Nuclear Energy and the Public, 7.
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plants for poor management, at times idling up to 10 percent of the nation's
nuclear facilities. The number of unplanned, automatic reactor scrams -- an
indirect measure of maintenance quality and operator diligence -- dropped
from 7.4 per plant per year in 1980 to 2.7 in 1987.
But whether all this means that "America's nuclear option potentially
can be even stronger," as Berkeley nuclear engineer Thomas Pigford has
suggested, is highly doubtful. 130 Former NRC safety expert Robert Pollard,
now a member of the Union of Concerned Scientists, told the New York
Times in 1989 that "it's beyond dispute that the plants are safer. The question
is, how much safer, and is that enough?" 131 During the nineteen-eighties
utilities reported more than 30,000 mishaps at U.S. nuclear reactors, some
minor, some alarming. Examples drawn at random from the pages of the
Department of Energy publication Nuclear Safety include the following:
On February 26, 1980, in an event reminiscent of Three Mile Island, a
malfunctioning instrument panel in the control room of the Crystal
River Unit 3 reactor in Florida caused the reactor's pressurizer relief
valve to open for two hours, spilling 40,000 gallons of radioactive
coolant water onto the floor of the containment building. The reactor
was safely shut down.132
* On January 25, 1983, an unexpected reactor shutdown at the Maine
Yankee plant caused the plant's auxiliary cooling system to kick in,
130 Thomas Pigford, "Three Mile Island: The Good News," 7The New York Times (March 28,
1989) A21.
131Wald, "10 Years After Three Mile Island," D17.
132 William R. Casto, "Selected Safety-Related Events Reported i March and April, 1980,"
Nuclear Safety (Jan-Feb., 1984) 115-16.
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filling the steam generator and associated piping with cold water so
quickly that "water hammer" and thermal stress cracking resulted in a
feedwater line break. 12,000 gallons of radioactive water was dumped
into the containment building.133
* On December 9, 1986, an isolation valve on one of the steam
generators at the Surry Unit 2 plant in Virginia stuck closed. High
pressure inside the generator caused a feedwater pipe to burst and fly
loose. The superheated water and steam escaping into the containment
building severely burned eight workers. Four subsequently died.134
By 1989, only 24 reactors had undergone all of the safety changes required in
the NRC's Three Mile Island Action Plan. Massachusetts Representative
Edward J. Markey, a long-time critic of the nuclear industry, commented that
"The TMI Action Plan was a major test of the commitment of the NRC to
public health and safety. It is a test which the NRC has clearly failed."135 And
no matter how many pieces of equipment are overhauled or replaced, the
fundamental design flaws of LWRs remain. As Perrow demonstrated in
Normal Accidents, and as a growing number of nuclear engineers concur, the
"defense-in-depth" strategy for mitigating loss-of-coolant accidents in large
nuclear reactors is ultimately self-defeating. Multi-layered safety systems
simply work against Murphy's Law. If something can go wrong, it will, and
the more things that can go wrong, the harder it i to isolate each and prevent
133G. A. Murphy, "Selected Safety-Related Events Reported in October, November, and
December, 1986," Nuclear Safety (April-June, 1987) 240.
13 4 William R. Casto, "Selected Safety-Related Events Reported in March and April, 1980,"
Nuclear Safety (July-Aug., 1980) 516-517
1 3 5
"Nuclear Safety Goals Are Not Met," The New York Times (March 17,1989) D4.
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a system accident. As Perrow wrote, "We may have reached a plateau [in our
understanding of complex nuclear reactor systems] where our learning curve
is nearly flat."136
Some scientists advocate leaping beyond this plateau to a new generation
of reactors known as "inherently safe" or, more modestly, "advanced" or
"evolutionary" reactors. Rather than adding complexity to the old defense-
in-depth mechanisms, these reactors would be theoretically incapable of
melting down as a matter of design. Engineers estimate that plants with
passive cooling mechanisms, relying on gravity and convection for the
circulation of coolant, could be built with 60 percent fewer valves, 35 percent
fewer pumps, and 75 percent less piping than conventional LWRs, making
them less vulnerable to the complex interactions that lead to system
accidents. Other designs reduce or eliminate the possibility of meltdown by
building in "passive decay heat removal systems" and repackaging the
uranium fuel itself into impermeable, graphite-covered spheres which
radiate away decay heat more efficiently.137 A gas-cooled German reactor
incorporating the latter feature produced 3 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity
before it was shut down for financial reasons in 1989.
The attraction of "inherently safe" reactors is obvious. But a 1992 report
on advanced reactor technology by the National Research Council of the
National Academy of Sciences concluded that while there is "a distinct
advantage to passive containment cooling for preventing containment
failure... dependence on passive safety features does not, of itself, ensure
greater safety, especially given the potential effects of earthquakes, design
errors, inspectability, manufacturing defects, and other subtle failure
136 Perrow, Normal Accidents, 11-12.
137These spheres would also be safer to store as spent fuel than conventional fuel rods.
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modes."138 Given the public's strong antipathy toward nuclear power of any
variety and the federal government's tepid support for research and
development on new controlled-fission designs, it seems unlikely that a new,
safer generation of reactors will be ready in time to replace today's aging
plants. Nor will a permanent underground radioactive-waste depository be
in operation before the spent-fuel pools at each plant site have filled to
capacity.
Even without another major accident, then, the nuclear industry faces
troublesome decades ahead. But certain mistakes of the past will not be
repeated. As Alvin Weinberg recognized even before Three Mile Island,
"The public perception and acceptance of nuclear power appears to be the
question we missed rather badly in the very early days [of civilian nuclear
power developmentl. This issue has emerged as the most crucial question
concerning the future of nuclear energy." 13 9 Three Mile Island and
Cherrnobyl cost the U.S. nuclear establishment its special immunity from
broader social and political concerns. Each future step in the technology's
development, whether toward death or attempted rebirth, will now be
challenged and shaped by people representing a much wider set of interests
than were ever involved in nuclear issues before Three Mile Island.
The mechanisms for this kind of public participation are still crude,
corning into being only piecemeal as local citizens' groups win isolated battles
for influence. But these groups do have a powerful historical argument at
their diposal: Twice in the last fifteen years, sophisticated safety systems
have failed to prevent unexpected human errors and machine failures from
138 National Research Council, 91-155; quotation from p. 136.
139Alvin Weinberg, "The Maturity and Future of Nuclear Energy," American Scientist (64:
1976) 16-21.
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coming together to cause disastrous reactor accidents. (There was no loss of
life at Three Mile Island because the last safety barrier, the reactor vessel itself,
did not rupture; events at Chemrnobyl went much farther, as Chapter 5 will
explain.) Citizen knowledge of these disasters cannot be taken away. Its
significance can be argued, but not denied.
The people of Three Mile Island lived through a kind of terror never
before experienced in this country and were repaid for their trouble by the
nuclear establishment's campaign to nullify their roles as citizens and
decisionmakers. But that campaign, while successful for General Public
Utilities in the short run, did nothing to improve nuclear power's public
profile or to prolong the technology's existence. The residents of
southeastern Pennsylvania might someday wish to have the
decommissioned Three Mile Island facility preserved as an historical
monument, one as significant in its own way as the Civil War battlefield
markers that dot the region. It will be a testament not just to the nation's
failed dreams of cheap, abundant nuclear energy, but to the inroads a skeptical
and organized citizenry has made against the political power of large
technological systems.
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Chapter 4
RUNAWAY REACTION
Knowledge, Control, and
Democracy After Bhopal
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For agony and spoil
Of nations beat to dust,
For poisoned air and tortured soil
And cold, commanded lust,
And every secret woe
The shuddering waters saw --
Willed and fulfilled by high and low--
Let them relearn the Law.
-Rudyard Kipling,
"Justice" (1918)
On December 2, 1984, Anees Chishti was up late in his room at the Hotel
Nalanda in the old part of Bhopal. A 53-year-old journalist with university
degrees in chemistry, Chishti was in the city to gather information for a story
on the upcoming parliamentary elections.
"I was trying to get one of the foreign stations on the radio at about 2:30
a.m. when I felt some choking in my throat," he said later. "I thought it was
some ordinary case of bad throat or something. I tried to get some cough
syrup but then I realized that it was something much more than that. There
was a burning sensation in the eye. I somehow opened the door of my room.
First I thought it was a hotel problem. I went out. I was running for some
open space where I could get relief but I could get relief nowhere. I felt this
was something like gas. So I dressed up, took my identity card, filing
authority, the money I had because I didn't know if I would come back alive,
or where I would be.
"When I came out, I saw hordes of people moving towards some
direction. I was new to Bhopal city, I didn't know all the routes. Nobody was
in a position to tell me which road led to the Paintalees Bangle area, where I
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had some friends, some access to communication. Anyway, I walked. Some
landmarks were there. And that was a ghastly experience. I saw ladies,
almost undressed, straight out of the bed in petticoats, children clinging to
their breasts, all wailing, weeping, some of them vomiting, some of them
vomiting blood, some falling down, I now presume falling dead. It was a
sight. And when I was passing through Kamala Park it was a very bad
situation, people trying to enter temples...they were falling dead, family
members were leaving their own family members and running for safety.
"My own rationality was challenged for the first time in my life -- on that
stretch of four kilometers. For a while I also thought some religious Lhoughts
that might perhaps save me. But then I was back to my rational thinking
very soon. My eyes were burning. In that condition I reached the Indian
Express office. Nobody knew what was happening. Soon people started
pouring in asking for blankets, sheets, water, all sorts of things. I gave them
water, people started putting water into their eyes, but having been a
chemistry student myself I was not very sure of what the effect of water
would be on the gas, because it was a gas, after all. And nobody was telling
wherefrom the gas was coming. Nobody I have spoken to actually heard an
announcement. The sky was clear, as I was passing I could see the stars. I
didn't smell anything, maybe because of panic. "l
Chishti's lungs and those of thousands of others in Bhopal were partially
eaten away that night by leaking methyl isocyanate gas, a component of the
commercial pesticide Sevin. Despite his injuries, Chishti made his way by
dawn to the source of the corrosive cloud, a Union Carbide plant two miles
north of the city's central railroad station. There he obtained interviews with
lAnees Chishti, Dateline Bhopal: A Newsman's Diary of the Gas Disaster (New Delhi:
Concept Publishing, 1986) 7-8.
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the plant's managers and composed the first of dozens of newspaper
dispatches he would file on the disaster over the coming months. The story
that emerged from Chishti's work and that of other journalists was one of
scarcely-credible devastation. The Bhopal gas leak, history's most lethal
industrial accident up to that time, killed more than 3,000 people and injured
200,000, quickly becoming an international symbol of corporate callousness
and the hidden threat chemical factories pose to host communities. Needless
to say, the elections Chishti was to have covered were postponed.
Nothing that has occurred since the gas disaster can make up for the
victims' suffering, which is the true ongoing story of Bhopal. Even payments
far larger than the $470 million settlement reached between Union Carbide
and the government of India in 1989 would not bring back the dead, cure the
survivors' disabilities, or restore the social and economic fabric of the city.
Yet the shock and dismay the catastrophe caused among lay citizens around
the world also fueled political changes that have turned the traditional
methods of chemical-hazard control on their heads. Groups in India have
organized to keep new industrial threats out of their communities, and
regulations enacted in the U.S. after Bhopal have put power in the hands of
citizens by requiring manufacturers to disclose information on the kinds and
amounts of toxic substances they release into the environment each year.
These "right-to-know" laws are designed to prevent chemical disasters by
giving industries' neighbors the means to be vigilant -- means unavailable to
the people of Bhopal, who had no inkling that Union Carbide's "plant
medicine" was a deadly toxin or that it might one day escape the facility. This
sharing of technological control, as it spreads to other industries and nations,
helps to honor -- though not justify -- the Bhopal victims' loss.
It is a troubling irony, however, that Bhopal's most important political
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effects occurred in the United States and other Western nations, not in India.
No other technological crisis abroad has led to such extensive changes in U.S.
law, industrial practice, and community-industry relations. But only an
unfaithful account of the disaster could prc'end that Bhopal's social and
political aftermath in India has been, on the whole, encouraging or beneficial.
Like the former Soviet republics, India is a nation facing numerous
economic, ecological, and ethnic problems, so that even a catastrophe on the
horrifying scale of a Chernobyl or a Bhopal must compete for attention with
numerous other pressing matters. Grassroots Indian responses to the disaster
were handicapped by an unresponsive government, low literacy rates,
people's necessary preoccupation with economic survival, and plain apathy.
The emphasis on responses in the United States in the later sections of
this chapter is a product of the fact that the American public, already
sensitized to industrial hazards by incidents like Love Canal and Three Mile
Island, was better able to act for increased citizen involvement in decisions
about chemical technology. Moreover, the U.S. political system was not
consumed, as India's was, by the need to provide medical and social relief for
the disaster victims and by a drawn-out dispute over matters of liability and
compensation. If Americans living near chemical facilities are significantly
safer today than they were ten years ago, it is because thousands of Indian
citizens died through the negligence of an American corporation.
Just two weeks before the Bhopal leak, the explosion of four liquefied-
natural-gas tanks outside Mexico City killed more than 500 people. The Wall
Street Journal labeled the accident "Mexico's Three Mile Island," and
similarly, in the debate over Bhopal's meaning for industrial communities in
the U.S., Three Mile Island was the central metaphor and historical reference
point. James Speth, president of the World Resources Institute and chairman
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of the Council on Environmental Quality under President Carter, predicted
that "Bhopal will become the chemical industry's Three Mile Island -- an
international symbol deeply imprinted on public consciousness... Just as Three
Mile Island spurred a thorough assessment of the safety of nuclear power,
Bhopal will bring justifiable demands that hazardous facilities in the
chemical industry be designed, sited, and operated so that nothing even close
to Bhopal can ever happen again."2 Michael Heylin, editor of the industry
journal Chemical and Engineering News, agreed that "the worldwide
chemical industry has been changed forever by Bhopal," but his view of
Three Mile sland's legacy was clearly different from Speth's. "The way
Carbide has handled things so far has removed the remote possibility that
Bhopal would have the same crippling effect on the chemical industry that
Three Mile Island had on the future of nuclear power," he wrote.3
As an undisputed debacle for the nuclear industry, the Three Mile Island
case made the arguments on both sides of the Bhopal debate immediately
clear. If chemical manufacturers wanted to avoid the fate of their compatriots
in nuclear power business, they would have to sacrifice some measure of
control over their industry. But how much? What environmentalists and
citizen activists saw as "justifiable demands" for new controls over chemical
hazards were viewed by industry representatives as "crippling." This clash
was at the core of the fight for right-to-know laws in the U.S., and it continues
to characterize the relationship between manufacturers and the local citizens'
groups now using toxic-release data to press for safety improvements and
pollution reduction.
2 Philip Shabecoff, "Officials Tell a House Hearing that Plant in West Virginia is Safe," The
New York Times (Dec. 13,1984).
3 Michael Heylin, "Bhopal: A C&EN Special Issue," Chemical and Engineering News (Feb. 11,
1985) 14-15.
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This chapter will investigate how the particulars of the Bhopal accident
itself -- its origins in political and technical decisions made at a far remove
from the people actually harmed by the disaster -- strengthened the
conviction among citizens and lawmakers that information about chemical
hazards, and hence control over those hazards, must be shared more
democratically. After recounting the history of Union Carbide's operations at
Bhopal and the emergence of the social conditions that made the disaster
possible, I will describe the leak itself and its immediate effects on the city's
population. Next, I survey the range of Indian reactions to the disaster,
including the swift response of voluntary citizens' groups, the controversy
surrounding the legal case against Union Carbide, and the growth of
technology resistance movements in scattered Indian communities. Ending
the chapter is an account of the reaction to the disaster in U.S. chemical
communities -- especially West Virginia's Kanawha Valley, home to the
Bhopal faciiity's sister plant -- and a history of the enactment and use of right-
to-know laws governing chemical facilities. While limited in scope, these
laws have fundamentally altered the balance of power between U.S chemical
producers and their host communities.
Organic Chemistry Comes to Bhopal
Chemistry, an ancient science, is also one of the oldest modern
industries. As early as 1780 chemists were mixing sulfur, saltpeter, and air in
large lead-lined chambers to produce sulfuric acid, an agent in the
manufacture of bleaching powders and soda. 4 By 1850 French and British
sulfuric acid factories already incorporated "most of the design principles of
4L.F. Haber, The Chemical Industry During the Nineteenthl Century (Oxford: The Clarendon
Press, 1958) 3-5.
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modern engineering," 5 Three important developments in the second half of
the nineteenth century -- the discovery of synthetic coal-derived dyes, the
invention of nitration methods for organic cellulose and glycerin
compounds, and the use of dynamos to manufacture electrochemicals such as
chlorine gas and acetylene -- formed a base for the industry's tremendous
growth after 1900. Union Carbide Company, founded in 1898 to produce
acetylene for home and street lighting, became one of the largest chemical
manufacturers in the United States when it merged in 1917 with three other
firms making electric arc lamps, dry cell batteries, oxygen for acetylene
torches, and acetylene lamps for automobiles. 6 As the organic chemistry
revolution began in the nineteen-twenties and thirties, Union Carbide
commercialized Vinyon, a competitor to Du Pont's new synthetic fiber Nylon
(of which more later).7
With foreign supplies of natural rubber cut off during World War 1I, the
crash program to create a U.S. synthetic rubber industry was "the chemical
equivalent of the Manhattan Project," in the words of John Kenly Smith, a
historian of the chemical industry.8 Union Carbide's research on butadiene,
5 Historian John Kenly Smith, quoted in Stu Borman, "Conference Offers Insights on Challenges
Facing Science Historians," Chemical and Engineering News (Aug. 6, 1990) 26.
6David Dembo, et al., Abuse of Power: Social Performance of Multinational Corporations: The
Case of Union Carbide (New York: New Horizons Press, 1990) 12-13.
7David Hounshell and John Kenly Smith, Jr., Science and Corporate Strategy: Du Pont R&D,
1902-1980 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 386. It was at this time that Union
Carbide precipitated what has been called "the worst occupational health disaster in
American history," the Hawk's Nest Tunnel Incident. Between 1930 and 1932 Union Carbide
employed 5,000 men to drill a three-mile tunnel through Gauley Mountain in West Virginia.
High silica content was discovered in the rock, and the construction project became an
unreported mining project as well, since the company used silica in its plant at Alloy. Union
Carbide knew of the health threat posed to workers by silica dust but took few precautions.
Some 700 workers died of silicosis within five years of the tunnel's completion. The case was
eventually settled out-of-court for less than $130,000, but figured prominently in
Congressional deliberations strengthening occupational safety regulations. See Martin
Cherniack, The Hawk's Nest Incident: America's Worst Industrial Disaster (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1986).
8 Borman, 28.
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an acetylene derivative similar to the isoprene molecules that make up
natural rubber, helped synthetic rubber production grow from zero at the
beginning of the war to 800,000 tons per year by its midpoint. (At the same
time, Union Carbide became part of the real Manhattan Project as manager of
a uranium gaseous-diffusion plant for atomic bomb fuel at Oak Ridge,
Tennessee.) After the w r, the synthetic polymers that had proved good
substitutes for rubber, glass, brass, aluminum, and other strategic materials
evolved into a vast array cof polyethylene-based consumer products, including
Union Carbide's Glad plastics.
The birth in the nineteen-sixties of the Green Revolution -- the
campaign in many Third World nations, including India, to increase food
production through the mechanization of agriculture and the use of high-
yield grains and chemical pesticides and fertilizers -- created a massive new
market for organic chemicals. Supported by government subsidies, pesticide
use tripled in India between 1956 and 1970.9 Union Carbide, which had been
doing business in India since 1905 through its subsidiary Union Carbide India
Limited (UCIL), was ideally placed to profit from this trend. Though more
than half of UCIL's revenue in India came from the sale of its Eveready
batteries, the company had used parent Union Carbide's advanced technology
to become a leader in several other capital-intensive manufacturing sectors,
including specialized metals, gases, and plastics. The company's Agricultural
Products Division, headquartered in Bhopal, was a welcome addition to the
Indian economy when it opened in 1969. "If you want to buy something and
you're told it's a Union Carbide product, you just go and buy it," said Gopal
9Mark N. Wexler, "Learning from Bhopal," Midwest Quarterly (Autumn, 1989) 113; Paul
Shrivastava, Bhopal: Anatomy of a Crisis (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing
Company, 1987) 39.
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Behari: an adviser at the Indian Investment Center in Delhi. "It was the same
for a pesticide plant. It came from them. We expected it to be good." 0l °
Bhopal, in the early nineteen-seventies, was already a city suffering from
"industrial indigestion."" For a century before Indian independence in 1947,
the city was ruled by Moslem landowners with little interest in
modernization. When the Indian government chose Bhopal in 1956 as the
capital of the state of Madhya Pradesh and in 1959 as the site of a gigantic state-
owned electrical works, the city's primitive infrastructure for transportation,
communication, education, and public health came under severe strain. As
the Green Revolution kicked in and agricultural employment fell behind
rural population growth, meanwhile, the rural unemployed sought work in
cities, swelling Bhopal's population from 102,000 in 1961 to 670,000 in 1981
(and to 900,000 in 1991).12 With transportation difficult and government
housing scarce and overpriced, makeshift shantytowns accreted around
factories and other centers of employment, including the Union Carbide
plant. Though a lively and intricate social organization helped offset dismal
material conditions in the shantytowns, residents knew little -- and could do
even less -- about the dangers posed by the industrial plants in their midst.
Proving how thoroughly Mohandas Gandhi's vision of an Indian
economy based on small-scale, artisanal production had been repudiated after
independence, industrialization in Bhopal and elsewhere had proceeded too
fast for health and environmental safeguards to keep pace. Shantytown
residents lacked the clout to merit protection even under existing regulations.
10Barry Newman, "Death in Bhopal: Compensation Seems Not Quite the Point," The Wall
Street Journal (Dec. 19, 1984) 1, 20.
11Lois R. Ember, 'Technology in India: An Uneasy Balance of Progress and Tradition,"
Chemical and Engineering News (Feb. 11, 1985) 64.
12Shrivastava, 57-59.
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A development plan approved for Bhopal in 1975 legally required "obnoxious
industries," including pesticide manufacturers, to relocate to an industrial
zone 15 miles away from residential areas.13 But the plan was never
enforced, and the shantytowns continued to grow. Hut owners in Jaiprakash
Nagar, a neighborhood just across the street from Union Carbide, thought the
facility was making "medicine for the crops" or "some kind of powder." Said
one resident, "We were never told anything about poison, by the company or
the government."' 4 Small leaks from the plant occasionally caused nausea
and other symptoms, but the plant's neighbors "were never in a position to
protest because they had illegally st up their houses," explains Kim Laughlin,
an American anthropologist who spent eighteen months working with
voluntary citizens' groups in Bhopal. "They continually feared that the
slums, not the plant, would be relocated."15
During the first five years of its existence, from 1973 to 1978, the Bhopal
plant only formulated and packaged pesticides, mixing together ingredients
imported from Union Carbide plants outside India. But high shipping costs,
pressure from the Indian government to reduce imports, and growing
competition from smaller firms with low-cost manufacturing capacity led
UCIL to plan its own facilities for the production of methyl isocyanate.16 MIC
is an intermediate product in the synthesis of carbaryl, an insecticide which
the company markets under the brand names Sevin and Sevimol. When it
13 Robert Reinhold, "Disaster in Bhopal: Where Does Blame Lie?" The New York Times (Jan.
31, 1985) Al, A8.
1 4 Robert Reinhold, "Slum Dwellers Unaware of Danger," The New York Times (Jan. 31, 1985)
A8.
15Laughlin is an assistant professor in the Program in Science and Technology Studies at
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in Troy, New York. She kindly provided me with a copy of
her 1993 unpublished manuscript entitled "Rehabilitating Science, Imagining Bhopal."
Quoted with permission.
1 6 Wexler, 114; Reinhold, A8.
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introduced the pesticide in 1957 Union Carbide had made carbaryl by reacting
phosgene (used as a chemical weapon during the First World War) with the
compounds alpha-naphthol and then methylamine, with 1-naphthol
chloroformate as an intermediate product. But in 1973 the company juggled
this process, first reacting methylamine with phosgene to create MIC, then
adding alpha-naphthol to make carbaryl. MIC was much more reactive than
chloroformate and therefore harder to handle safely, but the company
considered the new process superior because MIC could also be used at its U.S.
plants to produce Temik and other carbamate-based pesticides.17 Though
there was no such reason to favor the MIC process at the Bhopal plant, the
process was the natural choice since the technology could be copied directly
from Union Carbide's existing MIC facility in Institute, West Virginia. In
October, 1975 -- two months after Bhopal municipal officials had ruled on the
relocation of "obnoxious industries" -- UCIL received a permit from the state
government to build the MIC plant on its eighty-acre site near the heart of
Bhopal.
By 1979 MIC production was underway, but onditions at the Bhopal
plant differed ominously from those at the prototype facility in Institute.
Though the usual 40 percent limitation on foreign equity in Indian
companies had been waived in Union Carbide's case -- the American parent
owned 50.9 percent of UCIL, Indian investors and the government the other
49.1 percent-- the firm was not exempt from Indian "indigenization" laws
requiring that the plant be designed and built using local equipment,
materials, and workers.18 As a result, the quality of the plant's construction
17Ward Worthy, "Methyl Isocyanate: Chemistry of a Hazard," Chemical and Engineering
News (Feb. 11, 1985) 27-32.
18Stuart Diamond, "Plant Had to Be Locally Designed and Operated," The New York Times
(Dec. 13, 1984).
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did not meet U.S. safety standards. Government guidelines also encouraged a
labor-intensive dsign, one dependent on manual rather than automatic
safety controls at many points in the production process. These policies
might have been benign had Union Carbide's visions of profitability for its
new facility been realized, but 1979 was also the year when "the bottom fell
out of the agricultural pesticide industry."19 Dwindling subsidies and
favorable weather drove Third World pesticide use rapidly downward. The
Bhopal plant, with the capacity to make 5,000 tons of pesticides per year,
produced 1,647 tons in 1983 and 2,308 in 1984, contributing only 8 percent of
UCIL's total revenues.20
As it began to seem that sales of Sevin would never be great enough to
pay off UCIL's $24 million investment in the Bhopal MIC facility, the plant's
management structure began to crumble. Six different directors ran the plant
between 1979 and 1984. Of the twenty UCIL engineers who spent a year at
Institute in 1978 training to become the subsidiary's technical experts on MIC,
all but four had resigned from the Bhopal plant by 1984 amidst economic
losses and plummeting morale.2 1 At the same time, layoffs among the blue-
collar staff in 1983 reduced the number of operators on each rotating shift at
the MIC plant from eleven to six; in maintenance, from ten to six; and in the
control room, from two to one. As a former project engineer at the plant put
it, "The whole industrial culture of Union Carbide at Bhopal went down the
drain."2 2 In the three years before the final catastrophe, small MIC and
1 9 Wexler, 115.
2 0Robert Reinhold, "Union Carbide of India: Image is Shattered," The New York Times (Dec.
12, 1984) A9.
2 1Wexler, 115-16; Shrivastava, 49; Sheila Jasanoff, "The Bhopal Disaster and the Right to
Know," Social Science and Medicine (Vol. 27, No. 10, 1988) 1115; Praful Bidwai, "Plant
Undermanned, Run Down," Bhopal: Industrial Genocide? (Hong Kong: Arena Publications,
1985) 72-73.
2 2 Stuart Diamond, "The Bhopal Disaster: How It Happened," The New York Times (Jan. 26,
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phosgene leaks killed one worker and injured at least 21.23 Hoping to cut its
losses, UCIL put the plant up for sale.
It was at this time that a dangerous combination of knowledge, denial,
and ignorance of the plant's hazards set in. Union Carbide executives at the
company's U.S. headquarters knew enough about Bhopal's management
problems to dispatch a three-member inspection team in 1982. Their report
concluded that unstable management and nearly a dozen major technical and
maintenance deficiencies had created "a higher potential for a serious
accident or more serious consequences if an accident should occur." The
team "strongly recommended" that the spray system on the plant's periphery,
designed to throw up a curtain of water to prevent chemical clouds from
escaping the premises, be strengthened.24 UCIL received the report but
ignored the recommendation, and the parent company never undertook a
follow-up investigation, asserting that "safety is a local responsibility."2 5 In
September, 1984, three months before the disaster, another safety audit at the
company's Institute plant warned that a runaway reaction resulting in
"catastrophic failure" could occur if even a small amount of water entered the
MIC storage tanks, but this warning was not shared with managers at Bhopal.
"It was not immediately apparent to me that it would have been helpful,"
explained Jackson Browning, the company's director of health, safety, and
environmental affairs.2 6
1985) A1, A6.
2 3 Wexler, 118-118.
24Diamond, "The Bhopal Disaster: How It Happened," A6.
25Stuart Diamond, "Union Carbide's Inquiry Indicates Errors Led to India Plant Disaster," The
New York Times (Mar. 21, 1985) A1.
26Robert E. Taylor and Ron Winslow, "Union Carbide Internal Report Warned of Hazards at
U.S. Plant, Waxman Says," The Wall Street Journal (Jan. 25, 1985) 2.
235
With high employee turnover the rule at the Bhopal plant, meanwhile,
few workers bothered to read the company technical manuals that mentioned
MIC's lethal effects. "The management said MIC could give you a rash on
your skin or irritate your eyes. They never said it could kill you," one worker
reported after the disaster.27 Said another worker with 11 years' experience at
the plant, "I was never told that there were such dangerous chemicals inside
the factory. If I knew, I would not have worked there. When we worked
there, our eyes used to hurt and our skin itched, but who ever knew that such
a disaster could happen?"2 8 No one in India knew, apparently. Though
Union Carbide had established a U.S. toxicology laboratory as early as 1935 and
had done more research on MIC's toxicity than any other organization, the
results were trade secrets so well protected that even plant managers at
Bhopal admitted their ignorance of the chemical's dangers.29 "No one at this
plant thought MIC could kill more than one or two people," said Kamal
Pareek, an engineer who had helped build the facility.30 And at Union
Carbide headquarters, where all major financial and safety decisions about the
Bhopal plant were made, no one recognized the true extent of the Bhopal
staff's deficiencies or took the trouble to rectify them. "Union Carbide had its
finger on the pulse of the Bhopal plant all the time. They just didn't
appreciate the information they were getting," Pareek said.31
The disaster, in sum, would reveal "a disturbing pattern of ignorance
among those exposed to risk and more or less informed indifference among
2 7Stuart Diamond, "Many at Plant Thought MIC Was Chiefly a Skin-Eye Irritant," The New
York Times (Jan. 30,1985) A6.
2 8Bhopal Group for Information and Action, Voices From Bhopal (Bhopal, India: Aadarsh
Printers & Publishers, 1990) 8.
2 9Hounshell and Kenly Smith, 562-63; Shrivastava, 50.
30Diamond, "Many at Plant Thought MIC Was Chiefly a Skin-Eye Irritant."
3 1 Stuart Diamond, "U.S. Company Said to Have Had Control in Bhopal," The New York
Times (Jan. 28, 1984) A7.
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those with the power to prevent the accident from happening," as Sheila
Jasanof, a sociologist and legal expert, has written.32 It was this disparity in
levels of knowledge and control -- not any intrinsic technical incompetence
in India, as some analysts have suggested -- that made the Bhopal catastrophe
possible. In the months after the disaster, the rueful consensus in the West
was the one expressed by political scientist Richard Worthington: "It is all too
easy to transfer hardware from industrialized to developing nations, but just
about impossible -- and unethical -- to impose the political-economic
structures, the regulatory apparatus, and western-scientific world view that
are necessary for the hardware to work efficiently and safely."33
Such statements were well-meaning but wrong. India is a
technologically sophisticated nation with the third-largest pool of scientific
and engineering expertise in the world. But understandably, few talented
Indian engineers elected to stay at the Bhopal plant while its importance to
Union Carbide waned and its morale deteriorated. Though the Madhya
Pradesh government's enforcement of pollution and safety standards was
timid and haphazard, it was Union Carbide's legal responsibility to ensure
safety at its facilities, not the state's. And while it may be true, as one World
Bank official put it, that "what is right for Pittsburgh is not right for Calcutta,"
plants in Pittsburgh are no more immune to failure than their counterparts
in Calcutta.3 4 As a massive aldicarb oxime leak at Union Carbide's Institute
plant demonstrated only nine months after Bhopal, "chemical technology is
not necessarily managed more intelligently" in the developed world, pointed
out chemist G. Thyagarajan, a researcher at India's Council of Scientific and
3 2 Jasanoff, 1117.
3 3 Ember, 65.
34Wil Lepkowski, "Chemical Safety in Developing Countries: The Lessons of Bhopal,"
Chemical and Engineering News (April 8, 1985) 9-14.
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Industrial Research and head of the Indian team that investigated the MIC
leak. "Runaway reactions do not make a distinction between developed and
developing countries."35 Without the information and influence they
needed to protect themselves, the citizens of all countries remain vulnerable
to catastrophe.
Poisoned Air
Union Carbide officials explain the devastating gas leak of December 2-3,
1984, as an act of sabotage. The company's version of events is roughly as
follows: During a change of shifts between 10:45 and 11:15 p.m., a
"disgruntled operator" entered the area where three 15,000-gallon, stainless-
steel tanks stored refined methyl isocyanate destined for the Sevin production
unit. The operator unscrewed a pressure indicator attached to tank E610 and
connected a rubber water hose, intending to spoil the batch of 42 metric tons
of MIC inside. More than 2000 pounds of water flowed into the tank, where it
reacted with MIC to produce methylamine, carbon dioxide, and slowly
accumulating heat. The vapor leaked out through a relief valve and through
the stack of the vent gas scrubber, a device designed to neutralize poisonous
exhausts by spraying them with a caustic soda mixture. Plant operators
smelled the escaping MIC vapor and sprayed a fire hose toward what they
believed to be its source, an open pipe near the vent gas scrubber. Just after
midnight, however, operators saw from control room gauges that pressure
was rising rapidly in tank E610. They ran to the tank, allegedly discovered the
saboteur's water hose, and decided to try to transfer enough liquid out of the
tank to stop the reaction. By then, however, so much heat and pressure had
35Wil Lepkowski, "Bhopal: Indian City Begins to Health but Conflicts Remain," Chemical
and Engineering News (Dec. 2,1985) 18-32.
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built up inside the tank that a safety valve ruptured and an undetermined
amount of MIC vapor wafted out over central Bhopal, where it killed
thousands. "Not knowing if the attempted transfer had exacerbated the
incident, or whether they could have otherwise prevented it...those involved
decided on a cover-up," writes Ashok Kalelkar, an employee of Arthur D.
Little, Inc., the Massachusetts consulting-engineering firm hired by Union
Carbide to investigate the accident.36 The operators allegedly altered logs to
erase signs that they knew of the water entry and had attempted the MIC
transfer.
While the sabotage scenario was plausible -- modern chemical plants are
highly vulnerable to deliberate mischief -- Union Carbide never offered any
direct evidence for it. The company cited a newspaper report that a Sikh
extremist group called Black June had claimed responsibility for the accident
in a street poster, but the report was uncorroborated and the poster was never
found. Investigators based their accusation that operators had altered logs on
minor inconsistencies in handwriting and chronology. And if a cover-up did
exist, the company had no material evidence as to what was being covered up;
the conjectured water hose was never located. In his report, Kalelkar
attached great importance to the deposition of a "tea boy" whose job it had
been to serve tea to operators in the MIC control room. In 1987 Union
Carbide agents located the boy in the Nepalese Himalayas and transported
him to Delhi, where he said that when he had entered the control room at
12:15 that night, "the atmosphere was tense and quiet" and the operators had
refused their tea -- proof, in Kalelkar's view, that a conspiracy was afoot.
36Ashok Kalelkar, "Investigation of Large-Magnitude Incidents: Bhopal as a Case Study,"
paper prepared for The Institution of Chemical Engineers Conference on Preventing Major
Chemical Accidents, London, England, May 1988 (Cambridge, Mass.: Arthur D. Little, Inc.,
1988) 26-27.
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During litigation, Union Carbide's lawyers repeatedly claimed that they knew
the saboteur's identity, but his name has never been released, not even to the
Indian authorities.
The biggest flaw in Union Carbide's account of the accident, however,
was its fixation on a simple cause: direct, deliberate entry of water into tank
E610. In fact, the Bhopal catastrophe was a classic system breakdown of the
kind described in Perrow's Normal Accidents, which appeared the same year
as the disaster. As Pcrrow wrote in a later article, "the specific way in which
the water got into the methyl isocyanate storage tank is not as important as
the design and conditions of the plant," since little vapor would have escaped
had a series of operating, mechanical, and engineering failures not also
occurred. 3 7 Paul Shrivastava, who is a Bhopal native, a specialist in
industrial crisis management, and a Bucknell University professor of
management who mediated settlement negotiations between Union Carbide
and the Indian government, explains that "accident by sabotage was
technologically improbable because the accident had involved simultaneous
failures in design, technological subsystems, safety devices, managerial
decisions, and operating procedures. More importantly, some of these
failures occurred several weeks prior to the accident. To intentionally bring
about the accident, saboteurs would have had to control operations of
virtually the entire plant for several weeks."38
A reconstruction of the catastrophe's proximate causes from the best
available evidence39 leaves no doubt that the gas leak had complex human,
3 7Charles Perrow, "The Habit of Courting Disaster," The Nation (Oct. 11, 1986) cover, 347-356.
3 8Shrivastava, 51. Emphasis in original.
39Much of the actual forensic evidence that might help explain the gas leak remains sealed
pending ongoing civil and criminal litigation in India.
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organizational, and technological origins. 40 But the main reason to
reexamine the Bhopal disaster here is not to disprove the sabotage hypothesis
or to bolster Perrow's theory of normal accidents. It is, rather, to highlight the
crucial links between knowledge, control, and danger which helped persuade
U.S. activists and members of Congress of the need to strengthen and codify
citizens' protections against technological hazards.
Bhopal demonstrated that control is meaningless without knowledge.
The control Union Carbide thought it exercised over its Indian subsidiary had
eroded away through inattention to management problems; the control
Bhopal's operators thought they had over the plant proved illusory during
the crisis as they stumbled through a series of misjudgments and
malfunctions; and the safety the residents of Bhopal's shantytowns thought
they enjoyed as neighbors of Union Carbide's "plant medicine" factory, a
source of jobs and income in the community, turned out to have been a
colossal, if unavoidable, leap of faith. The illusion of absolute control over
technology does not create danger: the possibility of catastrophic failure is
always present, an inherent and ineradicable part of the technological
enterprise. But the stronger the illusion of control and the more widely it is
shared, the more excluded and vulnerable are industrial technologies' host
communities.
Safeguards against chemical leaks began to wither at Bhopal months
before the disaster. To prevent interruptions of Sevin production, it was the
norm to maintain large supplies of MIC at the plant, a risky practice requiring
strict monitoring and careful handling. Procedures at Bhopal were clearly
40Shrivastava combines these three factors into a so-called "HOT" analysis showing "how
antecedent conditions for the accident developed and how a complex set of interacting
failures led to the disaster." 48-57.
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unequal to the requirement. When the MIC production area shut down for
repairs in October, tank E610 contained 42 tons of MIC, almost 60 percent over
its recommended capacity. (See Figure 4.1.) Operators normally used
pressurized nitrogen gas to push liquid MIC out of the tanks and into the
Sevin production area, but on October 21 nitrogen pressure in tank E610
dropped to one-fifth its normal level and none of the excess MIC could be
extracted. To continue Sevin production, managers switched to an adjacent
tank, E611, which held 20 tons of MIC. They never investigated the cause of
the pressure loss in tank E610. On November 30, nitrogen pressure failed in
tank E611 as well, prompting attempts to repressurize tank E610, but operators
later told journalists that every time nitrogen was pumped in, it leaked out
again through an unknown route. A defective valve attached to tank E611
was repaired and tank E610 was again abandoned. 41
Without positive pressure in tank E610 over the intervening weeks,
meanwhile, the pipes became contaminated by small amounts of water,
which reacted with MIC residue .to form a clogging plastic substance called
trimer. Trimer buildup could only be flushed out with more water. At 9:15
on the night of December 2, Gori Shankar, a second-shift supervisor with
only two months' experience at the MIC plant, asked operator Rahaman
Khan to flush out several pipes leading to the vent gas scrubber via the
storage tanks. While Shankar watched, Khan opened a nozzle on one of the
pipes and inserted a water hose. Though there was a closed valve between
the nozzle and the storage tanks, operators knew that the plant's valves
frequently leaked, and Union Carbide's MIC operating manual required that
4 1Details in this and the following seven paragraphs are drawn from Shrivastava, 42-57;
Diamond, "The Disaster in Bhopal: Workers Recall Horror"; Diamond, "The Bhopal
Disaster: How it Happened"; Worthy, "Methyl Isocyanate: Chemistry of a Hazard";
Lepkowski, "Bhopal: Indian City Begins to Heal But Conflicts Remain."
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maintenance workers insert metal disc called a slip bind inside the pipe
before water-washing to prevent any possibility of water entry. But there was
no second-shift maintenance supervisor on duty that night -- the position
had been eliminated several days before -- and the slip bind was never
inserted.
Khan turned on the water at 9:30 p.m. Unbeknownst to the two men,
the overflow lines through which the flushing water should have been
draining were plugged. The water backed up and began to rise past the
unprotected and apparently leaky valve into the relief-valve pipes, then ran
downhill toward the storage tanks. Khan noticed that no water was coming
out the overflow line and turned off the hose, but Shankar ordered him to
resume the flushing operation. The two then left the area, intending to let
the hose run for about three hours. The water overflowed the relief-valve
pipes and entered the process pipes via jumper connections between the two
systems. From the process pipes, the water flowed through an unsealed valve
used to establish nitrogen pressure inside the tank42 and into tank E610,
where it began to react with MIC.43
42This valve, the blow-down valve, may have been responsible for the undiscovered leak in
the nitrogen pressure system.
43Ashok Kalelcar argues on the basis of his Union Carbide-sponsored inspection of the Bhopal
facility that "the water-washing theory is clearly untenable...The bleeder valves in the
water-washing area would have had to be closed (but three were witnessed to have been
open), the intermediate header valves would have had to be open (but one is documented to
have been closed and leak tight), and there would have had to be hundreds of pounds of
water in the 220-foot section of the process vent header drilled after the incident was over
(but not a single drop was found)" (Kalelkar, page 16). Kalelkar does not say who witnessed
the open bleeder valves. He assumes from plant maintenance records indicating that the
intermediate header valve was closed that it was indeed closed (while at the same time
questioning the truthfulness of other records kept by operators). He does not describe the
conditions of the simulation that allegedly showed the intermediate header valve to be
"leak tight." And he assumes that there was no other possible escape for the water he
expected to be found in the process vent header two months after the accident.
Clearly, this is not the forum in which a final verdict on the gas leak's causes will be
reached. But for completeness' sake a third theory should be mentioned, one which skirts
Kalelkar's objections to the water-washing scenario. According to this theory, favored by
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In a cost-saving move five months earlier, plant managers had shut
down the refrigeration unit attached to the three MIC storage tanks and
siphoned off its freon coolant for use elsewhere, allowing the temperature in
the tanks to rise to nearly 20 degrees centigrade -- far above the 5 degree
maximum dictated by Union Carbide's technical manual. When the
exothermic water-MIC reaction began, therefore, it took little time for the
mixture to reach its boiling point of 39 degrees centigrade. The new operators
coming on duty at 10:30 p.m. noted and logged the pressure indicated on the
control-room gauge for tank E610 -- it was normal, two pounds per square
inch -- but they did not record the temperature. "For a very long time we
[had] not watched the temperature. There was no column to record it in the
log books," said one worker.
At 11:00 p.m. control room operator Suman Dey noticed that pressure in
tank E610 had risen to 10 pounds per square inch, an unusually rapid increase
but still within the normal range of 2 to 25 pounds per square inch. Shakil
Qureshi, who had just replaced Shankar as MIC shift supervisor, later said he
thought the pressure gauge was faulty. "Instruments often didn't work,"
Qureshi explained. "They got corroded. Crystals would form on them." At
11:30, however, workers in the MIC area began to suffer teary eyes, a sure sign
Indian scientists who conducted their own investigation of the accident, lax maintenance
allowed trace amounts of contaminants - sodium hydroxide, metallic chlorides, rust, or as
little as a cupful of water - to catalyze a runaway reaction of MIC with itself. "In the
presence of a catalyst, purified MIC will form either a cyclic trimer (trimethyl isocyanurate)
or a grimy, resinous polymer," writes chemist Ward Worthy. The process liberates 540 Btu of
heat per pound of MIC. Aware of the dangers of contamination and self-polymerization of
MIC, Union Carbide prescribed that the chemical be handled using only steel, glass, or
flourocarbon resin containers and tubes. Yet a UCIL production superintendent admitted to
journalists that "we just didn't know that MIC could be that reactive." See Worthy, "Methyl
Isocyanate: Chemistry of a Hazard," 28, and Lepkowski, "Bhopal: Indian City Begins to
Heal But Conflicts Remain," 22.
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of a leak. ("We were human leak detectors," Dey said, though this method
violated Union Carbide regulations.) They a found a small amount of dirty
water and yellowish MIC gas coming out one of the relief-valve pipe heads
and notified the control room. Qureshi decided that the leak would be
corrected after the nightly 12:15 control room tea break. (This was when the
Himalayan tea boy allegedly observed that the control room was "tense and
quiet.")
When Dey finished his tea and looked again at the instrument panel, he
was astonished to see that both the temperature and pressure gauges for tank
E610 had risen past the top of their scales -- 25 degrees centigrade and 55
pounds per square inch, respectively. The control room lacked computerized
alarms, like those at its sister plant in Institute, that would have alerted
operators to the rising levels sooner. Dey told Qureshi about the pressure
increase and ran to the tanks to investigate. He heard the tank's safety valve
hissing loudly. (The valve was designed to burst open only if the gas
temperature inside the tank exceeded 121 degrees centigrade.) The tank, half-
buried in a cement liner, was rumbling and screeching and the cement
around it had begun to crack. The local temperature and pressure gauges
were off the scale. Above, a white cloud of MIC drifted slowly southeast
toward Jaiprakash Nagar.
Dey ran back to the control room and tried to activate the vent gas
scrubber. The scrubber had been out of use since MIC production ceased in
October, and the caustic soda mixture in the substance failed to circulate.
Even if the scrubber had functioned correctly, however, few deaths would
have been prevented, since the volume, temperature, and pressure of the
escaping gas far exceeded its scrubbing capacity. The plant's flare tower could
have burned off some of the gas, but it was missing a section of pipe. The last
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safety device that might have contained the spreading cloud -- te water spray
system on the plant's periphery -- raised a curtain of water only 100 feet high.
Most of the gas spewed from a vent pipe 120 feet off the ground. Everyone
but Qureshi, six operators, and one administrator fled the plant. Before the
remaining staff could devise a response to the leak, MIC vapor engulfed the
control room itself. "I couldn't see two feet in front of me, the cloud was so
thick. I thought I was going to die," Qureshi said. Unable to locate an
emergency oxygen mask, Qureshi ran for a clear area near the plant's six-foot,
barbed-wire fence. He scaled the fence, breaking his leg on the descent. Dey,
who had oxygen gear, stayed behind to watch the control room gauges until
all the MIC in tank E610 had escaped.
Between 12:30 and 3:00 a.m., some 38 metric tons of MIC and reaction
products poisoned the air over Bhopal. In the annals of chemical disasters, it
was not an especially severe release. In the United States alone, 17 accidents
between 1964 and 1989 resulted in the escape of larger volumes of toxic
chemicals, but favorable weather conditions, remoteness from population
centers, and rapid evacuation efforts held injuries in these incidents to 815
and deaths to only five.44 Bhopal was not so lucky. The air was cool and dry
that night; a light wind was blowing from the r hwest at four miles per
hour and a temperature inversion like those that plague smog-ridden Denver
and Los Angeles straddled the city. The 40-square-kilometer area over which
the MIC cloud spread was the most densely populated in Bhopal. UCIL had
made token gestures toward an evacuation plan: six buses waited on a lot at
the plant's edge, and an emergency siren could be used to warn the
surrounding settlements of danger. But five of the buses had flat tires, and
44Philip Shabecoff, "Bhopal Disaster Rivals 17 in U.S.," The New York Times (April 30, 1989)
1.
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there was nobody left to drive the last bus since workers had fled the plant on
foot. The siren was not activated until half an hour after the leak began, and
inexplicably, operators turned it off only minutes later.
According to the U.S. National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health, the maximum "safe" level of human exposure to MIC vapor is 0.02
parts per million over an 8-hour period -- equivalent to a teaspoonful of MIC
in 50 Olympic-size swimming pools full of air. Eye, nose, and throat irritation
set in at 2 parts per million and exposure becomes "unbearable" at 21 parts per
million. In laboratory studies of rats and mice, exposures of 20 to 30 parts per
million over two hours cause death.45 Scientists disagree about the
concentration of MIC in Bhopal immediately after the accident, but simple
ca! :lations show that it was worse than unbearable, perhaps as high as 50
parts per million in some locations.4 6 The gas attacked people's eyes, raising
blinding ulcers on their corneas, and their lungs, causing bronchial spasms
and massive secretions of liquid into the alveoli. Thousands suffocated or
drowned in their own body fluids. Many died in their sleep, but others were
roused by burning eyes, coughing, and the noisy panic and ran out into the
4 5 Pushpa S. Mehta, et al., "Bhopal Tragedy's Health Effects: A Review of MIC Toxicity,"
Journal of the American Medical Association (Dec. 5, 1990) 2781-87.
4 6 The safe concentration of 0.02 parts per million can also be expressed as 0.05 mg of MIC per
cubic meter of air. To dilute the 38,000 kg of MIC and other reaction products that escaped
from the Bhopal plant to a safe concentration would therefore have required 7.6 X 1011 cubic
meters or 760 cubic kilometers of air. But since the gas cloud was mainly confined to an area 40
kilometers square and no more than 50 meters high, with a total volume of 80 cubic
kilometers, its average concentration must have been at least 9.5 times the safe concentration.
Obviously, however, the gas cloud was not evenly distributed over this area. The Union
Carbide plant is three kilometers northwest of Bhopal's central railroad station, and over a
period of two hours all 38,000 kg of MIC gas had to either settle in a three-kilometer circle
around the station or pass through this circle. Average exposure within this circle over two
hours would therefore have been at least 540 times the safe level, or 11 parts per million.
Assuming that most of the cloud stayed below an altitude of 5 meters rather than 50 (in fact,
many of the survivors were those who climbed to the roofs or second floors of their buildings),
human exposures could easily have been far beyond the lethal laboratory level of 20-30 parts
per million.
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streets, where they were finally overcome. The gas killed at least 1,000 people
that night and inflicted injuries that would prove fatal for another 2,000
before the week was out.
At Bhopal's four major hospitals, 300 physicians treated some 90,000
patients in the first 24 hours after the leak. Lacking information about the
gas's toxic effects or possible antidotes, they could administer only the most
general remedies: eyewashes, furosemide (a diuretic to counteract fluid
buildup in the lungs), and a catch-all battery of pills and injections. UCIL
officials insisted at first that MIC was nothing more than an eye irritant. Only
several days after the disaster did doctors become certain that MIC, and not
phosgene or hydrogen cyanide, was the actual culprit.47 Though Union
Carbide scientists in the U.S. had "the best information on MIC toxicity
around," according to industry journalists, the company considered the
results of its laboratory studies proprietary.48 Union Carbide dispatched eye
and lung specialists to India along with medicines, oxygen, respirators, and
$10,000 in cash, but these gestures meant little in the absence of firm
information about the toxin. "The truth is that we were unable to
communicate to [the medical community in Bhopal] what they needed to
know," said UCIL's managing director, V.P. Gokhale.49
The confusion of the day.; and weeks after the disaster made it
47The conclusion of a prominent Bhopal forensic pathologist that gas victims had died from
cyanide poisoning, however, led to an extended controversy over whether Union Carbide had
concealed the true nature of the gas leak. Activists spent much of their time during the first
three months after the disaster lobbying for the release of supplies of thiosulfate, a cyanide
antidote - a "tactical error" that "could have been avoided if they had realized that MIC
was as deadly in its own light as cyanide," writes Sheila Jasanoff (p. 1116-17). Clinical and
pathological signs of cyanide poisoning can also be produced by MIC and other effects,
scientists point out (Mehta et al., p. 2782).
48Ron Dagani, "Data on MIC's Toxicity Are Scant, Leave Much To Be Learned," Chemical and
Engineering News (Feb. 11, 1985) 37-40.
4 9Lepkowski, "Bhopal: Indian City Begins to Heal," 26.
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impossible to assemble an exact death toll. Cremation and mass burials began
before all of the dead could be identified, and later estimates of their numbers
varied according to the interests of the groups making them.50 Some of the
mortality figures offered were as follows: Union Carbide, 1,000; the
Government of India, 1,800; the Times of India and India Today, 2,500; the
International Red Cross, 3,000; the Delhi Science Forum, an independent
public-interest group, 5,000; miscellaneous Indian and foreign journalists,
6,000 to 15,000. Mark Wexler, a sociologist, reported that "circumstantial
evidence such as number of shrouds sold, cremation wood used during the
week after the disaster, and missing persons reports place the figure at
10,000. "51
As shocking as these numbers were, the ongoing tragedy of Bhopal is
that at least 200,000 gas-affected residents still suffer from debilitating
respiratory and ophthalmic illnesses.52 Scar tissue constricts the lung airways
of many of those who inhaled MIC. Like emphysema or tuberculosis, these
injuries cause frequent breathlessness, coughing, throat irritation, choking,
chest pain, and hemoptysis (coughing up blood). Chronic conjunctivitis, a
painful inflammation of the inner lining of the eyelids, affects at least 15
percent of the victims. Among women who were pregnant at the time of
exposure, 43 percent suffered spontaneous abortions, four to seven times the
usual rate in Bhopal. Many surviving infants had multiple birth defects such
as spina bifida, limb deformities, and heart and lung diseases. Menstrual
disorders were widespread among women, and physicians also noted a
variety of other effects in the population, including immune system
5 0Just as at Chernobyl sixteen months later; see Chapter 5.
51Wexler, 123.
52Arvind Rajagopal, "Continuing Tragedy: An International Medical Team in Bhopal,"
Frontline (March 11, 1994) 80-84.
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suppression, blood diseases, neuromuscular impairment, and psychiatric
symptoms. The lack of funding for large-scale epidemiological studies,
however, has left the overall health picture in Bhopal scanty and
unreliable. 53
Knowledge, Control, and Danger
The safety of the people of Bhopal depended on control and the way it
was distributed, and control, in turn, flowed from knowledge and the way it
was shared. The substrate for the disaster, the base on which events fed and
grew, was a combination of techmical flaws in the Bhopal plant's design and
construction. Among these were a process design calling for the handling
and storage of dangerously large amounts of MIC; corroded and leaking
valves; a jumper connection that allowed water from the pipe-flushing
operation to flow to the storage tanks; a control room with unreliable dials
and gauges and without automatic safety alarms; a vent gas scrubber that did
not start when needed and that was underdesigned for actual emergency
conditions; and a water spray system that could not reach to the height of the
actual leak. None of these pre-existing factors, however, actually caused the
devastation of December 3, 1984. A full accounting of that night must focus
on what was known about these and other conditions, by whom, and how
this knowledge (or lack thereof) helped determine people's actions.
Among the facts known to the Bhopal plant's operators were that layoffs
had spread the burden of safety and maintenance thinly among a small staff,
that tank E610 was overfilled, that water and MIC reacted together violently,
that there was a leak in the tank's nitrogen pressurizer system, that the MIC
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5 3 Mehta et al., 2783-85.
temperature was higher than regulations allowed, that water contamination
had caused trimer to build up in the pipes, that a slip bind should have been
inserted before washing the pipes, that the water was not draining where it
should have been during the flushing operation, that the water curtain was
inadequate, that both the flare tower and the vent gas scrubber were out of
commission, and that MIC was leaking from the vent tower. The operators
did not know that the slip bind had not been inserted, that water was actually
flowing into tank E610, that the temperature in the tank was rising rapidly
after 9:30 p.m., that the pressure gauges in the control room were accurate,
that the vent gas scrubber was difficult to start, that MIC vapor was more than
an eye and skin irritant, that there were not enough oxygen masks to go
around, or that a runaway reaction was occurring in tank E610 while they
were on their tea break.
Of the known deficiencies at the plant, most stemmed from
management decisions beyond the operators' realm. Everything else the
operators knew -- all the information they might have acted upon to prevent
the disaster -- was canceled out, in effect, by what they did not know. Most
fundamentally, they did not understand MIC's reactivity and toxicity, because
they had never been fully informed about it. It is unimaginable that the
operators would have acted so carelessly had they appreciated MIC's unstable
chemistry. At the Union Carbide plant "there [was] a high degree of
secretiveness even in matters of safety," said D. Lakshminarayana, a former
Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories in Madhya Pradesh. "So absolutely rigid is
Union Carbide's monopoly on information on this gas, that its
employees...are never ever permitted, not even during their training, to take
the company's specialized literature and safety manuals outside its premises.
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Notes can be taken down only with the sanction of the manager."54 Because
the operators did not comprehend the plant's hazards, they were not in a
position to protect themselves or the public against those hazards. It cannot
be said that they "lost control" of the plant. They never had much to begin
with.
If not the technology and not the operators, then who or what was
responsible for the catastrophe? Union Carbide's legal and financial liability
as the majority owner of UCIL was never seriously disputed, though the
company used the sabotage theory as an argument to try to reduce that
liability. As the only involved party with the real power to prevent the
disaster, the company must bear much of the final blame. Yet the
multinational corporation's contribution to the actual events of that night
was curiously passive. Officials at Union Carbide's U.S. headquarters knew
that MIC was a dangerous toxin, that there were safer ways to make carbaryl,
that the Sevin facility could have been designed with much smaller MIC
storage needs, that the Bhopal unit was plagued by management and
technical problems, and that the plant's safety systems were inadequate.55 But
the company acknowledged later that "no direct authority link" was in place
between headquarters and UCIL. It was simply assumed that the subsidiary
would correct the problems noted in the 1982 safety audit. After the disaster,
Union Carbide officials said they were not aware that operating conditions at
54 Lakshminarayana added that "the most serious lacuna in the safety policy of many of these
hazardous factories...is the absence of a manual of safety standards made available to all
employees at all levels." Interview reprinted from Indian Express in Eklavya's pamphlet
Bhopal: A People's View of Death, and Their Right to Know and Live (1986), p. 52.
55Edward Munoz, a retired Union Carbide vice president and managing director of UCIL at the
time of the MIC plant's construction, stated in an affidavit that Union Carbide officials had
overruled UCIL's preference for smaller, safer MIC storage facilities. Ward Morehouse and
M. Arun Subramaniam, The Bhopal Tragedy: What Really Happened and What It Means for
American Workers and Communities At Risk (New York: Council on International and Public
Affairs, 1986) 3.
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the plant had deteriorated so badly. Chairman Warren Anderson admitted to
reporters in 1985 that "appropriate people in the organization should have
known" about the state of the plant, and said that had he known himself, he
would have shut it down.56
The Bhopal unit's unprofitability may explain much of Union Carbide's
inattention. Industry analysts also suggested, however, that Union Carbide's
oversight of the plant had been hampered by the Indian indigenization policy
calling for the use of local materials, labor, and expertise during construction
and operation. "If developing countries continue to insist on a dilution of
multinational corporate control," wrote two contributors to the Wall Street
Journal's opinion page, "they will also be diminishing the motivation and
capacity of companies to invest and to transfer environmental management
and safety competence."57 But this argument, like the one about the
impossibility of transferring a safety ethic to developing nations, fails to
diminish Union Carbide's responsibility. Indian law required the company to
use Indian labor, materials, and staff only when the needed resources were
available locally. If the plant's safety could not be guaranteed using local
equipment and personnel, then the company was free to import them from
elsewhere.
The choices Union Carbide made were, finally, inexplicable: It neither
brought in qualified outsiders nor verified that local workers were adequately
trained. It failed to determine whether known safety problems at the plant
were being corrected. It withheld study results warning of the possibility of a
runaway reaction in the MIC storage tank. And it failed to share adequate
56Wil Lepkowski, "Bhopal Disaster: Union Carbide Explains Gas Leak," Chemical and
Engineering News (March 25, 1985) 4-5.
57 Thomas M. Gladwin and Ingo Walter, "Bhopal and the Multinational," The Wall Street
Journal (Jan. 16, 1985) 28.
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information on MIC's toxic properties even after thousands had died. The
list of ways in which Union Carbide helped cause the Bhopal catastrophe is,
in other words, a list of things company officials chose not to know together
with things they chose not to do. In both cases, curbs on knowledge resulted
in the forfeit of control.
The people who paid the largest price for the disaster, the gas victims
themselves, knew less about the plant's true dangers than anyone. Some said
Bhopal's shanty-dwellers had known all they needed to know: that the
Union Carbide plant represented jobs, prosperity, and modernity. "Of those
people killed, half would not have been alive today if it weren't for that plant
and the modern health standards made possible by the wide use of
pesticides," said Melvin Kranzberg, a pioneer U.S. historian of technology.
"We accept the benefits that technology brings us until there's an accident or
catastrophe, and then we begin to worry," Kranzberg added.58 From this
point of view, the accident was merely part of the "pain of progress": the
people of Bhopal were getting what they bargained for. But this attitude's
smugness was matched only by its naivet6. Many of those killed and injured
in the gas disaster had come to Bhopal precisely to escape the rural economic
disruption brought on by the Green Revolution and its heavy reliance on
pesticides. Moreover, the city's residents had no access to information about
the plant's dangers or about how they might protect themselves in the event
of a chemical emergency. Union Carbide's decision to exclude the public
from all forms of knowledge about plant hazards effectively blocked external
control and guaranteed a tremendous death toll when internal control itself
shattered.
58William J. Broad, "Risks and Benefits: Disaster in India Spreads Net of Fear and Raises
Issues of Technology's Cost," The New York Times (Dec. 7, 1984) A12. Emphasis added.
255
It is fair to ask however, how knowledge alone could have protected the
people of Bhopal against danger. Individual residents of Jaiprakash Nagar
and the other shantytowns, had they learned before 1984 of the toxicity of
methyl isocyanate, the inadequacy of the plant's control systems, or the sorry
state of emergency preparations, would still have lacked the political and
economic power to win safety improvements; and in any case, the most
critical safety-related decisions (those having to do with the location of the
plant and whether MIC would be manufactured there) had been made a
decade earlier. But had information about the plant's hazards been shared, it
might at least have forced a recognition of the need for organized attempts to
gain power. Without this information, no one in Bhopal could perceive the
shadow of risk that had settled over the city, and it would take the gas tragedy
itself to goad the people into organizing in their own defense: an outcome
that, as much as anything else, epitomizes the argument of this thesis.
Indian Citizens Respond
As headlines and television pictures carried the stunning reality of the
gas disaster around the world, volunteers assembled a massive effort to help
the survivors. Thousands of private citizens poured into Bhopal ahead of the
army and police brigades, helping to remove the dead, provide food and
clothing for the dispossessed, and build refugee camps. Students, trade
unions, and other groups around Madhya Pradesh collected relief funds.
Rickshaw drivers transported the sick to hospitals free of charge. "With
elections around the corner, candidates and political parties mobilized their
workers for relief work, publicizing their contribution in the process,"
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reported the local Madhya Pradesh Chronicle. 59 The need for medical relief
and material assistance promised to continue for years, however, and some
volunteers decided that another kind of response to the disaster was also
necessary: grassroots action to eliminate the conditions that had brought
about the catastrophe.
Citizen organizing is an honored tradition in India, with roots in
Mohandas Gandhi's non-violent activism for Indian independence, pure
democracy, social equality, and artisanal village-based production. The public
interest groups webbing the country play an important mediating role
between India's population and its massive and sluggish government
bureaucracy. From the first days of independence, however, the Gandhian
program for small-scale economics conflicted with Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru's vision of material plenty through rapid industrialization. Debate
about technology's proper role in social progress became one of the earliest
themes in contests over government policy. Disillusioned during the
nineteen-sixties and seventies by the persistence of caste differences and the
unintended consequences of the Green Revolution, many young state-
educated scientific and technical professionals discarded the idea that the state
could direct science and technology for the social welfare and formed their
own alternative network of "public science" activist groups. One such group,
the Delhi Science Forum, states that its goals are "to stimulate informed
public debate on the precise way in which science and technology interact
with our society" and "to create awareness and to articulate problems related
to the environment in which scientists and technologists are working in our
country today."60 Members of this movement viewed the Bhopal disaster as
59 Eklavya, Bhopal: A People's View of Death, and Their Right to Know and Live, 15.
60 From Bhopal Gas Tragedy: Delhi Science Forum Report (New Delhi: Society for Delhi
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an indictment of Nehruvian policies and Indian dependence on imported
technology, and they quickly flocked to the stricken city to help organize the
victims in a call for reform.
The Zahreeli Gas Kand Sangharsh Morcha, or Poison Gas Struggle Front,
formed within days after the disaster to coordinate protest actions. "Local
people worked alongside professionals, academics, trade unionists and others
in a mammoth effort to respond to the urgency of the situation," writes
Laughlin. "In so doing, however, the Morcha did not simply prioritize relief
and relegate critical perspectives to secondary importance...The Morcha took a
very critical stand on Bhopal as an issue in the ongoing debate about the role
of technology in the development of Indian society. The Morcha represented
the disaster as the outcome of economic planning which prioritized high-
speed growth...Perhaps most significantly, they questioned the ability of
technology to solve problems of its own creation."6 1 The group spotlighted
inefficient government relief programs and state and municipal officials'
failure to crack down on Union Carbide's safety violations. Its insistence on
public access to epidemiological data and to official reports on the disaster was
new and radical in India, where secrecy in government was the norm. (As
Madhya Pradesh minister Arjun Singh had explained to reporters,
"Information will spread fear."62)
Fearing, in fact, that government investigators might suppress all
information about the disaster's true causes out of reluctance to antagonize
foreign investors, the Delhi Science Forum sent its own team of experts to
Science Forum, 1984) 49.
6 1Laughlin, "Rehabilitating Science, Imagining Bhopal," 17.
62
"Bhopal Update: India, U.S. Still Grapple with Effects," Chemical and Engineering News
(Jan. 21, 1985) 4-6.
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Bhopal. Their first report, released only weeks after the accident, focused on
MIC's toxicity and the design and management decisions that had rendered
the UCIL plant less safe than its West Virginia prototype. The Forum
investigators said they had discovered evidence of gross negligence on the
part of Union Carbide and UCIL, including "astonishingly deficient"
maintenance and safety systems that were "utterly underdesigned." Yet the
report's authors saved their roughest criticism for the Indian government,
charging that there had been a "total absence of measures to educate the
public as well as medical personnel, which would have greatly ameliorated
the condition of the affected population." The Forum scientists called for a
"fully informative" government assessment of the tragedy "with details
which could be cross-checked independently." A broad coalition of Indian
professionals and workers should work together to overcome government
apathy toward industrial safety, the report recommended: "It is only the
vigilance of the people at large, and the scientific community in particular,
which can guarantee safe harnessing of science and technology for human
welfare."6 3
Among the voluntary groups that adopted Bhopal as a symbol of the
need for wider public involvement in technological decision-making was
Eklavya, founded in 1982 to enhance science education in Madhya Pradesh.
Recounted Vinod Raina, a theoretical physicist who led Eklavya, "When the
leak happened, we did the type of volunteer work everyone else was doing.
Then we thought a bit and decided our main task should be in information.
This was an example of a science-society catastrophe where the uninformed
were victims of a vicious manifestation of ignorance. So we decided to play a
6 3 Bhopal Gas Tragedy: Delhi Science Forum Report, 2, 36-40.
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significant role in simplifying matters and tell people whatever we were able
to find out through our own investigations...There were so many Indian
groups writing to us for information that we decided to write our own report
on the tragedy at a time of much conflicting information. Officials would be
saying on the one hand that the water was safe, but to boil it before drinking
it. They were saying the vegetables were okay, but wash them." Eklavya
commissioned independent scientists to monitor Bhopal's fields, gardens,
and water supplies for MIC breakdown products and soon published a
"people's report" on public health concerns in the city. (Environmentalists
and anti-nuclear groups in Ukraine would take up similar tactics after the
Chernobyl explosion, as will be described in the next chapter.)
While such efforts offered an active counterexample to the
government's tight-lipped treatment of the disaster, however, the public
science movement's ultimate accomplishments in Bhopal were limited by
several inescapable realities. Foremost was the victims' extreme
disenfranchisement within Indian society. They were "wretchedly poor
people with no history of social organization and certainly no significant
political experience," Indian journalist Praful Bidwai observed. "Naturally,
in the debates of the state assembly, they count for nothing. In Parliament,
too, they have at best attracted desultory attention. In Bhopal itself, the
middle class does not think of them...Voluntary groups, professional relief
organizations and charities have by and large ignored them. Even
environmentalists and safety activists, both part of a growing movement in
India, have not taken up Bhopal as their principal cause but only as one
among many."64 Volunteers could help the victims organize, but they could
6 4 Praful Bidwai, "Bhopal," The Times Of India (Dec. 3, 1986), reprinted in World Press
Review (March, 1987) 56.
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not hope to provide them with political power or with more than a fraction
of the medical and financial resources they needed. Once the Indian
government decided in 1985 to sue Union Carbide on behalf of all the
victims, nullifying independent legal actions, real compensation became a
matter for the two sides' attorneys to decide, and there was little the victims
could do but wait. (In 1986 the government agreed to pay a meager $766 in
interim relief to the families of each of those who died and $115 to the
families of those injured. By 1993 it had only just begun the slow process of
distributing the $470 million Union Carbide paid in the 1989 settlement.)
Class differences between the victims and their would-be organizers,
meanwhile, could not help but influence their wor'k together. In contrast to
those who lived in the shantytowns, the professionals leading the public
science movement were highly educated, often more so than the government
officials they criticized. At the core of groups like Eklavya or the Bhopal
Group for Information and Action there was usually only a handful of
itinerant activists. The awkwardness of their position was self-evident. "An
extraordinary number of activists in the Indian Left are trained as scientists,
engineers or medical doctors," noted Laughlin. "Yet, a primary critique is of
the role science and technology has played in the development of Indian
society. This obliges [ther.] to continually ask if there is any possibility of an
'appropriate technology of expertise."'65 Activists were wary of framing the
gas victims' concerns for them -- of perpetuating the old patterns of
dependence on outsiders -- yet the organizations staffed by the university
elites always ended up being led by outsiders. This dilemma, and the
discouraging vastness of the problem itself, drove many volunteers out of
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Bhopal. As one activist explained, the movement "gradually tapered down to
a dismal state due to a combination of lack of effort, autocracy within the
organizations, hopelessness among the people due to lack of any history of
organized struggle, and of course the state's repression. 66
The largest and most effective example of grassroots cooperation in
Bhopal was a group organized by the victims themselves, the Gas Peedit
Mahila Udyog Sangathan (Gas-Affected Working Women's Union). The
Sangathan formed at a sewing center employing women who had gas-related
illnesses or whose husbands had died or been incapacitated in the disaster.
Thirty women cut cloth at the center and distributed it to another 600 for
sewing in their homes. The work paid $7 per month on average and was one
of the few sources of cash in the community. When the government shut
down the sewing center in 1986, the cloth cutters mobilized hundreds of
seamstresses to march on the residence of the Chief Minister of Madhya
Pradesh in a confrontation that continued for months. "We had to face the
police on many occasions," recounted one of the protest organizers, a woman
named Mohini. "In April, 1987, 225 of us were arrested and put in jail. It was
a long and hard struggle. Most of us were quite sick due to the gas. During
one demonstration a women named Hamida Bi fell unconscious with chest
pain and died four days later."67 The Sangathan eventually managed to get
the sewing center reopened on a much larger scale, employing 2,300 women.
Though budget cuts closed the center again in 1993 to renewed protest,
the Sangathan's membership had grown by then to 14,000 women and the
group had taken on a range of victims' causes, including tracking the legal
66 Quoted in Tara Jones, Corporate Killing: Bhopals Will Happen (London: Free Association
Books, 1988) 73-78.
6 7 Bhopal Group for Information and Action, Voices from Bhopal, 9-10.
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case against Union Carbide, providing health care information and job
counseling, and assisting Bhopal residents in their dealings with the Indian
relief bureaucracy.6 8 "The primary fight of the Sangathan has been for
restoration of local control through extended participation of community
members," writes Laughlin. In 1988 the group helped to secure interim relief
payments of 200 rupees ($5) per month for the victims. In 1991 the Sangathan
called for the creation of a new medical commission to reassess the number of
permanently injured gas victims (a number far larger than the court's
estimate of 30,000, the union asserted) and petitioned India's Supreme Court
to overturn the $470 million settlement in favor of a renewed $3.3 billion
liability suit against Union Carbide.6 9 "Among gas victims, faith in the legal
process is not strong," explained a pamphlet published by the Bhopal Group
for Information and Action, "[but] victims forcefully argue that they would
have been ignored completely had they not carried out sustained public
protest."70
Beyond Bhopal, years of legal jockeying over Union Carbide's liability for
the disaster overshadowed news of the gas victims' struggle. Though the
company stated in January, 1985, that it hoped to reach a "compassionate and
reasonable" settlement within six months, the case has since dragged on for
nearly a decade, following a labyrinthine route through both the Indian and
U.S. courts.71 Compensation payments from the $470 million settlement
6 8 Laughlin, 9-10.
69 David Bergman, "Judges May Free India to Renew Battle over Bhopal," New Scientist (Jan.
12, 1991) 24.
70Voices from Bhopal, 2.
71 Barry Meier, "Union Carbide Hopes to Settle Claims from Bhopal Acccident Within 6
Months," The Wall Street Journal (Jan. 11, 1985) 2; "Carbide Afte Bhopal: Board Chairman
Reveals Strategy," Chemical and Engineering News (Jan. 14, 1985) 6-7. The Indian
government turned down Union Carbide's first settlement offer of $200 million in 1985 and
filed suit in U.S. federal district court, asking both compensatory and punitive damages. The
company's lawyers requested dismissal, arguing that the claims should be heard in India -
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began in 1992, but the government's criminal case against Union Carbide
continues. The Indian parliament, meanwhile, emulated environmental
legislation in the United States and other industrialized nations in enacting a
new Environment Protection Act. The act created a central environmental
agency with authority to mandate pollution controls and strengthened
regulations on industrial zoning, safety inspections, and emergency planning.
Lawmakers also added a new chapter to the Indian Factories Act requiring
that all plant hazards, accidents and injuries, and emergency plans be
disclosed to authorities.
But journalists and environmentalists in India have labeled these
measures "halfhearted" and "unsatisfactory," and legal scholars here agree
that "it remains to be seen how these new statutes will be
implemented...What is required is not necessarily more government
where, it so happens, the courts do not award punitive damages. Federal Judge John F.
Keenan ruled in the company's favor in May, 1986, but ordered Union Carbide to follow
stronger U.S. standards of legal discovery in providing information to Indian prosecutors.
Carbide appealed the order, asking that it be granted the same evidence-gathering
privileges. The U.S. Appeals Court granted the request. At the same time the company filed
a countersuit in India claiming that the government had failed to investigate its allegations
of sabotage -- a move, legal experts said, signaling that the company had the means to extend
the case interminably if India continued to balk at a settlement. Two near-agreements on a
$492 million settlement package fell apart in 1987. With sentiment in India divided between
reaching a settlement and forcing an actual trial, presiding judge M. W. Deo ordered Union
Carbide in December, 1987, to pay $270 million in interim relief. The company refused, and
the order was eventually overturned on appeal. In the meantime, Union Carbide attorneys
announced that they were "fed up" with the Indian legal system and tried to have the case
transferred back to state courts in Connecticut, and a U.S. public interest group filed suit
against the company in Texas on behalf of 40,000 Bhopa! victims. A 1989 agreement on a
settlement payment of $470 million, or about $6,000 per victim, promised to bring the long
dispute to an end, but massive public protest and pressure from a newly-elected government
forced the Indian Supreme Court to review the figure. When a judgment still had not been
delivered two years later, 2,000 survivors of the disaster marched through Bhopal, shouting
"No to settlement" and burning effigies of Union Carbide officials. Late in 1991 the court
upheld the $470 million settlement but reopened the criminal case against the company. The
Indian Central Bureau of Investigation indicted former Union Carbide chairman Warren
Anderson and eight UCIL managers. When Anderson failed to comply with India's attempt
at extradition, a judge seized all Union Carbide assets and dividends in India.
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authority, but more real power to ensure that the promises of law do not
remain empty." 72 India has pressed on with its industrialization campaign,
and the international transfer of hazardous technologies will continue to be
one effect of this policy. "Given the limits of state intervention, we must ask
if there is a different way of organizing society," insisted Praful Bidwai at a
1991 Delhi conference on Bhopal's aftermath. "There is an accepted notion
that certain processes are excessively toxic in relation to conceivable benefits.
We must extend the logic: Nuclear power as a means of electrity. Cyanide as
a means of electroplating. Sevin, Temik as pesticides....We must disallow
Capital's domination of social considerations."73
A recent clash between local citizens and the Du Pont Company in the
southwestern Indian state of Goa suggests how dramatically the Bhopal
disaster has already changed popular Indian attitudes toward multinational
business. Du Pont joined with the Indian firm Thapars in 1985 to build a
plant in the city of Ponda for the manufacture of Nylon 6,6, a synthetic cord
used in radial tires.74 Eager development officials in Ponda prepared a hilltop
site for the factory and agreed to provide cut-rate electricity and water, but
local residents were not so welcoming. With a tiny office, no telephone, and
virtually no budget, the Anti-Nylon 6,6 Citizens Action Committee roused a
collection of farmers, craftsmen, students, and professionals to canvas the
region with information on Du Pont's U.S. operations. They distributed data
compiled by the New Jersey Health Department describing hexamethylene
diamine, a component of Nylon 6,6, as a "hazardous" and "corrosive"
72Bidwai, 56; Jamie Cassels, The Uncertain Promise of Law: Lessons from Bhopal (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1993) 270-72. Emphasis in original.
73From the National Convention on Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster and its Aftermath, April 8-9,
1991; reported by Laughlin, 18.
74Mark Schapiro, "Du Pont's Post-Bhopal Blues," The Nation (Nov. 2, 1992) 499-501.
265
substance. The U.S. Coast Guard's Hazardous Materials List, they pointed out,
identified 17 chemicals used in Nylon 6,6 as carcinogens. The group also
publicized Du Pont's extensive violations of U.S. environmental laws. Asked
one activist, "How can we expect that there will not be even worse violations
in India, where we still have almost no government oversight?"
After enraged residents stormed the Du Pont construction site in 1990
and damaged several buildings, Goa authorities launched a study of the
plant's environmental and economic impact. Another raid, the election of a
new legislature opposed to the project in 1991, and, in one Du Pont
managers's words, "a number of concerns about liability post-Bhopal" put
construction on hold for three years while the company developed "a newv
generation of technology."7 5 For citizens tired of the government
concessions and unquestioning trust that had always accompanied the
transfer of hazardous First World technologies to India, winning the delay
against Du Pont was a first.
These isolated uprisings, however, have not made India a drastically
different place after Bhopal. Citizens still have little legal power to force the
75Du Pont announced in May, 1994, that construction would resume at the Ponda site. Mary
Zane, business strategy manager for Du Pont Nylon Industries in Delaware, said in an
interview that the delay had been due to "a number of concerns about liability post-Bhopal"
and "a slowdown in our interest based on a determination of what the profitability of the site
was and the need to get a better understanding of what the general economic trends were going
to be." Zane contended that much of the local opposition to the plant had come from
competing factory owners rather than environmentalists. This opposition dried up, she said,
after the Indian government forced a local accommodation with Du Pont. "The competition
realized that the government was not going to oppose us any more, that they needed to be
more embracing of foreign investment if they wanted to get funds from the IMF. They [the
government] are trying to be our buddies." Zane promised that Du Pont would be "going in
there with all the environmental controls. We would be operating there just as we would
operate in Houston, Texas, or in the middle of New York City...We will do the normal thing
for going into Asia. We will put in a clinic, a dormitory, schools, a full campus." Zane added,
somewhat contradictorily, "It's far more than we would do in the United States." (From the
author's notes on a telephone interview with Zane from her office in Delaware, April 27,
1994.)
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public disclosure of industrial hazards. The agencies administering the new
environmental laws are said to be returning to their secretive, exclusionary
ways. And in Bhopal itself, life remains nightmarish. The majority of the
victims still live in cardboard-and-tarpaulin shacks, and fiery riots after the
Hindu demolition of a Muslim mosque in northern India in 1992 killed 150
in Bhopal and destroyed the homes and compensation documents of some
1,300 gas victims.76 "These were working people, self-sufficient, people who
seldom had to consume medicine on a regular basis," writes Arvind
Rajagopal, an Indian journalist. "Now they are reduced to a condition akin to
beggary, with aches and afflictions and uncontrollable moods that respond to
nothing, unable to do much work. For any kind of relief, they have to
confront a bureaucracy rendered immune to all human suffering, and often
dismissive of their complaints as the mouthings of a lazy population greedy
for compensation. Their sense of helplessness is acute. Imagine hundreds of
thousands of people in this condition, and you will have some idea of the
ongoing disaster in Bhopal."7 7
"It Can Happen Here"
After the catastrophe in India, people living near chemical plants in the
United States no longer needed to use their imaginations. Toxic clouds from
chemical plant malfunctions or railroad accidents were not an unfamiliar
hazard in North America; as recently as as 1979, the derailment of a freight
train carrying hazardous materials in Mississauga, Ontario, had forced 250,000
people in a 50-square-kilometer area to leave their homes for up to a week,
76Sanjoy Hazarika, "Settlement Slow in India Gas Disaster Claims," The New York Times
(March 25, 1993) A6.
7 7 Rajagopal, 82.
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and in 1980 a 6,000-gallon spill of phosphorous trichloride in densely
populated Somerville, Massachusetts, had injured 4i8 people and forced the
evacuation of 23,000.78 But the images from Bhopal conveyed destruction
and defenselessness on a scale few had contemplated before. The fact that
U.S. technology had caused this carnage evoked a mixture of guilt, fear, and
anger. Just as Three Mile Island had swept away much of the U.S. nuclear
industry's credibility, Bhopal left Americans predisposed to doubt chemical
makers' reassurances about plant safety.79
For residents of Institute, West Virginia, events in the Indian city ten-
and-a-half time zones away hit especially close to home. The Union Carbide
plant in Institute is one of five major chemical factories on the 35-mile-
stretch of the Kanawha River known to locals as "Chemical Valley." The
town is home to the prototype for the Bhopal MIC facility, as residents were
reminded when dozens of journalists arrived the day after the catastrophe.
Even among those who had warned of chemical hazards in the valley for
years, the extent of the disaster in Bhopal came as a surprise. "What
happened in India was far beyond our worst-case scenario. But the identical
thing could happen here," said Perry Bryant of the West Virginia Citizens
Action Group, a local industry watchdog organization.80 West Virginia State
College student Kaye Summers reflected, "This incident in India kind of
brings it home, doesn't it? Here in the valley we are producing something
that can kill a thousand people, and I can see this plant from my classroom
78Susan L. Cutter, "Airborne Toxic Releases: Are Communities Prepared?" Environment
(July/Aug., 1987) 12-17, 28-31.
7 9In a Business Week/Harris poll weeks after the Bhopal disaster, 44 percent of those
surveyed said they believed Union Carbide was withholding information about the
accident's causes, as against 36 percent who believed the company had told the truth and 28
percent who were unsure. Jones, 32.
8 0Walter V. Robinson, "Worries on Hazardous Gases Waft Over West Virginia's 'Chemical
Valley'," The Boston Globe (Dec. 7, 1984) 1, 14.
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window. It's scary."81 Many who had already been nervous about chemical
emissions in the valley now began to feel trapped. "There is just one way to
go" to escape, said Warne Ferguson, an Institute resident and an
administrator at West Virginia State. "You'd have to go east, down that road
[Route 25]. West would be toward the source. They tell you to go crosswind,
but south is the Kanawha River and north means climbing that mountain.
You'd have just one big traffic jam. I'm going to move. I can't justify raising
my daughter here."82 A Charleston Gazette survey of Kanawha County
residents found that 62 percent believed a catastrophe on the scale of Bhopal
could happen in their valley.83
Industry officials dismissed such fears. Though Union Carbide
immediately shut down MIC production at Institute to await evidence of the
causes of the Bhopal leak, the company insisted that "the West Virginia plant
is 'very safe"' and that "residents haven't any cause for concern," the Wall
Street Journal reported.8 4 "The probability of the kind of accident that
happened in India happening here is just not the same," said John Holtzman,
a spokesman for the Chemical Manufacturers Association.8 5 "No, sir. I'm
not a bit worried. Our safety precautions are second to none," said Earl Dye,
director of security at the Institute MIC plant.86 Jackson Browning, Union
Carbide's vice president for health, safety, and environmental affairs,
announced in March, 1985, that "based on comprehensive analysis of what
81Stuart Diamond, "Jobs and Risks are Linked in a U.S. Chemical Valley," The New York
Times (Dec. 5, 1984) 1, 12.
82 William Robbins, "Near West Virginia Plant, The Talk is of Escape," The New York Times
(Dec. 9, 1984) 22.
8 3Jane Slaughter, "Valley of the Shadow of Death," The Progressive (March, 1985) 50.
8 4Carol Hymowitz and Terence Roth, "In West Virginia's 'Chemical Valley,' India's Toxic Gas
Disaster Stirs Fears," e Wall Street Journal (Dec. 5, 1985) 4.
85 Cathy Trost and Carol Hymowitz, "Congressmen, Environmentalists Fear That Laws In U.S.
Wouldn't Prevent a Poison-Gas Disaster," The Wall Street Journal (Dec. 6, 1984) 6.
8 6 Robinson, 14.
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happened in the tank in India, we can confidently say that it can't happen
here." 8 7 Charleston mayor James E. Roark was less sanguine about the
dangers of living in the Kanawha Valley, but also less evasive about the real
issues at stake. "It's the ultimate question of the Industrial Revolution," he
said. "You have to take reasonable risks to achieve reasonable profits."88
After August 11, 1985, however, "The chemical industry suddenly
seemed a lot more risky," as one New York Times writer put it.89 As if to
mock the industry's assurances, a series of equipment breakdowns and
operator oversights at Union Carbide's Institute plant triggered the eruption
of two tons of toxic chemicals into the air over the Kanawha Valley. The
events leading up to the release so resembled those in India that the episode
drew global media attention and instantly nullified Union Carbide's efforts to
rebuild its reputation after Bhopal.
On August 1, operators were mixing methylene chloride and aldicarb
oxime in a large tank to make Union Carbide's Temik pesticide. A
malfunctioning flow meter allowed too much aldicarb into the tank, and
operators transferred the imbalanced solution to another 5,000-gallon, glass-
lined tank to await later processing. This second tank had not been used since
the previous November, and unbeknownst to operators, steam was flowing
through leaky valves into the tank's heating jacket, slowly raising the
solution's temperature. A computer monitoring the temperature was not
programmed to display this information to operators. As the temperature
passed 40 degrees centigrade, the methylene chloride began to boil off and
87
"Bhopal Disaster: Union Carbide Explains Gas Leak," Chemical and Engineering News
(March 25,1985) 5.
88Terence Roth, "Carbide T-Shirts and Gas-Leak Worries Clash Near Methyl Isocyanate
Facility," The Wall Street ournal (April 12, 1985) 12.
89 Stuart Diamond, "Credibility a Casualty in West Virginia," The New York Times (Aug. 18,
1985) El.
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escape into connected vessels, raising the concentration of aldicarb oxime in
the tank from 38 percent on August 1 to 81 percent by August 7.
Unaware of this change, operators activated a pump to empty the tank's
contents back into the aldicarb reactor, but 500 gallons of the solution formed
a hard-to-remove "heel" in the bottom of the convex vessel and remained
there. Operators could not tell whether the tank was empty because its
volume meter was broken. Over the next four days, leaking steam continued
to heat the remaining solution. On Sunday morning, August 11, the reactor
temperature reached 149 degrees centigrade, touching off an exothermic
decomposition reaction. Safety valves burst under the high pressure and an
opaque white cloud began to spew from the plant's flare tower.9 0
Events over the next few minutes gravely tarnished the idea that
computerized decision aids could help control-room operators act quickly to
protect the public in a chemical emergency. In May, Union Carbide had
restarted methyl isocyanate production at Institute after a five-month hiatus.
The company boasted that it had spent $5 million installing new safety
equipment at Institute, including a computerized vapor emission modeling
system that would "instantly alert both the company and the surrounding
communities to a leak."91 Developed by Safer Emergency Systems of
California, the system combined information from a network of chemical
sensors and weather stations with a three-dimensional model of the plant
and the surrounding terrain to produce a full-color graphic display of the
expected path of an airborne chemical release. Using this information,
90
"Carbide Restructures: Problems Prompt Massive Cutback," Chemical and Engineering News
(Sep. 2, 1985) 6-7;Rick Wartzmann, Barry Meier, and Thomas Petzinger, "Union Carbide
Cites Errors in Chemical Leak; Company Stumbles in Delivering on its Safety Promises," The
Wall Street Journal (Aug. 26, 1985) 6.
9 1United Press International, "Union Carbide Plant to Restart In West Virginia," The New
York Times (May 3,1985) A12.
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operators could quickly notify authorities which areas of the city to evacuate.
But when plant alarms sounded at Institute on August 11, operators found
that the Safer system contained no information about the chemical properties
of aldicarb oxime. They selected a chemical they thought was close-- MIC, as
it happened -- and the computer generated a map indicating that the toxic
cloud would not drift past the plant's property line.92 Thus reassured, the
operators waited 19 minutes before warning authorities about the release.
By that time, however, the cloud had already engulfed a nearby golf
course and a residential neighborhood, sending 135 people to hospitals with
eye, throat, and lung irritation. (Fortunately, aldicarb oxime is only one-tenth
as toxic as MIC.) The cloud also entered the control room itself, making it
"virtually impossible for operators to see the control board or see the doors
for escape," according to the head of the company's investigation. 93 This
complication contributed to the 19-minute delay, but the Environmental
Protection Agency concluded later that "Union Carbide staff outside the
release area...should have contacted Kanawha County while [employees in
the control room] were being assisted."94 Later, both emergency officials and
industry spokesmen agreed that the communications delay at Institute was
"unacceptable," and Union Carbide announced that in the future it would
notify officials immediately of any toxic accidents.95 Experts on vapor-plume
behavior, meanwhile, warned against overreliance on computerized
dispersion models. "The main danger of a Safer-type system is believing the
9 2 Edward J. Joyce, "To Stop Another Bhopal," Datamnation (March 1, 1986) 40-44.
9 3Wartzmann et al., 6.
9 4United States Environmental Protection Agency Region mII Hazardous Waste Management
Division, Evaluation of Emergency Response to the August 11, 1985 Release of Hazardous
Substances from Union Carbide's Facility in Institute, West Virginia (Philadelphia, Penn.,
Dec. 1985) 2.
95 Barry Meier, "Carbide Pledges Immediate Alert on Toxic Leaks," The Wall Street Journal
(Aug. 19,1985) 4.
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impressive picture created on the color graphics terminal without using
judgment or looking out the window," one authority told Datamation
magazine. Added another, "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of
cure. We should try to catch abnormal situations upstream in the
manufacturing process before they erupt as leaks."96
The breakdowns and bungling that produced the Institute leak
convinced many Americans that for Union Carbide -- and probably for the
rest of the industry as well -- "abnormal situations" were all too normal. "In
recent months, the chemical industry asserted that Bhopal was a unique
aberration and that such a disaster could not happen here. That assertion,
many industry experts say, has been undermined by Union Carbide itself," the
New York Times summarized.9 7 In the months after the Institute leak,
stepped-up media coverage provided Americans with evidence that U.S.
chemical plants were far more hazardous than had previously been believed.
Union Carbide reported to a Congressional committee that there had been 190
minor releases of MIC and phosgene at Insitute between 1979 and 1984.98 At
Union Carbide's Texas City facility, 14 "major upsets" leading to airborne toxic
releases had occurred in the first eight months of 1985 alone. A confidential
EPA study obtained by reporters showed that there had been 6,928 chemical
accidents in the United States betweer. 1980 and 1985, causing 139 deaths and
1,500 injuries. In 35 of the incidents, operators had mishandled chemicals
stored in large tanks -- the essential elements of the Bhopal and Institute
accidents. 9 9 Citizens and local officials around the nation began to realize
9 6 Joyce, 41-42. Emphasis added.
97 Diamond, "Credibility a Casualty in West Virginia," El.
98
"Carbide Discloses More Toxic Gas Leaks in U.S.," Chemical and Engineering News (Feb. 4,
1985) 8.
99 Stuart Diamond, "Problems at Chemical Plants Raise Broad Safety Concerns," The New York
Times (Nov. 25, 1986) Al, D11.
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that their communities were ill-prepared for a serious catastrophe. In one
New Jersey town, newpapers pointed out, a plant storing 20 tons of phosgene
stood across the street from a day-care center.100 Said Karim Ahmed,
research director for the Natural Resources Defense Council, "Bhopal and
Institute were warning signs. If they are not heeded -- and quickly -- people
are just going to become sick of this industry."' 0l ° l
Finally recognizing the depth of their public-relations problem, chemical
manufacturers updated their stance on toxic hazards. Robert D. Kennedy,
president of Union Carbide's chemicals and plastics group, admitted in 1986
that 'Institute was a turning point, especially on top of Bhopal. A year ago, a
one-in-a-million shot was unthinkable. Now it's thinkable. It can happen
here; it can happen anywhere. It causes us to rethink everything we do."102
In 1985 the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) had devised the
Community Awareness and Emergency Response program (CAER),
encouraging member companies to form voluntary evaluation teams
consisting of plant managers, local officials, and hand-picked community
members. The teams were to coordinate local emergency plans and provide
the public with information on specific chemicals used at area plants. Two
years later, however, only six states had operating CAER programs. Activists
criticized management's dominance of the CAER teams, and proliferating
state and federal laws requiring reporting of chemical hazards (discussed
below) reflected the public's continuing doubt that the industry could regulate
itself.
The CMA's "Responsible Care" program, established in 1988, was an
1 0 0 Matthew L. Wald, "Industrial New Jersey Girds to Prevent Toxic Disasters," The New York
Times (Nov. 26, 1985) A1, B4.
101Diamond, "Credibility a Casualty in West Virginia," El.
102Diamond, "Problems at Chemical Plants Raise Broad Safety Concerns," Dll.
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expanded attempt to cap public concern. It required the CMA's 175 member
companies to follow to a set of guiding principles including "To recognize
and respond to community concerns about chemicals and our operations,"
"To report promptly to offials, employees, customers and the public,
information on chemical-related health or environmental hazards and to
recommend protective measures," and "To participate with government and
others in creating responsible laws, regulations and standards to safeguard the
community, workplace, and environment.'"1 0 3 CMA President Robert
Roland said of the program in 1991, "We are not asking the public to trust us.
We are asking everyone to track us, to monitor our performance and make
suggestions that will help us improve." Indeed, the unofficial motto of the
Responsible Care program is "Don't trust us. Track Us."
But when activists at the U.S. Public Interest Research Group in
Washington decided in 1992 to test the industry's commitment to this idea by
contacting 192 CMA member facilities with a list of nine basic questions, the
results were not encouraging. At 42 percent of the facilities, callers could not
reach anyone to answer their questions, despite repeated attempts. At 27
percent, company officials could not or would not answer any of the
questions. At only 17 percent of the facilities did company representatives
answer each of the nine questions. (Officials at Union Carbide's facility in
South Charleston, W. Va., refused to answer all questions, and nobody at the
-Institute plant would return the researchers' calls.) The group concluded that
"Responsible Care may have made its way onto the pages of Newsweek and
People, but it has not yet made its way inside the gates of the vast majority of
103Responsible Care®: A Public Commitment, a brochure updated yearly and available from
the Chemical Manufacturers Association, 2501 M Street NW, Washington DC 20037, (202)
887-1100.
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chemical companies across the country."104
After Institute the U.S. chemical industry could no longer claim that its
plants were safer or its operators more competent simply because they were
on American soil. Even in Chemical Valley, where residents fearing for their
jobs had initially repudiated calls for strict safety crackdowns, community
groups began to question manufacturers' commitment to reducing plant
hazards. Community briefings held after Bhopal for 800 invited neighbors of
Union Carbide's Institute plant were "a dog-and-pony show and totally
inadequate," said Perry Bryant, director of the West Virginia Citizen Action
Group. 10 5 "It is clear that people do not entirely trust the companies as
reliable sources of information," said Lewis Crampton, a former EPA official
and founding director of the industry- and government-sponsored National
Institute for Chemical Studies in Charleston, W. Va. The organization's
survey of the Kanawha Valley found that "local people want to have more
information about chemical risks in their community, and they want the
opportunity to register their concerns with public officials and with chemical
104Carolyn Hartmann, Trust Us. Don't Track Us. An Investigation of the Chemical Industry's
'Responsible Care' Program (Washington, D.C: U.S. Public Interest Research Group, March
1992). The PIRG surveyors asked, or attempted to ask, the following questions: "(1) Can you
tell me the names and quantities of chemicals that potentially cause cancer or birth defects
that you brought into the facility last year? (2) Can you tell me what chemicals that may
cause cancer or birth defects workers are exposed to at the facility? (3) Do you make products
at the facility that contain chemicals that are toxic or could cause cancer or birth defects? (4)
Can you tell me the names and amounts of toxic chemicals that go into the products you
produce at the facility? (5) Canr you tell me the neighborhoods through which you ship toxic
chemicals or hazardous wastes? Can you send me a map or a schedule? (6) Have you had any
accidents involving the tra:isportation of toxic or hazardous chemicals to or from your facility
in the past five years? (7) Has your facility made public its accident risk reduction plans? (8)
Have you made available to the public internal emergency management plans, including
worst case scenarios for accidental chemical releases? (9) Does your facility conduct toxics use
reduction or source reduction planning? If yes, have you made available to the public your
facility's toxics use reduction or source reduction plans or goals?"
105Ben A. Franklin, "Few West Virginians Go to Briefings on Union Carbide Plant," The New
York Times (April 3, 1985) A22.
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plant managers."10 6 After Bhopal and Institute, no amount of new safety
equipment or talk of responsible care would relieve citizens' anxiety about
the chemical industry's single-handed control over life-threatening
technologies. Information and shared control were the two key antidotes,
and if companies were not willing to provide them, then community
activists and sympathetic legislators were ready to obtain them by force of law.
Winning and Using the Right to Know
The right-to-know movement in the United States sprang from the
conflict between a basic democratic idea and the established reality of chemical
industry autonomy. The idea is that lay citizens need detailed information
about the toxic substances handled by local industries in order to explore the
links between chemical emissions and health problems, to protect themselves
against chemical accidents, and to create public pressure on industries to
reduce chemical hazards. The reality -- as many citizens were astonished to
discover when they first set out to find the information they wanted -- was
that no law or government regulation required chemical manufacturers to
provide publicly accessible data on the kinds, quantities, and dangers of the
chemicals they used or e.nitted.107 Often manufacturers themselves lacked a
clear understanding of the amount of waste, pollution, and disease they
might be generating through inefficiency and inattention to safety measures.
10 6 Lewis Crampton, "Living Together," Chemtech (June, 1989) 344-48.
107Of the thousands of toxic industrial chemicals contaminating the air and water in the
United States, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulated only
22 as of 1990, and the Environmental Protection Agency only eight. Gary Cohen and John
O'Connor, Fighting Toxics: A Manual for Protecting Your Family, Community, and Workplace
(Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1990) 20. The 1979 Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation & Liability Act, or Superfund, required that any spill of more than one pound
of certain hazardous materials be reported to the EPA, but this information was not
automatically available to the public.
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These were simply "negative externalities," part of the reasonable risk needed
to achieve reasonable profits, and until the nineteen-eighties public policy
supplied few incentives to eliminate them.108 Before the Bhopal catastrophe,
in other words, the American political system had failed to address adequately
the possibility that the chemical industry's tradition of trade secrecy might be
incompatible with community safety and self-rule.10 9
But although Bhopal provided the crucial political boost necessary for
the passage of federal right-to-know legislation, the effort to win access to
corporate information on toxic chemicals had begun years earlier. The
Philadelphia city council's enactment of the nation's first right-to-know law
in 1981 capped a five-year citizen campaign to uncover the sources of
alarmingly high cancer rates in the city's industrialized neighborhoods. The
campaign succeeded, organizers believed, because it had combined the efforts
of more than 40 groups, including the United Auto Workers, the League of
Women Voters, Friends of the Earth, Americans for Democratic Action, and
the Philadelphia Area Project on Occupational Safety and Health.
"Opponents were unable to dismiss the right-to-know as simply a labor
question or another item on a list of community concerns," wrote one
organizer. "Nor were they able to effectively undercut our premise: in a city
10 8The economic term "negative externality," as I use it here, is similar to Ivai- Illich's concept
of "specific counterproductivity." Illich writes: "Specific or paradoxical counterproductivity
is a negative social indicator for a diseconomy which remains locked within the system that
produces it... [it is] an unwanted side-effect of increasing institutional outputs that remains
internal to the system which itseli originated the specific value. It is a social measure for
objective frustration." Medical Nemesis: Ti'e Expropriation of Health (New York: Random
House, 1976) 8. Toxic chemical emissions are clearly an unwanted and frustrating side effect
of the system of chemical producion, but it would be wrong to claim that they are "locked
within" that system, as the success of right-to-know legislation in reducing emissions has
demonstrated.
109But see Carl F. Cranor, Regulating Toxic Substances: A Philosophy of Science and the Law
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) for an overview of the tort and regulatory law
that does exist to control toxics.
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with one of the highest cancer rates in the nation, people should, at the very
least, have a right to know the names of the chemicals to which they have
been exposed."1l 0 The resulting legislation guaranteed public access to
information on toxic chemicals used in Philadelphia and empowered the city
government to regulate their storage and emission. By 1984, grassroots
campaigns had contributed to the enactment of similar disclosure laws in 20
states, including New Jersey, New York, and California, and more than 40
cities, including Cincinnati, San Diego, and Sacramento. This patchwork
approach meant, however, that citizens had different sets of rights in different
communities and that manufacturers and distributors had to follow multiple
and often conflicting regulations. 1 Federal courts also ruled that some state
and local right-to-know laws were unenforceable, since they established
reporting standards stricter than the federal government's. 112
At the same time, environmental groups advocating toxic waste
reduction were learning that constructing an accurate overview of toxic
chemical use or waste generation at any particular industrial facility was a
nearly impossible task. "Industries didn't know very much about where or
when or why they created waste," explains Paul Orum, coordinator of the
national Working Group on Community Right-to-Know. 113 Detailed
information appeared on waste-discharge permits required under the Clean
Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
110Caron Chess, "Winning the Right-to-Know," Working Notes on Community Right-to-Know
(March, 1990) insert, page 4. Published by the Working Group on Community Right-to-Know,
United States Public Interest Research Group, 215 Pennsylvania Ave., SE, Washington, D.C.
20003-1107.
111 Jolie B. Solomon and Mark Russell, 'U.S. Chemical Disclosure-Law Efforts Getting Boost
from Tragedy in Bhopal," The Wall Street Journal (Dec. 14, 1984) 22.
112Janice R. Long and David J. Hanson, "Bhopal Triggers Massive Response from Congress, the
Administration," Chemical and Engineering News (Feb. 11, 1985) 53-59.
113 personal interview.
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and numerous other federal and state environmental laws, and this
information was theoretically available for public review. But a study begun
in 1982 by INFORM, a non-profit environmental research group based in
Manhattan, found that "the information, while technically availabL. was
logistically extremely difficult (occasionally impossible) to get access to.
Mismanaged filing systems, multitudes of federal, state, and local-level
record-keeping systems, and staff reluctance to make information available
rendered data gathering an arduous task."114 Once the data were in hand,
moreover, inconsistencies in terminology and reporting requirements made
comparisons between plants meaningless. INFORM did uncover one
example of a systematic, comprehensive chemical inventory -- a study
prepared by the state of New Jersey in 1979, then more or less forgotten -- and
in 1985 the group proposed a national chemical survey based on the New
Jersey model.
The proposal came at a critical moment in the drive for national right-
to-know legislation. When the 99th U.S. Congress convened in January, 1985,
a month after the Indian gas catastrophe, preventing another Bhopal in the
United States or abroad was one of the first items on its agenda. New York
representative Stephen Solarz visited Bhopal and held a series of hearings on
the health, safety, and environmental standards followed by U.S.
multinational corporations doing business in developing countries. New
Jersey Representative James Florio introduced a package of bills strengthening
federal regulation of toxic substances and requiring companies to inform state
and local officials about plant hazards. New Jersey Senator Frank Lautenberg
114David Sarokin and Joanna D. Underwood, "The Toxics Release Inventory: The New Era of
'Right-to-Know' in the United States," UNEP Industry and Environment (July-Dec., 1990) 38-
41.
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included INFORM's plan for a national chemical survey in the proposed
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-know Act (EPCRA). Since
Congress was also under pressure to reauthorize the 1979 Superfund law
governing the cleanup of toxic-waste sites before the law expired in 1986,
EPCRA proponents wrote the right-to-know provisions into the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act, where they became known as SARA,
Title III.
The provisions provoked vehement opposition from chemical industry
lobbyists, who persuaded many members of Congress that the Title III
reporting requirements would be overburdensome for manufacturers and
would inundate the public with information it lacked the technical
knowledge to use. Even the Environmental Protection Agency opposed the
right-to-know law, arguing that the voluntary "Chemical Emergency
Preparedness Plan" it had created after Bhopal would be enough to help local
communities guard against potential toxic hazards. l15 But on December 10,
1985, the crucial amendment creating a mandatory annual Toxics Release
Inventory (TRI) survived House opponents' attempt to strip it from the
Superfund reauthorization act by a vote of 212 to 211.
Right-to-know activists attributed their razor-thin victory to the fear and
distrust generated by the accidents at Bhopal and Institute. Just weeks before
the attempt to kill the TRI amendment, National Toxics Campaign Fund
founder John O'Connor, an environmental health activist, had delivered
115The EPA's Chemical Emergency Preparedness Plan created a list of 405 acutely toxic
chemicals and recommended that communities set up working groups to monitor their use. The
working groups were to be similar to the CAER teams formed under the industry's Community
Awareness and Emergency Response program. Skeptics, including Rep. James Florio,
criticized the EPA's scheme because it failed to provide any sanctions against companies
choosing not to cooperate. David J. Hanson, "Cooperation Key to EPA's Disaster Plan,"
Chemical and Engineering News (Jan. 6, 1986) 20-22.
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petitions to Washington bearing two million signatures in the amendment's
favor. "There's no question that people saw Bhopal and felt more
vulnerable," O'Connor says today. "People picked up the phone or signed a
petition because of Bhopal. The right-to-know section was the easiest issue to
campaign on, because people thought they had that right already! They were
shocked to find out that they didn't."116
David Allen, director of the Boston-based Center for Pollution
Prevention and a long-time proponent of toxics-use reduction, agrees that
Bhopal made 1985-86 the right time for right-to-know. "We never would
have gotten that thing through without Bhopal," Allen says. "It was an
accident of history. It was the coming of reason. Bhopal is what gave us the
groundswell of public opinion that pushed it through Congress. People said,
'Gee, we need this information!' The chemical industry was under attack; its
public opinion ratings went way down, and Congress acted. It wouldn't have
had the political wherewithal to do it otherwise."117
In October, 1986, when Congress reauthorized Superfund by veto-proof
margins of 386 to 27 in the House and 88 to 8 in the Senate, SARA Title III
finally became law.118 Among the law's many requirements were that the
EPA draw up a list of extremely hazardous substances and threshholds for
116Interview with the author at O'Connor's home in Cambridge, Mass., April 8, 1994.
117Telephone interview with the author from Allen's home in Somerville, Mass., March, 1994.
The fact that knowledge of Bhopal had helped to ensure passage of the Community Right-
to-Know Act as part of the Superfund reauthorization bill echoed the importance of another
technological disaster, Love Canal, in the creation of the original Superfund in 1980. Writes
sociologist Adeline Gordon Levine: "Love Canal was referred to frequently in congressional
discussion [of Superfund], Love Canal residents and involved officials and consultants
testified at legislative hearings, and Senator [Patrick] Moynihan publicly lauded the
organized citizens of Love Canal.. for their part in bringing the problem of toxic wastes to the
national attention and for keeping it there." Love Canal: Science, Politics, and People
(Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1982) 69.
11 Joseph A. Davis, "Congress Clears 'Superfund,' Awaits President's Decision," Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report (Oct. 11, 1986) 2532.
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reportable releases of each; that plant operators immediately notify local and
state emergency coordinators of releases above these threshhold quantities;
that local emergency planning committees (LEPCs) be created to handle public
information requests in all U.S. communities; that plant operators regularly
submit "material safety data sheets" to the LEPCs describing their use of EPA-
listed hazardous chemicals; that industries report routine releases of specified
chemicals that might cause chronic health problems; that all material safety
data sheets, toxic release forms, and emergency notices be made available
upon request to the general public and that the LEPCs advertise this data's
availability; and that citizens be allowed to sue plant operators or
government officials for failure to carry out any of these provisions.1l9
The new law effectively repudiated the old regulatory system's reliance
on permits, fines, and trust in favor of a massive experiment in grassroots
democratic rule. 20 "Right-to-know is really the modern extension of the best
democratic traditions the country has to offer," says O'Connor. "This is not
an idea that was cooked up by experts at INFORM or some public policy think
tank. It's thousands of people dying in the streets, and people saying 'There
ought to be something in the Constitution!' 12 1 Minnesota representative
Gerry Sikorski, one of Title III's sponsors in Congress, called the legislation "a
119
"Major Provisions of 'Superfund' Reauthorization Bill," Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report (Oct. 11, 1986) 2538-40.
12 0 Environmental policy analysts Richard C. Rich, W. David Conn, and William L. Owens
write: "It was in pursuit of the goal of reducing chemical hazards that Title III was
innovative...Legislators apparently hoped t'A requiring firms to share data on their use of
hazardous materials would both provide a vigilant public with the information it needed to
monitor industry performance and cause industry to undertake voluntary risk reduction efforts
in order to reassure citizens and prevent both legal actions and political pressure for more
formal regulation." "'Indirect Regulation' of Environmental Hazards Through the Provision
of Information to the Public: The Case of SARA, Title III," Policy Studies Journal (Vol. 21,
No. 1, 1993) 16-34.
1 2 1 Personal interview, April 8, 1994.
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philosophical leap of faith -- kind of a heartfelt belief that people in
communities have a absolute, fundamental right to know what goes into
the air their kids breathe, the water they drink and the ground they play
on."122 Armed with this information, legislators hoped, lay citizens could
mobilize public pressure to achieve what years of lawsuits and complex
regulations had not: technological changes to reduce chemical plant hazards
and minimize the use and abuse of toxic substances. But would it work? As
Boston University law and technology scholar Michael S. Baram put it, "Will
we achieve the Jeffersonian ideal of informed citizens who can take a
responsible role in making public policy?" 123
Jeffersonian or not, the political order that emerged with the right-to-
know law was closer to direct democracy than anything the chemical industry
had endured before. Manufacturers grumpily began a crash effort to meet
Congress's July 1, 1988, deadline for compliance with the first Toxic Release
Inventory. As Christopher Cathcart, the CMA's associate director for health,
safety, and chemical regulation, complained, "There is some difficulty in
releasing this information because of the possibility of its direct application to
risk characterization." 12 4 Chemical makers feared, in other words, that the
public would do with the TRI data exactly what Congress had intended it to
do: embarrass the worst polluters into reducing annual emissions. But most
companies complied anyway, and in 1989 the EPA released the first 300-page
12 2Keith Schneider, "For Communities, Knowledge of Polluters Is Power," The New York Times
(March 24,1991) E5.
12 3Philip Shabecoff, "Industry to Give Vast New Data on Toxic Perils," The New York Times
(Feb. 14, 1988); M. S. Baram, P.S. Dillon, and B. Ruffle, Managing Chemical Risks: Corporate
Response to SARA Title III (Medford, Mass.: Tufts University Center for Environmental
Management, 1990); see also Philip Shabecoff, A Fierce Green Fire: The American
Environmental Movement (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993).
124David J. Hanson, "Industries Straining to File Toxic Release Data by Deadline," Chemical
and Engineering News (June 20, 1988) 13-16.
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national TRI report.
The results startled the public. Some 9.6 billion pounds of toxic
chemicals had been released into the air, water, and ground in 1987 -- 43
percent of it generated by chemical manufacturers, 19 percent by the metals
industry, and the rest by paper manufacturers, petroleum refineries, vehicle
manufacturers, electronics factories, and a variety of other industries. 125
Though this aggregate was huge in itself, the Office of Technology
Assessment estimated that it covered only 5 percent of the nation's total toxic
emissions. Admitted American Petroleum Institute president Charles J.
DiBona, "Some of these numbers are going to sound absolutely
frightening." 126
Local media outlets and environmental groups quickly fastened on the
report's listings of emissions from individual facilities. Residents of
Northfield, Minnesota, for example, learned that Sheldahl, Inc., a local
manufacturer of electronic circuit boards, had released 400 tons of methylene
chloride into the air in 1987 -- enough to make it the United States' 45th-
largest emitter of suspected carcinogens. Working with laborers at the
Sheldahl plant, community groups persuaded the company to cut emissions
as part of a new union contract.127 The success stories accumulated as local
citizens' groups aggressively put TRI data to new uses. Toxics-release
information gave lay people a valuable bargaining chip in their bid to change
industrial practices: the threat of bad publicity. In case after case, industrial
managers remembered Union Carbide and gave in to community demands
for hazard reduction:
125Sarokin and Underwood, 40.
12 6 Tim Smart, "Pollution: Trying to Put the Best Face on Bad News," Business Week (July 18,
1988) 76-77.
1 2 7 John E. Young, "Keeping Tabs on Toxics," World Watch (May/June, 1992) 9, 33.
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* In San Jose, California, the group Citizens for a Better Environment
used 1987 TRI data to show that IBM's Silicon Valley plant discharged
the third largest volume of ozone-destroying chloroflourocarbons in the
nation. On Earth Day, 1989, 2,000 activists marched on the plant
demanding a reduction in emissions. IBM agreed that autumn to phase
out the use of CFCs in all products and processes by 1993.128
* Using TRI data showing that 65 companies in California's Contra Costa
County stored a total of over 140 million pounds of extremely hazardous
chemicals, Citizens for a Better Environment warned of the danger of a
chemical catastrophe and pointed out that the county health department
had failed to ask these companies for Risk Management Prevention
Plans as authorized by state law. After a 1989 explosion at a local
Chevron refinery spread a black cloud over residential areas, a coalition
of activists convinced the county board of supervisors to force the still-
reluctant health department to obtain the risk management plans.12 9
* The New Jersey Coalition Against Toxics used TRI data to identify five
facilities in Berlin, New Jersey, a.3 candidates for "good neighbor"
agreements designed to prevent chemical accidents. Managers at Dynasil
Corporation's Berlin glass factory, where a large fire had recently terrified
nearby residents, invited the Coalition to tour their plant. The group's
128Jeffrey TryerLs, Richard Schrader, and Paul Orumn, Making the Difference: Using the Right-
to-Know in the Fight Against Toxics, a 1990 paper published by the National Center for
Policy Alternatives, 2000 Florida Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009; page 1. Available
from the Working Group on Community Right-to-Know.
1 2 9Ibid., 14.
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inspection report recommended fire hazard training and emergency
showers for workers, new spill containment walls around outdoor
storage tanks, sharing of emergency response information with the local
fire department and emergency planning committee, and the
installation of new sump pumps to keep rainwater from mixing with
toxic silicon tetrachloride. Dynasil adopted all of the
recommendations. 13 0
* In a highly publicized report entitled "Local Error, Global Terror," the
Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group used TRI data to show that
the Raytheon Company had emitted 3.6 million pounds of CFCs, used to
clean printed circuit boards, in 1987-88. Raytheon announced it would
switch to water- and detergent-based cleaners by 1992, saying the
MassPIRG report had "added an impetus" to this decision. 3l
* Residents of Boerum Hill, a South Brooklyn neighborhood, had
complained for more than a decade of noxious odors from the Ulano
Corporation, a graphic arts supplies manufacturer. 1988 TRI data showed
that the company's emissions of toluene accounted for 17 percent of
New York City's total toxic air pollution. On the same day that the
Boerum Hill-South Brooklyn Clean Air Committee released these
findings to the press, the New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation ruled that Ulano must begin using a new incinerator to
130Ibid., 15; Susan Jaffe, "Bhopal in the Backyard?" Sierra (Sep./Oct., 1993) 50-52.
131Nita Settina and Paul Orum, "Making the Difference, Part II: More Uses of the Right-to-
Know in the Fight Against Toxics," Working Notes on Community Right-to-Know (Sep./Oct.,
1991) 1-8.
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reduce toluene emissions by 95 percent.l32
Although the Toxics Release Inventory is far more useful than any
previous form of public information about the chemical industry (especially
now that toxic-release data are available instantly via modem133), deficiencies
in the original legislation limit its power. SARA Title III required that
companies file toxic-release forms on only 328 hazardous chemicals, and no
reporting was required at all if a company's total annual releases were under
10,000 pounds. Environmental policy analysts also point out that "if the
'regulation through information' strategy of Title III is to be effective in
reducing chemical risks, the Local Emergency Planning Committees must
succeed in alerting the public to chemical hazards and in providing them
with the information they need to hold industry and its public sector
regulators accountable."'13 4 Yet because Congress left the responsibility to
fund the committees to the states, many LEPCs still lack the resources to make
TRI data easily available or even to advise the public of its existence. LEPC
members who participated in a recent study said they spent only 9 percent of
their time "informing the public" or "seeking public input for the planning
process," in contrast to 17 percent attending meetings and 32 percent
"studying the issues." And while Title III mandated that the LEPCs'
membership be broadly representative of their communities, the study found
that affiliates of environmental and community organizations are
1321bid., 5.
133The EPA's official TRI database is maintained by the National Library of Medicine.
Activists and public-interest organizations also use the Right-to-Know Network (RTK-NET)
to exchange toxic release data, newsletters, and other resources. Information on RTK-NET, a
project of OMB Watch and the Unison Institute in Washington, D.C., is available at (202)
234-8494.
1 3 4 Rich, et al., 17.
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outnumbered 5 to 1 on the committees by government and business officials.
"As presently structured, LEPCs cannot be expected to serve as a catalyst for
active public monitoring of local environmental risks," the study
concluded. 135
Yet citizens' groups and sympathetic policymakers seem to have found
ways around some of these limitations. The Clinton Administration has
beefed up TRI reporting requirements by adding another 200 chemicals to the
inventory and by requiring federal facilities (including those operated by the
Department of Defense and the Department of Energy) to report the same
information as private companies. In the Clean Air Act of 1990, Congress
established a new "risk management planning program" that will eventually
require 140,000 industrial facilities nationwide to disseminate worst-case
scenarios explaining to workers and the public what could happen if safety
systems fail.136 The "Community Right-to-Know More Act" introduced by
Representative Gerry Sikorski in the 1991-92 legislative season would have
built on the TRI by adding 520 new chemicals to the inventory, requiring
information from new kinds of polluting facilities, and collecting
information on storage and production processes rather than simply on
environmental releases. By that time the sense of urgency in Congress
created by Bhopal had dissipated; the legislation stalled in committee because
environmental groups "didn't muster the coalition" necessary to overcome
industry opposition, according to right-to-know proponent Paul Orum. But
the Administration is gradually putting pieces of Sikorski's bill into effect
1 3 5 Ibid., 31.
136The EPA is still studying ways of implementing this requirement. Paul Orum, "EPA
Proposes Accident Prevention Rules," Working Notes on Community Right-to-Know
(Sep./Oct. 1993) 1.
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nonetheless. 137 Under the glare of TRI publicity, meanwhile, U.S. industries
reduced total toxic emissions, as measured by the inventory, by some 30
percent between 1987 and 1992.138
The World After Bhopal
Chemical manufacturing, until the nineteen-eighties, was one of the
most lightly regulated industries in the United States. Managers boasted of
the industry's comparatively low accident rate (6.5 injuries per 100 full-time
workers in 1988, as against 12.1 injuries per 100 workers for all manufacturing
industries 13 9 ) and advocated voluntary safety programs instead of
meddlesome government oversight. Legislatures and regulatory agencies
traditionally allowed corporations to conceal as trade secrets the identities,
quantities, and potential hazards of the chemicals they used in everyday
production. Decisions about plant design -- including the choice of processes
and chemicals used, the extent to which control should be automated, the
presence or absence of safety monitoring devices, and the provision of
emergency response plans -- were guided by industry practice and business
priorities, not by outside pressure from lawmakers or citizens. After Bhopal,
everything changed. I principle, if not in always practice, issues of safety,
confidentiality, and design have been opened to community review on a scale
137
"Key to the Revised Community Right-to-Know More Act," Working Group on Community
Right-to-Know (Aug, 1992) 2; Notes from author's telephone interview with Orum from his
office in Wasington, D.C., May 2,1994.
13 8David Hanson, "Toxic Release Inventory: Firms Making Strides in Cutting Emissions,"
Chemical and Engineering News (May 31, 1993) 6-7.
139These figures do not include injuries to contract workers and may therefore mask a large
number of accidents reported under different categories such as "construction." Nicholas
Ashford, et al., The Encouragement of Technological Change fo'- Preventing Chemical
Accidents: Moving Firms from Secondary Prevention and Mitigation to Primary Prevention
(Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Technology, Policy, and Industrial Development,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1993) III-10.
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that would have seemed impossible before the disaster.
More than one group claims credit for these changes. In the words of
Ronald Van Mynen, a Union Carbide vice president who led the company's
technical and medical team to Bhopal after the disaster, "We concluded that
an angry or frightened public could shut us down and realized that we faced
two possible futures: We could be a severely regulated industry with limited
growth potential, or we could be one that continues to carry out our
traditional mission of innovation, of bringing new and better products to the
public." Bhopal taught Union Carbide that "risk decisions are more likely to
win public acceptance if the public shares in the decisionmaking" and
purportedly inspired the company to launch "an all-out effort to involve the
community in our actions. 1 40 Citizen organizers, of course, describe these
changes somewhat differently. "People ought to be involved in their own
fate -- that is the most important democratic inkling Americans have," says
O'Connor. "Bhopal added a lot of impetus to community right-to-know and
reinforced that people have got to use democratic structures to ensure that
disasters won't happen. 141
Change came only after much reflection and effort on both sides. In
stressing the importance of their own efforts to reduce chemical hazards,
however, industrial managers and activists alike forget the gripping power of
the Bhopal disaster itself. As I have argued here, the political outcomes of
technological failures are strongly shaped by the detailed character of those
failures. It was not simply the fact of the Bhopal gas leak and its horrendous
death toll but rather the particular way the disaster happened and the
140Ronald Van Mynen, "View from the Top: After the World Changed," Chemtech (March
1992) 135.
141Thom the author's notes on an interview with O'Connor at his home in Cambridge, Mass.,
April 8, 1994.
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systemic flaws in chemical process safety it revealed that led citizens to agitate
for technical and operational reforms and managers to offer concessions in
these areas. There could have been no more forceful demonstration than
Bhopal of the vulnerability of host communities to catastrophic control
failures at chemical manufacturing facilities.
The search for ways to avoid a recurrence has been a major
preoccupation of environmental activism and legislative change over the last
decade. Events after Bhopal, in other words, have been largely driven by
events at Bhopal: an assertion which this chapter has documented. Citizen
knowledge of technological catastrophes is inherently politicizing and can
help redress, if not fully reverse, imbalances in the decision-making power
held by different social groups. Understanding how this happened after
Bhopal might prepare us to cope with the next catastrophe more proactively.
Will history after Bhopal come full circle -- will the right to know
someday find its way to India? Canada will implement a TRI-like program
this year, and the United Kingdom, Sweden, France, and Australia have plans
to establish their own public chemical invertories based on the American
model. At the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro some 150 nations signed
"Agenda 21," a development blueprint calling for global emissions
inventories and the phaseout of some toxic chemicals. Public interest groups
in several countries have requested TRI-equivalent data from international
chemical companies, with some success.142
But if the democratic ideas behind the U.S. Community Right-to-Know
Act can be put to work in India, the world's largest democracy, the
incongruity of the fact that an Indian disaster enhanced safety and democratic
142
"Emissions Inventories Develop Internationally," Working Notes on Community Right-to-
Know (May/June, 1993) 3.
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participation in the United States might begin to be righted. "Community
right-to-know provisions have received a considerable boost in the United
States after Bhopal. It is to be hoped that the governments of developing
countries will recognize the need for similar guarantees for their citizens,"
writes Sheila Jasanoff. She warns, however, that "efforts to lobby for such
legislation in India will almost certainly run up against the predisposition
toward governmental secrecy that marks India's traditions of public
administration. There is little reason to expect that government agencies will
set the presumption of confidentiality aside in future policy-making with
respect to hazardous technologies."14 3 Jasanoff further points out that Third
World governments are reluctant to do anything to discourage continued
technology transfer and industrialization. The impetus for democratic
technological change in India and other developing countries, then, must
come from citizens themselves. While technology-exporting countries like
the United States can enact laws requiring companies to warn foreign
governments about industrial hazards, it falls to the technology-importing
nations to ensure that those hazards are respected, and only where
governments are accountable to their people will this occur.
Even in the so-called "developed" nations, meanwhile, right-to-know
laws provide no perfect shield against technological catastrophe; As T.H.
Huxley asked in 1877, "If a little knowledge is dangerous, where is the man
who has so much as to be out of danger?'144 Explosions that killed 23
workers at a Phillips refinery in Pasadena, Texas, in 1989 and 17 workers at an
Arco petrochemicals complex in Channelview, Texas, in 1990, in spite of
updated safety technology, showed how deeply-rooted and resistant to
1 4 3jasanoff, 1122, 1119.
144T.H. Huxley, On Elementary Instruction in Physiology (1877).
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cosmetic change are the causes of most modern industrial disasters.14 5 Only
in a few isolated cases have community groups, local emergency planning
committees, workers, and plant managers cooperated to conduct the kind of
top-to-bottom safety reviews needed to identify and reduce vulnerabilities in
a facility's technological and organizational structure. Although work is
underway to shift the emphasis in chemical accident regulation from
"secondary prevention" (reducing the probability of an accident) to "primary
prevention" (deploying inherently safe technologies that prevent the
possibility of an accident)146, the right-to-know approach remains a remedial
strategy. It limits citizens to (a) discovering what substances have already
becn emitted by industry and (b) pressing for incremental technological
modifications to reduce, not really eliminate, toxic hazards.
The right-to-know, in other words, is a reactive right, not proactive one.
As Jasanoff writes of the Bhopal disaster, "knowledge would have been most
beneficial at the time Union Carbide made its basic decision about what
manufacturing process should be employed in Bhopal," not after thousands
had already been exposed to corrosive doses of MIC.147 In the same way, data
like those gathered in the Toxics Release Inventory would be more useful in
the form of environmental-impact projections allowing communities to
debate proposed technological projects on their social, economic, and
ecological merits, rather than in the form of dry reports issued after those
projects have already been completed and are affecting their environments.
145Susan Ainsworth and Wil Lepkowski, "Arco Plant Explosion: Many Casualties, Markets
Disrupted," Chemical and Engineering News (July 16, 1990) 4-5.
146Nicholas A. Ashford, et al., The Encouragement of Technological Change for Preventing
Chemical Accidents: Moving Firms from Secondary Prevention and Mitigation to Primary
Prevention (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Center for Technology, Policy, and Industrial
Development, July 1993).
14 7 Jasanoff, 1122.
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But despite their limitations, the Toxics Release Inventory and other
varieties of right-to-know legislation have already shifted the balance of
political power between U.S. chemical producers and citizens. More than
Chernobyl (which helped spark a general social conflagration with tentatively
democratic results) and more than Three Mile Island (which ended in a
stalemate that will be resolved only after decades of nuclear plant attrition),
the Bhopal catastrophe has fostered a tangible rejuvenation of democracy -- or
at least a kind of stopgap substitute for it. As William Greider has written,
"Against these bleak facts [that the system of electoral politics has been
corrupted by big money, that a few powerful corporations and lobbying
organizations dominate policymaking], there is a crucial contrary truth, one
that is seldom acknowledged and, therefore, not widely understood. It is this:
The nation is alive with irregular political energies, despite the failure of
formal electoral politics. Citizens of every stripe and status do engage
themselves one way or another in trying to move the public agenda, despite
all the impediments."'14 8 In the age of large, centralized technological
systems, true democracy may be no more realistic a possibility than perfect
safety, but grassroots forms of political representation are emerging to fill the
gap between the ideal and the real. Right-to-know laws are one such form,
and although it took a disaster to get them enacted, they may yet become part
of a broad new pattern of public involvement in the control of complex
technologies.
14 8 William Greider, Who Will Tell the People? The Betrayal of American Democracy (New
York: Touchstone, 1992) 23-24.
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Chapter 5
A CRIMSON INCANDESCENCE
Chernobyl and the Fall of the Soviet Union
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Hope,
crowned by Nobel,
like a dreadful genie
woke above Chernobyl.
Forgive me, those who
shut the crack
with their own bodies.
Who is to blame --
Humanity or Science?
.. And i man is
the image of God
Is God -- my image?
- Andre Vosnesensky
published in Pravau, 19871
The people of the former Soviet Union asserted their freedom bit by bit
as glasnost gradually exposed the weakness, corruption, and bloody history of
the Communist Party. But if this process of awakening and recognition had a
discrete beginning, it came at 1:23 a.m. o April 26, 1986, when reactor No. 4
of the state-run V.I. Lenin Atomic Energy Station at Chernobyl disintegrated
in a blast of steam, flaming graphite, and deadly radionuclides. The explosion
was no accident, the Soviet people came to understand, but simply another
malignant product of the Communist apparatus that controlled nuclear
power along with everything else in Soviet life. "Chernobyl was not like the
Communist system. They were one and the same," said Yurii Shcherbak, a
leader of the new Ukrainian environmental movement.2 Fusing technology
and politics, the disaster came to symbolize the Soviet Union's long history of
environmental abuses and frightened many Soviet citizens into their first
1Quoted in Armand Hammer and Robert Peter Gale, "The Lessons of Chernobyl, One Year
Later," The New York Times (April 26, 1987) E31.
2David Remnick, Lenin's Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire (New York: Random
House, 1993) 245.
299
open defiance of the state. Angry scrutiny of the nuclear industry led to a
moratorium on plant construction and set a pattern for the renunciation of
Communist power itself. Russian physicist Valerii Legasov was one of many
who h2lped bring about this transformation, and though he did not live to
witness the empire's fall, his story is a microcosm of the Chernobyl
revolution.
At 6:00 p.m. on April 26, 1986, a cavalcade of black government
limousines awaited the Aeroflot jet as it taxied to a halt on tarmac at Kiev
airport. This special flight from Moscow carried some very important
passengers; a crowd of Ukrainian officials, ashen-faced, watched nxiously as
they emerged. One of the passengers rushed up to the officials. It was
Legasov, First Deputy Director of the Soviet Academy of Sciences' Kurchatov
Atomic Energy Institute, where the high-power boiling channel-type reactor --
RBMK, in Russian parlance -- had been invented. Any more news of the
accident? Legasov demanded. Nothing exact, the officials replied, but the
situation was bad. It was best that they proceed to the site directly. The
delegation piled into the limousines and sped north to Pripyat.
Just six hours earlier, Legasov had been appointed scientific director of a
government commission hurriedly assembled to evaluate the situation at the
V.I. Lenin Atomic Energy Station in Chernobyl. Someone had pulled him
from a Party organizational meeting to tell him of the accident. By then,
more than t hours had passed since the apparent explosion inside one of
the station's four 1000-megawatt reactors. (Another 30 hours would go by
before the detection of a radioactive cloud over Sweden would alert Western
nations to the disaster). Legasov had rushed back to the Institute to find
Aleksandr Kuligin, head of the RBMK section, and then to Vnukovo airport,
where he met the leader of the government commission, Deputy Chairman
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of the Council of Ministers Boris Shcherbina.
The creation of an emergency commission was the Soviet Politburo's
normal response to a major natural or industrial disaster. Shcherbina, a
former minister of construction in the gas and oil industry, was an innocuous
choice to head the Chernobyl team, someone with a profile low enough to
avoid attracting attention to the incident. Legasov, by contrast, was "clearly
the most qualified man in the world to compile the documentary record of
the causes and consequences of the accident"3 -- a graduate of the Mendeleev
Institute's prestigious Faculty of Physicochemical Engineering, former Deputy
Director of the All-Union Institute of Chemical Physics, Radiochemistry, and
Nuclear and Plasma Technologies, and an expert on nuclear fuels. Not
coincidentally, perhaps, the 51-year-old Legasov also favored the rapid
expansion of the Soviet nuclear energy program and was a strong defender of
the safety of Soviet nuclear plants. In 1979 he had written an article asserting
that the Three Mile Island accident was "irrelevant" to the Soviet nuclear
enterprise because Soviet safety standards were higher than those in the
United States and because Soviet plant operators were better trained and
educated than their American counterparts. 4
Shcherbina, Legasov and the rest of their team arrived at Pripyat after
dark that evening. The town, 20 kilometers north of the atomic plant itself,
had been built from nothing in the middle of this sandy, marshy, non-arable
region of rural Ukraine to house tens of thousands of Chernobyl workers and
their families. Local officials now informed the commissioners (as recorded
by Legasov) that "In the course of conducting an irregular experiment...two
3 Zhores A. Medvedev, The Legacy of Chernobyi (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990)
19.
4 Medvedev, 272-73.
301
consecutive explosions had occurred in the fourth block of the station. The
reactor building had been destroyed and several hundred people had received
radiation injuries...Two people had died and the others were in the town
hospitals...The radiation level in Pripyat was significantly raised, but it did not
yet represent a grave danger to the population." Shcherbina assigned Legasov
to coordinate measures to "localize" the accident, but nothing could be done
until the next morning, when helicopter units reported the extent of the
damage. "It was evident on the first flight that the reactor was completely
destroyed," Legasov reported. "Pieces of the graphite blocks, either whole or
in bits, were scattered about on the roofs of the machine hall and over the
whole area...A white column several hundred meters high consisting of the
products of the fire (apparently graphite) was constantly being emitted from
the reactor crater. Inside the reactor space one could see separate huge spots of
crimson incandescence."5
Legasov's first job was to stop any further deterioration of the reactor
core. Since the control rods had been destroyed in the explosion and the core
was no longer being cooled by the normal circulation of water and steam, it
was entirely possible that an uncontrolled fission reaction was going on
inside the devastated reactor. Rising temperatures from fission could lead to
another explosion or even a meltdown. After firefighters from the Ukrainian
Ministry of Energy made three unsuccessful attempts on April 27 to douse the
graphite fire with water, Legasov and the other scientists on the commission
ordered that the reactor be smothered with loose solids. That day and the
next, 279 helicopter sorties dropped several hundred tons of sand, clay, lead,
dolomite, and boron carbide into the reactor building. The physicists hoped
5 The passage is from Legasov's memoirs, published in Pravda on May 10, 1988, and is quoted in
Medvedev, p. 51.
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the material would quell the fire, cool the core, inhibit fission by absorbing
stray neutrons, and filter out poisonous decay products before they entered
the atmosphere. At first, the strategy seemed to work. As helicopter sorties
continued, radionuclide emissions declined from 4 million curies (MCi) on
April 27 to 2 MCi on May 1.6
But in fact the helicopter pilots were dumping the quenching material in
the wrong place.7 Almost none of it entered the burning reactor core, where
the temperature crept back upward. By May 5 the daily release of vaporized
radionuclides had increased to 8-12 MCi -- nearly as much material as was
ejected in the original explosion.8 An evacuation of the 30-kilometer-radius
"exclusion zone" around Chernobyl had begun on May 3, but the hundreds of
emergency workers and scientists scrambling heroically to contain the
accident were left to absorb huge doses of radiation. On May 4, when
Shcherbina and the rest of the government commission flew back to Moscow
for treatment at a clinic specializing in radiation sickness, Legasov stayed
behind.
He and his colleagues were mystified when radioactive releases from the
core suddenly plummeted to less than 150,000 curies on May 5. Scientists
later speculated that debris from the reactor fuel elements had undergone a
second meltdown and burned through to the vault beneath the reactor,
6A curie (abbreviated Ci) is a unit used by physicists to measure the amount of errgy given off
by a piece of radioactive material. One curie equals 37 billion atomic disintegrations per
second. A person holding one gram of radium in his hand for one second would be exposed to
one curie of radiation (ab=ut 888,000 ergs) - 16 times the fatal dose.
7 A fact recently brought to public attention by Alexander R. Sich, author of a 1994 doctoral
dissertation in the MIT Department of Nuclear Engineering. See Sich, The Chornobyl
Accident Revisited: Source Term Analysis and Reconstruction of Events During the Active
Phase (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Jan., 1994) 3-
4, 239-249; David L. Chandler, "Study Says Chemrnobyl Core Melted Down," The Boston Globe
(Jan. 30, 1994) 1, 12; David L. Chandler, "Chernobyl: What Really Went On During Those 10
Harrowing Days," The Boston Globe (Jan. 31, 1994) 25, 28-29.
8 Medvedev, 53-57, 59.
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where it was cooled by emergency injections of liquid nitrogen. By Victory
Day, May 9 -- the anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany -- "It seemed to
us that Unit 4 had ceased to breathe, burn, live," Legasov wrote. The
physicists at the site were eager to celebrate, but events inside the core spoiled
the holiday. As some of the physicists had feared might happen, the still-
burning floor of the reactor core collapsed, raising a huge cloud of radioactive
dust that caused radiation measurements to shoot up even as far as 60
kilometers from the plant. After Legasov ordered that another 80 tons of lead
be dropped into the crater, however, the fire was finally extinguished.9 The
core was still hot and extremely radioactive, but radionuclide emissions had
largely ceased.10
The accident's tentative resolution marked the beginning of a two-year
odyssey for Legasov. Initially, the physicist stood by the Soviet scientific and
military establishment's unswerving commitment to nuclear energy. "I am
profoundly convinced that atomic energy stations are the pinnacle of
achievement of power generation," he had told Pravda in June, 1986. "They
are not only economically advantageous compared to thermal stations in
normal use and not only cleaner ecologically, but they are the preparatory
basis for the next technological leap. The future of civilization is
inconceivable without the peaceful utilization of nuclear power...People have
been killed [at Chernobyl] but I am convinced that nuclear power will come
out of this test even more reliable."1' Legasov went on to suggest that
nuclear power could become a stabilizing influence in world politics as
9 Medvedev, 64-65.
10Even at the end of May, however, daily radionuclide emissions were still higher than the
total release from the Three Mile Island accident. Emissions did not cease altogether until
the completion of the sarcophagus in October. Medvedev, 80.
1 1Quoted in David Marples, Chernobyl and Nuclear Power in the USSR (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1986) 176.
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competition over dwindling fossil-fuel resources heightened.' 2 As the leader
of a 28-member Soviet delegation to the International Atomic Energy
Agency's annual session in Vienna in August 1986 and co-author of the
official report on Chernobyl presented there, he admitted that the actions of
the plant's operators leading up to the accident had been "awkward and silly"
but he defended the basic design of RBMK reactors, saying they were easier to
build and more economical than the alternatives.13
Sometime after the Vienna meeting, however, Legasov began to
question the basic doctrines guiding Soviet nuclear development.' He
commented that the promise demonstrated by the first, small RBMK reactors
built in the nineteen-sixties had darkened when the technology was
indiscriminately scaled up to meet national electricity demand. (This crash
program to increase Soviet reactor output parallelled the post-Sputnik
acceleration of research on nuclear power and space exploration in the United
States; see Chapter 3.15) "The problem today is the proliferation of all sorts of
[nuclear] sites and the concentration of vast power," Legasov told Ukrainian
environmentalist Yurii Shcherback in a 1987 interview. "It was necessary
quickly to introduce and master new scales of power...The number of people
busy with the preparation of installations and their running increased
sharply. But the teaching and training methods could not keep up with the
1 2David Marples, Ukraine Under Perestroika: Ecology, Economics and the Workers' Revolt
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991) 23.
13Richard L. Hudson, "Experts Stunned by Soviet Nuclear Laxity," The Wall Street Journal
(August 29,1986) 21.
14Ukraine scholar David R. Marples relates Legasov's story in his 1991 study Ukraine Under
Perestroika. Marples' first two Chemobyl books were Chernobyl and Nuclear Power in the
USSR (1986) and The Social Impact of the Chernobyl Disaster (1988).
15See also chapter 7 in Brian Balogh, Chain Reaction: Expert Debate and Public Participation
in American Commercial Nuclear Power, 1945-1975 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University
Press, 1991) 171-220.
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rate of development.'16
In the published memoirs of his Chernobyl experience, Legasov bitterly
criticized the lack of emergency preparedness, medical services, and
dosimetric equipment at the site. He asserted that accidents were far too
common at Soviet atomic energy stations. "Frequent leaks...badly working
valves...all these took place every year...Anyone who has been in an atomic
energy station building site is amazed that one can do such highly responsible
work at such shoddy building sites."1 7 In 1988 Legasov told a journalist for
the Moscow News that he was now "convinced" that any of the USSR's 14
other RBMK reactors could easily suffer a Chernobyl-type failure. "The most
important contributing factors to the Chernobyl accident have not been and
cannot be removed," he stated. "They include faults resulting from poor
construction and lack of reliable emergency systems for similar plants, and
the impossibility of constructing concrete 'cones' to seal them at this stage."18
More than simple whistleblowing, Legasov's increasingly frequent
public statements in 1987 and 1988 amounted to a deep critique of Soviet
officialdom's blind infatuation with advanced technology. While battling the
radiation sickness that had begun to weaken him physically, he
simultaneously challenged his colleagues in the Soviet technocracy to rethink
their notions of industrial safety. "We have become too carried away by
technology," he said.19 "The accident[s] at Chernobyl, at Three Mile Island,
and other tragic events not connected with the peaceful atom, for example,
the explosion of the Challenger spaceship, the explosion [sic] in Bhopal, India,
!6 Yurii Shcherbak, Chernobyl: A Documentary Story (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1989) 149-
150.
17Quoted in Medvedev, 268-69.
18Interview with Ales Adamovich in Moscow News, no. 29, 1988; quoted in Marples, Ukraine
Under Perestroika, 24.
19Ibid., 24.
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catastrophes at sea and on the railroad, have demonstrated to us that the
problem of the interrelationship between people and the machine has still
not been fully resolved and demands our tireless attention. The enemy is not
technology itself, but our incompetence, our irresponsibility in dealing with
it.',20
Legasov's emphasis on operator error in his report to the IAEA had
given way to an awareness of the ideological and institutional roots of the
disaster, and of the need for a fundamental reassessment of the country's
technological goals. Legasov now urged a return to engineering enterprises
carried out "in the spirit of the great humanitarian ideas."2 1 He told
Shcherbak, "If someone is educated only in technical ideas, he can only
reproduce technology and perfect it...the general key to everything that has
been happening is that we have for a prolonged period been ignoring the role
of the moral principle [in technology]: the role of our history and of our
culture."22
For his efforts Legasov earned the resentment of many of his fellow
academicians. His ideas for reform were, in the words of Ukraine scholar
David Marples, "rebuffed and rejected at every turn." One skeptical senior
researcher at the Kurchatov Institute dismissed Legasov as "a typical
representative of the scientific mafia whose politicking brought about the
Chernobyl tragedy, thereby injuring the country more than the mafiosi who
dealt in corruption."2 3 On April 26, 1988, the second anniversary of the
accident, the Soviet Academy of Sciences formally rejected by a vote of 129-100
Legasov's plan to rework the principles of industrial safety in the USSR. The
2 0Quoted in Marples, The Social Impact of the Chernobyl Disaster, 259.
2 1Marples, Ukraine Under Perestroika, 24.
2 2Shcherbak, 152-153.
23Ibid., 24.
307
next day, Valerii Legasov committed suicide.
The Soviet press did not report Legasov's death until three weeks later,
but on May 20, 1988, in a sign of the growing openness which Legasov himself
had helped to foster, Pravda posthumously published his Chernobyl memoirs
under the title Moi dolg rasskazat ob etom -- "My duty to tell about this."2 4
The memoirs revealed a great deal about the bungled official response to the
accident and shockingly lax safety standards within the Soviet nuclear
industry. They did not, however, pinpoint the sources of Legasov's own
remarkable about-face on these issues. Had the accident's horrors prompted
Legasov to revise his personal and professional beliefs about the Soviet
nuclear program? Or had they simply created enough political room for him
to express long-concealed doubts about RBMK safety? Had he, at the end of
his life, been overcome by radiation sickness and the burdens of professional
ostracization, or was his suicide an attempt to make a final statement that
might sway the Soviet nuclear establishment from its disastrous course? The
answers died with him.
Legasov ended his life just as the Soviet Union's enforced consensus on
nuclear power was beginning to unravel -- as was the Soviet state itself.
Accurate information about Chernobyl's causes and consequences began to
reach the Soviet public early in 1988, in a wave of newspaper and magazine
articles made possible by the lifting of press restrictions under glasnost
(openness). Opposition to nuclear power surfaced even in remote rural areas
like the Khmelnitsky oblast (district) of Ukraine, where a huge complex of
nuclear reactors was under construction. "Workers, school teachers, and low-
24Valerii Legasov, "Moi dolg rasskazat ob etom," Pravda (May 20, 1988), reprinted in Fantom:
Sbornik Dokumentalt'nykh I Khudozhestvenykh Proizvedenii 0 Tragicheskih Sobytiiahkh
Na Chernobyl'skoi A.E.S. (Moscow: Moldai Gvardiia, 1989) 7-20.
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level bureaucrats... were swept into a frenzy of anti-nuclear activism," writes
Jane Dawson, an American political scientist who visited the region. The
specter of Chernobyl "dragged them out of their long lethargy and into a
determined, angry crusade against those government organs who would
impose nuclear power on their oblast."25
The story was repeated all over the Soviet Union, where nuclear energy
came to be despised as both source and symbol of state-prescribed misery.
Central Committee plans called for a doubling of nuclear power between 1986
and 1991, but during that time not a single new reactor was commissioned
and opponents halted construction on 39. Among a people once cowed into
passivity by Lenin's Red Terror, Stalin's purges, and decades of Party
repression, this kind of resistance was unprecedented. Anti-nuclear activism,
however, would be only the first phase of the upheaval. The Soviet people
were engaged in nothing less than the collective withdrawal of their consent
to be governed.
Valerii Legasov was thus only one among millions whose lives were set
on a new course by the Chernobyl disaster. But his story is unique because it
has since been echoed, at least in its broad contours, by the fate of the Soviet
nuclear industry, by the fall of Soviet Communism, and by the collapse of the
Soviet Union itself. Despite adherence to the Party line in some quarters, the
accident opened to question the entire design and operating philosophy of the
Soviet nuclear program.26 It demonstrated the inherent dangers of the
2 5Jane Irons Dawson, Social Mobilization in Post-Leninist Societies: The Rise and Fall of the
Anti-Nuclear Power Movement in the USSR (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of
Political Science, University of California at Berkeley, 1993) 194-95. Provided courtesy of
the author.
2 6David Marples reports that a minority of Soviet nuclear scientists had had longstanding
doubts about RBMK safety, but that authorities' initial response to the disaster reflected
only the views of staunch proponents of the design. "KGB archives reveal that throughout
the nineteen-seventies, scientists were concerned about station flaws, from the combustible
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RBMK system and the astonishing arrogance with which designers and
operators invited disaster. It exposed a pattern of technological optimism and
complacency about health and environmental hazards that was foolhardy to
the point of absurdity. And it showed that the Party bureaucracy in Moscow
was more concerned with controlling information about the disaster than
with mitigating its consequences. Moreover, the accident occurred at a crucial
moment in the evolution of Soviet society, when perestroika was as yet little
more than a proposal but pressure for political independence in the republics
was growing rapidly. It thus provided both environmentalist democrats and
conservative nationalists with a powerful lever for change.
The dissolution of the USSR shortly after the abortive coup of August,
1991, was a kind of consensual state suicide in which the various republics
agreed to sever the ties, especially those of Soviet Communism, which had
bound them for so long. This moment might not have come with such
swiftness and finality if not for the Chernobyl disaster's political
repercussions in Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Russia, and other republics.
Just as it drove Valerii Legasov to end his own life, I intend to show, the
Chernobyl disaster helped hasten the demise of the Soviet Union as a nation
and as an idea. It was Lenin's famous formula that "communism equals
Soviet power plus electrification of the entire country," but today it seems
that communism plus nuclear-generated electric power equaled Soviet
disintegration.
bitumen on its roof to serious faults with the control rods...the RBMK was known to be
unstable when operated at low power...[but] in fact, the Soviet authorities were proud of the
reactor...The accident had been 'contained,' went the party line...The government had acted
promptly and efficiently in dealing with the evacuation, decontamination, and sealing the
fourth reactor." Marples, "Chernobyl's Lengthening Shadow," Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists (Sep., 1993) 38-43.
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This chapter will document aspects of the Soviet nuclear program, of the
disaster itself, and of reform movements in Ukraine and elsewhere that
combined to make Chernobyl such an important vehicle for change. My
assertions here may be more controversial than those of the previous
chapters; while many writers have recognized that the Chernobyl disaster
helped transform the political landscape of the Soviet Union, few have
argued that the catastrophe was central to the collapse of the Communist
regime. It is my contention that Chernobyl changed Soviet citizens' ideas
about the competence and credibility of the Soviet state in ways that
guaranteed the acceleration of the Gorbachev's early reforms -- reforms that
eventually destroyed the USSR and dwarfed the democratizing changes
emerging from Three Mile Island or Bhopal.
This is by no means to claim that the people of the former Soviet
republics would be worse off today if the explosion at Chernobyl had never
occurred. The accident spread radiation and sickness across a vast area;
millions of acres remain too radioactive to farm, and the death toll, already in
the thousands, will grow by thousands more as fallout-induced cancers
appear over the coming years and decades. Moreover, the Communist Party
would doubtless have lost power eventually, and whether one more year or
ten had intervened before the final convulsion, the future of democracy in
Russia and the former republics would remain uncertain, beclouded by
persistent economic chaos and the danger of takeover from the far right. But
the Chernobyl disaster did happen, and eight years later it is possible to say
that no single unplanned event was more destabilizing for the old regime or
created a greater opportunity for citizen involvement in technological and
political affairs. That is the story I want to tell here: the one Valerii Legasov
started but did not live to finish.
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Technological Gigantism
The notion that nuclear power plants are inherently hazardous facilities
whose siting and planning should be subject to local review gained
widespread currency in the Soviet Union only after the accident at Chemrnobyl.
Before the disaster, only a tiny group of urban writers and intellectuals had
dared to express opposition to the Soviet nuclear program. 27 The equivalent
was not quite as true in the United States, where anti-nuclear groups boasted
a sizable following even before Three Mile Island; nonetheless, many people
considered these groups part of the "radical fringe" until TMI, when the bulk
of the public turned against nuclear power.) The ideology guiding the Soviet
government's development of nuclear power precluded both a realistic
estimate of the technology's dangers and any possibility of citizen
involvement in preventing or mitigating them. That the old regime would
fall victim to reform pressures stemming in part from the nuclear disaster
was a kind of justice, for the RBMK was the product of a nuclear program that
owed both its form and its flaws to Soviet politics.
From the beginning of the Soviet state, its leaders distinguished
themselves by their commitment to what has been called "technological
gigantism." 2 8 The key to achieving a strong communist society, Lenin
believed, lay in rationalized mass-production processes. He was fascinated by
2 7 Jane Dawson writes, based on her 1990 interview with environmental leader Yurii
Shcherbak, that "opposition to nuclear power simply did not exist among the general
population prior to Chernobyl." See Dawson, Social Mobilization in Post-Leninist Societies,
163.
28See Paul Josephson, "The Historical Roots of the Chernobyl Disaster," Soviet Union/Union
Sovietique (Vol. 13, No. 3, 1986) 275-299; Loren Graham, The Ghost of the Executed Engineer:
Technology and the Fall of the Soviet Union (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1993); Nikolai Nikolaevich Vorontsov, "Nature Protection and Government in the USSR,"
Journal of the History of Biology (Fall, 1992) 369-384, esp. 378-83.
312
Furdism, the standardized assembly-line methods that had made Henry
Ford's Detroit auto plants so efficient, and by Taylorism, the "scientific
management" of the labor process developed at the turn of the century by
American Frederick W. Taylor. Science and technology, Lenin hoped, would
guarantee the success of the Bolshevik Revolution by harnessing the Soviet
Union's vast manpower and natural wealth for continuous economic growth
and social progress.2 9
But the large construction projects of early Soviet history were neither
rational nor efficient; instead they belied a commitment to grandiosity for its
own sake. Dneprostroi, a huge hydroelectric dam built on the Dnieper River
during the First Five-Year Plan, displaced thousands of farmers from its flood
plain and was too far from centers of electrical demand to transmit power
efficiently, but Stalin and other leaders "wanted the largest power plant ever
built in order to impress the world and the Soviet population with their
success and that of the coming Communist social order," according to Loren
Graham, a historian of Soviet science and technology.3 0 Thousands of
enslaved peasant laborers died building Magnitogorsk, a steel manufacturing
complex begun in 1929 as the Soviet answer to U.S. Steel's massive mills in
Gary, Indiana, but within forty years the depletion of nearby ore deposits
turned the plant and the surrounding city into an economic disaster area.
The construction of Belomer, the canal that fulfilled the dreams of Peter the
Great by linking the Baltic and White Seas, was an equally monstrous waste
of lives and resources. Prison laborers "completed" the canal in 1933, but it
was ozen half the year, often dry the other half, and too shallow for
oceangoing vessels. Its locks and embankments had been cobbled together
2 9 Josephson, 289-293.
3 0 Graham, The Ghost of the Executed Engineer, 52.
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from wood and rocks, and the entire canal had to be rebuilt after the Second
World War.31
Unfortunately, Soviet planners learned little from these mistakes. In its
early decades the Soviet Union was swept up in a single-minded campaign to
subdue Nature for the glorification of the state. Popular mottoes like "to
destroy means to create" and "the smoke of factories and plants is the breath
of the Soviet republic" summed up this malignant strain of technological
enthusiasm. Belomor, Dneprostroi, and Magnitogorsk were all products of
the government's "great transformation of nature in the interest of socialist
construction." 3 2 As former Minister of the Environment of the USSR
Nikolai Vorontsov has written, "The entire ideology of the five-year plans
was based on the idea that the country must leap forward at any price, linked
with the necessity of immediate militarization to defend the world's lone
outpost of socialism, threatened by 'capitalist encirclement.' It was assumed
that natural resources were for all practical purposes infinitely available to
meet the needs of the country's industrialization...The syndrome of being a
Great Power and having limitless natural resources intensified a ruthless
attitude toward nature."33 Social movements for nature preservation in the
Soviet Union were ignored or ridiculed. ("From whom are we protecting
nature, from Soviet man?" asked Lysenkoist philosopher I. I. Prezent.34 ) In
suppressing criticism of gigantic state projects, Soviet economic planners
denied themselves an important mechanism of social control over
3 1 Ibid., 60-65.
32Vorontsov, "Nature Protection and Government in the USSR," 380.
3 3 Ibid., 375, 378; see also F. R. Shtil'mark, "The Evolution of Concepts about the Preservation of
Nature in Soviet Literature," 429-47, esp. 435; Anton Yu. Struchkov, "Nature Protection as
Moral Duty: The Ethical Trend in the Russian Conservation Movement," 413-28, esp. 426; both
in Journal of the History of Biology (Fall, 1992).
34 Quoted in Vorontsov, "Nature Protection and Government in the USSR," 383.
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technology: professional and public review of organizational failures.
Atomic power became the Soviets' next arena for nationalistic
technological enterprise. The earliest nuclear reactors in both East and West
produced plutonium, an ingredient in nuclear w apons. But while the
United States entered the nuclear arms race with a four-year lead, Soviet
scientists were the first to adapt a reactor for electric power generation. The
experimental Obninsk Atomic Energy Station near Moscow, built under the
direction of Igor Kurchatov, the father of the Soviet atomic bomb, yielded its
first kilowatt on June 27, 1954, three years before the American prototype
light-water reactor at Shippingport. Kurchatov chose the Obninsk reactor's
graphite-moderated, water-cooled design -- predecessor to the RBMK --
because it produced more plutonium than other models. Kurchatov's
engineers also developed more advanced designs, including a fast breeder
reactor and a pressurized-water reactor for use on ships and submarines, but
when work on commercial nuclear plants began in 1958 the Obninsk
technology prevailed. "It was not because of economic efficiency, safety, or
institutional support that the RBMK was later given priority," writes Russian
biologist and nuclear power analyst Zhores Medvedev. "It was simply easier
for Soviet industry to construct its less sophisticated design...[and] it was the
only entirely Soviet system. Other designs would have entailed copying or
imitating Western models."35
Design changes implemented between 1958 and 1964, when construction
began on the first 1000-megawatt RBMK outside Leningrad, added to reactor
efficiency at the expense of safety. Like Western pressurized water reactors,
the Obninsk reactor featured two separate cooling systems: one to carry heat
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3 5Z. Medvedev, 227-230.
from the core to a heat exchanger, the other to carry steam to the turbines.
The RBMK, however, saved energy by transferring ths heat directly inside the
core pressure tubes rather than in a separate steam generator vessel, as in
LWRs. As a result the water in the secondary system became radioactive,
carrying some 4,000 curies daily to evaporators outside the plant.36 At low
power, the presence of steam inside the reactor also gave rise to a dangerous
instability known as the "positive reactivity coefficient" (of which more later).
And while Soviet industry lacked the technology to manufacture large steel
pressure vessels to enclose the reactor core as in Western LWRs, plant
designers had no such excuse for omitting another important safeguard
against the escape of radioactivity: a strong external containment structure. In
the worst possible accident, it was assumed, only a single pressure tube out of
hundreds would rupture. Admonished by government nuclear proponents
to demonstrate nuclear power's economic competitiveness, engineers at
Moscow's Kurchatov Institute justified each design compromise as a cost-
cutting measure. 37
But gigantomania -- the tendency to plow ahead with massive
engineering projects, minus any understanding of their long-term human
and environmental costs -- was also at work in Soviet decisionmaking about
reactor safety. Soviet ideology framed technology as the highest form of
culture. Large, expensive, highly centralized technologies like nuclear power
were seen as the fullest expression of that form. Faith in technology's power
fostered an official disregard for its dangers. "The Soviets have had a certain
technological hubris. They simply believed it was possible to design things so
well that they idn't have to worry about risk." remarked Robert H.
3 6See note 5 for the definition of curies.
3 7 Ibid., 230-240.
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Randolph, a student of Soviet science at the National Council for Soviet and
Eastern European Research, in a New York Times article shortly after the
Chernobyl disaster. (The article went on to note that "the same kind of
optimism...pervaded the nuclear industry here before Three Mile Island, the
chemical industry before the Bhopal disaster and the space establishment
before the Challenger.")38
As nuclear power grew into an icon of the Soviet Union's glorious
industrial future, the reality of radiation hazards was never mentioned.
Writing in a popular Soviet magazine in 1980, Academician M.A. Styrikovich
repeated the standard enthusiasms: "Nuclear power stations are like stars
that shine all day long! We shall sow them all over the land. They are
perfectly safe!"39 In 1984 A. M. Petrosyants, president of the State Committee
for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, celebrated nuclear energy as one of "the
greatest achievements of mankind" and declared that abandoning it would be
impossible. 40 Over the three decades preceding the disaster, observed Russian
nuclear engineer and Chernobyl investigator Grigori Medvedev, "the
ordinary citizen was made to believe that the peaceful atom was virtually a
panacea and the ultimate in genuine safety, ecological cleanliness, and
reliability. "41
Good-humored recklessness suffused the Soviet nuclear energy program
and was the unfortunate source of its growing electricity output throughout
the nineteen-seventies and early nineteen-eighties. By the time of the
Chernobyl disaster, crash construction projects had brought the number of
38Stuart Diamond, "Chernobyl Rouses Bad Memories, New Fears," The New York Times (May
4, 1986) IV:3.
3 9 Quoted by G. Medvedev, 2.
40Quoted in Josephson, 295.
41Grigori Medvedev, The Truth About Chernobyl, Evelyn Rossiter, trans. (New York: Basic
Books, 1990) 2.
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operating reactors in the USSR to 43. Fourteen of these were RBMKs.
Another 70 reactors were in the construction or planning phases. 42 But
aggressive building schedules, an obsession with standardization, poor siting
choices, shoddy workmanship, inadequate operator training, and disregard
for safety had combined to "convert a risky industry into a terrifying one."43
Safety shortcuts demonstrated that planners and engineers treated nuclear
power no differently from the other technologies that validated the Soviet
Union's superpower status: As with the nuclear missiles paraded through
Red Square every May Day, the important thing was not just that the
technology worked, but that it could be displayed.44 The possibility of future
harms -- to human health, to the land, to the economy -- figured nowhere in
the Party's plans to build 8 to 10 new nuclear plants every year between 1980
and 2000. 4 5
Paul Josephson, n American analyst of Soviet technological history,
summarizes the USSR's nuclear program this way: "The long-term historical
experience of the Soviet Union with respect to large-scale technologies; the
fascination with electrification since the founding of the Soviet state; the self-
aggrandizing feeling of national pride and prestige which technologies such
as rockets and reactors bring to the USSR, especially in self-conscious
competition with the West...All of these factors helped create an
environment in which the shortcomings of the Soviet nuclear power
program were ignored."46 The Soviet nuclear establishment admitted its
4 2 Marples, The Social Impact of the Chernobyl Disaster, 3.
4 3 Graham, 92.
4 4 0n the politics of technological display, see Michael Smith, "Selling the Moon," in T.
Jackson Lears and Richard Fox, eds., The Culture of Consumption (New York: Random House,
1986).
4 5 Z. Medvedev, 254.
46Josephson, 289.
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errors only in 1990, a few months before the nation's collapse. Writing in
Soviet Physicist, the official newspaper of the Kurchatov Atomic Energy
Institute, officials commented: "Regarding the RBMK-1000: It's worth
reiterating to the public that a similar reactor type will not be constructed in
our country, that its selection and significant implementation in Lhe national
economy was a mistake."47
Irregular Experiment, Normal Accident
Accounts of the Chernobyl explosion itself -- and dozens have already
been written -- fall into two categories: those emphasizing the numerous
errors and safety violations committed by the plant's operators, and those
stressing instead the equally numerous design flaws by virtue of which the
human errors could culminate in catastrophic failure. The investigators who
place blame primarily on the operators, including the authors of the Soviet
government's first official report on the accident to the International Atomic
Energy Agency, usually interpret this finding as a vindication of the RBMK.
"The problem isn't the design," wrote Anatolii Aleksandrov, a member of
the Soviet Academy of Sciences, in 1990. "If you're driving a car and turn the
wheel in the wrong direction and have an accident, do you say that the
engine is at fault? Or its designer? No. Everyone will say that it was the fault
of the driver."48
Conversely, those who see the accident primarily as an "unanswerable
indictment" of the RBMK design tend to let the operators off the hook,
portraying them as the victims of a criminally neglectful nuclear
4 7Soviet Physicist (Jan. 20, 1990), quoted in Alexander Sich, The Chornobyl Accident
Revisited, 137.
4 8Quoted in Vladimir Chernousenko, Chernobyl: Insight from the Inside (New York: Springer-
Verlag, 1991) 71.
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bureaucracy. 49 Vladimir Chernousenko, a senior member of the scientific
team dispatched to the accident site by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences,
continues the automotive analogy. "To design a reactor with an accident
prevention system [like Chernobyl's] is equivalent to designing cars in which,
in a moment of need (for example, on a steep descent) the brake pedal
becomes an accelerator," Chernousenko writes. "Worse still is to keep quiet
about this strange, or rather terrifying characteristic of the brake pedal and
then -- after a crash in which the wretched motorist attempted to stop his car
using this 'reliable' brake pedal -- to accuse him of not understanding the
braking system properly and of being reckless."50
In fact, neither viewpoint is adequate. The worst technological disasters,
as we have seen again and again, are the combined result of human error,
control mechanisms that fail to account for operator frailty, and plant designs
that incorporate high energy reserves and overly complex safety systems. At
Three Mile Island, the operators had both too little and too much
information at hand to make correct decisions about the reactor coolant level;
moreover, engineers had attempted to buttress the fundamental design flaws
of light-water reactors with layers of emergency systems that were themselves
failure-prone. At Bhopal, water could only enter the methyl isocyanate
storage tank through a combination of operator errors, carelessly designed
plumbing, and poor maintenance -- conditions attributable to Union
Carbide's absent-minded governance of the plant. The Chernobyl accident
was just as much a result of technological imprudence as were the TMI and
Bhopal disasters, but as in each of these preceding cases, it took a string of
49 Viktor Haynes and Marko Bojcun, The Chernobyl Disaster: The True Story of a Catastrophe
-- An Unanswerable Indictment of Nuclear Power (London: The Hogarth Press, 1988).
50Chernousenko, 76.
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Figure 5.1: Sectional View of Chernobyl No. 4 RMBK-1000 Reactor
(Source: Alexander R. Sich, The Chornobyl Accident Revisited, 193.)
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operator missteps to call forth the hidden pathologies in the system. "The
death sentence was implicit...in the very design of the RBMK reactor," writes
Grigori Medvedev. "All that was needed was a certain confluence of
circumstances making the blast possible. And those circumstances did come
together."51
Ironically, the "irregular experiment" that led to the explosion of the
Chernobyl No. 4 reactor was part of a series of tests intended to reduce the
likelihood of a major accident. Soviet nuclear engineers knew that their
RBMK reactors, as safe as they supposedly were, suffered from a pesky
vulnerability: a gap of 60 to 75 seconds between the failure of a plant's
internal electrical system, which powered vital coolant pumps and control
rods, and the availability of full power from backup diesel generators. This
would be more than enough time for the reactor core -- a huge stack of 2,488
graphite bricks perforated by 1,661 narrow channels for fuel and cooling water
-- to overheat and lose coolant. (See Figure 5.1.) The problem was
compounded by the fact that RBMKs feature a design peculiarity known as
"positive reactivity coefficient": a tendency for the fission reaction to speed
up uncontrollably when too much of the liquid water in the coolant system
flashes to steam, rather than slow down as in Western light-water reactors.
To bridge the 75-second power gap and prevent such an occurrence,
Chernobyl's operators wanted to see whether a new magnetic field regulator
installed inside one of the plant's main turbogenerators would allow the
extraction of emergency power from the turbines as they spun down after the
cut-off of steam from the reactor.52
Similar tests had been conducted previously at Chernobyl and many
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5 1G. Medvedev, 56.
5 2Z. Medvedev, 8-19.
other nuclear plants, but with one major difference. Safety rules dictated that
the emergency core cooling system be ready for activation before such a test
could begin. Chernobyl plant director Viktor P. Brukhyanov and chief
engineer Nikolai M. Fomin worried, however, that it would be more difficult
to repeat the test later if at the moment of switchover from external to
internal electrical supply sensors inside the core detected the drop in coolant
flow and triggered emergency flooding. They had submitted a proposal to
conduct the test with the emergency system turned off to the USSR State
Committee on Operational Safety in the Nuclear Power Industry, but no reply
had yet been received. On April 25, 1986, with the No. 4 reactor scheduled for
shutdown and refueling, Fomin directed that the test go forward anyway.
Between 1:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. that day, operators reduced the reactor to
50 percent power. The process was slow because xenon, a neutron-capturing
gas which accumulates inside the fuel channels whenever the fission reaction
is not held steady, had to be given time to decay and dissipate. At 2:00 p.m.,
ready to begin the experiment, operators switched off the emergency cooling
system. 53 A load dispatcher in Kiev then directed that the reactor continue to
feed the national electrical grid, delaying the experiment until 11:00 that
evening. (Chernobyl's four reactors together supplied 1.3 percent of the
Soviet Union's total electricity, and a vital 45 percent of Ukraine's total
nuclear-generated power).54 The emergency system remained disabled
throughout this time. At 11:10 p.m., operators received permission to
continue reducing power. The test of the magnetic field regulator was to
begin with the generator spinning at an output of between 700 and 1000
5 3 The Truth About Chernobyl, 32-36.
54 David Marples, The Social Impact of the Chernobyl Disaster (London: MacMillan Academic
and Professional Ltd., 1988) 90, 107.
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thermal megawatts, or about 30 percent of the reactor's maximum.55
At this point, however, confusion beset the reactor's control room. A
new, less-experienced shift of operators came on duty at midnight, led by
supervisor Anatoly S. Dyatlov, a deputy chief engineer who had been called
"slow-witted, quarrelsome, and difficult" by superiors. 56 The special team of
electrical engineers who had been waiting ten hours for permission to begin
the test was nearing exhaustion. At some point during the change in shifts,
the operators forgot to activate an automatic control system designed to
prevent the reactor from dropping below 700 thermal megawatts output; at
lower power levels, the fission reaction in an RBMK had proved extremely
difficult to control. When the power reduction resumed, therefore, the
reactor's control rods moved too far into the core, soaking up neutrons and
causing output to plummet to a mere 30 megawatts. Xenon levels inside the
fuel channels shot upward correspondingly, and all of the steam in the
coolant tubes condensed to liquid water, further poisoning the reaction.
Conditions for the test had clearly been ruined. The experiment would have
to be put off until the next time the reactor was being powered down for
refueling, perhaps in another year.5 7
But Dyatlov thought he saw a way out. Although he had just begun his
shift and was not in charge of the experiment, one analyst has suggested that
55For every 3 megawatts of thermal power (MWt) an RBMK reactor produces 1 megawatt of
electric power (MWe). Z. Medvedev, 232.
56The Truth About Chernobyi, 52.
57My account of the prelude to the explosion in this and the following three paragraphs relies
on the following sources: G.Medvedev, The Truth About Chernobyl, 46-57; Z. Medvedev, The
Legacy of Chernobyl, 24-33; Viktor Haynes & Marko Bojcun, The Chernobyl Disaster, 6-10;
Victor G. Snell, "The Cause of the Chernobyl Accident," introduction to David Marples, The
Social Impact of the Chernobyl Disaster, 1-24; John F. Ahearne, "Nuclear Power After
Chernobyl," Science (8 May, 1987) 673-79; Stuart Diamond, "Moscow Reports A-Plant
Workers Ignored Warnings," The New York Times (Aug. 16, 1986) Al, A4.
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he considered completing the test "a matter of honor."58 Another speculates
that he was caught up in the workplace practice known as shturm, the
periodic and frantic attempts to meet work quotas before national holidays.59
If most of the control rods were removed from the reactor, Dyatlov reasoned,
power might be restored and the test continued. His subordinates balked at
the idea. Regulations required that at least 30 rods remain inserted at all
times, and the reactor was already down to 28. In any case, a power increase
was prohibited for at least one day after such a precipitous fall to allow time
for the extra xenon to decay. But Dyatlov, now shouting and swearing,
ordered the senior operator on duty, 26-year-old Leonid Toptunov, to remove
most of the remaining control rods anyway. Toptunov remembered
thinking, "I might cause a power surge, but if I don't do what I'm told, I'll be
fired." (He died of radiation burns soon after this initial statement.)60
RBMKs very rarely have to be shut down. In normal operation,
individual channels are refueled while the reactor is still running. This fact
may have lulled Dyatlov, Toptunov and the other operators into the belief
that it was safe to disengage more safety mechanisms. According to Alfred
Schneider, a professor of nuclear engineering at Georgia Institute of
Technology, "There may well have been a false sense of friendship [with the
reactor]...because you almost continually work around it when it is running.
With that kind of mindset, you are more likely to shut off automatic controls
5 8 Valerii Legasov, quoted in Z. Medvedev, The Legacy of Chernobyl, 29.
59 Alexander Sich writes, "The importance of the [May 1st Socialist Labor Day] period for
meeting production quotas cannot be overemphasized...The operators were anxious to
complete the experiment because they wouldn't have another chance to conduct a similar
experiment for over a year (another RBMK station might be ordered to do it instead), and
they would lose their holiday bonus for completing the experiment." The Chornobyl Accident
Revisited, 227.
6 0 G. Medvedev, The Truth About Chernobyl, 55.
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because you think you know the plant so well."6 1
By 1:00 a.m., April 26, Toptunov had coaxed the reactor back up to an
output of 200 thermal megawatts. Hoping to increase steam pressure inside
the reactor and push the power further upward, he switched on two
additional coolant pumps, but the extra water flowing into the core only
lowered the reactor temperature. More control rods came out to compensate.
With steam volume now falling toward levels that would have triggered an
automatic reactor shutdown, Toptunov disengaged the emergency sensors
inside the steam drums. As Canadian nuclear scientist Victor Snell would
later write, all of this was "rather like driving a car with the accelerator
floored and the brakes on-- it was abnormal and unstable."62
At 1:21 a.m, the operators choked off the reactor's water supply in a final
attempt to force the temperature back up. A few control rods fell into the core
automatically, but even so there were now only six to eight rods in place. At
1:23 a.m., while the control room computer disgorged printouts calling for an
immediate shutdown, the reactor momentarily stabilized at 12 percent of
maximum power. Although the turbogenerator test would be useless at this
low power level, Dyatlov ordered that steam flow to the turbines be cut off.
But first, hoping for a chance to repeat the experiment if necessary, he told
Toptunov to disable another emergency mechanism, one which would have
detected the disconnection of the furbine and shut down the reactor. It was
61Stuart Diamond, "U.S. Experts Say Chernobyl's Design Made Workers' Risk-Taking Worse,"
The New York Times (Aug. 18,1986) A6.
6 2 Snell, in Marples, Social Impact, 15. Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, has offered a similar comment: "Operating the RBMK reactors in the ex-
Soviet Union is like driving a 1928 Ford.. safe only with very special handling." Ariane
Sains, "Blix: RBMKs Can't Meet Safety Norms, But Nuclear is Necessary," Nucleonics Week
(Sep. 24, 1992) 14. That the comparison between cars and nuclear power plants is so often
made underscores the human need to frame complex hazards in terms of familiar ones, and
may also indicate the extent to which the automobile has become the dominant technological
icon of our time.
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the reactor crew's sixth and final mistake.6 3
Electricity from the gradually slowing turbine was now feeding four of
the reactor's eight main pumps. As the power dwindled, so did the volume
of water flowing through the reactor. Moving more slowly over the hot fuel,
the water began to turn to steam. Now the positive reactivity coefficient came
into play: a decrease in the amount of liquid water inside the reactor meant
that fewer neutrons were being captured in their post-fission flights. They
barrelled instead through the graphite blocks, where they were sufficiently
slowed to cause more fissions in the fuel rods. This in turn released heat that
boiled more water. In a single second this self-reinforcing cycle pushed the
reactor from 200 to an incredible 32,000 thermal megawatts, 100 times full
power. The "brakes" had been unalterably released.64
At 1:23:40 Toptunov noticed the precipitous power buildup and pushed
an emergency button to lower all the control rods, but two final design flaws
now sealed the reactor's fate. In RBMKs it took 15 to 24 seconds for the
control rods to drop all the way into the core, an eternity compared to the pace
at which energy was gathering inside the reactor. And while the rods
themselves were constructed of a neutron-absorbant material, their tips -- the
first part to enter the reactor -- were made of graphite, which only slows
neutrons to fission-ready speed. During the first few seconds of control rod
insertion, then, the effect was actually to increase the reactor's power rather
6 3 The six major errors were as follows: 1) Disabling the emergency core cooling system, 2)
neglecting to activate automatic controls to prevent power from dipping below 700 thermal
megawatts, 3) removing more control rods to counteract for the subsequent power loss, 4)
disengaging the steam drums' pressure-sensitive emergency shutdown system, 5) interrupting
coolant flow through the core, and 6) disengaging the turbogenerator's emergency shutdown
system. Investigators have called this series of missteps "incredible" and "unforeseeable,"
but each decision was seemingly dictated by the logic of the moment.
64This phenomenon cannot occur inside a Western-style reactor, where circulating water acts as
both moderator and coolant and the fission reaction ceases if coolant is lost.
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than to decrease it. Within four seconds the reactor's output jumped from
100 to 470 times maximum, at which point the control rods overheated and
turned to powder. The fuel channels ruptured and caused rapid boiling of the
coolant water, cracking the pressure tubes. A massive steam explosion
ensued. The flimsy containment structure around the graphite pile burst,
and the 1,000-ton concrete shield atop the reactor flew into the air like a tossed
coin. Much of the reactor building was destroyed in the explosion. Burning
fragments of uranium fuel and graphite soared skyward, landing in a three-
kilometer radius around the plant and starting more than two dozen fires.
Radioactive fuel decay products like iodine-131, cesium-137, zirconium-95
and ruthenium-103 began pouring into the atmosphere.
It was not history's worst nuclear accident -- the USSR had already
attained that distinction when a waste tank exploded at a nuclear weapons
factory at Kyshtym in the Ural Mountains in 1957, spreading long-lived
radionuclides over 2,000 square kilometers6 5 -- but it was one whose pan-
Soviet and even international dimensions would be impossible to hide.
According to Soviet nuclear industry economist Yuri Koryakin, the costs
from lost electricity production and contaminated farmland alone would
reach 170 billion to 215 billion rubles by the year 2000, equivalent to between
$283 billion and $358 billion at 1990 exchange rates. (Koryakin's work
suggested that the Soviet Union would have been better off if it had never
built nuclear power plants, since the net savings from their use over more
costly coal-burning plants from 1954 to 1990 was only 10 to 50 billion
rubles.) 66 With the Soviet economy already in a tailspin, these crushing costs
6 5Z. Medvedev, The Legacy of Chernobyl, 279-86.
66Richard L. Hudson, "Cost of Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster Soars in New Study; 1986 Reactor
Accident Dwarfs Other Soviet Peacetime Catastrophes," The Wall Street Journal (March 29,
1990) A8.
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would quicken the depletion of government coffers. And the Chernobyl
operators' foolish mistakes, set within the context of a deeply flawed
technological system and an irresponsible nuclear bureaucracy, would soon
come to symbolize the cultural and political depletion of the Soviet state
itself.
An Assault on Health and Nature
The explosion's immediate aftermath and the frantic attempts to snuff
out the reactor's "crimson incandescence" have already been described. The
emergency caught the Ukrainian and central Soviet governments
unprepared, and while some 500,000 people were eventually evacuated from
the 30-kilometer-radius "exclusion zone" around the plant and from nearby
cities, including thousands of children who were moved from the Ukrainian
capitol of Kiev, the official response to the accident was initially one of sloth
and denial. The majority of Party and government authorities, David
Marples writes, "acted as though nothing were happening." 6 7 Beyond
government mismanagement of the emergency and of the nuclear industry
itself, however, it was the disaster's threat to human health and the
environment that angered the Soviet public -- especially in the areas of
Ukraine, western Russia, and Byelorussia (now Belarus) where radioactive
fallout was heaviest. "When historians finally conduct an autopsy on the
Soviet Union and Soviet Communism," Sovietologist Murray Feshbach and
journalist Alfred Friendly have written, "they may reach the verdict of death
by ecocide....No other great industrial civilization so systematically and so
6 7 David R. Marples, The Social Impact of the Chernobyl Disaster (London: MacMillan
Academic and Professional Limited, 1988) 29.
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long poisoned its air, water, and people."68 As the most vivid, frightening,
and well-publicized of the USSR's environmental blunders, Chernobyl
provoked a long-overdue public outcry against this ongoing assault on health
and nature, with regime-toppling results.
Questions of blame and ,esponsibility guaranteed that "Chernobylogy,"
the scientific and biomedical study of the disaster, would be a highly
politicized affair from the beginning. Even eight years afterward, the likely
extent of the deaths, injuries, radioactive contamination, and epidemic
disease caused by the disaster remains a matter of intense disagreement.6 9 As
Zhores Medvedev explains, "People who are opposed to nuclear power tend
to make the highest possible estimates [of the damage to health], while those
in favor of it opt for the lowest possible figures."70 Felicity Barringer, Moscow
correspondent for the New York Times when the disaster struck, puts it more
bluntly: "With a thousand different versions of the truth in the newspapers
and official statements, people believe whatever story best fits their fears."71
68Murray Feschbach and Alfred Friendly, Jr., Ecocide in the USSR: Health and Nature Under
Siege (New York: Basic Books, 1992) 1.
69 The dispute entered a new phase in 1994 with the publicity surrounding the data presented in
Alexander R. Sich's MIT nuclear engineering dissertation, The Chornobyl Accident Revisited:
Source Term Analysis and Reconstruction of Events During the Active Phase (Jan., 1994).
(Sich is an ethnic Ukrainian and uses the Ukrainian spelling "Chornobyl" rather than the
Russian spelling "Chernobyl.") The most important new finding in Sich's work is that almost
none of the quenching materials dumped from helicopters during the attempt to douse the
burning reactor actually entered the core area. As a result, Sich asserts, the core materials
that remained inside the reactor after the explosion burned uncontrollably for approximately
nine days, releasing four to five times more radionuclides into the atmosphere than
previously claimed by Soviet and Ukrainian nuclear scientists. Sich's dissertation also
presents an extremely detailed account of the accident's progress, bringing together data from
a number of disparate sources (including many I have used here) on the explosion and extent
and location of the radioactive fallout it caused. Sich's work has shed needed light on
several poorly-understood aspects of the disaster, but Sich - who has publicly attacked
Chernobyl scientist Vladimir Chernousenko as a fraud - cannot himself be regarded as a
dispassionate observer of the accident and its consequences. His conclusions must be regarded
with the same caution demanded when approaching all treatments of this highly
politicized event.
7 0Z. Medvedev, The Legacy of Chernobyl, 166.
7 1Felicity Barringer, "Chernobyl: Five Years Later, The Danger Persists," The New York Times
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The true global magnitude of the Chernobyl disaster is probably impossible to
determine. In this as in many other health and environmental
controversies, complete and "objective" data are simply unavailable. But the
data that are available are the only ones that can affect politics, and they are
worth reviewing if for that reason alone.
For the first four years after the tragedy, the official death toll stood at 31.
According to a 1987 Novosti press agency report, two men were killed in the
original explosion, and another 29, mostly firefighters, absorbed between 200
and 1,600 rem per person and died of radiation sickness within months.72 In
1990 the government announced that between 250 and 350 additional deaths
had occurred among the 180,000 "liquidators": workers, mainly young
soldiers, who had been brought in to decontaminate the most heavily
irradiated parts of the reactor building and the surrounding zone. But
scientists and others critical of the government's role in the disaster,
including many who had taken part in the cleanup effort, ridiculed even this
revised estimate. In their book Ecocide in the USSR, Feshbach and Friendly
calculated on the basis of measured radiation levels and the known effects of
such levels on humans that approximately 4,000 liquidators must have died
prematurely by 1991.73 Yurii Shcherbak, a Ukrainian physician who became a
leader of the republic's environmental movement after the disaster, put the
figure at 5,000.74 Ukrainian health officials said in 1992 that between 6,000
Magazine (April 14, 1991) 28-39, 74.
72
"Rem," for rad-equivalant-man, is a weighted measure of ionizing radiation absorbed per
unit mass of human tissue; 100 rem are usually enough to produce clinical signs of radiation
sickness. An individual's exposure to natural background radiation typically amounts to less
than 0.5 rem per year. Marples, The Social Impact, 33-34.
7 3Feshbach and Friendly, 146.
7 4David R. Marples, "Revelations of a Chemrnobyl Insider," Bulletin of tHle Atomic Scientists
(Dec., 1990) 16-21.
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and 8,000 deaths had occurred among the liquidators. 7 5 Vladimir
Chernousenko, the Ukrainian science team member who has spoken widely
against the continued use of RBMKs, stated in 1991 that 7,000 liquidators had
died, and in 1993 he contended that the number had risen to 15,000.76 But
others believe that many of these figures have been exaggerated. Alexander
Sich, who spent 18 months inside the exclusion zone gathering data for his
1994 MIT doctoral dissertation in nuclear engineering, points out that it
would be difficult for the state to conceal thousands of new graves. Sich cites
an assertion by Ilya Likhtaroyov, head of the Department of Dosimetry and
Radiation Hygiene at the Ukrainian Ministry of Health, that the expected
mortality in an average population over the years since the disaster "would
not differ greatly" from the actual number of deaths among the liquidators.77
This argument has been contested, but Sich's main point is that the exact
death toll is irrelevant to the question of the RBMK's safety. "Is not one
victim enough -- let alone the thirty or more already undisputed -- to
7 5 Alexander R. Sich, The Chornobyl Accident Revisited, 128.
76Author's notes from Chernousenko's remarks at the Technology and Culture Seminar,
Building 25, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Oct. 26, 1993.
77 Likhtaroyov's statement is from Mark Hibbs and Ann Maclachlan, "Ukainian Expert Details
Doses and Follow-Up from Chernobyl," Nucleonics Week (May 7, 1992) 6. This assertion does
not appear to coincide, however, with known mortality rates in the Soviet Union during the
nineteen-eighties. Mortality data for the Soviet Union in the years 1986-1989 would lead one
to expect a "background level" of between 1,764 and 1,818 deaths each year among a randomly
selected group of 180,000 people (the size of the population of liquidators), for a total of
between 8,820 and 9,090 deaths in the five years from 1986 to 1991. But normal mortality
rates would naturally be much lower among the younger age groups represented by the
liquidators, who were mostly young military recruits. (See Table A.3 in Feschbach and
Friendly, 273.) Dr. Ira Helfand, an emergency-room physician at Cooley Dickinson Hospital
in Northampton, Massachusetts, and treasurer of Physicians for Social Responsibility, insists
that the death rate among the population aged 18-35 in the former Soviet Union is much
lower than 1 in 100 per year, adding that if 7,000 people have died among the 180,000
liquidators "then clearly some mechanism is at work" to cause this high mortality rate.
(Author's notes from Helfand's remarks at the Technology and Culture Seminar, Building 25,
Massachusetts Institute ot Technology, Oct. 26, 1993.) See also Kenneth Lichtenstein and Ira
Helfand, "Radiation and Health: Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Power," in Eric Chivan,
M.D., et al., eds., Critical Condition: Human Health and the Environment, A Report by
Physicians for Social Responsibility (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993) 93-122.
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condemn a reactor design long known to be deficient?" he asks.78
Estimates of the total amount of radioactive material emitted during the
explosion and subsequent 10-day fire also vary widely. The Chernobyl No. 4
reactor had been running continuously for more than two years before the
explosion, and some three-quarters of the original uranium fuel had decayed
into other radioactive isotopes with longer or shorter half-lives. The total
radioactive inventory of the reactor was near 1,200 MCi. Between 55 and 400
MCi is believed to have escaped -- either way, a vast cloud of radioactive
particles far exceeding the fallout at Hiroshima. 79 According to one study, 36
MCi of iodine-131 entered the atmosphere, sixty percent of the core inventory
of that isotope, along with 1.3 MCi o long-lived cesium-134 and 2.4 MCi of
cesium-137.80 Sich found that some 48.1 MCi of cesium-136, with a half-life of
13 days, were also released.8 1 At least 20 MCi of fallout landed in the 30-
kilometer zone around the reactor. According to Soviet data, a total of about
240 MCi of long-lived isotopes like cesium-137, strontium-90, and plutonium-
241 were scattered across the Soviet Union, and an undetermined amount--
perhaps equally large -- drifted elsewhere around the globe.82 Changing
winds carried fallout over Scandinavia, Great Britain, and central and
78 Alexander R. Sich, The Chornobyl Accident Revisited, 44.
79 Z. Medvedev, 74; Haynes and Bojcun, 20-21; Barringer, "Chernobyl: Five Years Later, The
Danger Persists," 28. Sich estimates that at least 200 Mci of radionuclides were released, four
times the Soviets' initial estimate in their Vienna report; in terms of mass, this would be 200
times the fallout from the atomic explosion at Hiroshima. Sich, The Chornobyl Accident
Revisited, 392, 417.
80 p. H. Gudiksen, et al., "Chemobyl Source Term Atmospheric Dispersion and Dose
Estimation," Health Physics (Nov., 1989) 704; cited in Allan S. Krass, "Consequences of the
Chernobyl Accident," Institute for Resource and Security Studies Working Paper No. 5
(Cambridge, Mass., Dec. 1991) 5; see Table 2. Sich's data on these radioisotopes are similar;
he estimates the release of iodine-131 at 31.1 MCi, of cesium-134 at 1.3 Mci, of cesium-137 at 2
Mci. The Chornobyl Accident Revisited, 394.
81 Ibid.
8 2Calculated using data from the 1986 Soviet INSAG-1 report to the IAEA. Only elements with
a half-life over 500 days are included. See Table 3.1 in Z. Medvedev, 78.
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southern Europe, and eventually even to Japan and North America.8 3
Exactly where the radionuclides fell to earth, and in what concentrations,
is fairly well understood. In the Soviet republics some 25,000 square
kilometers of land, home to 824,000 people, were contaminated with at least 5
Ci per square kilometer. Areas where millions more resided, including parts
of Poland, Austria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Germany, Switzerland, Finland,
Sweden, and Norway, received between 0.27 and 2.7 Ci per square
kilometer. 84 But scientists' inability to translate these figures into reliable
estimates of individual radiation doses gives broad license to interpreters of
the fallout's ultimate effects on health. The International Atomic Energy
Commission puts the lifetime dose for the 824,000 residents of the worst-
contaminated areas at 8 to 16 rem, while the Soviet government's projections
are two to three times as high. Estimates of the population dose for the entire
Northern Hemisphere also vary by a factor of two: a United Nations study
says the equivalent of 6 million people will receive a lifetime dose of 10 rem,
while the U.S. Department of Energy says 12 million people will receive this
dose.8 5
Over decades, these exposures will add a large number of cancer deaths
to the toll already incurred from radiation sickness, but just how large is
highly disputed. By 1990, the incidence of thyroid cancer in the worst-affected
areas of Ukraine, Belarus, and western Russia had already jumped to 5-10
8 3 Lynnr R. Anspaugh, et al., "The Global Impact of the Chernobyl Reactor Accident," Science
(Dec. 16,1988) 1513-1519.
84These figures are from the International Atomic Energy Agency, The International Chernobyl
Project: An Overview (Vienna, IAEA, 1991) 55; quoted in Krass, 14.
85This is the same as saying that 60 to 120 million people will receive a lifetime dose of one
rem, or that between 600 million and 1.2 billion will receive a tenth of a rem. Total
population doses are calculated in person-Sieverts, where one Sievert = 100 rem. See Krass,
15.
334
Table 5.1: Predicted Lifetime Cancer Fatalities From Chernobyl
Fallout and Natural Background Radiation86
Excess
Cancer Deaths
(Chemrnobyl)
Expected
Cancer Deaths
(Natural Causes)
Acute
Exposure 4,000
Serious
Exposure
Exclusion
Zone Inhabitants
Cesium Deposition
> 5 Ci/kmtr
Liquidators
Northern
Hemisphere
Natural
Background
Radiation
50,000
135,000
824,000
600,000
3 billion
3 billion
640
2,000
1,200
5,300-
26,400
2,000-
6,000
48,000-
96,000
17,000,000
86Adapted from Table 4 in Krass, p. 21.
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Population
Exposed
Number
Exposed
Percent
Increase
800
10,000
27,000
80%
20%
4.4%
3.2%-
16%
5%
165,000
40,000-
120,000
600,000,000
600,000,000
0.008%-
0.016%
2.8%
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
times the normal rate, and childhood leukemia cases had quadrupled. 8 7 The
environmentalist and anti-nuclear group Greenpeace projects that between
280,000 and 500,000 excess cancer deaths will ultimately occur worldwide as a
result of the catastrophe, while the European Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) contends that the scientific
uncertainties are so great that no projection should be made at all. Between
these extremes are models calling for increased cancer death rates of
anywhere between 0.008 percent (for the entire Northern Hemisphere) and 80
pert nt (for the 4,000 most acutely exposed liquidators). These predictions are
summarized in Table 5.1.
Through careful, long-term epidemiological studies it might be possible
to confirm predictions of extra cancer deaths among the first four groups
listed in the table. Globally, however, Chernobyl-related cancers will be
indistinguishable from those caused by natural background radiation and
other environmental insults. "It will almost certainly never be possible
unambiguously to attribute to Chemrnobyl fallout any particular cancer or
cluster of cancers outside the immediate vicinity of the plant," observes
physicist and policy analyst Allan Krass. He adds, "This makes the question
of assigning liability for compensation and damages highly problematic."88
Lay people attempting to trace their own illnesses to specific industrial
toxins inevitably face this barrier of scientific uncertainty, which government
or industry officials have often used as a convenient rationale for denying
citizens' claims. In Woburn, Massachusetts, for example, state and federal
health officials downplayed the possibility of an association between high
8 7Felicity Barringer, "Four Years Later, Soviets Reveal Wider Scope to Chernobyl Horror,"
The New York Times (April 28, 1990) Al, A4.
8 8 Krass, 22.
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childhood leukemia rates and trichloroethylene contamination of municipal
well-water until townspeople themselves gathered the epidemiological data
to demonstrate such a link.89 The need for citizens to become
"environmental detectives" or "lay epidemiologists" in order to substantiate
their own victimization reflects the fundamental political reality that
technical and scientific expertise is often monopolized by the state or by
private industry; we have already seen how swiftly experts dismissed the
fears of people living near Three Mile Island during the meltdown and the
worries of chemical-plant neighbors after Bhopal. Rarely, however, has the
source of an industrial poison been as obvious and indisputable as at
Chernobyl. Hundreds of people, if not thousands, died within years after the
accident, and millions more learned that their land was no longer safe to
farm, their food no longer safe to eat, their villages no longer safe to live in.
Public fear and anger over the possibility of a repetition of Chernobyl at any of
the USSR's 42 other nuclear reactors gradually coalesced into the most
widespread and effective protest movement in Soviet history.
Soviet Nuclear Power After Chernobyl
One Western scientist joked a year after the disaster that the only nuclear
power program not set back by Chernobyl was the Soviet Union's.90 In the
United States and Western Europe, the catastrophe reinforced existing anti-
nuclear sentiment and sent engineers scrambling to check their plants' design
characteristics against those of the RBMK. Critics quickly pointed out that
five U.S. reactors lacked concrete-and-steel containment domes and that two
8 9 See Phil Brown and Edwin Mikkelsen, No Safe Place: Toxic Waste, Leukemia, and
Community Action (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
9 0As reported by Bill Keller, "Public Mistrust Curbs Soviet Nuclear Power Efforts," The New
York Times (October 13, 1988) Al, A10.
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used graphite to moderate the fission reaction. Massachusetts Representative
Edward Markey said Chernobyl should force "a re-examination of nuclear
power in this country, much like the soul-searching that followed Three Mile
Island." 9 1 The Soviet government, meanwhile, remained outwardly
determined to continue the expansion of nuclear power, an important
element of Mikhail Gorbachev's ambitious economic reform program.
Gorbachev admitted in his first televised address after the disaster that "the
questions of reliability and safety of equipment, the questions of discipline,
order, and organization [now] assume priority importance," but Kremlin
plans still called for a doubling of nuclear power, from 11 percent of the total
Soviet energy output to 22 percent, by 1991.92
Official portrayals of the accident seemed calculated to belittle its
significance for Soviet nuclear policy. A Politburo statement released in July,
1986, announced the formation of a new Ministry of Atomic Power
Engineering to oversee the industry and added that several Chernobyl plant
officials, including Bryukhanov, would be expelled from the Communist
Party. "What was missing from the report," noted New York Times Moscow
correspondent Serge Schmemann, "was any suggestion that the Kremlin's
own insistent demands for rapid expansion of nuclear energy could have
contributed to the accident. The entire responsibility was apportioned among
the power plant's officials and Government ministries, and no blame fell on
party officials or party policy."93 Valerii Legasov's report to the IAEA a
month later attributed the accident to "an extremely improbable combination
91 0ne Hanford, Washington, plant used graphite and lacked containment. Fred Kaplan, "Six
U.S. Facilities Have Similarities to Soviet Plant," The Boston Globe (April 30, 1986) 3.
92Associated Press, "Excerpts from Gorbachev's Speech on Chernobyl Accident," The New York
Times (May 15,1986) A10; Z. Medvedev, 292.
93Serge Schmemann, "Chernobyl Answers: New Questions," The New York Times (July 21,
1986)A3.
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of procedure violations" and faulted RBMK designers only for failing to
foresee the "impossible."9 4
This outward optimism masked a certain amount of alarm among Party
and industry officials. After the explosion all of the Soviet Union's RBMKs
were shut down temporarily for safety checks. By implementing a series of
organizational changes and technical fixes at existing plants, including a
mechanism for quicker insertion of the control rods, nuclear engineers and
bureaucrats hoped to ensure -- at least on paper -- that an accident like the one
at Chernobyl could not happen again. Debate within the scientific
community over the risks of nuclear power, especially after Legasov's suicide,
had begun to foster a new level of realism about reactor safety. But none of
these changes proceeded fast enough or reached deeply enough to satisfy the
Soviet Union's growing number of critics of nuclear power. "What we have
is an ideally functioning system of collective irresponsibility," one Russian
writer commented in 1990. Safety, he asserted, could only can be restored
through "a fundamental reform of our socioeconomic and political life."9 5
Reform started slowly. Aside from a few timid complaints, including
letters published in Pravda from Chernobyl evacuees who claimed officials
had treated them poorly, public animosity toward the Soviet nuclear
establishment simmered quietly for more than a year after the accident.96
"Many former Soviet citizens describe this first year as a period of shock,
during which they first began to grapple with the notion that the central
94Tass Press Agency, "Excerpts From the Report on Chernobyl and News Conference in Moscow,"
The New York Times (Aug. 22, 1986) A4; Stuart Diamond, "Moscow Now Sees Chernobyl's
Peril Lasting For Years; Big Area Stricken," The New York Times (Aug. 22, 1986) Al, A4.
95Boris Kurkin, "Systems of Nuclear Irresponsibility," Literaturnaya Rossiya (June 8, 1990),
quoted in William C. Potter, 'The effects of Chernobyl on Soviet decision-making for nuclear
safety," Impact of Science on Society (no. 163) 264.
96 United Press International, "Chernobyl Evacuees Complain to Pravda," The New York Times
(Aug. 19,1986) A12.
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government might be neither competent nor as credible as previously
believed," relates Jane Dawson.97 Still wary about the government's true
commitment to glasnost, most critics restricted themselves to oblique
cynicism. "We are being assured that the situation is absolutely normal and
well-nigh better than it was before the accident," one Ukrainian writer
observed on a Moscow television program. "Is there really no room for
improvement? Let's blow up one more unit to make the situation really
splendid!"98
In 1987, however, popular opposition to the Soviet nuclear program
began to come into the open. In August the Kiev newspaper of the Ukrainian
Writers' Union, Literaturna Ukraina, published a groundbreaking critique of
plans to build a new atomic energy station near Chyhyryn, on the
Kremenchuk reservoir southeast of the city. The proposed plant would do
"irreparable harm" to the local envircnment and would threaten the
drinking-water supply of all the cities downstream, the writers asserted. "Is it
possible that the Chernobyl tragedy taught us nothing?" they asked.9 9
Although not yet coordinated into a widespread anti-nuclear movement,
protests were beginning to hinder work at several nuclear construction sites.
A nuclear power and heat-generating facility planned for Kiev was scrapped
in October, 1987, and in November Valerii Legasov told a German magazine
that plants in Odessa and Minsk were also under fire.
In December 1987, during a conference in Kiev entitled "Scientific-
Technical Progress and Morality," physician Yurii Shcherbak and other
97Jane I. Dawson, "Anti-Nuclear Activism in the Former USSR: A Surrogate for Nationalism?"
in Essig and Sachs, eds., Activism and Apathy in the Former USSR (Westview Press,
forthcoming) provided courtesy of the author.
9 8 from Moscow News (July 12, 1987) 11; quoted in Marples, The Social Impact of the Chernobyl
Disaster, 263.
99 quoted in Marples, The Social Impact of the Chernobyl Disaster, 263-67.
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members of the Ukrainian Writers' Union formed an unofficial group called
Zelenyi Svit (Green World) to press for the closure of the Chernobyl plant
and a freeze on all nuclear construction in Ukraine. The group hoped to tie
together the small environmental clubs forming all across Ukraine to oppose
nuclear projects, but with hardliner V. Shcherbitsky still in charge of the
Ukrainian Communist Party, it could take little action as yet. Citizens'
organizations could not legally exist outside the Party structure in Ukraine.
Street activism of all kinds was still forbidden; fifty people were arrested in
Kiev for unfurling anti-nuclear banners on the second anniversary of the
accident. But Zelenyi Svit functioned nonetheless as the center of a growing,
informal network of nuclear opponents.
1988 was the year, notes Dawson, when "anti-nuclear movements
emerged around literally every nuclear station under construction or in
operation in Ukraine" [there were 29].100 Dawson's research took her to the
rural Khmelnitsky oblast, where a large four-reactor complex was being built
in the village of Netishin. In 1987 residents concerned about the Chernobyl
accident had tried to circulate petitions opposing the Netishin plant, but
officials had simply confiscated the petitions as illegal. Now the dissent was
becoming more difficult to stem. Drawing on interviews with local anti-
nuclear activists, Dawson writes that "The key factor in mobilizing
[Khmelnitsky] society against the nuclear power station was the flood of
information that suddenly deluged the population after January of 1988
[when officials lifted the requirement that all articles pertaining to nuclear
power be cleared with military censors]...People who had not even thought
100"These movements might best be compared to the NIMBY movements observed in the West,"
she suggests. Dawson, "Anti-Nuclear Activism in the Former USSR: A Surrogate for
Nationalism?" 20; Sich, The Chornobyl Accident Revisited, 441-42.
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about the new nuclear power station in Netishin and the government's plans
to expand it suddenly learned that the station had experienced major
construction problems, numerous small accidents, and unscheduled
shutdowns of its single completed reactor, and was possibly defectively
constructed...In addition...the residents of Khmelnitsky also began to learn of
the true magnitude of the Chernobyl disaster." 101
In the nearby town of Shepetovka, Dawson relates, local residents
organized a rebuttal to the "educational" sessions being led by nuclear
specialists at area factories and club meetings:
On March 15, 1989, the nuclear specialists found their plans for a quiet educational
session at the Railroad Workers' Club in Shepetovka quite rudely interrupted.
Rather than sitting quietly and accepting the specialists' claims, a handful of local
opponents began asking questions and accusing the specialists of falsifying
information. Soon other local residents began to sit up and interject their own
questions and doubts into the discussion, and within no time the specialists had lost
control of the session. They were shocked by their reception, and eventually called
in the Communist Party First Secretary of the region...to bring the meeting back
under control.102
After the session, residents organized the Committee to Halt Construction
and Close Khmelnitsky Atomic Energy Station and declared themselves a
chapter of Zelenyi Svit. Residents in Netishin and the town of Ostrog
followed suit, and the groups held several public rallies to attract support
among workers' collectives in the area. "The mass meetings held during the
spring of 1989 in Shepetovka and Netishin came as quite a shock to the
residents of this quiet oblast," Dawson observes. "Many people recall these
meeting- as the beginning of the politicization of the region. People who had
never before considered opposing state policy in any way began to recognize
the possibility of participating in this movement and perhaps shaping state
10 1Dawson, Social Mobilization in Post-Leninist Societies: The Rise and Fall of the Anti-
Nuclear Power Movement in the USSR , 193.
10 2 Ibid., 196.
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policy."10 3 Individuals were teaching themselves concepts of political
participation that had always been denied them by Party rule, and they were
organizing in groups to nourish their newfound freedoms. These two simple
yet courageous acts -- repeated in a thousand cities and villages - slowly began
to loosen the Communist state's once-firm commitment to nuclear energy.
The official press in Ukraine and Russia could hardly help
acknowledging nuclear power's increasing travails. In January 1988 the
newspaper Komnsomolskaya Pravda revealed that officials in Krasnodar, near
the Black Sea, had acceded to a flood of letters demanding the abandonment
of a plant there. "Before Chernobyl, to have a nuclear power plant was
profitable - and prestigious," the newspaper said. "But then the entire world
started talking about Chernobyl." Nuclear power planners rightly feared that
Krasnodar would be the first in a "chain reaction" of plant cancellations due
to public opposition.10 4 In April the Communist Party newspaper Pravda
charged Kombinat, the organization responsible for managing the Chernobyl
cleanup, with nepotism, lax discipline, and neglect of safety measures. "The
leadership of Kombinat has not learned a lesson from the past. It is as though
there had been no accident," the newspaper said.105
The newspaper Pravda Ukrainy, in answer to rising public concern,
began printing weekly reports on radiation levels in Kiev and outlying
cities. 106 A few weeks after Legasov hanged himself, Pravda printed his
recrimination-filled memoir. Criticism of nuclear power may have directly
1 0 31bid., 202.
104Bill Keller, "Soviet Scraps a New Atomic Plant In Face of Protest Over Chernobyl," The
New York Times (January 28, 1988) Al, A9.
105Bill Keller, "Chernobyl Plant Being Mismanagaed, Pravda Charges," The New York Times
(April 25,1988) Al, A6.
106Felicity Barringer, "Fear of Chernobyl Radiation Lingers for the People of Kiev," The New
York Times (May 23, 1988) Al, A7.
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conflicted with Gorbachev's economic goals, but glasnost and perestroika
were allowing private complaint to blossom slowly into full-blown public
debate. "While Chernobyl provided the population with an intimate
awareness of the dangers of nuclear power facilities, perestroika provided the
opportunity and resources for independent actors to publicize their concerns
and mobilize the population against the government's program," writes
Dawson.107
Controversy was fiercest at Ignalina, Lithuania. Already home to two
giant 1,500-megawatt RBMKs, Ignalina was slated to be the site of yet a third
reactor. In September 1987 six thousand protestors encircled the plant,
demanding that the third reactor be permanently abandoned and that the
existing two be opened for international inspection. Protest organizers
condemned the construction project as a policy of "genocide" against the
Lithuanian people.0 8 Ignalina plant director Anatoly Khromenko predicted
that the demonstrators would have their way, lamenting that "everything we
do now in nuclear power is affected by Chernobyl." Work at Ignalina was
suspended in August, 1988. By October of that year, five nuclear stations had
been canceled outright and work had been suspended at several more.109
Party organizations in many areas of Ukraine, while rigidly dismissive of
anti-nuclear groups' demands in 1987 and 1988, began to soften their stance in
1989. Shcherbitsky was ousted in September of that year and local anti-
nuclear groups now encountered no official resistance when they circulated
petitions, held mass rallies, or blockaded the gates of nuclear stations.110
107Dawson, "Anti-Nuclear Activism in the Former USSR: A Surrogate for Nationalism?" 2.
10 8 Ibid., 16.
1 0 9 Bill Keller, "Public Mistrust Curbs Soviet Nuclear Power Efforts," The New York Times
(Oct. 13,1988) Al, A10.
11 0Dawson, "Anti-Nuclear Activism in the Former USSR: A Surrogate for Nationalism?" 21-
22.
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Recognizing the extent of the popular discontent generated by the Chernobyl
accident - and perhaps fearful for their own health and safety -- Party officials
began to echo Zelenyi Svit's call for restrictions on nuclear power
construction. In Khmelnitsky, for example, "suddenly, everyone was anti-
nuclear...Party conservatives and progressive members of the political
opposition alike avowed their heartfelt opposition to the overwhelming
nuclear threat in their area."111 In campaigns for the local, city, and oblast
soviets in January and February of 1990, almost every candidate in
Khmelnitsky expressed opposition to the plant, and as soon as the new oblast
soviet met there in April, deputies voted unanimously to halt construction
on the Netishin reactors. The vote "set a precedent that was replicated across
the republic," with local decision-makers demanding the right to determine
whether nuclear power stations would be operated in their areas.112
As local projects foundered and details of Chernobyl's health impact
continued to emerge, Soviet citizens grew bolder and more willing to
question authorities' honesty and expertise -- all the way to the top. During
one of his well-publicized walks among Soviet people, this time on the streets
of Kiev in February, 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev was interrupted by an elderly
woman who demanded to know what the Kremlin planned to do about two
controversial nuclear reactors under construction in the Crimean peninsula.
Gorbachev promised that if a group of American nuclear experts reviewing
the plans concluded the location was unsafe, the project would be converted
into a training facility. 13 Residents of the village of Stare Shame in
11 1Dawson, Social Mobilization in Post-Leninist Societies: Thie Rise and Fall of the Anti-
Nuclear Power Movement in the USSR , 210.
112Ibid., 210-212.
1 13 John F. Burns, "A Rude Dose of Reality for Gorbachev," The New York Times (Feb. 21, 1989)
A3.
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Narodychi, a farming district west of the 30-kilometer exclusion zone around
Chernobyl, wrote an impassioned letter to Literaturna Ukraina stating that
"During the three years that have passed since the Chernobyl catastrophe...
residents have learned to distinguish truth from lies, and began to divide
those concerned with the problems of the raion [district] into 'honest' and
'dishonest."'11l l4 Anti-nuclear protest rallies grew larger and more vocal with
each passing anniversary of the disaster. Twelve thousand people gathered in
a Kiev soccer stadium to mark Cherncbyl's third anniversary. They heard
Ukrainian poet Dmytro Pavlychko declare that "All the lessons of Chernobyl
[have] not yet been learned....Anyone being sent to work at Chernobyl should
go there for one of two reasons: either to dismantle the station, or to assist in
sanitizing the zone." Nuclear power operation, Pavlychko said, "must be
guided by the wisdom of the people. 11l5
Opposition to nuclear power quickly became the organizing principle for
the Soviet Union's burgeoning environmental movement. Perhaps
shortsightedly, Soviet authorities had for many years tolerated
environmentalism as a harmless, non-subversive form of political protest.
The protection of nature had thus become one of the few subjects upon which
writers, intellectuals, and other thinkers could safely express dissident views.
But the Chernobyl disaster energized scattered individuals and groups to
combine forces in a more radical call for political change. In the spring of
1989, Zelenyi Svit chairman Shcherbak, an epidemiologist and novelist who
had been moved by the events at Chernobyl to become an environmental
activist, defeated six other candidates to win a seat in the new Congress of
People's Deputies. While a member of the Congress, Shcherbak spoke against
114Literaturna Ukraina, Junre 22, 1989; quoted in Marples, Ukraine Under Perestroika, 69-71.
115Ibid., 38. Translated by Marples.
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nuclear power, describing Chernobyl as part of a campaign of nuclear warfare
waged by the Ministry of Nuclear Power against the people of the Soviet
Union.1 l 6 Observed Marples, "By its attacks on the bureaucracy and on the
nature of industrial decision-making in Ukraine, and by its unceasing
opposition to nuclear power plants" Shcherbak and Green World had
'adopted a political stance that divorced [them] from contemporary Party
ideology."' 17
As the Party's hold on power weakened, party ideology soon withered.
In 1990 the balance of popular support in several Soviet republics shifted in
favor of the environmental movement. Sixty thousand people attended a
fourth-anniversary Chernobyl rally in Kiev. In a June survey of 96,000
Moscow residents, 54 percent expressed trust in the Green movement as
against only 39 percent who said they trusted the Communist Party, and more
than 70 percent said they were still concerned about radiation dangers from
Chernobyl.1 8 The Green movement had become popular "because the public
could perceive, after Chernobyl, how their land was being systematically
destroyed in the name of economic progress," Marples writes.119
In Ukraine, Green World members parlayed this support into the
creation of a Green Party, whose platform castigated the Soviet nuclear
establishment for its undemocratic, centralized command structure and for
the danger its designs posed to health and the environment. The new party
demanded nuclear energy's prohibition and offered legislation allotting two-
thirds of state energy spending for the development of alternative and
1 1 61bid., 155-156, 166.
117Ibid, 167-68.
1 1 8 Reuters, "Chemrnobyl Rally Attended by Thousands," The New York Times (April 27, 1990)
A6; Survey data reported in Feschbach and Friendly, 237.
119 Marples, Ukraine Under Perestroika, 173.
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renewable sources. 120 As the number of plant cancellations and suspensions
continued to mount, nuclear abolitionism gradually displaced the
government's program of reform and expansion of the nuclear industry.121
At its summer congress in 1990, the Communist Party of Ukraine itself
announced a moratorium on nuclear plant construction 122 In April 1994,
more than three years after the Soviet Union's collapse, the' government of
independent Ukraine finally agreed to shut down the remaining undamaged
reactors at Chernobyl, pending American help in finding alternative energy
sources. 12 3
After a period of inertia in 1986-1987, then, the Soviet people's reaction
to Chernobyl closely mirrored t - U.S. experience after Three Mile Island. In
the five years following the disaster in Ukraine, no new reactors were
commissioned, and work halted on 39.124 Nuclear fission continued to
provide a significant fraction of the USSR's total energy, but atomic power
stations assumed a shadowy, menacing status emblematic of the Soviet
Union's historical despoliation of the natural environment. Henceforth, any
project that threatened human health or environmental quality would
encounter significant public opposition. As Dawson concludes in her study of
protest in the Khmelnitsky district, "mass participation in anti-nuclear rallies
and petition drives (premised on genuine fears about the safety of
neighboring nuclear power stations and the threat they posed to home and
1 2 0 Ibid., 171-72.
121William C. Potter, in "The effects of Chernobyl on Soviet decision-making for nuclear
safety," Impact of Science on Society (no. 163) 257-67, provides an overview of this process.
22Marples, Ukraine Under Perestroika, 220.
123John H. Cushman, Jr., "Ukraine to Close Chernobyl Plant," The New York Times (April 10,
1994) 1, 12; Reuters News Service, "Ukraine Agrees to Seek Other Energy Source, Close
Chernobyl," The Boston Globe (April 10, 1994) 21.
124 vichael Dobbs, "Disaster, Nuclear and Bureaucratic," The Washington Post National
Weekly Edition (May 6-12, 1991) 10-11.
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family) represented a major change in how the population viewed its
relationship to the state."12s Shcherbak confirms this observation in
Chernobyl: A Documentary Story, an account of his three-month research
journey through the Chernobyl region. 1986, Shcherbak writes, was the year
when "we all suddenly matured, grew up by a whole epoch...We became
harder and more exacting toward both ourselves and toward those who take
responsible decisions, those in whose hands human existence and the fate of
nature rest."126
The Fission of the Soviet State
While Chernobyl mobilized lay opponents of nuclear power to pursue
and achieve changes in state technology policy that would have been
unthinkable before the disaster, the broader political consequences of the
catastrophe were even more momentous. The chain reaction leading to the
Soviet breakup started with glasnost and was sustained by Chernobyl and by
the fervor for political independence in the republics. When the Soviet
Union finally disintegrated, it was in a burst of conflicting ideas about the
responsibilities of the state, including its role in creating and managing
hazardous technologies. Just as the radioactive fission products in a nuclear
reactor's spent fuel rods can never be reassembled, nothing will restore the
USSR's constituent states to their former unity -- a conclusion brought about
by the gathering energy of popular outrage over Chernobyl and the other
failures of Soviet Communism.
We have already traced Chernobyl's effects on the Soviet nuclear
125 Dawson, Social Mobilization in Post-Leninist Societies: The Rise and Fall of the Anti-
Nuclear Power Movement in the USSR, 219.
1 2 6 Yurii Shcherbak, Chernobyl: A Documentary Story (London: Macmillan, 1989) 2.
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program up to the present day, but to understand the disaster's full political
impact we must begin again in 1986. In the first days and months after the
explosion, the only political question that occurred to Western political
analysts was whether Gorbachev and his reform programs would survive the
disaster. "The tragedy of Chernobyl has produced a season of internal crisis in
Moscow," wrote Harrison Salisbury, a political correspondent specializing in
Soviet affairs. The accident had struck, he observed, at a time when
Gorbachev was gaining control over the party and state apparatus but was
"not yet firmly in the saddle."12 7 Like Krushchev after the U-2 incident in
1960, Gorbachev might have to abandon elements of his reforms in order to
retain power. Glasnost, Salisbury predicted, would be the first to go. Cold
Warriors in the West, as if they felt perversely vindicated by the new policies'
looming extinction, warranted that only a fallback to their old, authoritarian
ways would get the Soviets through the crisis. "The Soviet Union doesn't do
stunning transformations," the editors of the New York Times smugly
declared. 12 8
The early days of the disaster were indeed a time of official secrecy and
reticence. It was only when radioactive particles from Chernobyl were
discovered on the clothes of workers arriving at the Forsmark nuclear plant
in southern Sweden that the West learned of the nuclear fire and its toxic
cloud. The Soviets' official acknowledgement of the accident, when it came,
1 2 7 Harrison Salisbury, "Gorbachev's Dilemma," The New York Times Magazine (July 27, 1986)
18, 30.
1 28
"From Russia: Faces," The New York Times (Sep. 2, 1986) A18. As the editors of The New
Yorker later observed, "When Gorbachev went on television sixteen days later to
acknowledge the extent of the disaster, he was still viewed with deep suspicion by many in
the West. It would take the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Warsaw Pact, and
revolutions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet republics, to show that his policy of glasnost
was both genuine and irreversible." "Notes and Comment," The New Yorker (May 6, 1991) 31-
32.
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was terse and cryptic; spokesmen seemed mainly concerned to reassure the
world that life inside the Soviet Union was going on as usual. (And in fact,
while the reactor smoldered 150 kilometers to the north, authorities in Kiev
proceeded with a May Day parade and other outdoor celebrations). "When a
crisis struck, the Kremlin reverted to its time-honored pattern of rationing
information," wrote Serge Schmemann. "It was an approach rooted in a
view that information is a tool of the state, and that domestic disasters must
not be allowed to spread alarm or to raise questions about the wisdom or
qualifications of the state. The greater the disaster, in this view, the greater the
need to clamp down strict controls."129
Within days after the disaster, however, the controls had unexpectedly
begun to loosen. On May 6, Pravda published a detailed account of conditions
at Chernobyl, and Boris Shcherbina, head of the government commission to
which Legasov had been assigned, admitted in a Moscow news conference
that authorities had at first "underestimated the scope" of the disaster.130
More details followed. Izvestia remarked on May 9 that "there is no point in
denying" that evacuation efforts in Pripyat and the surrounding area had
been both tardy and inadequate.131 As even Western experts agreed,
Legasov's report to the International Atomic Energy Agency three months
later was candid and exhaustive, at least in its technical details.132 Though
129Serge Schmemann, "The Russia Syndrome: A Reticent Response to a Nuclear Calamity," The
New York Times (May 4, 1986) IV:4.
13 0David Marples, Chernobyl and Nuclear Power in the USSR, 12-15.
13 ilbid., 25. On May 13, Pravda observed that the disaster had "highlighted bottlenecks" in
emergency response plans and that local party leaders had been "psychologically
unprepared" for accident conditions. Marples, 31.
132Alexander Sich, for example, writes that "the Soviets are to be commended for displaying a
great deal of candor at the Vienna meeting in August 1986." He adds that the data in the
report must be treated with caution since much of it was in summary form. It is now known as
well that several pages of the report detailing radioactive fallout in Belarus and Russia
were removed before the Vienna meeting. "I did not lie at Vienna, but I did not tell the whole
truth," Legasov told the Soviet Academy of Sciences two months after the conference. See
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the disaster had occurred "at the worst possible time and in the worst possible
region," and though full disclosure held out potentially grave consequences
for the nuclear industry and for Gorbachev's economic plans, the new Party
leadership foresaw that attempting to deny the truth would lead to even
worse results. 133 "This was the first of many occasions when Gorbachev
would be faced with an unexpected event that challenged his plans," one
Party official later said. "His reaction was -- it turned out-- characteristic. He
took the Chernobyl disaster as a prod to move farther and faster."1 34
Information, formerly considered "too precious to be recklessly handed
about as if it were free," was now considered too volatile to be contained.13 5
While politicians inside and outside the Soviet Union feared that knowledge
of the disaster's severity would undermine the sense of renewed confidence
and energy surrounding Gorbachev's reform agenda, Gorbachev himself may
have seen that the disaster's lessons, once acknowledged, could be put to
constructive ends. "The handling of the disaster underscored a Gorbachev
refrain: that the Soviet bureaucracy is unwieldy and fragmented and
discourages crisp decision-making," observed one political reporter.13 6 If
economic revival depended on the streamlining of government, then public
displeasure over Chernobyl might be exploited as a purifying agent. "You
keep up the pressure," Gorbachev told a Moscow crowd. "We'll press from
the top, and you keep pressing from the bottom. Only in this way can
Sich, The Chornobyl Accident Revisited, 70-71.
13 3Marples, Chernobyl and Nuclear Power in the USSR, 35.
134 Quoted in Feschbach and Friendly, 14.
135Nicholas A. Ulanov, "Soviet Fear of the Knowledge Revolution," The Wall Street Journal
(May 13,1986) 30.
136 Philip Taubman, "A Worst Case Scenario That Isn't a Scenario," The New York Times (May
11, 1986) El.
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perestroika succeed."13 7
Perestroika promised to help change the way nuclear energy was
managed in the Soviet Union, for as Grigori Medvedev noted, "Chernobyl
demonstrated the insanity of the command-administrative system. '"13 8 In a
speech to party officials at Chernobyl, Gorbachev promised that the republics
would be given more autonomy to devise their own plans for energy and
economic growth. New nuclear projects, Gorbachev said, "ought to undergo
strict scientific examination for possible harm to the environment, and in
disputed cases should be subject to a referendum."13 9 The need for
international assistance in the areas of plant safety, radiation monitoring, and
health care after Chernobyl would also open Soviet society to a wealth of
outside perspectives and information -- an especially important development
for fledgling environmental groups like Zelenyi Svit. After the disaster, as
William C. Potter, an analyst of Soviet nuclear energy, observed, "Most facets
of the nuclear industry (outside the military sector) became a legitimate
subject for scrutiny...Although the political leadership was not prepared to
abandon its long-standing enthusiasm for and commitment to nuclear
power, it was no longer able to suppress expert and public criticism of the
nuclear power program or to conceal the inadequacies of the Soviet approach
to nuclear safety."140
Nor was the leadership able to contain rising nationalist sentiment in
the republics. In January, 1988, an unusual letter appeared in Literaturna
137Burns, "A Rude Dose of Reality for Gorbachev," A3.
138Dobbs, "Disaster, Nuclear and Bureaucratic," 10.
1 3 9 Bill Keller, "Gorbachev, at Chernobyl, Urges Environmental Plan," The New York Times
(Feb. 24,1989) A5.
140Potter is a professor of international policy studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies. 'The effects of Chernobyl on Soviet decision-making for nuclear
safety," 258.
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Ukraina indicting the USSR's 18-month-old Ministry of Atomic Power
Engineering for its ill-conceived plans to construct 6,000 megawatts of new
nuclear generating capacity in Ukraine. The thirteen Ukrainian scientists
who signed the letter asserted that the new plants were unnecessary and
would hurt farm production and the supply of fresh water. The Atomic
Ministry was ignoring these obvious problems, the writers charged, because it
wanted to preserve its "privileged, irrefutable authority" over Ukrainian
nuclear development. Chernobyl had undone the myth that nuclear power
plants are perfectly harmless, the letter stated, and one of the "moral-
economic consequences" of the accident was that "the entire complex of
problems involved in the development of nuclear energy in the Ukrainian
SSR" must be re-examined, with Ukrainians themselves deciding whether
and where to build new nuclear plants.141
The letter's plainly anti-Soviet tone epitomized Ukrainians' growing
mistrust of the central government. Decades of quasi-colonial domination or
"russification" had fostered a bitter discontent among the republic's
population. Ruthless exploitation of Ukraine's nonrenewable resources,
especially coal and iron ore, had left the republic's mines gutted, its workers
poor and unhealthy, its cities polluted. Falling industrial output, quickening
inflation, and ongoing shortages of food, housing, and consumer goods
testified to the failure of economic restructuring. On top of all this came
Chernobyl's radioactive fallout, which necessitated the decontamination of
two million hectares of agricultural land (an area the size of Massachusetts)
and the permanent abandonment of 150,000 once-fertile hectares.142
14 1Literaturna Ukraina, January 21, 1988; quoted in Marples, The Social Impact of the
Chernobyl Disaster, 271-74.
142Z. Medvedev, The Legacy of Chernobyl, 106.
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For millions of Ukrainians, economic and political independence from
Russia seemed the only escape from further abuses. Journalist David
Remnick, in his Pulitzer Prize-winning 1993 volume Lenin's Tomb: The Last
Days of the Soviet Empire, writes:
As I traveled around the Union, opinions varied on when and where the old regime
died...But it was in Ukraine that I found the most unifying event, the absolute
metaphor for the explosion of the last empire on earth. On a trip to the western
Ukrainian city of Lvov in 1989, I met with small groups of nationalists who
promised that 'one day' their republic of over fifty million people, the biggest
after Russia, would strike out for independence and do far more damage to the union
than the tiny Baltic states ever could...Bogdan and Mikhail Horyn, brothers who
had spent long terms in jail for their pro-independence activities before Gorbachev
took power, said that while an independent, post-Soviet Ukraine may be years off,
the old regime collapsed, practically and metaphorically, at 1:23 a.m., April 26,
1986, the moment of the nuclear accident at Chernobyl. That devastating instant
had from the start been wrapped in a mystical aura. Within weeks of the accident,
people realized that 'Chernobyl' meant 'Wormwood' and then pointed to
Revelations 8:10-11; 'A great start shot from the sky, flaming like a torch; and it
fell on a third of the rivers and springs. The name of the star was Wormwood; and a
third of the water turned to wormwood, and men in great numbers died of the waters
because it was poisoned.' The accident at Chernobyl embodied every curse of the
Soviet system, the decay and arrogance, the willful ignorance and self-
deception. 143
Indignation over Chernobyl and all it represented became a constant
undertone in the clamor for Ukrainian self-rule. After the disaster,
"Ecological consciousness became a part of our national consciousness," said a
leader of Rukh, the republic-wide reform movement of which Green World
was one part. Protests against nuclear power, the leader said, "were part of
the larger protest against the empire itself."144
Disagreement over the management of the Chernobyl cleanup was a
major ingredient in deteriorating relations between Moscow and the
republics. Regional Party officials, whose power and prerogatives were
already threatened by Gorbachev's reform programs and who therefore had
little to lose, added their voices to those of environmental groups criticizing
14 3 Remnick, Lenin's Tomb, 243.
144Feschbach and Friendly, 232-33.
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the central government's handling of the cleanup. Grigory Revenko, first
Party secretary of the Kiev region, complained to Pravda in April 1989 that
safety standards were slipping at the three reactors still operating at
Chernobyl.145 In July, Byelorussian officials released radiation measurements
proving that the central government should have evacuated an additional
100,000 people from areas contaminated by the explosion.146 Scientists from
the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences contended that soil contamination levels
and individual radiation doses rated as "safe" by the central government's
scientists were far too high. Moreover, the scientists believed that the
"sarcophagus" hurriedly built to contain the ruined reactor was leaking too
much radiation into the environment and that an entirely new structure was
required. "The possibility of further failure grows with time, and if the
republic does not exert local influence, the job will not be done right,"
asserted Ukrainian biologist Dmitri Grodzinsky.14 7
Even in Byelorussia, a docile region long lacking a sense of national
identity separate from Russia, Chernobyl stirred embers of resentment toward
Moscow. Fallout had idled five percent of the farmland in the southern
Gomel district, just across the Ukrainian border from the plant, and uprooted
hundreds of thousands of residents from 170 villages. "There's still
something bad, something poisonous out there," said one grandmother three
years after the evacuation. "The authorities have the best intentions, but they
better invent something else to replace atomic power."'148 Fifteen thousand
1 4 5 Associated Press, "Chernobyl's Safety Questioned," The New York Times (May 1, 1989) A7.
1 4 6 Francis X. Clines, "Soviet Villages Voice Fears on Chernobyl," The New York Times (July
31,1989) A3.
14 7Francis X. Clines, "A New Arena for Soviet Nationalism: Chernobyl," The New York Times
(December 30,1990) A1, A8.
14 8 Francis X. Clines, "Once Again, Chernobyl Takes a Toll," The New York Times (Sep. 30,
1989) A4.
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protestors carried the banned Byelorussian national flag through the capital
city of Minsk in September, 1989, demanding further evacuations from
contaminated areas and the resignation of the republic's Party chief.149 A
correspondent traveling through condemned villages in the republic
observed that Chernobyl had become "a special Byelorussian cry for identity, a
cause for vying with the central Government, viewed so long with fear and
suspicion."1 50
By 1991, then, politics in the sovereignty-minded republics had
undergone a remarkable transformation. Chernobyl and the faltering
economy had largely discredited the Communist Party. The accident,
according to Yurii Shcherbak, had exposed "all the secrecy, the callousness,
the self-interest. On May Day [the Party] ordered children into the streets.
People don't forgive when it affects their children. They never forgave. They
began to curse the Party."'15 In Ukraine, officials instituted a new national
currency to supplant the ruble, and free elections brought to power a fractious
yet reform-oriented parliament that included several members of the Green
Party. To win election, or a Chernobyl official reported ruefully, "a candidate
needed only two issues: throw out Article Six," which guaranteed the Party's
leading political role, "and close Chernobyl."'1 52 Far from remaining under
Russia's thumb, Ukrainians now pondered only whether- and for how long
-- Moscow should retain any influence at all. As David Marples wrote, "From
total disillusionment at the ability of the popular will to bring about any
149 Reuters, "Marchers in Minsk Demand Further Chernobyl Cleanup," The New York Times
(Oct. 1, 1989) A9.
15 0Clines, "Once Again, Chernobyl Takes a Toll," A4.
151Serge Schmemann, "Chernobyl Within the Barbed Wire: Monument to Innocence and
Anguish," The New York Times (April 23, 1991) A6.
15 2Aleksandr Zenyuk, head of the department of foreign relations at the Chernobyl atomic
station. Quoted in Schmemann, ibid.
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change in economic planning, we now have a situation in which one cannot
build a factory without republican approval, and one cannot acquire such
approval without first asking the public for its support...Events such as
Chernobyl -- paradoxically -- have been instrumental in uniting Ukrainians,
in forcing them to recognize that it is their fate and that of their country that
is being threatened.' 5 3
As 1991 ended, the storm of change initiated by Chernobyl spun to its
most furious pace yet. In October an explosion outside one of the three
remaining reactors at Chernobyl ripped a 2,500-square-meter hole in the roof
of a generator building, and the next month the Ukrainian parliament voted
to close the newly damaged unit, overriding the Soviet Atomic Ministry's
assessment of the accident as minor. The two reactors still in operation at the
Chernobyl site, the parliament decreed, should also be shut down "in the
shortest possible time and not later than 1993."154 On December 1,
meanwhile, the parliament proclaimed Ukraine's sovereignty from the
Soviet Union. The new nation joined the Commonwealth of Independent
States, which explicitly rejected the Soviet Union's claim to nationhood. On
December 11 a parliamentary commission demanded that 18 Ukrainian and
Soviet Party officials, including Mikhail Gorbachev, be prosecuted for
conspiring to conceal the true extent of the Chernobyl fallout.1 55 But the
question of the Soviet leader's responsibility for the disaster would soon
become academic. The chaos in Moscow touched off by August's failed
Kremlin putsch rapidly culminated in the suspension of the Communist
153 Marples, Ukraine Under Perestroika, 223.
154Yuri Kanin, 'Ukraine will close reactors," Nature (Nov. 17,1991) 8. A lack of electricity
from other sources would eventually undo this decision.
155Associated Press, "Ukrainians Demanding Trial for Gorbachev on Chernobyl," The New
York Times (December 12,1991) A12.
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Party, Russian President Boris Yeltsin's ascent to power, Gorbachev's
resignation, and the abolition of the Soviet Union itself.
The citizen campaign against Soviet nuclear technology had not begun
as a movement with radical political objectives; even Yurii Shcherbak, for
several years after the disaster, had continued to believe in "the future of the
Soviet system under Gorbachev.' 15 6 But in a post-Chernobyl world,
technology and politics had become inseparable. The disaster came to
symbolize not just government incompetence and environmental
mismanagement, but also Moscow's imperialistic influence over people's
lives and livelihoods in the republics. Alexander Sich (who is of Ukrainian
descent and uses the Ukrainian "Chornobyl" as opposed to the Russian
"Chernobyl") writes of his time at the plant site from 1991 to 1993 that "as far
as Ukrainians were concerned, the Chornobyl accident...forced the whole
issue of external control of the republic's resources into the public arena
Chornobyl brought to light many of the injustices and inefficiences of the
Russian-controlled Soviet system; and because of this it has been credibly
argued that as a watershed that forced then General Secretary Gorbachev to
accelerate and more fully implement his policy of glasnost, Chomrnobyl was a
major factor that led to the demise of the system and of the Soviet Union.' 1 57
Aleksandr Yakovlev, Gorbachev's right-hand man, looked back on the
tumultuous years 1985-1991 in an interview with David Remnick. Once
glasnost and perestroika had been given their initial momentum, Yakovlev
said, they acquired their own inexorable "logic of development":
Our baseline principle was that some things could be improved: more democracy,
elections, more in the newspapers -- limited, but slightly more open -- the
management should be improved, centralization should be less strict, power should
156 Marples, Ukraine Under Perestroika, 157.
1 5 7 Sich, The Chornobyl Accident Revisited, 88.
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be redistributed somewhat, maybe the functions of the Party and the government
should be divided...In 1985 we started implementing things for the first time so
that our words were matched by deeds. But as soon as these words became reality, a
logic of development began to develop, and that dictated the next steps...This logic
of development led us to the 'conclusion' that the concept of improvement will not
do us any good. One can fix up a car, add some oil, tighten some bolts, and you can
drive on. But with a social organism you cannot always do this. It is not always
enough. It turned out that everything had to be made over.158
Chernobyl occurred just as the reformers' words were becoming reality,
imparting to the "logic of development" a momentum which the reformers
themselves found they could not restrain. Gorbachev, Yakovlev, and their
circle were thus swept up in their own revolution, the pace of which the
nuclear disaster had speeded substantially. Natalya Ivanova, a Moscow
literary critic, described the swiftness of the final disintegration with an apt
simile. Gorbachev, she said, was like "the man who gave the orders to begin
the fateful experiment at Chernobyl. He wanted to refine the machine, but
the machine went out of control and exploded." 159
"The Beginning of Wisdom"
Little has occurred since the sudden liberation of the post-Soviet nations
to calm the nerves of a watchful world. Instituting democratic government
and market economies among populations still ambivalent about both, while
at the same time combatting ethnic divisions, rampant nationalism, and
lurking authoritarianism, has proved more challenging than any of the new
nations' leaders predicted before the breakup. Scarcity, hyperinflation, crime,
and the greed of a powerful "bandit bureaucracy" made up in good part of
former Communists have left many citizens disgruntled over the style and
pace of free-market reforms, and rightist demagogues stand ready to exploit
this discontent. Pessimists might aver that whereas the old Soviet Union was
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a collection of leaky life-rafts roped together by the Communist order, each of
the sovereign republics is now free to sink on its own.
The future of nuclear technology in the former Soviet Union seems no
less worrisome. In 1992 Yeltsin transferred the property of the Soviet
Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering to a new Russian ministry,
"effectively prolong[ing] the life of...the nuclear 'monster' of the former
regime, with its huge network of secret towns, plants, and waste dumps."16 0
Over the objections of Yeltsin's environmental advisors, the new ministry
soon announced that Russia would finish 30 more nuclear power plants,
including one mothballed RBMK, by the year 2010. "The nuclear industry is
protecting its own," says Lydia Popova, director of energy programs at
Moscow's Socio-Ecological Union, an umbrella organization for 150
environmentalist groups. "By blindly supporting the expansion of publicly
unpopular and unaccountable nuclear programs, the government will slow
the democratization of Russia and the development of a civil society with
civil law." 161
Despite the ongoing civil and technological turmoil in the former Soviet
Union, however, it would be foolish to wish for a return to the comforting
certainties of the Cold War era. Most of the economic, political and
environmental crises proliferating across Russia and the former republics are
not new but are the legacies of the USSR's misguided experiment with
centralized socialism. It is unlikely that the pre-Chernobyl order, had it
1 6 0Vera Rich, "Russia breathes life into 'nuclear' monster," New Scientist (Feb. 29, 1992) 13.
161Lydia Popova, "Russia's nuclear elite on rampage," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
(April, 1993) 14-15,47. The persistence of the nuclear option in Russia can also be attributed
to severe power shortages; as Marples has pointed out, "The collapse of the Soviet Union
created a paradox. It slowed progress in dealing with the effects of Chernobyl and created
energy shortages that have strengthened the nuclear power lobby today." David Marples,
"Chernobyl's Lengthening Shadow," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Sep. ,1993) 41.
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continued to exist, would have faced these problems openly or effectively.
Though the old Communist bureaucracy was in charge of everything, it took
responsibility for nothing. The citizens of the former Soviet Union -- rid of
the need to fear heterodoxy, able to form diverse political movements, and
presented with meaningful choices at the ballot box -- are, if nothing else,
finally free to confront the reality of their predicament. "If there is any bright
spot in this sketch of a nation on the edge of ecological and human disaster,"
Feshbach and Friendly wrote just before the breakup, "it is in the awareness
that Soviet citizens and leaders...show of the gravity of their crisis. That
consciousness can lead to change; it is at least the beginning of wisdom."162
Industrial technology, with its unseverable links to health, safety,
prosperity, and environmental quality, will continue to be one of the most
important arenas for democratization. The social consequences of the Soviet
government's industrial and military policies are coming to light after
decades of secrecy and denial, and environmentalists now recognize that
nuclear energy -- so important as an early focus for activism -- is only one of
myriad enterprises in need of reform. The new republics' environmental
problems are similar in nature to those in the United States, but vastly greater
in scale. The costs of remediating toxic and radioactive contamination,
curbing air and water pollution, and instituting sustainable agricultural
practices in Russia will exceed available resources for decades to come.
Fortunately, the breakdown of centralized industrial planning and
management has elevated many environmentalists to positions of power,
and public-interest groups like Socio-Ecological Union now fulfill the critical
need for outside monitoring of government activities. Change will also be
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reinforced by economic reality: no one can afford another Chernobyl.
It would be inaccurate, furthermore, to portray the threatened resurgence
of nuclear energy production in Russia as a repudiation of Chernobyl's
lessons. The majority of the nuclear construction projects shelved after
Chernobyl will never be resumed. Even the Russian nuclear ministry's most
ambitious expansion plans, should they get past the new web of
environmental controls, would leave the country far behind the production
goals set by the Soviet Union in 1986. And while fifteen RBMKs are still
operating today and a sixteenth is scheduled to be put into operation this year,
a new openness to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency
and technical assistance from Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Japan,
Sweden, and the United States has reduced the risk of future disaster.
Continuing concern over the RBMK's fundamental design flaws may
eventually generate enough international financial assistance to allow their
abandonment.163
1 6 3 Seth Shulman, "Risky Reactors," Technology Review (Aug./Sep., 1993) 18-19. Though
secondary to the disaster's effects in the former Soviet Union, the importance of Chernobyl
for Western technological politics should not be overlooked. It is simple enough to ascribe the
disaster, as I have done, to flaws in the Soviet Union's industrial philosophy. "This position
has the double virtue not only of being accurate in many respects - the reflexive secrecy and
pervasive incompetence within the Soviet nuclear enterprise made a major accident all but
inevitable - but also of implying that such a thing could never happen elsewhere," the
editors of the New Yorker wrote in 1991. They added, however, that The historical
record...suggests that the Soviet and the American experiences in attempting to master
atomic energy over the past forty years have been far more alike than not." ('Notes and
Comment," The New Yorker, May 6, 1991, 31-32.) The protestations of nuclear power's
proponents that "Chernobyl can't happen here," though correct in a narrowly technical sense,
missed the real point. (See, for example, Hans Bethe, "Chernobyl: It Can't Happen Here,"
The New York Times, May 2, 1992, A25; U.S. Committee for Energy Awareness, "Energy
Update: Why what happened at Chernobyl didn't happen at Three Mile Island,"
advertisement, The Wall Street Journal, May 12, 1986, 7.) American nuclear plants feature
their own set of design flaws, and as we learned in Chapter 3, the origins of these flaws
stretch as far back into the political history of the United States as the RBMK program does
into the Soviet Union's. As Kennedy P. Maize, senior energy analyst for the Union of
Concerned Scientists, wrote in 1986, 'The Soviet nuclear plants are inherently dangerous.
Unfortunately, so are ours. Our plants also make too many demands on operators, requiring
them to make literally life-and-death decisions in a matter of seconds. Russia-bashing won't
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Disaster has united the people of Russia, Ukraine, and the other former
Soviet republics many times. Indeed, the history of these nations can be
viewed as a series of devastating catastrophes interrupted by periods of
equally impressive cultural and economic rebound. But the region's
disasters, usually in the form of armed invasions, have almost always struck
from the outside. The Chernobyl explosion, by contrast, helped force the
Soviet people to confront the enemy within: the reality that the corrupt
Communist order had plundered the USSR's resources, repressed and
sickened its people, and despoiled the natural environment in the name of
state power and a flawed socialist ideology. Acknowledging this truth and
their own silent complicity in it required an act of immense political bravery
on the part of Soviet citizens, for in discarding the Communist system and
becoming participants in their own futures they have thrust themselves into
a difficult and dangerous new world: the world of democracy. If this political
experiment outlasts the disaster's radioactive legacy, then Valerii Legasov and
the legions of other Chernobyl victims will not have given their lives in
vain.
cure that situation." ('Technological Hubris," The Wall Street Journal, Sep. 9, 1986, 29.)
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Chapter 6
TECHNOLOGICAL CITIZENSHIP
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Ring the bells that still can ring.
Forget your perfect offering.
There is a crack in everythtng.
That's how the light gets in.
- Leonard Cohen,
"Anthem" (1992)
After journeying through accounts of two blackouts, a chemical leak, and
two meltdowns, the reader is entitled to ask whether these stories have
anything new to teach us today, years after the disasters themselves have
ended. The direct medical and social consequences of these catastrophes, of
course, will continue to be felt for decades, especially in India and the former
Soviet republics. Each failure has also led to technological changes that have
made the systems in question nominally safer. But the main reason for
examining these well-known events anew has been to explore the
proposition that the major technological disasters of recent years add up to
something more than a collection of regrettably "normal" accidents: that they
are, in fact, helping to redefine the meaning of democratic participation in
modern societies.
Rapid technological change in the twentieth century -- in particular, the
spread of large, complex technological systems -- has placed the terms
"citizenship" and "democracy" under stress. The technologies that provide
us with cheap energy and abundant food, that let us communicate with one
another instantaneously across great distances, that carry us around the globe
at great speed -- that have, in other words, allowed us to transcend many of
the limitations of our immediate environments -- have all been purchased in
the currency of local control. Large technological systems, to use Anthony
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Giddens' terminology, are "disembedding mechanisms" that "remove social
relations from the inmediacies of context."u l They force people to place their
welfare in the hands of far-away experts whom they have never met and
whose expertise must remain an article of faith. For ordinary individuals,
"participation" in these systems is often limited to the level of consumerism:
decisions about whether to use or not to use, to buy or not to buy. In theory,
existing forms of representative government provide the formal means of
"changing the rules" under which these systems operate, should this become
necessary to maintain safety or efficiency. In practice, the political power held
by large technological organizations often blocks citizens' access to the
governing process.
In this final chapter, I argue for an understanding of large-system failures
that focuses on their serendipitous power to prompt people to reclaim active
roles as citizens. Throughout this study, I have attempted to demonstrate the
truth of the widening perception that growing size and complexity add to the
instability of large technological systems. Through the enormous media
attention they generate, technological catastrophes disclose to a wide audience
a startling possibility: no one is truly "in control" of these technologies.
Despite all attempts to centralize and automate control, the seeds of
catastrophic failure lay dormant within thousands of components scattered
throughout the systems. Once underway, moreover, breakdowns often
propagate faster than any human being can counteract them. The "spectacle
of suddenly vanishing competence" that the public sees under such
conditions reveals that the claim of total competence was a pretense from the
start. If complex, tightly coupled systems are inherently unstable -- defying
1Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 1990) 27-29.
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absolute technical control -- then the only real "control" people have over
them is political, residing in decisions about whether to build these systems
in the first place, for whom, and in the service of what social needs, and, once
the systems are built, how best to guard against the inevitable breakdowns.
Operating large systems on a day-to-day basis is both a technical and a
political process, involving wide-ranging choices about the social and
technological arrangements within which people must structure their lives
and about the hazards to which they will be subjected. System failures thus
create the potential for the reorganization of control. After most of the
disasters I have described, the collapse of technological control activated
grassroots challenges to established patterns of political control. In order to
mount these challenges, people had to reassert their functions as citizens,
functions that had grown unfamiliar through disuse. They had to build their
own understandings of the workings of complex technologies, and then apply
this knowledge in organized movements for change. The cases provided
here demonstrate that the civic transformations accompanying large-system
failures are at the very center of the cultural meaning of technological
disasters.
Ulrich Beck, the German sociologist, is one of the few analysts who have
recognized these developments. In Beck's view, modern nations have
evolved into "risk societies" in which everyone, rich and poor alike, is
equally threatened by reactor accidents, chemical catastrophes, toxic wastes,
and other unwanted side-effects of industrialization. Basic social conflicts
therefore no longer revolve around property, profit, or the relative
deprivation of the middle and lower classes, but around the "systemic causes"
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of industrial hazards and how they should be combatted.2 Beck writes:
Socially recognized risks...contain a peculiar political explosive: what was until
now considered unpolitical becomes political -- the elimination of the causes [of
risk] in the industrialization process itself. Suddenly the public and politics extend
their rule into the private sphere of plant management -- into product planning and
technical equipment...In smaller or larger increments -- a smog alarm, a toxic spill,
etc. - what thus emerges in risk society is the political potential of catastrophes.
Averting and managing these can include a reorganization of power and authority.
Risk society is a catastrophic society. In it the exceptional condition threatens to
become the norm. 3
Beck's characterization of the "risk society" is marred by his neglect of the fact
that the social distribution of technological hazards is highly unequal, as the
poverty surrounding most industrial districts and recent studies of
"environmental racism" make clear.4 These inequities are precisely the issue
in many local disputes over the placement of hazardous waste incinerators,
repositories for radioactive wastes, and other less-than-desirable facilities.
But Reck is nonetheless correct that catastrophes show the formerly
"unpolitical" -- the design histories of nuclear plants, operating practices at
chemical factories, the computerization of cybernetic control systems, and so
forth -- to be, in fact, deeply political. And since all political issues are, in
theory, decidable through democratic means, disasters eliminate technical
expertise as a prerequisite for involvement in the management of
technological systems. Disasters are therefore opportunities for the exercise of
citizenship in realms where it previously had little meaning. As large
technological systems grow larger, more interconnected, and more vulnerable
to breakdown, these opportunities become more frequent: "the exceptional
condition threatens to become the norm."
2 Ulrich Beck, The Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage Publications, 1986)
39-40.
3Ibid., 24. Emphasis in original.
4See, for example, Eric Chivian, et al., eds., Critical Condition: Human Health and the
Environment (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993).
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One thing attention to technological disasters has not done, however, is
turn the public against scientific and technological innovation, as some
experts feared might happen. After an embarrassing and well-publicized
series of technological failures in the spring of 1979 -- Three Mile Island, the
Skylab satellite's premature reentry into the atmosphere, and the deaths of
275 people in a DC-10 crash in Chicago5 -- a group of scientists met at
Harvard's Kennedy School of Government to discuss their responsibility to
communicate with the public after such disasters. At the meeting Alan
McGowan, president of the Scientists' Institute for Public Information,
accused the New York Times, the Washington Post, and other media outlets
of "attempting to discredit, or saying everybody else was trying to discredit,
the scientific community." The public shared a basic faith in science and
technology, but they might lose that faith if journalists told them often
enough that they had, McGowan worried.6
Though aggressive media coverage of disasters continued, the feared
public disenchantment with science and technology never materialized.
Throughout the nineteen-eighties and into the nineties, the majority of
Americans still believed that the benefits of scientific research and
technological innovation outweighed the harms, opinion polls showed.
Although a substantial number, 75 percent, said in a 1982 survey that science
and technology "often get out of hand, threatening society instead of serving
it," scientists and engineers remain among the best-regarded professional
groups, and the American public continues to expect significant advances in
5For an innovative treatment of the Chicago DC-10 crash of May 25, 1979, see John H. Fielder
and Douglas Birsch, eds., The DC-10 Case: A Study in Applied Ethics, Technology, and Society
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992) 8-9, 207-246.
6Eliot Marshal, "Public Attitudes to Technological Progress: Scientists Fear Engineering
Accidents of 1979 May Turn Public Against Science," Science (July 20, 1979) 281-85.
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science and technology in the future.7 Moreover-- and this hardly needs
saying -- technologies like the electrical grid, nuclear power plants, chemical
factories, and the space shuttle continue to operate today, even after the
spectacular failures of the last three decades. The demands for outright
renunciation one might have expected from a public thoroughly outraged by
these disasters have not been heard.
But the civic aftershocks of large-system breakdowns may not be
measurable by such crude standards. One lesson from the incidents we have
reviewed is that citizen responses to disaster can take a number of outward
forms, depending on political conditions in the society where the disaster
occurs and on the resources and ambitions possessed by the citizens
themselves. If the results fall short of outright renunciation, it is because this
is rarely a recognized goal to begin with. What unites these movements,
rather, is citizens' desire to seize some measure of decision-making power
over dangerous and influential technological systems, so that the dangers
might be reduced and so that the systems themselves might be made more
responsive to local needs and concerns.
The evidence of the previous chapters has powerfully confirmed Charles
Perrow's argument that given a certain level of complexity and tight coupling
in a technological system, occasional catastrophic failures are inevitable. But
neither Perrow nor other analysts have fully explored the cultural meaning
of this observation and its impact on democratic politics. Throughout, my
claim has been that the most famous technological disasters of the recent past
have shared more than just common technical and organizational origins:
7Northern Illinois University Public Opinion Laboratory, "Public Attitudes Toward Science
and Technology," a recurring chapter in National Science Board, Science & Engineering
Indicators (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980, 1982, 1987, 1989, 1990 -).
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they have also struck common political chords among the public. Geography
has brought out different tones in different places, but the key,
democratization, has remained constant. Drawn together, the case studies
furnish proof that disasters have helped members of technological societies
improve their ability to govern themselves through at least three basic
mechanisms, which I will detail below: challenges to technological design;
challenges to technical authority; and expanding definitions of citizenship.
Each, in its own way, has helped to make large technological systems more
democratic.
Before I continue, however, the sense in which I have been using the
word "democratic" needs more clarification. Political theorists have fought
long and hard over the meanings of words like "democracy." I agree with
Richard Sclove, who wrote in a 1987 study entitled "The Nuts and Bolts of
Democracy: Democratic Theory and Technological Design" that democracy is
"a necessary background condition for enabling people to develop individual
autonomy, and to debate and decide together whatever else, aside from
democracy, should matter to them." At the core of any democratic social
order should be institutions that "provide members with equal and extensive
opportunities...to participate in determining the collective conditions of their
existence."8 Plainly, of all the means by which modern societies structure the
"collective conditions of existence," large technological systems are among
the most significant. Just as plainly, few of these systems incorporate ways for
ordinary people to participate in their operation -- nor could they continue to
8Richard Sclove, 'The Nuts and Bolts of Democracy: Democratic Theory and Technological
Design," delivered at the 1987 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
4. See also Richard Sclove, Technology and Freedom: A Prescriptive Theory of Technological
Design and Practice in Democratic Societies, Ph.D. Dissertation, Dept. of Political Science,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June, 1986, chapter 2; forthcoming from Guilford Press.
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function if they did so, since operating these systems requires specialized
knowledge and experience. Deciding whether these systems are "democratic,"
therefore, requires that we first distinguish between who operates them on
the one hand and who decides they should be operated, and at what social
cost. on the other.
Large technological systems are a class of what Giddens has called "expert
systems," by which he means medical care, traffic planning, architecture, and
similar examples of the "systems of technical accomplishment or professional
expertise that organize large areas of the material and social environments in
which we live today."9 Our own knowledge of these systems is usually
minimal, yet we continuously place enormous confidence and trust in them.
In return, we gain varieties of autonomy unavailable to most pre-modern
peoples: freedom from darkness, cold, hunger, and an early death; freedom
to acquire information about people and events far away; freedom from
being bound all our lives to a particular geographical location. In one sense,
then, the question of democracy is unrelated to the question of trust in expert
systems. We allocate trust (and money) to these systems because we desire
the benefits they provide. If we come to believe that the costs outweigh the
benefits, or that the experts in charge are not worthy of our trust, we
withdraw that trust. It is not correct simply to all this withdrawal
"democratic," any more than it is correct to say that our trust in airplanes,
pilots, and the systems of air traffic control involved in transcontinental jet
travel is "undemocratic."10
But there is a broader sense, I believe, in which democracy and the
allocation of trust are intimately related. According to Sclove's criteria, a
9Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 27.
10I owe this formulation to Kenneth Keniston. (Personal communication, July 12,1994.)
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society whose members were free to place their trust in existing systems or to
withdraw that trust, but who were rarely given the opportunity to specify
what kinds of systems they found intrinsically trustworthy or to work to bring
existing systems into accordance with these ideals, would be highly
undemocratic. Yet this is exactly the society in which we live. As Giddens
writes, "The reliance placed by lay actors upon expert systems is not just a
matter...of generating a sense of security about an independently given
iniverse of events. it is a matter of the calculation of benefit and risk in
circumstances where expert knowledge does not just provide that calculus but
actually creates the universe of events."11 Our freedom to choose which
systems to trust and how far to trust them, in other words, is bounded by the
systems themselves. This is what Ulrich Beck means by the "risk society": no
one can be safe from the globalized hazards posed by modern technological
systems, since no one can completely opt out of these systems. "Trust,"
Giddens concludes, "is much less of a 'leap to commitment' than a tacit
acceptance of circumstances in which other alternatives are largely
foreclosed.12
The term "democratization" may logically be applied, therefore, to any
social or technological change such that decisions about the kinds of risks and
benefits created by the construction and operation of large technological
systems are opened to broader, more direct public participation. Citizen
challenges to existing systems may begin with the withdrawal of public trust
in professional expertise (technical authority) or in the machines that embody
that expertise (technological design) or both. These withdrawals are only the
first steps, however, toward a more democratic technological order. Equally
1 1Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 84. Emphasis in original.
12Ibid., 90.
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important are efforts by ordinary people to remap the boundaries of
citizenship in a technological age. People must "authorize themselves," in a
sense, to contest and transcend institutionalized technological hazards.
Challenges to Technological Design
Most philosophers and essayists searching for ways to counteract modem
technology's corrosive effects on citizenship surrender from the start all hope
of modifying existing technologies o make them more compatible with
democratic forms of living. They prefer instead to begin with a clean slate,
banking on the success of movements for so-called "alternative" or
"appropriate" technologies. In Langdon Winner's words, these movements
"seek to devise technologies which offer genuine alternatives to the large-
scale, complex, centralized, high-energy life forms which dominate the
modem age."'3 Particularly heartening to alternative-technology advocates
are experiments like the aptly-named UTOPIA project in Sweden, intended as
an antidote to the "cybernation revolution." There, workers and managers in
the newspaper industry collaborated with computer scientists to design a
flexible, decentralized electronic page-production system that built upon
workers' existing skills rather than outmoding them.14
Great effort and creativity have gone into such projects in both the
developed and the developing worlds, but one basic fact will always stymie
the alternative-technology movement: the slate is never clean. A
democratization program that ignores this fact -- that accepts the current
technological infrastructure as unalterable and merely aims to create shadow
13 Langdon Winner, 'The Political Philosophy of Alternative Technology: Historical Roots and
Present Prospects," Technology in Society (Vol. 1, 1979) 75-86.
14Langdon Winner, "Citizen Virtues in a Technological Order, "Inquiry (35) 356-57.
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technologies which might in some ideal future gain ascendancy -- will
achieve few visible changes in the near term.
By paying greater attention to existing systems during and after
technological disasters, meanwhile, many citizens have achieved a working
understanding of the messy realities of technological power, one that
promises to serve them better than any amount of faith in the future of
alternative technologies. At the heart of this achievement is a process of
learning and experience. Disasters uncork a flow of previously hard-to-come-
by information about the ways technological systems come into being, how
they are managed and regulated, the kinds and amounts of energy they
employ and how this energy is controlled, and so forth. Through direct
experience of technological breakdowns -- or, more often, through media
reports -- people absorb this information and incorporate it into their
previous (usually sketchy) understandings of technological systems. Since
disasters are, by their very nature, alarming and undesirable events, the
revised citizen understandings they foster can only be more cautious,
skeptical, and critical than before.
This process was at work in each of the episodes we have examined.
When the lights went off in New York City and the rest of the Northeast in
November, 1965, people were moved to ponder the fallibility of the largest
technological system of all: the electrical grid. Press coverage of the blackout
emphasized the dauntingly complex geography of utility interconnections
and the futile efforts of utility managers to stem the cascading power failure,
leading customers of Consolidated Edison and other utilities to question
whether such basic comforts as electricity could be taken for granted any
longer. The 1977 New York City blackout renewed these worries and touched
off a search for ways to make the nation's energy system more resilient and
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user-controllable. Three Mile Island, meanwhile, produced the revelation
that mundane failures like a clogged air line, a stuck valve, a hidden light on
a control panel, and operator misjudgments based on shaky instrument
readings could combine to bring an American-style nuclear reactor to the
verge of catastrophe. The accident prompted TMI's neighbors and millions of
others to conclude that nuclear power is, as one woman commented, "a
technology that's really gotten away from us." 15
After the Bhopal tragedy and its sequel in West Virginia exposed
slipshod operating practices and a shocking inattention to safety among
Union Carbide managers, no one living downwind from a chemical plant
could feel altogether safe from airborne toxic releases. And as glasnost took
effect in the waning days of the Soviet Union, allowing average citizens to
obtain accurate information about the causes of the Chernobyl explosion and
about technical problems at other nuclear plants, people across Ukraine and
other republics were sufficiently alarmed and emboldened to speak out
against one of the Soviet Union's proudest technological accomplishments.
The point is that these disasters persuaded some people to stop seeing
large, pervasive technological systems as impervious to outside influence. In
each case, what was once solely the domain of technical experts -- details of
design, operation, and management -- was opened to review and criticism
from thousands. Though these were revolutions in thought and attitude
more than action, they prepared the way for later, more substantive changes
in the political and technological spheres. The changes began to bring to life
the idealistic closing words of Mumford's The Myth of the Machine: "For
those of us who have thrown off the myth of the machine, the next move is
15Quoted in the interview section of Raymond L. Goldsteen and John K. Schorr, Demanding
Democracy After Three Mile Island (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1991) 51-111.
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ours: for the gates of the technocratic prison will open automatically, despite
their rusty ancient hinges, as soon as we choose to walk out. 16
In all of this, the broadcast and print media played a crucial part. Most
people, even if they live in the area of a disaster, look to television, radio,
newspapers, and newsmagazines to explain the technical and political context
of such events. How well journalists convey that context (or conversely, how
many of them sink to the level of shrill sensationalism) can have a
fundamental impact on the quality and agenda of public debate after a
disaster. After a quarter of a million Pennsylvanians fearing radiation from
Three Mile Island fled their homes in March, 1979, many critics in
government and industry charged that the press had botched the story,
presenting an inaccurate and overly alarming picture of the actual events
inside the Unit 2 reactor. Media analysts, however, produced convincing
evidence to the contrary. Despite the seriousness of the accident, only one-
quarter to one-third of the statements made by the media during the first
week after the meltdown were alarming or negative, one study found, and
the alarming statements that were used echoed information provided by
officials. 17
16Lewis Mumnford, The Myth of the Machine: The Pentagon of Power (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, Jovanovich, 1964, 1970) 435.
17Mitchell Stephens and Nadyne Edison, "News Media Coverage of Issues During the Accident
at Three Mile Island," Journalism Quarterly 59 (Summer, 1982) 199-204, 259. The media's
coverage of Three Mile Island has been analyzed perhaps more exhaustively than that of any
other technological disaster. See also Peter M. Sandman and Mary Paden, "At Three Mile
Island," Columbia Journalism Review 18 (July/Aug. 1979) 43-58; Public's Right to Know Task
Force, Staff Report to the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island.
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980); Michael Fenichel and Peter Dan,
"Headlines from Post and Times on Three Mile Island," Journalism Quarterly 57 (1980) 338-39,
368; Friedman, Sharon M., "Blueprint for Breakdown: Three Mile Island and the Media Before
the Accident," Journal of Communication (Spring 1981) 116-128; David Rubin, "What the
President's Commission Learned About the Media" and other articlees in Annals of the New
York Academy of Sciences 365 (1981) 95-133; and Allan Mazur, "The Journalists and Technology:
Reporting About Love Canal and Three Mile Island," Minerva 22 (Spring, 1984) 45-66.
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As the editors of the journal Technology Review later insisted, the main
problem for journalists at Three Mile Island was not sensationalism but "the
babble of confusion and contradiction within the technological priesthood
itself."18 Covering this confusion -- showing Americans exactly how little
nuclear engineers and regulators knew about their own plants -- was, in fact,
the most important service the press could have rendered during the disaster.
The same can be said of the media's performance during the blackouts and
the Bhopal and Chernobyl catastrophes. Democratic societies have often
benefited from the disclosure, by unauthorized agents, of information held
secret by government or industry bodies. 19 Among these agents are
journalists, and disasters can aid them greatly in prying the secrets loose.
Challenges to Technical Authority
To a few, the failure of trained operators and managers to prevent
catastrophes like Three Mile Island and Bhopal suggested that the underlying
technologies were inherently ungovernable. To many more, it simply
exposed the fallacy of officials' repeated claims that they were prepared to
handle all emergencies. 20 Because the incompetence on display during each
of these events was generally assumed -- or shown -- to extend to the very top
levels of the organizations in charge, public confidence in the experts and
bureaucracies controlling hazardous systems became another casualty of the
disasters we have examined.
18
"Technology and the Press at Three Mile Island," Technology Review (June/July, 1979) 72.
19As demonstrated, for example, by the Pentagon Papers leak and the Washington Post's
coverage of Watergate scandal during the nineteen-seventies. I owe this thought to Victor
McElheny (Personal communication, June 8,1994).
20As ack Lemmon, playing a nuclear plant shift supervisor in The China Syndrome, asserted,
"Hell, we've got quality control that's only equaled by NASA!" -- a line given new impact by
the Challenger disaster.
380
Ever since the social and political upheavals of the nineteen-sixties,
sociologists and political scientists in the United States have been tracking a
general increase in public skepticism toward authority and established
institutions. 2 1 The unsurprising effect of Three Mile Island, Bhopal, and
Chernobyl has been to accelerate this trend. The citizen activists mobilized by
these and other environmental and health crises, says former EPA
administrator William Ruckelshaus, are "the most radicalized group I've
seen since Vietnam...They've been empowered by their own demands. They
can block things. That's a negative power, but it's real power."22
As Winner points out, the role of a large technological organization as
the keeper of a public trust -- the provider of some vital service -- is often
eclipsed by the imperative for the organization to expand, to increase
efficiency and profitability, and to "reverse-adapt" human ends to these new
goals. Disasters highlight this conflict, making it difficult for system
managers to continue to trade on their reputations as public servants. Even
before the 1965 and 1977 blackouts, for example, frequent small outages and
the highest electrical rates in the nation had made Consolidated Edison "the
company New Yorkers love to hate," but the big power failures brought down
a new shower of criticism.23 "The utility left the public in the care of a control
room whose personnel and equipment were not prepared to handle the
emergency," the New York Times editorialized after the 1977 blackout.
21See, for example, Todd La Porte and Daniel Metlay, "Technology Observed: Attitudes of a
Wary Public," Science 188 (April 11, 1975) 121-127; Todd La Porte and Daniel Metlay, They
Watch and Wonder: Public Attitudes Toward Advanced Technology (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute
of Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1975); Allan Mazur, "Public
Confidence in Science," Social Studies of Science 7 (1977) 123-25; Allan Mazur, "Opinion Poll
Measurement of American Confidence in Science," Science, Technology, & Human Values
(Summer, 1981) 16-19.
22Quoted in William Greider, Who Will Tell the People: The Betrayal of American
Democracy (New York: Touchstone, 1991) 168.
23
"Where Were You When the Lights Went On?" Fortune (Aug., 1977) 20.
381
"Inevitably, in times of crisis, the security of the city's electrical lifeline must
be left to the judgment of a few key individuals. But there is no excuse for
sending them into action ill-prepared or ill-equipped."2 4 Critics charged after
both failures that Con Ed had abused its monopoly power over the city, and it
may only have been the forbidding expense of a public buyout that kept the
utility intact.
General Public Utilities, owner of the Three Mile Island plant, came to
suffer from its own severe credibility gap -- especially after one vice-president
snapped at reporters with the now-infamous line, "I don't know why we
need to tell you each and every thing that we do." Publicly-aired
disagreements between nuclear experts over the danger of a hydrogen bubble
explosion inside the reactor added to the impression of confusion,
incompetence, and deception. And the company's unyielding insistence on
restarting the Unit reactor, with strong backing from the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, convinced many Pennsylvanians that the nuclear
establishment's goal was not to ensure safety but to prevent Three Mile Island
from becoming a beachhead for the anti-nuclear movement. It was no
wonder that, as one study found, "loss of faith in experts [was] the single most
demonstrable psychological impact" for those who experienced the TMI
disaster.2 5
Among Indian professionals, the Bhopal catastrophe sparked an angry
critique of the managerial and ethical performance of Union Carbide and
other multinational corporations doing business in India. At the grassroots
level, the disaster mobilized unprecedented resistance to new industrial
2 4
"The Control Room That Didn't Control," The New York Times (Sep. 10, 1977) 24.
25Sandra Prince-Embury and James F. Rooney, "Perceptions of Control and Faith in Experts
Among Residents in the Vicinity of Three Mile Island," Journal of Applied Social Psychology
(Vol. 17, No. 11, 1987) 953-68.
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development, as Du Pont's troubles in Goa demonstrated. In the U.S.,
however, the real public-image crisis for chemical industry representatives
developed only after the 1985 aldicarb oxime leak at Institute, which
demolished all assurances that a Bhopal-type accident "can't happen here."
Seven years later, a Union Carbide official could still complain that "in spite
of the progress Union Carbide and other companies have made [in reducing
the frequency of accidental toxic releases], opinion surveys indicate the public
isn't buying it one bit."26
But it was in the post-Chernobyl Soviet Union that the breakdown of
technology and the breakdown of authority were most intertwined. The
accident exposed the Soviet people to much more than fallout: it also showed
them how little the Communist Party cared about their welfare. Striking just
when Soviet officialdom was beginning to acknowledge the Party's early
atrocities, moreover, Chernobyl came to stand for the whole litany of human
and environmental abuses buried in the nation's past: Belomor, Dneprostroi,
Magnitogorsk, Kyshtym, collectivization, the draining of the Aral Sea, and so
on. Seen alongside their halfhearted attempts to mitigate the accident's
impact, Soviet officials' steadfast commitment to nuclear power for almost
four years after the catastrophe was particularly galling. The Party's behavior
during this time helped teach the Soviet people to tell "truth from lies' and
"the honest from the dishonest." Public anger over the government's central
role in the disaster contributed greatly to anti-nuclear victories in the 1990
elections, to republican nationalism, and, ultimately, to the undoing of the
Communist state. Cleaning up after the environmental damage will, of
course, go slowly, since Communism also left the republics bankrupt.
26Ronald Van Mynen, "View from the Top: After the World Changed," Chemtech (March,
1992) 135.
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Suspicion and mistrust toward authority, it must be admitted, are not
the ideal building blocks of democracy -- especially if they degenerate into
cynicism and alienation, leading people to opt out of all formal and informal
mechanisms of government. As Aristotle wrote, a good citizen knows both
"how to govern like a freeman, and how to obey like a freeman."27 But for
people who hope to advance self-government, learning to question
established systems of technological and political authority is an unavoidable
first step. The Pennsylvania woman who complained during the Three Mile
Island restart battle that "in the end the little guy just has no say" was
expressing a justifiable pessimism. The fact that she and millions like her
have ceased to take at face value the assurances of utility and regulatory
officials about the safety of nuclear power, however, has helped to bring
nuclear plant construction in the U.S. to a virtual standstill. It is in these
numerous small acts of resistance -- "plugging up the toilet" of industrial
abuses, as ecoactivist Lois Gibbs put it -- that change is born.
Expanding Definitions of Citizenship
The things citizens of modern democracies do -- vote, pay taxes, write to
their representatives, fight in their countries' wars, complain about "those
bastards in Washington" -- are the same things they have always done. It is
the world around these citizens that is constantly changing. Urbanization,
professionalization, mass production and mass consumerism, the revolution
in transportation and communications, advances in medicine and public
health, the growth of a "fifth estate" of scientific and technological experts, the
unlocking of the atom and the genetic code: these developments have given
27Aristotle,Politics, Benjamin Jowett, trans., in Jonathan Barnes, ed., The Complete Works of
Aristotle, vol. II (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984) 2027.
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rise to political conflicts of a kind the authors of the U.S. Constitution never
contemplated. 2 8 John Kemeny may have been correct in saying that, as a
result, "the world has become too complex" for Jeffersonian democracy.29 But
the rubber-stamp model of citizenship Kemeny proposed, with the people
and their representatives merely ratifying the recommendations of panels of
scientists and engineers, would only exacerbate the problem. What many
citizens want today i not a smaller role in government, but a bigger one.
Democracy is more than an abstract ideal to these people. It can mean
having real power to protect themselves and their communities from
external threats that are, more and more often, technological in origin. As
William Greider observes, "A vast network of indigenous environmental
organizations has 'popped up' from the grassroots during the last
decade...Typically, these people saw their homes or communities threatened
in tangible ways. They turned to the government for help and were
confronted by bureaucratic indifference or political sleight-of-hand. The
disillusionment eventually led them to ask larger questions about power and
the nature of democracy, but also to entertain more ambitious conceptions of
their own citizenship."30 Technological disasters, as moments when both
technical designs and traditional structures of control and authority are
thrown into doubt, can help shape these conceptions and give them velocity.
There are many ways in which people can become more active
participants in public life, and we have witnessed a good number of them in
28At the same time, of course, suffrage movements in the modern democracies and in countries
like South Africa, the former Soviet Union, and the former Warsaw Pact countries have
enfranchised millions of new citizens. Now is the moment to ask what kinds of new
technologies would best serve these new citizens.
2 9 John Kemeny, "Saving American Democracy: The Lessons of Three Mile Island," Technology
Review (June/July, 1980) 65-75. See Chapter 1.
3 0Greider, Who Will Tell the People, 176.
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this study. The most dramatic instance may have been the political
transformation in the Soviet Union, in part the result of public outrage over
the Chernobyl disaster. To gain their independence, the people of Ukraine,
Lithuania, Belarus, and the other republics literally had to invent themselves
as citizens, creating an ethic of involved membership in the political
community where there was none before.31 As Jane Dawson noted, "People
who had never before considered opposing state policy in any way began to
recognize the possibility of participating [in the anti-nuclear movement] and
perhaps shaping state policy."32 Once enough people had made this mental
leap from vassaiage to citizenship, the Communist Party's eventual
irrelevance and downfall wereguaranteed.
The other disasters studied here sparked subtler reevaluations of the
meaning of citizenship. Neither the 1965 blackout nor its sequel in 1977
generated large grassroots political responses, but they served as unplanned
exercises in what Winner called epistemological Luddism, temporarily
disconnecting people from their sophisticated technological support systems.
At least in November, 1965, the result was that New Yorkers were briefly able
to see themselves as members of a polis defined by people, not by the
technological shell they inhabited: "While the city of bricks and mortar was
dead, the people were more alive than ever."33 The lesson of July 13, 1977,
was very different; the breakdown of civil order showed people how much
they had come to rely upon technology to avoid and deny their social and
moral responsibilities toward one another. But in both blackouts long-
31A process, however, that is far from complete and whose success is far from guaranteed.
32Jane Dawson, Social Mobilization in Post-Leninist Societies: The Rise and Fall of the Anti-
Nuclear Power Movement in the USSR, 202.
3 3 From The New Yorker "Notes and Comment" section, 1965, quoted by Lewis Mumford inThe
Myth of the Machine: The Pentagon of Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1970)
409.
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suppressed human impulses, whether toward community or toward conflict,
expanded to fill the vacuum left by technological failure. Citizenship can be
defined as the quality of an individual's response to membership in a
community, 34 and the blackouts tested these responses in telling ways.
A more traditional indicator of the seriousness with which people view
their roles as citizens is the breadth and scale of political activism in a society.
Both the Three Mile Island and Bhopal disasters added to the ranks of social
movements organized around technological issues. Political scientists have
long been interested in the challenge posed to social movements by "free
riders," people who are content to benefit from the successes of activist groups
without contributing to their efforts,3 5 but so many people were -noved to
join anti-restart groups after Three Mile Island that the real challenge became
keeping all of them busy, especially during the drawn-out hearings and court
proceedings. Pennsylvanians who had lived through the Vietnam era
without so much as writing a letter to their local newspaper were suddenly
marching on the TMI plant's gates, traveling to Washington to lobby their
senators and representatives, mounting referenda and petition drives, and
engaging in civil disobedience.
Prodded by disaster to enlarge their responsibilities as citizens, these new
activists were much the same as their counterparts in the Soviet republics
after Chernobyl. The difference was hat politics in America were supposed to
have been democratic from the start. It was indignation over what they had
come to perceive as an abridgement of their constitutional rights, rather than
34 Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster, Inc.,
1984) 243.
35For a discussion of scholarly views on the "free rider" problem in the context of anti-nuclear
activism, see Edward J. Walsh, Democracy in the Shadows: Citizen Mobilization in the Wake
of the Accident at Three Mile Island (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988) 12-13.
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the total absence of those rights, that motivated TMI protesters. Fear and the
instinct for self-preservation, of course, were also large factors in both cases.
Indignation was also a prime element in the movement for right-to-
know laws in the U.S. following the Bhopal and Institute accidents. The gas
leaks had two related consequences: they left plant neighbors unwilling to
trust chemical corporations to monitor the safety of their own practices, and
they demonstrated that public ignorance of what went on inside the factory
gates meant continued vulnerability to disaster. Both knowledge and
responsibility needed to be redistributed, and citizens recognized that some of
the burden must fall on them. But as toxics activist John O'Connor
recounted, community members were "shocked to find out" that they did not
have the legal right to know what kinds of chemicals were used and emitted
by manufacturers, or in what volumes.3 6 The demand for previously
unavailable information about chemical-plant emissions in the form of a
national Toxics Release Inventory was the citizenry's way of saying that it
wanted to be let in on crucial decisions about safety, health, and
environmental quality, no matter how technically complex the issues.
Blunt power confrontations outside the normal channels of
representative government can, in fact, involve sophisticated citizen
knowledge and political techniques. Knowing that the effectiveness of their
movement would depend on their political skills and on their command of
the technical issues at hand, many activists at Three Mile Island became self-
trained lawyers, public speakers, and experts on nuclear power. The same
learning process took place after the creation of the Toxics Release Inventory,
which community groups have used to expose (and modify) unsafe and
3 6 Personal interview, April 8, 1994.
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polluting practices at dozens of ch. mical plants across the United States. All
activists must first be students of their chosen subjects, whether this means
self-teaching or collaborating with others in an organized citizen's group.
Thns truth greatly widens the scope of citizenship and enriches its practice.
The domain in which technological disasters have helped to redefine
citizenship most, however, is geography, or to use the terminology of cultural
criticism, "space and place."37 This category should perhaps have come before
everything else I have discussed in this section, since the question of who
should make decisions about hazardous technologies is almost always the
same as the question of where these decisions should be made. The harmful
effects of technological disasters may be local, translocal, or both, but over the
past two decades attempts to assert citizen control over large technological
systems have become relentlessly local in focus.
Giddens labels this process, naturally enough, "reembedding": "the
reappropriation or recasting of disembedded social relations so as to pin them
down (however partially or transitorily) to local conditions of time and
place." 38 After a large-system breakdown citizens may feel the need for
reembedding particularly acutely:
All disembedding mechanisms [including large technological systems] take things
out of the handl of any specific individuals or groups; and the more such
mechanisms are of global scope, the more this tends to be so. Despite the high level
of security which globalized mechanisms can provide, the other side of the coin is
that novel risks come into being: resources or services are no longer under local
control and therefore cannot be locally refocused to meet unexpected contingencies,
and there is a risk that the mechanism as a whole can falter, thus affecting
everyone who characteristically makes use of it.39
Efforts to implement local control in communities where disasters have
37See esp. David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of
Cultural Change (Cambridge, U.K.: Basil Blackwell, 1989), chapter 14: "Time and Space as
Sources of Social Power."
38Giddens, Thle Consequences of Modernity, 80.
3 9 Ibid., 126-27.
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struck, or might strike, are pleas for a return to the ancient meaning of the
word citizen: someone having rights and privileges as the inhabitant of a
town or city. "Local self-government is a key building block for strong
democracy," Richard Sclove explains. "The average citizen can exert much
more influence locally than nationally, and local political equality and
autonomy provide crucial opportunities for citizens to influence translocal
politics." 40 Staking out the community and the local region as the
preeminent spheres of popular rule is itself an act of assertive citizenship, one
which occurred again and again in the stories we have reviewed.
The question at issue in the Unit 1 restart battle at Three Mile Island was,
in essence, whether the reactor's future would be decided by the communities
adjacent to the plant or by a national regulatory bureaucracy that was
perceived as largely captive to the industry it regulated. In a town-hall
confrontation with NRC representatives, Pennsylvania State Senator George
Gekas framed the issue this way: "If someone wants to run a pig sty in our
neighborhood, we can collect signatures on a petition to prevent it. If [local
citizens] can prevent a pig sty, why shouldn't they be able to stop Three Mile
Island?" 4 1 After Chernobyl, similar questions occurred to the people of
Netishin, Shepetovka, Ostrog, and dozens of other towns hosting reactors run
by the Soviet State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy. In the
Soviet Union, however, even petition drives were outlawed. Environmental
clubs founded as chapters of umbrella organizations like Zelenyi Svit served
as legitimate "front" groups for activism, allowing local citizens to mount
their own assaults against the Soviet nuclear establishment.
4 0Richard Sclove, "Technological Politics as if Democracy Really Mattered," in Michael
Shuman and Julia Sweig, eds., Technology for the Common Good (Washington, D.C.: Institute
for Policy Studies, 1993) 64.
4 1Walsh, Democracy in the Shadows, 68.
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To be sure, one cumulative effect of local contests over technological
control has been democratization at the national level. Anti-nuclear victories
in the Soviet Union fed into the broader movement to throw off state
tyranny altogether. Opposition to nuclear plant construction in hundreds of
American communities has left the long-term fate of the U.S. nuclear
industry in grave doubt -- as it should be, given the state of national opinion
on the matter. But many of the national-level legal and economic reforms
emerging from technological disasters still hinge on action at the local level.
In order to carry out the provisions of the 1986 Community Right-to-Know
Act, for example, Congress created a network of local emergency planning
committees and charged each with the duty to gather toxic-release data and
evacuation plans from local industries and make this information available
to local citizens.
There is more to these developments than the old dictum that "all
politics is local."42 Progressive reform now lives in the grassroots. Whereas
public interest groups like Common Cause or the Sierra Club once thought it
most effective to organize on a national scale and lobby the federal
government for sweeping protections, citizens today "skip over government
altogether to confront powerful interests bluntly on their own turf," to use
Greider's words. 43 One official of the National Wildlife Federation admits
that "A reordering of priorities, a rethinking of strategy and tactics is taking
place throughout the entire [mainstream] environmental movement because
of the increased activism by the very people who are most at risk. Here in
Washington it is becoming increasingly obvious that true change will occur at
42The saying is usually attributed to the late Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives
Thomas P. O'Neill of Massachusetts.
4 3 Greider, Who Will Tell the People, 157.
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the local level."44
The assumption in the U.S. that the state and federal governments are
the only qualified agents in society to identify and reduce industrial hazards
goes back to the nineteenth century, when inspection bureaus and sunshine
laws were created to guard against steamboat boiler explosions, railroad
accidents, and the like.4 5 Monitoring and challenging government action
today, however, is a web of highly vigilant local citizens' organizations who
make their voices heard through lobbying, lawsuits, civil disobedience, and
other means. According to one political scientist's estimate, there are more
than two million citizen groups in the United States, with an active,
overlapping membership of some 15 million.46 The number of Americans
who are both attentive to and knowledgeable about technological and
political issues is probably not much greater; technologically "attentive"
citizens are thought to comprise ten percent of the population, or about 25
million people47. But this core of active citizens works and speaks on behalf
4 4Gerry Poje, chief environmental toxicologist for the NWF. Quoted in Charles Piller, The
Fail-Safe Society: Community Defiance and the End of American Technological Optimism
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991) 169.
450On the terrible steamboat explosions of the mid-nineteenth century -- "a succession of
disasters in kind and scale unprecedented in peacetime experience" -- and the movement for
federal regulation they engendered, see Louis C. Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers: An
Economic and Technological History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949) 271-
304, 520-546. See also John Burke, "Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power," Technology and
Culture (Winter, 1966) 1-23. On the grisly railroad accidents of the same period and the
innovative response of Charles Francis Adams' Massachusetts Board of Railroad
Commissioners - known as the "sunshine commission" because it forced disclosure of data on
railroad finance, management, and reform -- see Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation:
Charles Francis Adams, Louis D. Brandeis, James M. Landis, Alfred E. Kahn (Cambridge,
Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1984) Chapter 1, especially pp. 25-31.
4 6Karen Paget, "Citizen Organizing: Many Movements, No Majority," The American Prospect
(Summer, 1990).
4 7For a discussion of "scientific literacy" rates among the U.S. population, see the work of
political scientist Jon D. Miller: "Scientific Literacy: A Conceptual and Empirical Review,"
Daedalus 112 (1983, vol. 2) 29-48; "Scientific Literacy in the United States," Communicating
Science to the Public (Chichester, England: Wiley Publications, 1987) 1940; "Scientific
Literacy," a paper presented to the 1989 Annual Meeting of the AAAS, San Francisco, Calif.
(Dekalb, Ill., Public Opinion Laboratory, 1989).
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of many millions more.
I argued in Chapter 1 that the managers of large technological systems
must exercise control over translocal politics in order to hold together their
extended technological and bureaucratic enterprises. The result is that
citizens have little formal recourse against these systems' unwanted local
impacts; as David Harvey puts it, "Those who command space can always
control the politics of place."4 8 Disasters, however, have the power to push
citizens over the line from complacency, resignation, or privatism into
radical activism in the interest of local control. "Any struggle to reconstitute
power relations is a struggle to reorganize their spatial basis," Harvey writes.
The disaster movements studied here have helped bring this struggle into the
realm of technological politics.
Technological Citizenship
To have ived in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries is to have
witnessed first-hand the seemingly irrepressible influence of technological
change on social and political affairs. As Charles Francis Adams wrote in
1867, "It is useless for men to stand in the way of steam-engines" -- expressing
the belief, common even then, that industrialization's momentum had
outstripped all available means of regulating it.49 More recently, historians
and social analysts have spent much time pondering the "technological
determinism" hypothesis, the idea that a historical force arising from the
extra-human, volitional qualities of machines fundamentally patterns
48 Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, 234.
4 9Charles Francis Adams, "The Railroad System," North American Review (April, 1867) 476-
511; quoted in Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, 8. Adams went on, of course, to
prompt Massachusetts to open the modern era of industrial regulation by creating a railroad
commission whose purpose was to focus publicity on failures and worker and passenger safety
deficiencies.
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human existence.50 Given the difficulties average people face in attempting
to assert some reciprocal control over their broad technological
environments, it is easy to fall into such a belief.
Technology is not, however, some disembodied power that "drives"
history according to its own mysterious logic. It would be more accurate to
say that technology is history, helping to define in every era the shape of
people's activities, expectations, and surroundings, and, in a less significant
sense, providing the material cues (waterwheels, plows, locomotives,
Victrolas, Model T's, Saturn 5's) which we use to organize our images of the
past. Just as the steam engine, the railroad, and the telegraph were the
defining technological forms of the nineteenth century, it can be argued that
large, complex, failure-prone systems like the electrical grid, chemical
factories, and nuclear power plants are the technologies most emblematic of
our own times.
From the idea that technology is history, it follows that conceptions of
citizenship may slowly change in response to a shifting technological context.
The evidence suggests that in the contemporary context -- that is, in societies
transformed by the presence of powerful, complex, interconnected
technological systems -- a new fornm of citizenship is emerging. Every society
has its own ways of encompassing the idea of technology and rendering it a
part of social life, whether through politics, philosophy, art, literature, myth,
or actual technical practice. Carl Mitcham, an American science-studies
scholar, suggests that Western societies have articulated three major ways of
50For useful discussions of the idea of technological determinism, see Larngdon Winner,
Autonomous Technology, 73-88, and Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx, eds., Does Technology
Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1994).
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understanding technology. 5' The one still dominant today-- a belief in the
benevolence of technological progress -- is an inheritance from the
Renaissance and Enlightenment eras. I propose, however, that there is also a
newer, more citical undercurrent in modern attitudes toward technology
which I will call simply "technological citizenship."
This new stance is best defined by comparison to what has cc,e before.
The oldest of Mitcham's three ways of understanding technology is the
skepticism expressed in legends like that of Icarus and Daedalus and in the
sayings of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and other ancient philosophers. The
ancients believed that technological (i.e. practical, artisanal) activity entailed
hubris -- the dangerous emulation of the gods -- and led to both personal vice
and social disruption. With the coming of the European Renaissance in the
fourteenth century and the Enlightenment in the eighteenth, however, the
burden of proof shifted from those who favored the introduction of new
technologies to those who opposed it. Exemplified by the writings of Francis
Bacon, this new philosophy explicitly denied the need for moderation in
technological affairs and viewed technology as either morally neutral (and all
misuse of it therefore accidental) or inherently virtuous, ministering to
physical and social needs that would otherwise go unmet.52 In reaction to the
power and success of the Enlightenment view, finally, came the Romanticism
of the nineteenth century. Romantic writers acknowledged the ravages of the
Industrial Revolution -- urban blight, unemployment, class conflict,
environmental pollution-- but nonetheless rejoiced in their civilization's
technological accomplishments. Though the romantics criticized
51Carl Mitcham, "Three Ways of Being-With Technology," in Gayle Omrniston, ed., From
Artifact to Habitat: Studies in the Critical Engagement of Technology (Bethlehem, Penn.:
Lehigh University Press, 1990) 31-59.
52This belief was described in Chapter 1 using the term "meliorism."
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technology's dehumanizing social effects, their fascination with industrialism
as an aesthetic phenomenon prevented them from outlining a realistic
alternative.
Something new and different is afoot today. The annexation, deliberate
or unintended, of decisive political powers by the large, complex
technological systems emblematic of the twentieth century -- combined with
the fact that these systems' very complexity assures occasional catastrophic
breakdowns of technological and political control -- has created both motive
and opportunity for the emergence of technological citizenship, a new way of
relating to technology. This view is neithei piously skeptical, nor blindly
enthusiastic, nor frozen with ambivalence. t is, rather, fundamentally
pragmatic, concerned with the busin~?s of restoring the democratic political
structures modern societies need if they are to cope adequately with constant
technological change and with the ever-present danger of disaster.
The idea of technological citizenship, as we have seen it in action here,
incorporates elements from the three previous ways of understanding
technology while remaining distinct from all of them. "Technological
citizens" share with the ancients a constant caution toward technology, but
this is not because they place their own trust in abstract nature or providence.
Instead, they see themselves as the custodians of their own futures, capable of
selecting good or bad technologies, and therefore obliged to evaluate the
potential for social and political restructuring implicit in each new invention.
Technological citizens make no attempt to hold technology at arm's length or
to insulate themselves from technological change, as the ancients did; in this
respect their view is more like that of the Enlightenment enthusiasts,
acknowledging, even celebrating humanity's irrepressible need to build and
innovate. Technological citizens dismiss the Enlightenment belief, however,
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that every machine that can be built must be built, and they are suspicious of
the conviction that "technological progress" automatically improves the
human condition.
The technological citizens who have appeared in the foregoing chapters,
were they to articulate their attitudes toward technology, might say the
following: The gift of technological skill is accompanied by a special
responsibility for the integrity of both the physical and the human
environments. Complexity is a fact of life in modem technological societies,
and we are unwilling to give up the abilities and efficiencies it brings. But if
we are to rely on complex technological systems then we must try to
understand and monitor them ourselves. We cannot leave these tasks solely
in the hands of experts, whether they be operators, designers, corporate
managers, or government regulators. We will no longer overlook or tolerate
the negative side-effects generated by many technological systems; indeed,
there is in this view no such thing as a "side" effect. While nothing in
technology is inherently inimical to imagination, emotion, spirituality,
freedom, or community, technological activity in the service of aims selected
undemocratically can encroach on any or all of these values. Strong
democratic participation in the process of shaping the technological order is
an effective countermeasure to our current problems, and democracy is also
worth promoting in and of itself.
The idea of technological citizenship has much in common with other
current concepts on the social shaping of technology, including Neil
Postman's portrait of the "loving resistance fighter," Philip Frankenfeld's
model of a "new social contract of complexity," and Richard Sclove's
advocacy of "technological politics as if democracy really mattered," and so
may tap into a general cultural theme that is only now beginning to be
397
expressed. 53 To map the boundaries of technological citizenship, determine
whether it is a permanent addition to the political landscape, and ascertain
whether it is truly different from older ways of understanding technology,
one would need to review more stories of technological disasters and other
unanticipated products of technological endeavors and go into more detail
about the attitudes and ambitions of the participants (and the bystanders) in
local conflicts around scientific and technological issues.54
Technological citizenship is only one new variety of citizen mobilization
through grassroots political organizing, a phenomenon as old as modernity
itself. This is, in fact, one of very few mechanisms people have for adapting
to the rapidly changing circumstances of modern life. Giddens believes that
there are only four possible "adaptive reactions" to the risks posed by the
proliferation of expert systems and other disembedding mechanisms:
pragmatic acceptance (a focus on day-to-day tasks, covering an underlying
numbness or anxiety); sustained optimism (essentially, the Enlightenment
view); cynical pessimism (a humorous or world-weary response); and radical
engagement (an "attitude of practical contestation toward perceived sources of
danger.") 55 Technological citizenship is one important variety of the fourth
reaction, radical engagement, but there are many more venerable examples:
5 3 See Neil Postman, Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to Technology (New York: Vintage
Books, 1992) 181-99; Philip J. Frankenfeld, "Technological Citizenship: A Normative
Framework for Risk Studies," Science, Technology, & Human Values (Autumn, 1992) 459-84;
Richard Slove, "Technological Politics as if Democracy Really Mattered," in Shuman and
Sweig, eds., Technology for the Comnmon Good, 54-79.
54There is, of course, a vast literature on scientific and technological controversies, but little of
it focuses explicitly on issues of citizenship and democracy. Good starting places are Dorothy
Nelkin, ed., Controversy: Politics of Technical Decisions (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications,
1979); Allan Mazur, The Dynamics of Technical Controversy (Washington, D.C.:
Communications Press Inc., 1981); and H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr. and Arthur L. Caplan, eds.,
Scientific Controversies: Case Studies in the Resolution and Closure of Disputes in Science and
Technology (Cambrdige, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
5 5 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 136-37.
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abolitionism, prohibitionism, feminism, labor movements, civil rights
movements, movements for consumer and environmental protections, and
so on. Happily, the opportunities for collective organization in modern
societies are legion, and the rewards increasingly clear. "Fighting back is a
kind of self-interest," as an anti-nuclear activist in one Massachusetts town
explains. "It gives us community and identity for the first time."56
*F * *
"Perhaps we should recognize," writes William McNeill, "that the risk
of catastrophe is the underside of the human condition -- a price we pay for
being able to alter natural balances and to transform the face of the earth
through collective effort and the use of tools."57 By building systems that
exploit the extraordinary speed and power of electronic computers, cybernetic
control mechanisms, and complex interconnections, we have unwittingly
invited two new kinds of technological hazards, what Wordsworth called
"bondage lurking under the shape of good," into our lives.58 One is the
danger of catastrophic technological breakdowns. The other is the danger that
large technological systems -- or more precisely, those who design and operate
them -- will gain autocratic political control over the societies they are
supposed to serve. Serendipitously, however, one of these dangers blunts the
other; catastrophe moderates autocracy by cultivating an expanded definition
5 6 Deborah Katz, panelist, Knowing Our Place: Challenges to Citizenship in a Technological
Age, Program III: "Democracy, Technology, and the Environment: Public Participation in
Scientific Debate and Environmental Policy," a live interactive television program produced by
David Tebaldi of the Massachusetts Foundation for the Humanities and broadcast by the
Massachusetts Corporation for Educational Telecommunications on May 19, 1994.
57 William H. McNeill, "Control and Catastrophe in Human Affairs," Daedalus (Vol. 118, No.
1, Winter 1989) 1-12.
5 8 Quoted in Mitcham, 48.
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of citizenship. It is regrettable that real disaster is required to initiate and
propel this process. But since failures are the inevitable sequels of
technological innovation, we would be foolish not to use them to investigate
the crucial relationship between catastrophe, control, and citizenship.
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